adverse claim in Texas

2025Vernon v. Perrien, 390 S.W.3d 47, 61 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2012, pet. denied). “[T]he plaintiff must prove, as a matter of law, right, title, or ownership in himself with sufficient certainty to enable the court to see that he has a right of ownership and that the alleged adverse claim is a cloud on the title that equity will remove.” Hahn v. Love, 321 S.W.3d 517, 531 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied).

2025That is, “the plaintiff must prove, as a matter of law, right, title, or ownership in himself with sufficient certainty to enable the court to see that he has a right of ownership and that the alleged adverse claim is a cloud on the title that equity will remove.” Hahn v. Love, 321 S.W.3d 517, 531 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied).

2013See McLaren v. Beard, 811 S.W.2d 564, 569 (Tex. 1991) (“Repudiation thus establishes the point at which adverse possession commences in the case where possession was initially permissive.”); see also Baughn v. Capps, No. 10-09-00111-CV, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 1580 , at **8-9 (Tex. App.—Waco Mar. 3, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Where the original use of the land in controversy is permissive, it is presumed that the continued use thereof is also permissive in the absence of notice to the true owner of the repudiation of such permissive use and the assertion of an adverse claim.”); Griffin v. Watley

2009“Where the original use of the land in controversy is -5- 04-08-00171-CV permissive, it is presumed that the continued use thereof is also permissive in the absence of notice to the true owner of the repudiation of such permissive use and the assertion of an adverse claim.” Commander, 67 S.W.3d at 270 .

2022Rhodes v. Cahill, 802 S.W.2d 643, 645 (Tex. 1990).

2010See id. at 673-74 ; Scott, 959 S.W.2d at 721-22 ; see also Tran, 213 S.W.3d at 914 (“Joint use is not enough, because ‘possession must be of such character as to indicate unmistakably an assertion of a claim of exclusive ownership in the occupant.’”) (quoting Rhodes v. Cahill, 802 S.W.2d 643, 645 (Tex. 1990) (quoting Rick v. Grubbs, 214 S.W.2d 925, 927 (Tex. 1948))).

2009See id. at 524 .

2009See id. at 524 .

2023The doctrine “requires its proponent to establish three elements: (1) a long-asserted and open claim, adverse to that of the apparent owner; (2) nonclaim by the apparent owner; and (3) acquiescence by the apparent owner in the adverse claim.” Id. (citing Magee v. Paul, 221 S.W. 254, 257 (Tex. 1920).

1967In Magee v. Paul, 110 Tex. 470 , 221 S.W. 254 (1920), the Court said: “ * * * the rule is sound which permits the inference that an apparent owner has parted with his title from evidence, first, of a long-asserted and open claim, adverse to that of the apparent owner; second, of nonclaim by the apparent owner; and third, of acquiescence by the apparent owner in the adverse claim.

2019The Trial Court’s Summary Judgment Was Proper “The plaintiff in a quiet-title suit ‘must prove, as a matter of law, that he has a right of ownership and that the adverse claim is a cloud on the title that equity will remove.’” Lance, 543 S.W.3d at 739 (quoting Essex Crane Rental Corp. v. Carter, 371 S.W.3d 366, 388 (Tex. App.— Houston [1st Dist.] 2012, pet. denied)).

2018The plaintiff in a quiet-title suit "must prove, as a matter of law, that he has a right of ownership and that the adverse claim is a cloud on the title that equity will remove." Essex Crane , 371 S.W.3d at 388 (citing Hahn, 321 S.W.3d at 531 ).

2009Scott distinguished the aforementioned cases by noting that in those cases, "the claimants were trying to establish an easement by prescription based on continuous use alone" and that "[t]here was no evidence in any of those cases other than use of the road to establish an adverse claim of right." Id. at 722 .

2009Scott distinguished the aforementioned cases by noting that in those cases, “the claimants were trying to establish an easement by prescription based on continuous use alone” and that “[t]here was no evidence in any of those cases other than use of the road to establish an adverse claim of right.” Id. at 722 .

2025And as the supreme court pointed out in Brookshire Brothers, “a party’s intentional destruction of evidence may, ‘[a]bsent evidence to the contrary,’ be sufficient by itself to support 3 “The most severe sanction for evidence spoliation is to dismiss the action or render a default judgment.” Trevino v. Ortega, 969 S.W.2d 950, 959 (Tex. 1998) (Baker, J., concurring). 4 I note that the spoliation instruction submitted to the jury is the less severe of the two types of presumptions identified by Justice Baker in his Trevino concurrence because “[i]t is merely an adverse presumption that the evide

2025See Trevino, 969 S.W.2d at 960 . 9 a finding that the spoliated evidence is both relevant and harmful to the spoliating party.” 5 Id. at 22 (footnote omitted) (quoting Trevino v. Ortega, 969 S.W.2d 950, 959 (Tex. 1998) (Baker, J., concurring)).

2012See id. at 673–74; Scott, 959 S.W.2d at 721–22.

2012See id. at 673-74 ; Scott , 959 S.W.2d at 721-22 .

2009See Johnson , 2005 WL 1653656 , at *4; Wright v. Matthews , 26 S.W.3d 575, 578 (Tex. App.--Beaumont 2000, pet. denied) (citing Ellison v. Butler , 443 S.W.2d 886, 888-89 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1969, no writ)).

2009See Johnson, 2006 WL 1653656 , at *4; Wright v. Matthews, 26 S.W.3d 575 , *532 578 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2000, pet. denied) (citing Ellison v. Butler, 443 S.W.2d 886, 888-89 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1969, no writ)).

2008Co. v. Mecom Oil Co. , 62 S.W.2d 75 (Tex. Comm'n App. 1933); NRG Exploration, Inc. v. Rauch , 905 S.W.2d 405, 410 (Tex. App.--Austin 1995, writ denied).

2008Co. v. Mecom Oil Co., 62 S.W.2d 75 (Tex. Comm’n App.1933); NRG Exploration, Inc. v. Rauch, 905 S.W.2d 405, 410 (Tex.App.-Austin 1995, writ denied).

2015Mecom, 62 S.W.2d at 76 .

1935App.) 62 S.W.(2d) 75, 77 , the lessee of the mineral interests, the Mecom Oil Company, drilled the oil well after notice of the adverse claim and pendency of suit.

2025Vernon v. Perrien, 390 S.W.3d 47, 61 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2012, pet. denied). “[T]he plaintiff must prove, as a matter of law, right, title, or ownership in himself with sufficient certainty to enable the court to see that he has a right of ownership and that the alleged adverse claim is a cloud on the title that equity will remove.” Hahn v. Love, 321 S.W.3d 517, 531 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, pet. denied).

2023Rhodes v. Kelly, No. 05-16-00888-CV, 2017 WL 2774452 , at *10 (Tex. App.—Dallas June 27, 2017, pet. denied) (mem. op.) (citing, inter alia, Vernon v. Perrien, 390 S.W.3d 47, 61 (Tex. App.—El Paso 2012, pet. denied)). “[T]he plaintiff in a quiet-title suit must prove that he has a right of ownership and that the adverse claim is a cloud on the title that equity will remove,” Brumley v. McDuff, 616 S.W.3d 826 , 835 (Tex. 2021) (internal quotation omitted), but US Bank has made clear that it was not seeking to dispel any clouds on its title.

2015Pool, 124 S.W.3d at 194 .

2013See McLaren v. Beard, 811 S.W.2d 564, 569 (Tex. 1991) (“Repudiation thus establishes the point at which adverse possession commences in the case where possession was initially permissive.”); see also Baughn v. Capps, No. 10-09-00111-CV, 2010 Tex. App. LEXIS 1580 , at **8-9 (Tex. App.—Waco Mar. 3, 2010, no pet.) (mem. op.) (“Where the original use of the land in controversy is permissive, it is presumed that the continued use thereof is also permissive in the absence of notice to the true owner of the repudiation of such permissive use and the assertion of an adverse claim.”); Griffin v. Watley

2009See Johnson , 2005 WL 1653656 , at *4; Wright v. Matthews , 26 S.W.3d 575, 578 (Tex. App.--Beaumont 2000, pet. denied) (citing Ellison v. Butler , 443 S.W.2d 886, 888-89 (Tex. App.--Corpus Christi 1969, no writ)).

2009See Johnson, 2006 WL 1653656 , at *4; Wright v. Matthews, 26 S.W.3d 575 , *532 578 (Tex.App.-Beaumont 2000, pet. denied) (citing Ellison v. Butler, 443 S.W.2d 886, 888-89 (Tex.App.-Corpus Christi 1969, no writ)).

2008"When one enters into possession of land and makes improvements thereon with full knowledge of the pendency of an action to enforce an adverse claim to the premises, one is conclusively considered a trespasser in bad faith." Mayfield , 693 S.W.2d at 504 ; see Houston Prod.

2008“When one enters into possession of land and makes improvements thereon with full knowledge of the pendency of an action to enforce an adverse claim to the premises, one is conclusively considered a trespasser in bad faith.” Mayfield, 693 S.W.2d at 504 ; see Houston Prod.

2023Oil & Gas Co. LP v. Tex. Crude Energy, LLC, 573 S.W.3d 198, 211 (Tex. 2019)). “[T]he plaintiff in a quiet-title suit ‘must prove, as a matter of law, that he has a right of ownership and that the adverse claim is a cloud on the title that equity will remove.’” Brumley v. McDuff, 616 S.W.3d 826 , 835 (Tex. 2021) (quoting Lance v. Robinson, 543 S.W.3d 723, 739 (Tex. 2018)); Haynes v. DOH Oil Co., 647 S.W.3d 793 , 803 (Tex. App.—Eastland 2022, no pet.).

2022That is present here, and then some. “[T]he plaintiff in a quiet-title suit ‘must prove, as a matter of law, that he has a right of ownership and that the adverse claim is a cloud on the title that equity will remove.’” Brumley v. McDuff, 616 S.W.3d 826 , 835 (Tex. 2021) (quoting Lance, 543 S.W.3d at 739 ).

2001Keels, 427 S.W.2d at 915-16 ; Jackson v. Genecov, 471 S.W.2d 589, 593 (Tex.Civ.App.-Tyler 1971, writ refd n.r.e.).

1971We said in Keels v. Keels, 427 S.W.2d 913 (1968) n. w. h.: “Where the original use of the land in controversy is permissive, it is presumed that the continued use thereof is also permissive in the absence of notice to the true owner of the repudiation of such permissive use and assertion of an adverse claim.

2026To prevail, the party pressing the doctrine must establish three elements: “(1) a long-asserted and open claim, adverse to that of the apparent owner; (2) nonclaim by the apparent owner; and (3) acquiescence by the apparent owner in the adverse claim.” Id.

2023The doctrine “requires its proponent to establish three elements: (1) a long-asserted and open claim, adverse to that of the apparent owner; (2) nonclaim by the apparent owner; and (3) acquiescence by the apparent owner in the adverse claim.” Id. (citing Magee v. Paul, 221 S.W. 254, 257 (Tex. 1920).