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34 Pennsylvania opinions name it 12 courts 1835–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Pennsylvania courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Commonwealth v. Trignanigreen1 sentence2015Appellant concedes that neither the Commonwealth nor the police had the surveillance video in their actual possession at any time. _______________________ (Footnote Continued) accompanied Smalley throughout the incident and that her driver’s license was used to attempt to obtain money for the unpaid-for merchandise. - 10 - J-S42018-15 Appellant’s Brief at 17; see also Trignani, supra. Moreover, until the time Home Depot converted to a new surveillance system, the video of the incident was equally available to Appellant. | 1 | 1 |
Adonizio Bros. v. Commonwealthgreen2 sentences2004Therefore, we conclude that the adverse rule is inapplicable to his case. 6 Accord Adonizio Brothers, Inc. v. Department of Transportation *74 Board of Review, 108 Pa.Cmwlth. 25 , 529 A.2d 59, 61 (1987), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 518 Pa. 627 , 541 A.2d 1138 (1988) (no adverse inference could be drawn from the Department of Transportation’s failure to call two of its employees as witnesses because they could have been called by the other party, a public contractor whose bidding privileges had been suspended). 2004Therefore, we conclude that the adverse rule is inapplicable to his case. 6 Accord Adonizio Brothers, Inc. v. Department of Transportation *74 Board of Review, 108 Pa.Cmwlth. 25 , 529 A.2d 59, 61 (1987), petition for allowance of appeal denied, 518 Pa. 627 , 541 A.2d 1138 (1988) (no adverse inference could be drawn from the Department of Transportation’s failure to call two of its employees as witnesses because they could have been called by the other party, a public contractor whose bidding privileges had been suspended). | 1 | 1 |
Baylor v. Soskagreen2 sentences2002See generally Baylor, 540 Pa. at 438 , 658 A.2d at 744 (delineating the elements of adverse possession as actual, continuous, exclusive, visible, notorious, distinct, and hostile possession of the land for twenty-one years). 2002See generally Baylor, 540 Pa. at 438 , 658 A.2d at 744 (delineating the elements of adverse possession as actual, continuous, exclusive, visible, notorious, distinct, and hostile possession of the land for twenty-one years). | 1 | 1 |
Penn v. Iveygreen1 sentence2002See, e.g., Reiter, 173 Pa. at 84 , 33 A. at 1012 ("The maintenance of a line fence between owners of adjoining lands by their acts, up to which each claims and occupies, is a concession by each of the open, adverse possession by the other of that which is on his side of such division fence, which after twenty-one years will give title, though subsequent surveys may show that the fence was not exactly upon the surveyed line.”); Brown, 9 Watts, at 567 ("A possession claim[ed] as [one’s] own is in law and reason adverse to all the world — and as much so as if he has never heard of an adverse clai | 1 | 1 |
Adams v. Tamaqua Underwear Co.green2 sentences2002See, e.g., Reiter, 173 Pa. at 84 , 33 A. at 1012 ("The maintenance of a line fence between owners of adjoining lands by their acts, up to which each claims and occupies, is a concession by each of the open, adverse possession by the other of that which is on his side of such division fence, which after twenty-one years will give title, though subsequent surveys may show that the fence was not exactly upon the surveyed line.”); Brown, 9 Watts, at 567 ("A possession claim[ed] as [one’s] own is in law and reason adverse to all the world — and as much so as if he has never heard of an adverse clai 2002See, e.g., Reiter, 173 Pa. at 84 , 33 A. at 1012 ("The maintenance of a line fence between owners of adjoining lands by their acts, up to which each claims and occupies, is a concession by each of the open, adverse possession by the other of that which is on his side of such division fence, which after twenty-one years will give title, though subsequent surveys may show that the fence was not exactly upon the surveyed line.”); Brown, 9 Watts, at 567 ("A possession claim[ed] as [one’s] own is in law and reason adverse to all the world — and as much so as if he has never heard of an adverse clai | 1 | 1 |
Reiter v. McJunkingreen2 sentences2002See, e.g., Reiter, 173 Pa. at 84 , 33 A. at 1012 ("The maintenance of a line fence between owners of adjoining lands by their acts, up to which each claims and occupies, is a concession by each of the open, adverse possession by the other of that which is on his side of such division fence, which after twenty-one years will give title, though subsequent surveys may show that the fence was not exactly upon the surveyed line.”); Brown, 9 Watts, at 567 ("A possession claim[ed] as [one’s] own is in law and reason adverse to all the world — and as much so as if he has never heard of an adverse clai 2002See, e.g., Reiter, 173 Pa. at 84 , 33 A. at 1012 ("The maintenance of a line fence between owners of adjoining lands by their acts, up to which each claims and occupies, is a concession by each of the open, adverse possession by the other of that which is on his side of such division fence, which after twenty-one years will give title, though subsequent surveys may show that the fence was not exactly upon the surveyed line.”); Brown, 9 Watts, at 567 ("A possession claim[ed] as [one’s] own is in law and reason adverse to all the world — and as much so as if he has never heard of an adverse clai | 1 | 1 |
Culver v. Hazlettgreen1 sentence2002See, e.g., Reiter, 173 Pa. at 84 , 33 A. at 1012 ("The maintenance of a line fence between owners of adjoining lands by their acts, up to which each claims and occupies, is a concession by each of the open, adverse possession by the other of that which is on his side of such division fence, which after twenty-one years will give title, though subsequent surveys may show that the fence was not exactly upon the surveyed line.”); Brown, 9 Watts, at 567 ("A possession claim[ed] as [one’s] own is in law and reason adverse to all the world — and as much so as if he has never heard of an adverse clai | 1 | 1 |
Brown v. M'Kinneygreen1 sentence2002See, e.g., Reiter, 173 Pa. at 84 , 33 A. at 1012 ("The maintenance of a line fence between owners of adjoining lands by their acts, up to which each claims and occupies, is a concession by each of the open, adverse possession by the other of that which is on his side of such division fence, which after twenty-one years will give title, though subsequent surveys may show that the fence was not exactly upon the surveyed line.”); Brown, 9 Watts, at 567 ("A possession claim[ed] as [one’s] own is in law and reason adverse to all the world — and as much so as if he has never heard of an adverse clai | 1 | 1 |
Cunningham v. INS. CO. OF NORTH AMER.green2 sentences1996Cunningham, 515 Pa. at 494, 530 A.2d at 411, (emphasis in original). 1996Cunningham, 515 Pa. at 494, 530 A.2d at 411, (emphasis in original). | 1 | 1 |
Sutton v. Millergreen2 sentences1993Accord Sutton v. Miller, 405 Pa.Super. 213 , 592 A.2d 83, 90-91 (1991). 1993Accord Sutton v. Miller, 405 Pa.Super. 213 , 592 A.2d 83, 90-91 (1991). | 1 | 1 |
Tioga Coal Co. v. Supermarkets General Corp.green2 sentences1993See also Concurring Opinion by Justice Larsen, who added that “where possession is sufficiently open and notorious to put the true owner on notice of an adverse claim, that possession is hostile.” Id. at 76 , 546 A.2d at 5 (Emphasis added). 1993See also Concurring Opinion by Justice Larsen, who added that “where possession is sufficiently open and notorious to put the true owner on notice of an adverse claim, that possession is hostile.” Id. at 76 , 546 A.2d at 5 (Emphasis added). | 1 | 1 |
Waltimyer v. Smithgreen2 sentences1991See Waltimyer v. Smith, 383 Pa.Super. 291 , 556 A.2d 912, 914 (1989) (citing cases). 1991See Waltimyer v. Smith, 383 Pa.Super. 291 , 556 A.2d 912, 914 (1989) (citing cases). | 1 | 1 |
| People's Bank v. Etting & Groomegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Pennsylvania. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Crown, Cork & Seal Co. v. Parker
green
2 sentences1996The Supreme Court noted: As stated in Crown, Cork & Seal Co., 462 U.S. at 352 , 103 S.Ct. at 2397 , 76 L.Ed.2d at 635 , ‘Limitations periods are intended to put defendants on notice of adverse claims and to prevent plaintiffs from sleeping on their rights....’ When a complaint is filed by one who, upon the face of the pleadings, is patently without standing, it cannot be said that the defendant has been given notice of an actual adverse claim; rather, the defendant has been advised only of the possibility of such a claim, a fact of which the defendant may well have been aware even in the absen 1996The Supreme Court noted: As stated in Crown, Cork & Seal Co., 462 U.S. at 352 , 103 S.Ct. at 2397 , 76 L.Ed.2d at 635 , ‘Limitations periods are intended to put defendants on notice of adverse claims and to prevent plaintiffs from sleeping on their rights....’ When a complaint is filed by one who, upon the face of the pleadings, is patently without standing, it cannot be said that the defendant has been given notice of an actual adverse claim; rather, the defendant has been advised only of the possibility of such a claim, a fact of which the defendant may well have been aware even in the absen | 3 | 1987–1996 |
PTSI, Inc. v. Haley
green
1 sentence2025Id. | 1 | 2025–2025 |
Kovach v. Solomon
green
1 sentence2019Cragle asserts that “[t]here is little doubt that a juror could use an adverse instruction as an ingredient of causation.” Id. at 33 (citing Kavach v. Soloman, 732 A.2d 1 (Pa.Super. 1992)). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
Chiodetti, G. v. Fernandes, E
green
1 sentence2016The only case cited by appellant is Chiodetti, supra, which is non-precedential, and, according to our Internal Operating Procedures, should not be cited. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Hanley v. Stewart
green
2 sentences2016Hanley v. Stewart, 155 Pa.Super. 535 , 39 A.2d 323 (1944). 2016Hanley v. Stewart, 155 Pa.Super. 535 , 39 A.2d 323 (1944). | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Schroeder v. Com., Dept. of Transp.
green
2 sentences2014Under these circumstances, Pennsylvania Courts have not only determined that it is appropriate to sanction Guru, but that an adverse instruction is the least punitive of any possible sanction, our Supreme Court set forth the approach to be taken with respect to a spoliation of evidence claim in Schroeder v. Department of Transportation, 551 Pa. 243 , 710 A.2d 23 (1998). 2014Under these circumstances, Pennsylvania Courts have not only determined that it is appropriate to sanction Guru, but that an adverse instruction is the least punitive of any possible sanction, our Supreme Court set forth the approach to be taken with respect to a spoliation of evidence claim in Schroeder v. Department of Transportation, 551 Pa. 243 , 710 A.2d 23 (1998). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Commonwealth v. Douglas
green
2 sentences1999In light of this, Appellant’s claim fails. 12 See Douglas, 537 Pa. at 597 , 645 A.2d at 230-31 . 1999In light of this, Appellant’s claim fails. 12 See Douglas, 537 Pa. at 597 , 645 A.2d at 230-31 . | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Niles v. Fall Creek Hunting Club, Inc.
green
2 sentences1994Glenn v. Shuey, 407 Pa.Super. 213 , 595 A.2d 606 (1991) (what constitutes actual possession depends on the facts of the case and the character of the premises); Niles, 376 Pa.Super. 260 , 545 A.2d 926 (actual possession may be taken by residence or cultivation of part of a tract of woodland); 3 American Law of Property § 15.3 (“actual use of property as the average owner would use it, so that people residing in the neighborhood would be justified in regarding the possessor as exercising the exclusive dominion and control incident to ownership, establishes adverse possession”). 1994Glenn v. Shuey, 407 Pa.Super. 213 , 595 A.2d 606 (1991) (what constitutes actual possession depends on the facts of the case and the character of the premises); Niles, 376 Pa.Super. 260 , 545 A.2d 926 (actual possession may be taken by residence or cultivation of part of a tract of woodland); 3 American Law of Property § 15.3 (“actual use of property as the average owner would use it, so that people residing in the neighborhood would be justified in regarding the possessor as exercising the exclusive dominion and control incident to ownership, establishes adverse possession”). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Glenn v. Shuey
green
2 sentences1994Glenn v. Shuey, 407 Pa.Super. 213 , 595 A.2d 606 (1991) (what constitutes actual possession depends on the facts of the case and the character of the premises); Niles, 376 Pa.Super. 260 , 545 A.2d 926 (actual possession may be taken by residence or cultivation of part of a tract of woodland); 3 American Law of Property § 15.3 (“actual use of property as the average owner would use it, so that people residing in the neighborhood would be justified in regarding the possessor as exercising the exclusive dominion and control incident to ownership, establishes adverse possession”). 1994Glenn v. Shuey, 407 Pa.Super. 213 , 595 A.2d 606 (1991) (what constitutes actual possession depends on the facts of the case and the character of the premises); Niles, 376 Pa.Super. 260 , 545 A.2d 926 (actual possession may be taken by residence or cultivation of part of a tract of woodland); 3 American Law of Property § 15.3 (“actual use of property as the average owner would use it, so that people residing in the neighborhood would be justified in regarding the possessor as exercising the exclusive dominion and control incident to ownership, establishes adverse possession”). | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Vlachos v. Witherow
green
2 sentences1988This Court has always held that the act of hostility necessary to render possession adverse must be brought to the knowledge of the owner of the property, Vlachos v. Witherow, 383 Pa. 174 , 118 A.2d 174 (1955), but that it is not necessary for the claimant to even know that there is an owner. 1988This Court has always held that the act of hostility necessary to render possession adverse must be brought to the knowledge of the owner of the property, Vlachos v. Witherow, 383 Pa. 174 , 118 A.2d 174 (1955), but that it is not necessary for the claimant to even know that there is an owner. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Henry v. Grove
green
2 sentences1981Henry v. Grove, 356 Pa. 541 , 52 A.2d 451 (1947); Parks v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., supra. Inclosure would appear to be the more appropriate method upon which to base an adverse claim to a room within a building. 1981Henry v. Grove, 356 Pa. 541 , 52 A.2d 451 (1947); Parks v. Pennsylvania Railroad Co., supra. Inclosure would appear to be the more appropriate method upon which to base an adverse claim to a room within a building. | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Stavros v. Western & Southern Life Insurance Co.
green
1 sentence1981Stravros v. Western and Southern Life Insurance Company, Inc., 486 S.W.2d 712 (Ky.Ct.App.1972); Golden State Mutual Life Insurance *352 Company v. Adams, 340 S.W.2d 77 (Tex.Ct.Civ.App.1960); Redden v. Prudential Life Insurance Company, 193 Minn. 228 , 258 N.W. 300 (1935); Sink v. Waco Mutual Life and Accident Association, 49 S.W.2d 888 (Tex.Ct.Civ.App.1932). 9 Pension Plan’s contention that appellees had to state specific legal grounds in support of their claim to vitiate its duty to the designated beneficiaries is contrary to the weight of authority and, we believe, is not in accord with the | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Redden v. Prudential Life Insurance Co.
neutral
2 sentences1981Stravros v. Western and Southern Life Insurance Company, Inc., 486 S.W.2d 712 (Ky.Ct.App.1972); Golden State Mutual Life Insurance *352 Company v. Adams, 340 S.W.2d 77 (Tex.Ct.Civ.App.1960); Redden v. Prudential Life Insurance Company, 193 Minn. 228 , 258 N.W. 300 (1935); Sink v. Waco Mutual Life and Accident Association, 49 S.W.2d 888 (Tex.Ct.Civ.App.1932). 9 Pension Plan’s contention that appellees had to state specific legal grounds in support of their claim to vitiate its duty to the designated beneficiaries is contrary to the weight of authority and, we believe, is not in accord with the 1981Stravros v. Western and Southern Life Insurance Company, Inc., 486 S.W.2d 712 (Ky.Ct.App.1972); Golden State Mutual Life Insurance *352 Company v. Adams, 340 S.W.2d 77 (Tex.Ct.Civ.App.1960); Redden v. Prudential Life Insurance Company, 193 Minn. 228 , 258 N.W. 300 (1935); Sink v. Waco Mutual Life and Accident Association, 49 S.W.2d 888 (Tex.Ct.Civ.App.1932). 9 Pension Plan’s contention that appellees had to state specific legal grounds in support of their claim to vitiate its duty to the designated beneficiaries is contrary to the weight of authority and, we believe, is not in accord with the | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Sink v. Waco Mut. Life & Accident Ass'n
green
1 sentence1981Stravros v. Western and Southern Life Insurance Company, Inc., 486 S.W.2d 712 (Ky.Ct.App.1972); Golden State Mutual Life Insurance *352 Company v. Adams, 340 S.W.2d 77 (Tex.Ct.Civ.App.1960); Redden v. Prudential Life Insurance Company, 193 Minn. 228 , 258 N.W. 300 (1935); Sink v. Waco Mutual Life and Accident Association, 49 S.W.2d 888 (Tex.Ct.Civ.App.1932). 9 Pension Plan’s contention that appellees had to state specific legal grounds in support of their claim to vitiate its duty to the designated beneficiaries is contrary to the weight of authority and, we believe, is not in accord with the | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Golden State Mutual Life Insurance Co. v. Adams
green
1 sentence1981Stravros v. Western and Southern Life Insurance Company, Inc., 486 S.W.2d 712 (Ky.Ct.App.1972); Golden State Mutual Life Insurance *352 Company v. Adams, 340 S.W.2d 77 (Tex.Ct.Civ.App.1960); Redden v. Prudential Life Insurance Company, 193 Minn. 228 , 258 N.W. 300 (1935); Sink v. Waco Mutual Life and Accident Association, 49 S.W.2d 888 (Tex.Ct.Civ.App.1932). 9 Pension Plan’s contention that appellees had to state specific legal grounds in support of their claim to vitiate its duty to the designated beneficiaries is contrary to the weight of authority and, we believe, is not in accord with the | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Romberger v. Romberger
green
1 sentence1979One threatened by such litigation has sufficient interest in the prior proceedings, whether as a party to the record or not, to represent the facts to the court and invoke its powers.’ “In Romberger v. Romberger, 290 Pa. 454 , it was held that no laches can run against a void judgment and so it can be stricken at any time. | 1 | 1979–1979 |
Blanchard v. German Evangelical Protestant Church
neutral
2 sentences1954Where there is no reasonable doubt either at law or in fact as to good title, an adverse claim asserted in good faith and with a threat of litigation is not sufficient to invalidate an agreement requiring marketable title: Blanchard v. German Evangelical Protestant Church, 256 Pa. 242 , 100 Atl. 804 . 1954Where there is no reasonable doubt either at law or in fact as to good title, an adverse claim asserted in good faith and with a threat of litigation is not sufficient to invalidate an agreement requiring marketable title: Blanchard v. German Evangelical Protestant Church, 256 Pa. 242 , 100 Atl. 804 . | 1 | 1954–1954 |
| Commonwealth v. Mitchneck neutral | 1 | 1942–1942 |
| Commonwealth v. Hillpot green | 1 | 1942–1942 |
Commonwealth v. Overheim
green
2 sentences1942It did not apply to one who borrowed money, even though he may have had no intention of paying the loan, for by the act of lending, the money became the property of the borrower — “the defendant did not receive any money or goods which belonged to any person other than himself”: Com. v. Bixler, 79 Pa. Superior Ct. 295 ; nor to articles or property transferred to the defendant with the purpose and intent of passing to him the property and title: Com. v. Overheim, 106 Pa. Superior Ct. 424, 427 , 162 A. 475 ; nor is it to be applied as a means of collecting a mere debt: Com. v. Hillpot, 84 Pa. Su 1942It did not apply to one who borrowed money, even though he may have had no intention of paying the loan, for by the act of lending, the money became the property of the borrower — “the defendant did not receive any money or goods which belonged to any person other than himself”: Com. v. Bixler, 79 Pa. Superior Ct. 295 ; nor to articles or property transferred to the defendant with the purpose and intent of passing to him the property and title: Com. v. Overheim, 106 Pa. Superior Ct. 424, 427 , 162 A. 475 ; nor is it to be applied as a means of collecting a mere debt: Com. v. Hillpot, 84 Pa. Su | 1 | 1942–1942 |
| Commonwealth v. Bixler green | 1 | 1942–1942 |
| Bechtel v. Sheafer neutral | 1 | 1939–1939 |
| Weedon v. Weedon green | 1 | 1935–1935 |
| Robin v. Brown green | 1 | 1933–1933 |
| S. Catanzaro & Sons, Inc. v. Hellman Commercial Trust & Savings Bank neutral | 1 | 1933–1933 |
| Farmers' & Mechanics' National Bank v. Ryan neutral | 1 | 1933–1933 |
| Hemphill v. Yerkes green | 1 | 1933–1933 |
| Campbell v. Duggan-Rider Co. neutral | 1 | 1930–1930 |
| McBride's Appeal green | 1 | 1930–1930 |
| Moore's Estate neutral | 1 | 1930–1930 |
| Chew v. Chew neutral | 1 | 1929–1929 |
| Miller v. Miller neutral | 1 | 1926–1926 |
| Maul v. Rider green | 1 | 1923–1923 |
| Davis v. Monroe green | 1 | 1923–1923 |
| Meigs v. Tunnicliffe neutral | 1 | 1923–1923 |
| East Lewisburg Lumber & Manufacturing Co. v. Marsh neutral | 1 | 1909–1909 |
| Ruple ex rel. Lewis v. Bindley green | 1 | 1909–1909 |
| Leeds v. Bender neutral | 1 | 1848–1848 |
| Lessee of Blaine v. Johnson neutral | 1 | 1835–1835 |
| Democrat v. Goodlander neutral | 1 | 1835–1835 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.