adverse claim in Oklahoma

1928In the case of Probst v. Bearman, 70 Okla. 71 , 183 Pac. 886 , this court used the following language: “The cost of improvements and operations incurred by the holder cl an oil and gas lease, purchased pendente lite, and with actual knowledge of the adverse claim, and of the purpose of such party to insist upon his rights, and to obtain redress for the in-vasión of such rights, will not be deducted, when, requiring such holder to account to the successful adverse party for oil and gas produced and sold from the premises.” The above case was cited with approval in First National Bank Bldg.

1923Probst v. Bearman, 76 Okla. 71 , 183 Pac. 886 : “Where oil and gas is purchased pending a suit to cancel the lease under which same is produced, by parties having knowledge of such litigation and of the purpose of the adverse party to insist upon his rights, the statute of limitations does not begin to run against the right to compel such purchasers to account for the oil and gas until the final determination of the suit canceling the lease.” “The costs of improvements and operations incurred by the holder of an oil and' gas lease, purchased pendente lite and with actual knowledge of the adver

1960Robertson v. Battles, 97 Okl. 54 , 221 P. 1002 .” From an examination of the record we conclude that the judgment is not against the clear weight of the evidence.

1960Robertson v. Battles, 97 Okl. 54 , 221 P. 1002 .” From an examination of the record we conclude that the judgment is not against the clear weight of the evidence.

1938Co. v. Traders’ Compress Co., 46 Okla. 356 , 148 P. 1019 .

1938Co. v. Traders’ Compress Co., 46 Okla. 356 , 148 P. 1019 .

1964In 44 Am. *475 Jur., Sec. 63 at page 47 appears this language : “ * * * The prevailing rule is that the right of a plaintiff to have his title to land quieted, as against one who is asserting some adverse claim or lien thereon, is not barred while the plaintiff or his grantors remain in actual possession of the land, claiming to be owners thereof, the reason for this rule being that while the owner in fee continues liable to an action, proceeding, or suit upon the adverse claim, he has a continuing right to the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of such claim and it

1964In 44 Am. *475 Jur., Sec. 63 at page 47 appears this language : “ * * * The prevailing rule is that the right of a plaintiff to have his title to land quieted, as against one who is asserting some adverse claim or lien thereon, is not barred while the plaintiff or his grantors remain in actual possession of the land, claiming to be owners thereof, the reason for this rule being that while the owner in fee continues liable to an action, proceeding, or suit upon the adverse claim, he has a continuing right to the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of such claim and it

1964In 44 Am. *475 Jur., Sec. 63 at page 47 appears this language : “ * * * The prevailing rule is that the right of a plaintiff to have his title to land quieted, as against one who is asserting some adverse claim or lien thereon, is not barred while the plaintiff or his grantors remain in actual possession of the land, claiming to be owners thereof, the reason for this rule being that while the owner in fee continues liable to an action, proceeding, or suit upon the adverse claim, he has a continuing right to the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of such claim and it

1964In 44 Am. *475 Jur., Sec. 63 at page 47 appears this language : “ * * * The prevailing rule is that the right of a plaintiff to have his title to land quieted, as against one who is asserting some adverse claim or lien thereon, is not barred while the plaintiff or his grantors remain in actual possession of the land, claiming to be owners thereof, the reason for this rule being that while the owner in fee continues liable to an action, proceeding, or suit upon the adverse claim, he has a continuing right to the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of such claim and it

1929In Clark v. Duncanson, 79 Okla. 180 , 192 Pac. 806 , the defense pleaded in the answer and cross-petition was held to be a counterclaim under the above statute because it was connected with the subject of action, but in that case plaintiff’s right was based upon title under a tax deed,, and the adverse claim of the defendants and the counterclaim was based on the contention that the tax deed was void, and hence the defense was connected with the subject of action.

1929In Clark v. Duncanson, 79 Okla. 180 , 192 Pac. 806 , the defense pleaded in the answer and cross-petition was held to be a counterclaim under the above statute because it was connected with the subject of action, but in that case plaintiff’s right was based upon title under a tax deed,, and the adverse claim of the defendants and the counterclaim was based on the contention that the tax deed was void, and hence the defense was connected with the subject of action.

2024"The reason for this rule [is] that while the owner in fee continues liable to an action, proceeding, or suit upon the adverse claim [made by someone not in actual possession (e.g., a lienholder)], he has a continuing right to the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of such claim and its effect on his title, or to assert any superior equity in his favor." Id. ¶ 16, 389 P.2d at 475 (quoting 44 Am.

2024"The reason for this rule [is] that while the owner in fee continues liable to an action, proceeding, or suit upon the adverse claim [made by someone not in actual possession (e.g., a lienholder)], he has a continuing right to the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of such claim and its effect on his title, or to assert any superior equity in his favor." Id. ¶ 16, 389 P.2d at 475 (quoting 44 Am.

2024The fact that Arnold played no part in executing or recording the subsequent leases "set[] th[e] case apart from the situation discussed in our . . . decisions in Scott v. Peters , 2016 OK 108, 388 P.3d 699, and Calvert v. Swinford , 2016 OK 100, 382 P.3d 1028.

2024The fact that Arnold played no part in executing or recording the subsequent leases "set[] th[e] case apart from the situation discussed in our . . . decisions in Scott v. Peters , 2016 OK 108, 388 P.3d 699, and Calvert v. Swinford , 2016 OK 100, 382 P.3d 1028.

2024The fact that Arnold played no part in executing or recording the subsequent leases "set[] th[e] case apart from the situation discussed in our . . . decisions in Scott v. Peters , 2016 OK 108, 388 P.3d 699, and Calvert v. Swinford , 2016 OK 100, 382 P.3d 1028.

2024The fact that Arnold played no part in executing or recording the subsequent leases "set[] th[e] case apart from the situation discussed in our . . . decisions in Scott v. Peters , 2016 OK 108, 388 P.3d 699, and Calvert v. Swinford , 2016 OK 100, 382 P.3d 1028.

2010Maloy at 1 9, 341 P.2d at 915 .

2007In Cox v. Kaiser-Francis Oil Co., 2007 OK CIV APP 10 , 152 P.3d 274 , this court noted that where the grantor continued to receive her royalty checks, she would not have known of an adverse claim to her ownership.

2007In Cox v. Kaiser-Francis Oil Co., 2007 OK CIV APP 10 , 152 P.3d 274 , this court noted that where the grantor continued to receive her royalty checks, she would not have known of an adverse claim to her ownership.

1998Bevan v. Shelton, 469 P.2d 245 (Okla.1970).

1965Thus, if the owner of severed minerals may be deprived of his mineral estate without notice of the application for certificate deed, and without notice of an adverse claim to the minerals (occupancy of the surface not being notice of an adverse claim to the minerals, Strickland v. Reeburgh, supra), it would suggest that due process, for lack of notice, has been denied.

1965Thus, if the owner of severed minerals may be deprived of his mineral estate without notice of the application for certificate deed, and without notice of an adverse claim to the minerals (occupancy of the surface not being notice of an adverse claim to the minerals, Strickland v. Reeburgh, supra), it would suggest that due process, for lack of notice, has been denied.

1965Lind v. Stubblefield, supra. From the foregoing considerations the judgment of the trial court must be, and accordingly is, reversed, and the cause is remanded to the trial court with instructions to enter judgment for the plaintiff quieting her title to all of the land involved in the action except the severed mineral interests of the defendants; and to enter judgment for the defendants quieting their titles to the severed mineral interests.

1964“Appellant likewise moved for an instructed verdict, contending that the undisputed proof showed that he and those holding under him had maintained under a claim of right continuous and uninterrupted possession of the tract for more than 13 years, using and cultivating the same, all of which was enclosed by a fence capable of turning stock. * * * ” * * * * * * “ * * * (I)t was held in Davis v. Morley, Tex.Civ.App., 169 S.W.2d 561, 567 , that * * *. “ ‘The law is well settled that the continued possession of land after a judgment of a court of competent jurisdiction has been rendered in which t

1964In 44 Am. *475 Jur., Sec. 63 at page 47 appears this language : “ * * * The prevailing rule is that the right of a plaintiff to have his title to land quieted, as against one who is asserting some adverse claim or lien thereon, is not barred while the plaintiff or his grantors remain in actual possession of the land, claiming to be owners thereof, the reason for this rule being that while the owner in fee continues liable to an action, proceeding, or suit upon the adverse claim, he has a continuing right to the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of such claim and it

1964In 44 Am. *475 Jur., Sec. 63 at page 47 appears this language : “ * * * The prevailing rule is that the right of a plaintiff to have his title to land quieted, as against one who is asserting some adverse claim or lien thereon, is not barred while the plaintiff or his grantors remain in actual possession of the land, claiming to be owners thereof, the reason for this rule being that while the owner in fee continues liable to an action, proceeding, or suit upon the adverse claim, he has a continuing right to the aid of a court of equity to ascertain and determine the nature of such claim and it

1963Plaintiff does not controvert the fourth proposition except to assert in her brief that defendants’ rights are barred by an adverse claim for fifteen years beginning with the issuance of the county commissioner’s deed in 1940. 12 O.S.1961 § 93(4), provides: “An action for the recovery of real property not hereinbefore provided for, within fifteen (15) years.” 60 O.S.1961 § 333, provides: “Occupancy for the period prescribed by civil procedure, or any law of this State as sufficient to bar an action for the recovery of the property, confers a title thereto, denominated a title by prescription,

1963Plaintiff does not controvert the fourth proposition except to assert in her brief that defendants’ rights are barred by an adverse claim for fifteen years beginning with the issuance of the county commissioner’s deed in 1940. 12 O.S.1961 § 93(4), provides: “An action for the recovery of real property not hereinbefore provided for, within fifteen (15) years.” 60 O.S.1961 § 333, provides: “Occupancy for the period prescribed by civil procedure, or any law of this State as sufficient to bar an action for the recovery of the property, confers a title thereto, denominated a title by prescription,

1963In the first paragraph of the syllabus in Bonebrake v. Flourney, 133 Okl. 101 , 271 P. 658 , we held that the title of a person in the actual and peaceable possession of land, claiming the same under a tax deed, void upon its face, will ripen into a good title where continuous, exclusive, adverse, and hostile possession is held thereunder for a period of fifteen years.

1963In the first paragraph of the syllabus in Bonebrake v. Flourney, 133 Okl. 101 , 271 P. 658 , we held that the title of a person in the actual and peaceable possession of land, claiming the same under a tax deed, void upon its face, will ripen into a good title where continuous, exclusive, adverse, and hostile possession is held thereunder for a period of fifteen years.

1962In discussing a bank’s duty to a third person who makes an adverse claim to a deposit in the bank in the case of Sanders v. First National Bank & Trust Company of Tulsa, (Okl.) 292 P.2d 160 , we said: “ * * * our iegisiature recognizing the precarious position in which banks were placed, when an adverse claim was made by a third party to funds such as involved in the instant case, saw fit in 1937 to pass a statute to protect banks in such cases, Title 6 Okl.Stats.Ann. § 118v.

1957We pointed out in Gassin v. McJunkin, 173 Okl. 210 , 48 P.2d 320, 326 , that: “ * * * Possession of a life tenant will be referred to his right thereunto, unless his conduct demonstrates a clear purpose to infringe the remain-derman’s right * * * It is not to be presumed that his possession is adverse to the owner of the subsequent estate.

1957We pointed out in Gassin v. McJunkin, 173 Okl. 210 , 48 P.2d 320, 326 , that: “ * * * Possession of a life tenant will be referred to his right thereunto, unless his conduct demonstrates a clear purpose to infringe the remain-derman’s right * * * It is not to be presumed that his possession is adverse to the owner of the subsequent estate.

1953Harrison v. Crume, 110 Okla. 87 , 236 P. 388 , and First National Bank & Trust Co. v. Bohanon’s Heirs, 199 Okla. 665 , 189 P. 2d 612 .

1953Harrison v. Crume, 110 Okla. 87 , 236 P. 388 , and First National Bank & Trust Co. v. Bohanon’s Heirs, 199 Okla. 665 , 189 P. 2d 612 .

1953Harrison v. Crume, 110 Okla. 87 , 236 P. 388 , and First National Bank & Trust Co. v. Bohanon’s Heirs, 199 Okla. 665 , 189 P. 2d 612 .

1953Harrison v. Crume, 110 Okla. 87 , 236 P. 388 , and First National Bank & Trust Co. v. Bohanon’s Heirs, 199 Okla. 665 , 189 P. 2d 612 .

1950In Burckhalter v. Vann, 59 Okla. 114 , 157 P. 1148 , this court said: “In an action to cancel a void conveyance of land, the plaintiff is not barred by any lapse of time short of that sufficient to establish title by prescription, as fixed by subdivision 4, sec. 4655, Rev.

1950In Burckhalter v. Vann, 59 Okla. 114 , 157 P. 1148 , this court said: “In an action to cancel a void conveyance of land, the plaintiff is not barred by any lapse of time short of that sufficient to establish title by prescription, as fixed by subdivision 4, sec. 4655, Rev.

1938State v. Lorenz (Wash.) 60 P. 645 ; Bartlett v. *457 Judd, 21 N. Y. 200 ; Varick v. Edwards, 11 Paige (N. Y.) 290; Bank v. Judy, 141 Ind. 322 , and Harris v. Ivey, 114 Ala. 363 , are cited as supporting the holding in State v. Lorenz, supra. Barrows v. Alford. 129 Okla. 265 , 264 P. 628 , follows in principle the rule stated in State v. Lorenz, supra. Therein it is said; “We hold the statute assumed applicable was tolled under the facts in the' case at bar for rights concerned were conceded to plaintiff Alford and he enjoyed all the benefits accruing under those rights by the express act of th