adverse claim in Utah

1903Fritts v. Camp, 94 Cal. 393 , 29 Pac. 867 ; Urton v. Woolsey, 87 Cal. 38 , 25 Pac. 154 ; Gurnee v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 88 .

1897Fritts v. Camp, 94 Cal. 393 ; Urton v. Woolsey, 87 Cal. 38 ; Gurnee v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 88 .

1903Fritts v. Camp, 94 Cal. 393 , 29 Pac. 867 ; Urton v. Woolsey, 87 Cal. 38 , 25 Pac. 154 ; Gurnee v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 88 .

1897Fritts v. Camp, 94 Cal. 393 ; Urton v. Woolsey, 87 Cal. 38 ; Gurnee v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 88 .

1903Fritts v. Camp, 94 Cal. 393 , 29 Pac. 867 ; Urton v. Woolsey, 87 Cal. 38 , 25 Pac. 154 ; Gurnee v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 88 .

1903Fritts v. Camp, 94 Cal. 393 , 29 Pac. 867 ; Urton v. Woolsey, 87 Cal. 38 , 25 Pac. 154 ; Gurnee v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 88 .

2025“A bona fide purchaser is one who pays valuable consideration for a conveyance, acts in good faith, and takes without notice of an adverse claim or others’ outstanding rights to the seller’s title.” Davis v. Sperry, 2012 UT App 278, ¶ 28 , 288 P.3d 26 (quotation simplified); see also Utah Code § 57-3-103.

2025“A bona fide purchaser is one who pays valuable consideration for a conveyance, acts in good faith, and takes without notice of an adverse claim or others’ outstanding rights to the seller’s title.” Davis v. Sperry, 2012 UT App 278, ¶ 28 , 288 P.3d 26 (quotation simplified); see also Utah Code § 57-3-103.

2025“Notice of a prior interest may be actual or constructive.” Harman v. 105 Partners LLC, 2024 UT App 109, ¶ 54 , 556 P.3d 669 (quotation simplified).

2025“Notice of a prior interest may be actual or constructive.” Harman v. 105 Partners LLC, 2024 UT App 109, ¶ 54 , 556 P.3d 669 (quotation simplified).

2020But a landowner’s lack of acquiescence in a prescriptive use does not interrupt the running of a prescriptive period. ¶29 To satisfy the “continuous” element, prescriptive users must show only that they used the easement “as often as required by the nature of the use and the needs of the [user]” without interruption during the twenty-year period.8 According to the Restatement (Third) of Property, there “are two aspects to the requirement that a prescriptive use be continued for the prescriptive period: one mental, the other physical.”9 The mental aspect “requires that the prescriptive user rem

2020But a landowner’s lack of acquiescence in a prescriptive use does not interrupt the running of a prescriptive period. ¶29 To satisfy the “continuous” element, prescriptive users must show only that they used the easement “as often as required by the nature of the use and the needs of the [user]” without interruption during the twenty-year period.8 According to the Restatement (Third) of Property, there “are two aspects to the requirement that a prescriptive use be continued for the prescriptive period: one mental, the other physical.”9 The mental aspect “requires that the prescriptive user rem

2020LAW INST. 2000). 10 Id. 11 Id. 12 Id. 8 Cite as: 2020 UT 22 Opinion of the Court the prescriptive user begins using the easement under the owner rather than against the owner).

2018McLaughlin , 43 P. at 111 .

1998As we stated in Richins , the fact that the parties were initially friendly or cordial with one another does not prevent a prescriptive right from arising. 412 P.2d at 316 .

1998As we stated in Richins , the fact that the parties were initially friendly or cordial with one another does not prevent a prescriptive right from arising. 412 P.2d at 316 .

1984In asserting that there existed an issue of material fact as to when they discovered the facts constituting the mistake in the deed, plaintiffs attempt to construe “discovery” as meaning “the time at which an adverse claim is asserted.” For this proposition, they cite as authority State v. King County, 29 Wash.2d 37 , 185 P.2d 134 (1947), and Cunnius v. Fields, Okla., 449 P.2d 703 (1969).

1984In asserting that there existed an issue of material fact as to when they discovered the facts constituting the mistake in the deed, plaintiffs attempt to construe “discovery” as meaning “the time at which an adverse claim is asserted.” For this proposition, they cite as authority State v. King County, 29 Wash.2d 37 , 185 P.2d 134 (1947), and Cunnius v. Fields, Okla., 449 P.2d 703 (1969).

1984In asserting that there existed an issue of material fact as to when they discovered the facts constituting the mistake in the deed, plaintiffs attempt to construe “discovery” as meaning “the time at which an adverse claim is asserted.” For this proposition, they cite as authority State v. King County, 29 Wash.2d 37 , 185 P.2d 134 (1947), and Cunnius v. Fields, Okla., 449 P.2d 703 (1969).

1974See also 78-12-7, U.C.A. 1953, re presumption of possession by payment of taxes. [3] Title 78-12-5.1 & 78-12-5.2, U.C.A. 1953, as amended. [4] Peterson v. Callister, 6 Utah 2d 359 , 313 P.2d 814 (1957); rehearing denied 8 Utah 2d 348 , 334 P.2d 759 (1959); Hansen v. Morris, 3 Utah 2d 310 , 283 P.2d 884 (1955). [5] In the alternative plaintiff sought reimbursement from Cedar City. [6] I regret that I did not dissent in that case, although I think it to be a stranger here.

1974See also 78-12-7, U.C.A. 1953, re presumption of possession by payment of taxes. [3] Title 78-12-5.1 & 78-12-5.2, U.C.A. 1953, as amended. [4] Peterson v. Callister, 6 Utah 2d 359 , 313 P.2d 814 (1957); rehearing denied 8 Utah 2d 348 , 334 P.2d 759 (1959); Hansen v. Morris, 3 Utah 2d 310 , 283 P.2d 884 (1955). [5] In the alternative plaintiff sought reimbursement from Cedar City. [6] I regret that I did not dissent in that case, although I think it to be a stranger here.

1974NOTES [1] Article XIII, Sec. 2, Constitution of Utah. [2] Section 59-10-3, U.C.A. 1953. [3] 14 Utah 2d 178 , 380 P.2d 924 (1963). [4] 27 Utah 372 , 75 P. 932 (1904). [5] Fivas v. Petersen, 5 Utah 2d 280 , 300 P.2d 635 (1956). [6] The dissent queries "What become of the lien." The answer is "It died aborning." [1] Utah Parks Co. v. Iron County, 14 Utah 2d 178 , 380 P.2d 924 (1963). [2] Bowen v. Olson, 2 Utah 2d 12 , 268 P.2d 983 (1954), which payment is notice to an asserted owner of an adverse claim, which is not dispositive here but some evidence of occupancy.

1974NOTES [1] Article XIII, Sec. 2, Constitution of Utah. [2] Section 59-10-3, U.C.A. 1953. [3] 14 Utah 2d 178 , 380 P.2d 924 (1963). [4] 27 Utah 372 , 75 P. 932 (1904). [5] Fivas v. Petersen, 5 Utah 2d 280 , 300 P.2d 635 (1956). [6] The dissent queries "What become of the lien." The answer is "It died aborning." [1] Utah Parks Co. v. Iron County, 14 Utah 2d 178 , 380 P.2d 924 (1963). [2] Bowen v. Olson, 2 Utah 2d 12 , 268 P.2d 983 (1954), which payment is notice to an asserted owner of an adverse claim, which is not dispositive here but some evidence of occupancy.

1974NOTES [1] Article XIII, Sec. 2, Constitution of Utah. [2] Section 59-10-3, U.C.A. 1953. [3] 14 Utah 2d 178 , 380 P.2d 924 (1963). [4] 27 Utah 372 , 75 P. 932 (1904). [5] Fivas v. Petersen, 5 Utah 2d 280 , 300 P.2d 635 (1956). [6] The dissent queries "What become of the lien." The answer is "It died aborning." [1] Utah Parks Co. v. Iron County, 14 Utah 2d 178 , 380 P.2d 924 (1963). [2] Bowen v. Olson, 2 Utah 2d 12 , 268 P.2d 983 (1954), which payment is notice to an asserted owner of an adverse claim, which is not dispositive here but some evidence of occupancy.

1974NOTES [1] Article XIII, Sec. 2, Constitution of Utah. [2] Section 59-10-3, U.C.A. 1953. [3] 14 Utah 2d 178 , 380 P.2d 924 (1963). [4] 27 Utah 372 , 75 P. 932 (1904). [5] Fivas v. Petersen, 5 Utah 2d 280 , 300 P.2d 635 (1956). [6] The dissent queries "What become of the lien." The answer is "It died aborning." [1] Utah Parks Co. v. Iron County, 14 Utah 2d 178 , 380 P.2d 924 (1963). [2] Bowen v. Olson, 2 Utah 2d 12 , 268 P.2d 983 (1954), which payment is notice to an asserted owner of an adverse claim, which is not dispositive here but some evidence of occupancy.

1974See also 78-12-7, U.C.A. 1953, re presumption of possession by payment of taxes. [3] Title 78-12-5.1 & 78-12-5.2, U.C.A. 1953, as amended. [4] Peterson v. Callister, 6 Utah 2d 359 , 313 P.2d 814 (1957); rehearing denied 8 Utah 2d 348 , 334 P.2d 759 (1959); Hansen v. Morris, 3 Utah 2d 310 , 283 P.2d 884 (1955). [5] In the alternative plaintiff sought reimbursement from Cedar City. [6] I regret that I did not dissent in that case, although I think it to be a stranger here.

1974See also 78-12-7, U.C.A. 1953, re presumption of possession by payment of taxes. [3] Title 78-12-5.1 & 78-12-5.2, U.C.A. 1953, as amended. [4] Peterson v. Callister, 6 Utah 2d 359 , 313 P.2d 814 (1957); rehearing denied 8 Utah 2d 348 , 334 P.2d 759 (1959); Hansen v. Morris, 3 Utah 2d 310 , 283 P.2d 884 (1955). [5] In the alternative plaintiff sought reimbursement from Cedar City. [6] I regret that I did not dissent in that case, although I think it to be a stranger here.

1974Bowen v. Olson, 2 Utah 2d 12 , 268 P.2d 983 (1954), which payment is notice to an asserted owner of an adverse claim, which is not dispositive here but some evidence of occupancy.

1974Bowen v. Olson, 2 Utah 2d 12 , 268 P.2d 983 (1954), which payment is notice to an asserted owner of an adverse claim, which is not dispositive here but some evidence of occupancy.

1974NOTES [1] Article XIII, Sec. 2, Constitution of Utah. [2] Section 59-10-3, U.C.A. 1953. [3] 14 Utah 2d 178 , 380 P.2d 924 (1963). [4] 27 Utah 372 , 75 P. 932 (1904). [5] Fivas v. Petersen, 5 Utah 2d 280 , 300 P.2d 635 (1956). [6] The dissent queries "What become of the lien." The answer is "It died aborning." [1] Utah Parks Co. v. Iron County, 14 Utah 2d 178 , 380 P.2d 924 (1963). [2] Bowen v. Olson, 2 Utah 2d 12 , 268 P.2d 983 (1954), which payment is notice to an asserted owner of an adverse claim, which is not dispositive here but some evidence of occupancy.

1974NOTES [1] Article XIII, Sec. 2, Constitution of Utah. [2] Section 59-10-3, U.C.A. 1953. [3] 14 Utah 2d 178 , 380 P.2d 924 (1963). [4] 27 Utah 372 , 75 P. 932 (1904). [5] Fivas v. Petersen, 5 Utah 2d 280 , 300 P.2d 635 (1956). [6] The dissent queries "What become of the lien." The answer is "It died aborning." [1] Utah Parks Co. v. Iron County, 14 Utah 2d 178 , 380 P.2d 924 (1963). [2] Bowen v. Olson, 2 Utah 2d 12 , 268 P.2d 983 (1954), which payment is notice to an asserted owner of an adverse claim, which is not dispositive here but some evidence of occupancy.

1940That plaintiff could have properly asserted his claim at any time after the approval of Application 4306 — A cannot be denied, Little Cottonwood Water Co. v. Kimball, 76 Utah 243 , 289 P. 116 , but he failed to make any protest while defendant, unaware of the adverse claim, expended large sums for pumps, and diversion works and contracted with farmer water-users to-sell them water.

1940That plaintiff could have properly asserted his claim at any time after the approval of Application 4306 — A cannot be denied, Little Cottonwood Water Co. v. Kimball, 76 Utah 243 , 289 P. 116 , but he failed to make any protest while defendant, unaware of the adverse claim, expended large sums for pumps, and diversion works and contracted with farmer water-users to-sell them water.

1924(N. Y.) 115, the reason for the rule is well stated by Chancellor Walworth in the following words: “It is a well-known fact that land is frequently conveyed with general warranty, which is warranty against eviction only, when both parties to the sale perfectly understand that the title is doubtful, or that there is some outstanding contingent interest, which may, perhaps, at a future period be the means of evicting the purchaser; and to protect the purchaser1 and enable him to recover against the vendor in case of eviction, the covenant of warranty is inserted in the deed.” In Wright v. Nipple

1903Co., supra, Ross, J., said: “The proceedings here in question are purely statutory, and they had their inception, not in the court in which the suits were commenced, but, as said by the' Supreme Court in Wolverton v. Nichols, 119 U. S. 488 , 7 Sup. Ct. 289, 30 L.

1903Sup. Ct. 971; 41 L.

1903In the case of Bennett v. Harkrader, supra, the court said: “Again, in this action, brought under a special statute of the United States in support of an adverse claim, but one estate is involved in the controversy.

1903Fritts v. Camp, 94 Cal. 393 , 29 Pac. 867 ; Urton v. Woolsey, 87 Cal. 38 , 25 Pac. 154 ; Gurnee v. Superior Court, 58 Cal. 88 .

1903In Lavag- nino v. Uhlig, 26 Utah 1 , 71 Pac. 1046 , this court held that the expression in the mining law, “It shall he assumed,” must be construed to mean “conclusively assumed.” It is clear from the record and the provisions of the mining law that the pending action is purely statutory, and was brought in pursuance of the United States statutes, and in support of the adverse claim, the filing of which constitutes the very basis of the action; that the only controversy between the contesting parties is as to which, if either, has the right of possession to that portion of the Ralph within the

1903In Lavag- nino v. Uhlig, 26 Utah 1 , 71 Pac. 1046 , this court held that the expression in the mining law, “It shall he assumed,” must be construed to mean “conclusively assumed.” It is clear from the record and the provisions of the mining law that the pending action is purely statutory, and was brought in pursuance of the United States statutes, and in support of the adverse claim, the filing of which constitutes the very basis of the action; that the only controversy between the contesting parties is as to which, if either, has the right of possession to that portion of the Ralph within the