adverse claim in Indiana

1995So, in a number of cases where an adverse presumption is to be overcome, or on the grounds of public policy and in view of peculiar facilities for perpetrating injustice by fraud or perjury, the degree of proof required is expressed in such terms as `clear,' `clear and conclusive,' `clear precise and indubitable,' `convincing,' `clear and convincing,' `satisfactory,' `entirely satisfactory,' `strong,' `clear, strong and convincing,' `clear, distinct and convincing,' `clear, positive and credible,' and `unequivocal,' and the phrase `preponderance of evidence' has been expressly disapproved as a

1994Reformation, when granted in equity, overcomes the presumption that the written instrument expresses the parties' intentions; it overcomes the Statute of Frauds, Colbo v. Buyer (1956), 235 Ind. 518, 528 , 134 N.E.2d 45, 50 ; and it has the potential to affect others beyond any immediate dispute via the recording system.

1994Reformation, when granted in equity, overcomes the presumption that the written instrument expresses the parties' intentions; it overcomes the Statute of Frauds, Colbo v. Buyer (1956), 235 Ind. 518, 528 , 134 N.E.2d 45, 50 ; and it has the potential to affect others beyond any immediate dispute via the recording system.

1990White v. Foster (1881), 77 Ind. 65 .

1987E.g., Staley v. Brown (1962), 244 Miss. 825 , 146 So.2d 739 ; Ginsberg v. Manufacturers Hanover's Trust Co. (1968), 55 Misc.2d 1052 , 287 N.Y.S.2d 818 ; Sanders v. First National Bank & Trust Co. of Tulsa (1955), Okla., 292 P.2d 160 ; Phil Grossmayer Co. v. Campbell (1958), 214 Ore. 265 , 328 P.2d 320 ; Annot., 62 A.L.R.2d 1116 (1958).

1987E.g., Staley v. Brown (1962), 244 Miss. 825 , 146 So.2d 739 ; Ginsberg v. Manufacturers Hanover's Trust Co. (1968), 55 Misc.2d 1052 , 287 N.Y.S.2d 818 ; Sanders v. First National Bank & Trust Co. of Tulsa (1955), Okla., 292 P.2d 160 ; Phil Grossmayer Co. v. Campbell (1958), 214 Ore. 265 , 328 P.2d 320 ; Annot., 62 A.L.R.2d 1116 (1958).

1987E.g., Staley v. Brown (1962), 244 Miss. 825 , 146 So.2d 739 ; Ginsberg v. Manufacturers Hanover's Trust Co. (1968), 55 Misc.2d 1052 , 287 N.Y.S.2d 818 ; Sanders v. First National Bank & Trust Co. of Tulsa (1955), Okla., 292 P.2d 160 ; Phil Grossmayer Co. v. Campbell (1958), 214 Ore. 265 , 328 P.2d 320 ; Annot., 62 A.L.R.2d 1116 (1958).

1987In Landrum v. Security National Bank of Roswell (1985), 104 N.M. 55 , 716 P.2d 246 , the New Mexico Court of Appeals held, among other things, that adverse claimants had failed to comply with the pertinent statute when - they - served "Forged Endorsement Affidavits" upon the bank rather than the statutorily prescribed notice.

1987In Landrum v. Security National Bank of Roswell (1985), 104 N.M. 55 , 716 P.2d 246 , the New Mexico Court of Appeals held, among other things, that adverse claimants had failed to comply with the pertinent statute when - they - served "Forged Endorsement Affidavits" upon the bank rather than the statutorily prescribed notice.

1987E.g., Staley v. Brown (1962), 244 Miss. 825 , 146 So.2d 739 ; Ginsberg v. Manufacturers Hanover's Trust Co. (1968), 55 Misc.2d 1052 , 287 N.Y.S.2d 818 ; Sanders v. First National Bank & Trust Co. of Tulsa (1955), Okla., 292 P.2d 160 ; Phil Grossmayer Co. v. Campbell (1958), 214 Ore. 265 , 328 P.2d 320 ; Annot., 62 A.L.R.2d 1116 (1958).

1987E.g., Staley v. Brown (1962), 244 Miss. 825 , 146 So.2d 739 ; Ginsberg v. Manufacturers Hanover's Trust Co. (1968), 55 Misc.2d 1052 , 287 N.Y.S.2d 818 ; Sanders v. First National Bank & Trust Co. of Tulsa (1955), Okla., 292 P.2d 160 ; Phil Grossmayer Co. v. Campbell (1958), 214 Ore. 265 , 328 P.2d 320 ; Annot., 62 A.L.R.2d 1116 (1958).

1987E.g., Staley v. Brown (1962), 244 Miss. 825 , 146 So.2d 739 ; Ginsberg v. Manufacturers Hanover's Trust Co. (1968), 55 Misc.2d 1052 , 287 N.Y.S.2d 818 ; Sanders v. First National Bank & Trust Co. of Tulsa (1955), Okla., 292 P.2d 160 ; Phil Grossmayer Co. v. Campbell (1958), 214 Ore. 265 , 328 P.2d 320 ; Annot., 62 A.L.R.2d 1116 (1958).

1987E.g., Staley v. Brown (1962), 244 Miss. 825 , 146 So.2d 739 ; Ginsberg v. Manufacturers Hanover's Trust Co. (1968), 55 Misc.2d 1052 , 287 N.Y.S.2d 818 ; Sanders v. First National Bank & Trust Co. of Tulsa (1955), Okla., 292 P.2d 160 ; Phil Grossmayer Co. v. Campbell (1958), 214 Ore. 265 , 328 P.2d 320 ; Annot., 62 A.L.R.2d 1116 (1958).

1985The title insurance company necessarily listed the procurement of the quitclaim deed from Circle City as a prerequisite to insurability in order to avoid liability to Altman, the insured, for a defect in his title pursuant to an adverse claim which might have arisen after he had given value. 4 For example, in Lawyers Title Insurance Co. v. Capp (1977) ist Dist., 174 Ind.App. 633 , 369 N.E.2d 672 , it was held that where a title insurer had actual knowledge of the overlap of a tract to be sold onto a tract previously sold and had originally excepted that overlap from insurance coverage, and whe

1985The title insurance company necessarily listed the procurement of the quitclaim deed from Circle City as a prerequisite to insurability in order to avoid liability to Altman, the insured, for a defect in his title pursuant to an adverse claim which might have arisen after he had given value. 4 For example, in Lawyers Title Insurance Co. v. Capp (1977) ist Dist., 174 Ind.App. 633 , 369 N.E.2d 672 , it was held that where a title insurer had actual knowledge of the overlap of a tract to be sold onto a tract previously sold and had originally excepted that overlap from insurance coverage, and whe

1959Weede v. Bechtel (1952), 244 Iowa 785, 814 , 56 N. W. 2d 173, 179 .

1959Weede v. Bechtel (1952), 244 Iowa 785, 814 , 56 N. W. 2d 173, 179 .

1935It is in effect that simple negligence, that is to say carelessness, failure, or neglect on the part of a banker or broker, or any officer, agent, or employee of a banking company, to discover what a reasonably prudent person might have discovered in the *240 exercise of ordinary care, is sufficient, and that knowledge of insolvency or a fraudulent intent need not be proven; that a presumption of fraudulent intent arises from negligence and that “while it is true that the defendant upon the trial would be entitled to rebut or overthrow this adverse presumption, still he would not be permitted

1935It is in effect that simple negligence, that is to say carelessness, failure, or neglect on the part of a banker or broker, or any officer, agent, or employee of a banking company, to discover what a reasonably prudent person might have discovered in the *240 exercise of ordinary care, is sufficient, and that knowledge of insolvency or a fraudulent intent need not be proven; that a presumption of fraudulent intent arises from negligence and that “while it is true that the defendant upon the trial would be entitled to rebut or overthrow this adverse presumption, still he would not be permitted

1929In May v. Dobbins (1906), 166 Ind. 331 , 77 N. E. 353 , the court stated the law to be: “The acquisition of title by adverse possession is predicated upon the statute of limitations, and the running of the statute may be instituted without even color of title, and without reference to the good or bad faith of the adverse claim asserted by the occupant.

1929In May v. Dobbins (1906), 166 Ind. 331 , 77 N. E. 353 , the court stated the law to be: “The acquisition of title by adverse possession is predicated upon the statute of limitations, and the running of the statute may be instituted without even color of title, and without reference to the good or bad faith of the adverse claim asserted by the occupant.

1909Leach v. Rains (1897), 149 Ind. 152 . 3.

1909Speir v. Town of New Utrecht (1890), 121 N. Y. 420 , 24 N. E. 692 . 6.

1909Speir v. Town of New Utrecht (1890), 121 N. Y. 420 , 24 N. E. 692 . 6.

1904Bishop v. Moorman (1884), 98 Ind. 1 , 49 Am.

1897“Where the purpose of the action is merely to enforce or cancel a lien, incumbrance, or contract, the statute,” as to new trials as a matter of right, “does not apply.” Liggett v. Hink ley, 120 Ind. 387 ; Williams v. Thames, etc., Trust Co., 105 Ind. 420; Voss v. Eller, 109 Ind. 260 .

1897“Where the purpose of the action is merely to enforce or cancel a lien, incumbrance, or contract, the statute,” as to new trials as a matter of right, “does not apply.” Liggett v. Hink ley, 120 Ind. 387 ; Williams v. Thames, etc., Trust Co., 105 Ind. 420; Voss v. Eller, 109 Ind. 260 .

1897“Where the purpose of the action is merely to enforce or cancel a lien, incumbrance, or contract, the statute,” as to new trials as a matter of right, “does not apply.” Liggett v. Hink ley, 120 Ind. 387 ; Williams v. Thames, etc., Trust Co., 105 Ind. 420; Voss v. Eller, 109 Ind. 260 .

1893People, ex rel., v. Fairchild, Attorney-General, 67 N. Y. 334 ; People v. Attorney-General, 22 Barb. 114 .

1893People, ex rel., v. Fairchild, Attorney-General, 67 N. Y. 334 ; People v. Attorney-General, 22 Barb. 114 .

1881In Marot v. The Germania, etc., Association, etc., 54 Ind. 37 , in delivering the opinion of the court, Biddle, J., said: “ The cloud that overhangs,’or the cause which disturbs, a title to lands, must necessarily be much better known to him who claims under it adversely, than to those who claim by a different title, and in such actions, it is peculiarly a matter of defence ; it is, therefore, unnecessary for the plaintiff to particularly state such cloud or disturbing cause, if it is shown to be adverse to his claim.” Dumont v. Dufore, 27 Ind. 263 ; Gillett v. Carshaw, 50 Ind. 381 .

1881In Marot v. The Germania, etc., Association, etc., 54 Ind. 37 , in delivering the opinion of the court, Biddle, J., said: “ The cloud that overhangs,’or the cause which disturbs, a title to lands, must necessarily be much better known to him who claims under it adversely, than to those who claim by a different title, and in such actions, it is peculiarly a matter of defence ; it is, therefore, unnecessary for the plaintiff to particularly state such cloud or disturbing cause, if it is shown to be adverse to his claim.” Dumont v. Dufore, 27 Ind. 263 ; Gillett v. Carshaw, 50 Ind. 381 .