73 Georgia opinions name it 2 courts 1897–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Georgia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
First Christian Church v. Realty Investment Co.green2 sentences2001See First Christian Church &c. v. Realty Investment Co., 180 Ga. 35, 39-41 ( 178 SE 303 ) (1934). 2001See First Christian Church &c. v. Realty Investment Co., 180 Ga. 35, 39-41 ( 178 SE 303 ) (1934). | 3 | 3 |
Douglas v. Knoxgreen2 sentences2023“Repairs performed with the owner’s permission or by agreement cannot establish a prescriptive easement.”6 Thus, the undisputed evidence conclusively establishes that the use of the shared driveway was permissive, not adverse.7 The Lewises argue that they did not need to demonstrate notice of an adverse claim, citing OCGA § 44-9-54, which provides that “[w]henever a private way has been in constant and uninterrupted use for seven or more years and no legal steps 5 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Douglas v. Knox, 232 Ga. App. 551, 552 (2) ( 502 SE2d 490 ) (1998). 6 Wilkes 581 Farms, LLC v. 2023“Repairs performed with the owner’s permission or by agreement cannot establish a prescriptive easement.”6 Thus, the undisputed evidence conclusively establishes that the use of the shared driveway was permissive, not adverse.7 The Lewises argue that they did not need to demonstrate notice of an adverse claim, citing OCGA § 44-9-54, which provides that “[w]henever a private way has been in constant and uninterrupted use for seven or more years and no legal steps 5 (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Douglas v. Knox, 232 Ga. App. 551, 552 (2) ( 502 SE2d 490 ) (1998). 6 Wilkes 581 Farms, LLC v. | 2 | 3 |
Morgan v. Mitchellgreen2 sentences1972Morgan v. Mitchell, 104 Ga. 596, 598 ( 30 SE 792 ). 1946Exclusive possession, therefore, by a cotenant alone will be presumed not an adverse holding, but simply one in support of the common title.” Morgan v. Mitchell, 104 Ga. 596, 598 ( 30 S. E. 792 ). | 2 | 3 |
Hobgood v. Blackgreen2 sentences2017An “interested” party within the context of the statute is one who “has a protect[a]ble interest and asserts an adverse claim on an accrued statement of facts.” Hobgood v. Black, 144 Ga. App. 448, 449 (2) ( 241 SE2d 60 ) (1978). 2017An “interested” party within the context of the statute is one who “has a protect[a]ble interest and asserts an adverse claim on an accrued statement of facts.” Hobgood v. Black, 144 Ga. App. 448, 449 (2) ( 241 SE2d 60 ) (1978). | 2 | 2 |
Walton v. Sikesgreen2 sentences1941He chose to ignore the rights of the latter, and he can not now be heard to say that his building was ‘bona fide placed5 on the property of the plaintiff.” In Walton v. Sikes, 165 Ga. 422, 427 ( 141 S. E. 188 ), *664 the court said: “It has been held by this court that where a defendant enters upon land in good faith under an adverse claim of title, and, after suit is brought against him by one who has actual title to the property, erects improvements upon the land, it can not be held that he has ‘bona fide placed improvements thereon,’ so as to entitle him to set oil the value of such improve 1941He chose to ignore the rights of the latter, and he can not now be heard to say that his building was ‘bona fide placed5 on the property of the plaintiff.” In Walton v. Sikes, 165 Ga. 422, 427 ( 141 S. E. 188 ), *664 the court said: “It has been held by this court that where a defendant enters upon land in good faith under an adverse claim of title, and, after suit is brought against him by one who has actual title to the property, erects improvements upon the land, it can not be held that he has ‘bona fide placed improvements thereon,’ so as to entitle him to set oil the value of such improve | 2 | 2 |
Fields v. Yellow Cab. Co. of Atlantagreen2 sentences1999Fields v. Yellow Cab Co. & c., 80 Ga.App. 569, 571 , 56 S.E.2d 845 (1949); Speagle v. Nationwide &c. 1999Fields v. Yellow Cab Co. & c., 80 Ga.App. 569, 571 , 56 S.E.2d 845 (1949); Speagle v. Nationwide &c. | 2 | 2 |
Denson v. Densongreen2 sentences1998Denson v. Denson, 214 Ga. 8, 9 (1) ( 102 SE2d 605 ) (1958); Hodges v. Hodges, 213 Ga. 689, 694 (2) ( 100 SE2d 888 ) (1957); Wallace v. Mize, 153 Ga. 374, 383 (1) ( 112 SE 724 ) (1922). 5 The statute of limitation begins to run against the party asserting title under an implied trust when there has been notice of an adverse claim by the alleged trustee or such change of circumstances as would put a reasonably prudent person on notice that any trust relationship has ceased. 1998Denson v. Denson, 214 Ga. 8, 9 (1) ( 102 SE2d 605 ) (1958); Hodges v. Hodges, 213 Ga. 689, 694 (2) ( 100 SE2d 888 ) (1957); Wallace v. Mize, 153 Ga. 374, 383 (1) ( 112 SE 724 ) (1922). 5 The statute of limitation begins to run against the party asserting title under an implied trust when there has been notice of an adverse claim by the alleged trustee or such change of circumstances as would put a reasonably prudent person on notice that any trust relationship has ceased. | 2 | 2 |
Jay v. Whelchelgreen2 sentences1925If J. executes a security deed to L. as administrator and remains in possession, J's possession is not adverse to the estate represented by L., but is merely permissive (Jay v. Whelchel, 78 Ga. 786 , 3 S. E. 906 ), and will not afford a basis for prescription against L. as administrator or the distributees (if ever before payment of the secured debt) until after an adverse claim by J. and actual notice thereof to L. as administrator. 1925If J. executes a security deed to L. as administrator and remains in possession, J's possession is not adverse to the estate represented by L., but is merely permissive (Jay v. Whelchel, 78 Ga. 786 , 3 S. E. 906 ), and will not afford a basis for prescription against L. as administrator or the distributees (if ever before payment of the secured debt) until after an adverse claim by J. and actual notice thereof to L. as administrator. | 1 | 4 |
Hadden v. Thompsongreen2 sentences1949Frost v. Arnaud, 144 Ga. 26 (2) ( 85 S. E. 1028 ); Hadden v. Thompson, 202 Ga. 74, 78 ( 42 S. E. 2d, 125 ). 1949Frost v. Arnaud, 144 Ga. 26 (2) ( 85 S. E. 1028 ); Hadden v. Thompson, 202 Ga. 74, 78 ( 42 S. E. 2d, 125 ). | 1 | 2 |
Ewing v. Tannergreen2 sentences1943In Ewing v. Tanner, 184 Ga. 773, 779 ( 193 S. E. 243 ), it was said: “The nature of the possession of personal property and that of realty, required to give title by prescription, is the same. 1943In Ewing v. Tanner, 184 Ga. 773, 779 ( 193 S. E. 243 ), it was said: “The nature of the possession of personal property and that of realty, required to give title by prescription, is the same. | 1 | 2 |
Smith v. Csx Transportation, Inc.green2 sentences2025Mgmt., 361 Ga. App. 311 , 318 (1) (b) ( 864 SE2d 140 ) (2021) (explaining that “[w]ithout a ruling by the trial court on its claim of spoliation, [appellant] cannot use the unresolved issue of spoliation to assert that genuine issues of material fact nonetheless exist”). 41 See Westmoreland, 362 Ga. App. at 122-23 (holding plaintiff, who was allegedly injured by glass bottles falling through package and onto floor, failed to establish spoliation claim that store’s failure to preserve packaging triggered rebuttable 22 To summarize, Johnson’s allegations that TICO’s mechanics failed to comply wi 2025Mgmt., 361 Ga. App. 311 , 318 (1) (b) ( 864 SE2d 140 ) (2021) (explaining that “[w]ithout a ruling by the trial court on its claim of spoliation, [appellant] cannot use the unresolved issue of spoliation to assert that genuine issues of material fact nonetheless exist”). 41 See Westmoreland, 362 Ga. App. at 122-23 (holding plaintiff, who was allegedly injured by glass bottles falling through package and onto floor, failed to establish spoliation claim that store’s failure to preserve packaging triggered rebuttable 22 To summarize, Johnson’s allegations that TICO’s mechanics failed to comply wi | 1 | 1 |
Kelley v. BLUE LINE CARRIERS, LLCgreen2 sentences2025Mgmt., 361 Ga. App. 311 , 318 (1) (b) ( 864 SE2d 140 ) (2021) (explaining that “[w]ithout a ruling by the trial court on its claim of spoliation, [appellant] cannot use the unresolved issue of spoliation to assert that genuine issues of material fact nonetheless exist”). 41 See Westmoreland, 362 Ga. App. at 122-23 (holding plaintiff, who was allegedly injured by glass bottles falling through package and onto floor, failed to establish spoliation claim that store’s failure to preserve packaging triggered rebuttable 22 To summarize, Johnson’s allegations that TICO’s mechanics failed to comply wi 2025Mgmt., 361 Ga. App. 311 , 318 (1) (b) ( 864 SE2d 140 ) (2021) (explaining that “[w]ithout a ruling by the trial court on its claim of spoliation, [appellant] cannot use the unresolved issue of spoliation to assert that genuine issues of material fact nonetheless exist”). 41 See Westmoreland, 362 Ga. App. at 122-23 (holding plaintiff, who was allegedly injured by glass bottles falling through package and onto floor, failed to establish spoliation claim that store’s failure to preserve packaging triggered rebuttable 22 To summarize, Johnson’s allegations that TICO’s mechanics failed to comply wi | 1 | 1 |
| Drew v. DeKalb Countygreen | 1 | 1 |
Woods v. Brannengreen1 sentence2017Woods, 208 Ga. at 496 (1) (where a deed conveying a right-of-way to a railway company reserved to the landowner the right to cultivate the land up to the tracks “until . . . needed for railway purposes,” the landowner’s subsequent possession of land within the right-of-way was permissive and could not ripen into prescriptive title in the absence of an adverse claim and actual notice to the railway of that claim). | 1 | 1 |
| Henson v. Tuckergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Arnold v. Shackelfordgreen | 1 | 1 |
| McDonald v. Taylorgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Simmons v. Community Renewal & Redemption, LLCgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Holloway v. Woodsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Sheffield v. Colliergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Mayor of Macon v. Franklingreen | 1 | 1 |
| Mathis v. Holcombgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Beavers v. Weatherlygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Cotton States Fertilizer Co. v. Childsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Wallace v. Mizegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Trednick v. Kramergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hodges v. Hodgesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Whitworth v. Whitworthgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Tennessee, Alabama & Georgia Railway Co. v. Zugargreen | 1 | 1 |
| Barnett v. Hollidaygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Harris v. Mandevillegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Nassar v. Saltergreen | 1 | 1 |
| McDonough & Co. v. Martingreen | 1 | 1 |
| Brown v. Lawrencegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hasty v. Wilsongreen | 1 | 1 |
| Roddy v. Coxgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Blount v. Beallgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Mitchell v. Guntergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Grant v. Hartgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Hadaway v. Hadawaygreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Georgia. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Hamilton v. Mutual Benefit Life Insurance
green
2 sentences1972Morgan v. Mitchell, 104 Ga. 596, 598 ( 30 SE 792 ). 1946Exclusive possession, therefore, by a cotenant alone will be presumed not an adverse holding, but simply one in support of the common title.” Morgan v. Mitchell, 104 Ga. 596, 598 ( 30 S. E. 792 ). | 3 | 1946–1972 |
Dutton v. Faulk
neutral
2 sentences1939Melson v. Leigh, 159 Ga. 683 ( 126 S. E. 718 ); Jay v. Whelchel, 78 Ga. 786 ( 3 S. E. 906 ). 1933Permissive possession can not be the foundation of a prescription, until an adverse claim and actual notice to the other party.” The principle stated in the sentence italicized was the basis of the decision in Melson v. Leigh, 159 Ga. 683 ( 126 S. E. 718 ), cited by counsel for plaintiff in error. | 3 | 1933–1939 |
Erwin v. Brooke
green
2 sentences1939Melson v. Leigh, 159 Ga. 683 ( 126 S. E. 718 ); Jay v. Whelchel, 78 Ga. 786 ( 3 S. E. 906 ). 1933Permissive possession can not be the foundation of a prescription, until an adverse claim and actual notice to the other party.” The principle stated in the sentence italicized was the basis of the decision in Melson v. Leigh, 159 Ga. 683 ( 126 S. E. 718 ), cited by counsel for plaintiff in error. | 3 | 1933–1939 |
Young v. Durham
green
2 sentences1974"Where a defendant in an action of trover admits in his plea or answer his possession of the property at the time of the action, under an adverse claim of title or right of possession, it is not necessary for the plaintiff to prove a demand and refusal...” Also see Young v. Durham, 15 Ga. App. 678 (5) ( 84 SE 165 ), which case is cited by the lower court. 1974"Where a defendant in an action of trover admits in his plea or answer his possession of the property at the time of the action, under an adverse claim of title or right of possession, it is not necessary for the plaintiff to prove a demand and refusal...” Also see Young v. Durham, 15 Ga. App. 678 (5) ( 84 SE 165 ), which case is cited by the lower court. | 2 | 1922–1974 |
Bledsoe v. Willingham
neutral
2 sentences1949While ordinarily prescription will not run against a remainderman out of possession during the occupancy of the estate by the life tenant ( Bledsoe v. Willingham , supra; Bull v. Walker , supra; Lamar v. Pearre , supra; Wallace v. Jones , supra; Seaboard Airline Ry. v. Holliday , supra), nevertheless where it appears that the adverse claim is based on a false, fraudulent, or forged deed, of which the remainderman has notice, equity requires that such remainderman shall proceed within a reasonable time to have such false, fraudulent, or forged deed removed as a cloud upon his title. 1949While ordinarily prescription will not run against a remainderman out of possession during the occupancy of the estate by the life tenant (Bledsoe v. Willingham, supra; Bull v. Walker, supra; Lamar v. Pearre, supra; Wallace v. Jones, supra; Seaboard Airline Ry. v. Holliday, supra), nevertheless where it appears that the adverse claim is based on a false, fraudulent, or forged deed, of which the remainderman has notice, equity requires that such remainderman shall proceed within a reasonable time to have such false, fraudulent, or forged deed removed as a cloud upon his title. | 2 | 1949–1949 |
Bull v. Walker
neutral
2 sentences1949While ordinarily prescription will not run against a remainderman out of possession during the occupancy of the estate by the life tenant ( Bledsoe v. Willingham , supra; Bull v. Walker , supra; Lamar v. Pearre , supra; Wallace v. Jones , supra; Seaboard Airline Ry. v. Holliday , supra), nevertheless where it appears that the adverse claim is based on a false, fraudulent, or forged deed, of which the remainderman has notice, equity requires that such remainderman shall proceed within a reasonable time to have such false, fraudulent, or forged deed removed as a cloud upon his title. 1949While ordinarily prescription will not run against a remainderman out of possession during the occupancy of the estate by the life tenant (Bledsoe v. Willingham, supra; Bull v. Walker, supra; Lamar v. Pearre, supra; Wallace v. Jones, supra; Seaboard Airline Ry. v. Holliday, supra), nevertheless where it appears that the adverse claim is based on a false, fraudulent, or forged deed, of which the remainderman has notice, equity requires that such remainderman shall proceed within a reasonable time to have such false, fraudulent, or forged deed removed as a cloud upon his title. | 2 | 1949–1949 |
Frost v. Arnaud
green
2 sentences1949Frost v. Arnaud, 144 Ga. 26 (2) ( 85 S. E. 1028 ); Hadden v. Thompson, 202 Ga. 74, 78 ( 42 S. E. 2d, 125 ). 1949Frost v. Arnaud, 144 Ga. 26 (2) ( 85 S. E. 1028 ); Hadden v. Thompson, 202 Ga. 74, 78 ( 42 S. E. 2d, 125 ). | 2 | 1949–1949 |
Ward v. Parks
green
2 sentences1946Ward v. Parks, 166 Ga. 149 (4b) ( 142 S. E. 690 ); Holley v. Hawley, 39 Vt. 525 ( 94 Am. 1946Ward v. Parks, 166 Ga. 149 (4b) ( 142 S. E. 690 ); Holley v. Hawley, 39 Vt. 525 ( 94 Am. | 2 | 1946–1946 |
Holley v. Hawley
neutral
2 sentences1946Ward v. Parks , 166 Ga. 149 (4b) ( 142 S.E. 690 ); Holley v. Hawley, 39 Vt. 525 ( 94 Am. 1946Ward v. Parks, 166 Ga. 149 (4b) ( 142 S. E. 690 ); Holley v. Hawley, 39 Vt. 525 ( 94 Am. | 2 | 1946–1946 |
Richards v. Edwardy
green
2 sentences1941Richards v. Edwardy, 138 Ga. 690 ( 16 S. E. 64 ); Hinesley v. Stewart, 139 Ga. 1 ( 16 S. E. 385 ); Hall v. Collier, 146 Ga. 815 ( 92 S. E. 536 ). 1927Richards v. Edwardy, 138 Ga. 690 ( 76 S. E. 64 ); Hinesley v. Stewart, 139 Ga. 7 ( 76 S. E. 385 ); Hall v. Collier, 146 Ga. 815 ( 92 S. E. 536 ). | 2 | 1927–1941 |
Hall v. Collier
green
2 sentences1941Richards v. Edwardy, 138 Ga. 690 ( 16 S. E. 64 ); Hinesley v. Stewart, 139 Ga. 1 ( 16 S. E. 385 ); Hall v. Collier, 146 Ga. 815 ( 92 S. E. 536 ). 1927Richards v. Edwardy, 138 Ga. 690 ( 76 S. E. 64 ); Hinesley v. Stewart, 139 Ga. 7 ( 76 S. E. 385 ); Hall v. Collier, 146 Ga. 815 ( 92 S. E. 536 ). | 2 | 1927–1941 |
Hall v. Citizens Bank of Hazlehurst
neutral
2 sentences1941Richards v. Edwardy, 138 Ga. 690 ( 16 S. E. 64 ); Hinesley v. Stewart, 139 Ga. 1 ( 16 S. E. 385 ); Hall v. Collier, 146 Ga. 815 ( 92 S. E. 536 ). 1927Richards v. Edwardy, 138 Ga. 690 ( 76 S. E. 64 ); Hinesley v. Stewart, 139 Ga. 7 ( 76 S. E. 385 ); Hall v. Collier, 146 Ga. 815 ( 92 S. E. 536 ). | 2 | 1927–1941 |
Rucker v. Rucker
green
2 sentences1938“Possession remaining with the grantor and never surrendered is held under the grantee, and is not adverse to his title; and neither prescription nor the statute of limitations is available as a defense to an action of ejectment founded on the deed.” Jay v. Whelchel, 78 Ga. 786, 789 ( 3 S. E. 906 ); Rucker v. Rucker, 136 Ga. 830 (2) ( 72 S. E. 241 ); Melson v. Leigh, 159 Ga. 683 ( 126 S. E. 718 ); Johnson v. Hume, 163 Ga. 867 ( 137 S. E. 56 ). 1938“Possession remaining with the grantor and never surrendered is held under the grantee, and is not adverse to his title; and neither prescription nor the statute of limitations is available as a defense to an action of ejectment founded on the deed.” Jay v. Whelchel, 78 Ga. 786, 789 ( 3 S. E. 906 ); Rucker v. Rucker, 136 Ga. 830 (2) ( 72 S. E. 241 ); Melson v. Leigh, 159 Ga. 683 ( 126 S. E. 718 ); Johnson v. Hume, 163 Ga. 867 ( 137 S. E. 56 ). | 2 | 1930–1938 |
Pearson v. Jones
green
2 sentences1937“Where the defendant is in possession at the time suit is entered, proof of demand and refusal is necessary only to save the plaintiff the costs of court in case the defendant should disclaim title to the property.” Pearson v. Jones, 18 Ga. App. 448 (4-a) ( 89 S. E. 536 ). 1922Civil Code (1910), § 4483; Muse v. Wright, 103 Ga. 783, 784 ( 30 S. E. 662 ); Moore v. Ramsey, 144 Ga. 118 ( 86 S. E. 219 ); Young v. Durham, 15 Ga. App. 678 (5) ( 84 S. E. 165 ); Pearson v. Jones, 18 Ga. App. 448 ( 89 S. E. 536 ); Collins v. Hilton, 27 Ga. App. 439 ( 108 S. E. 824 ). 2. | 2 | 1922–1937 |
Lowther v. State
green
2 sentences1937“Where the defendant is in possession at the time suit is entered, proof of demand and refusal is necessary only to save the plaintiff the costs of court in case the defendant should disclaim title to the property.” Pearson v. Jones, 18 Ga. App. 448 (4-a) ( 89 S. E. 536 ). 1922Civil Code (1910), § 4483; Muse v. Wright, 103 Ga. 783, 784 ( 30 S. E. 662 ); Moore v. Ramsey, 144 Ga. 118 ( 86 S. E. 219 ); Young v. Durham, 15 Ga. App. 678 (5) ( 84 S. E. 165 ); Pearson v. Jones, 18 Ga. App. 448 ( 89 S. E. 536 ); Collins v. Hilton, 27 Ga. App. 439 ( 108 S. E. 824 ). 2. | 2 | 1922–1937 |
Smith v. Commercial Credit Co.
green
2 sentences1937“Where a defendant in an action of trover admits in his plea or answer his possession of the property at the time of the action, under an adverse claim of title or right of possession, it is not necessary for the plaintiff to prove a demand and refusal or any other conversion of the property.” Smith v. Commercial Credit Co., 28 Ga. App. 403 ( 111 S. E. 821 ); Code, § 107-101. 1923“Where a defendant in an action of trover admits in his plea or answer his possession of the property at the time of the action, under an adverse claim of title or right of possession, it is not necessary for the plaintiff to prove a demand and refusal or any other conversion of the property.” Smith v. Commercial Credit Co., 28 Ga. App. 403 (1) ( 111 S. E. 821 ), and cases cited. 2. | 2 | 1923–1937 |
Citizens First National Bank v. Wilson
green
2 sentences1937“Where a defendant in an action of trover admits in his plea or answer his possession of the property at the time of the action, under an adverse claim of title or right of possession, it is not necessary for the plaintiff to prove a demand and refusal or any other conversion of the property.” Smith v. Commercial Credit Co., 28 Ga. App. 403 ( 111 S. E. 821 ); Code, § 107-101. 1923“Where a defendant in an action of trover admits in his plea or answer his possession of the property at the time of the action, under an adverse claim of title or right of possession, it is not necessary for the plaintiff to prove a demand and refusal or any other conversion of the property.” Smith v. Commercial Credit Co., 28 Ga. App. 403 (1) ( 111 S. E. 821 ), and cases cited. 2. | 2 | 1923–1937 |
| Gordon v. Georgia Kraft Company green | 1 | 2008–2008 |
| Harper v. Durden green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Bowles v. White neutral | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Board of Trustees of Employees' Retirement System v. Kenworthy green | 1 | 1990–1990 |
| Greer v. Piedmont Realty Investments, Inc. neutral | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| May v. Sorrell green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Jones v. State green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Fender v. Gardner neutral | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Blackwell v. Partridge green | 1 | 1978–1978 |
| Bennett v. Davis green | 1 | 1965–1965 |
| Hardin v. Snow neutral | 1 | 1965–1965 |
| Garner v. Lankford green | 1 | 1958–1958 |
| Citizens & Southern National Bank v. Ellis green | 1 | 1958–1958 |
| Hicks v. Webb green | 1 | 1950–1950 |
| Wells v. Walker neutral | 1 | 1949–1949 |
| Robson v. Harris green | 1 | 1947–1947 |
| Anderson v. Caldwell green | 1 | 1947–1947 |
| Denham v. Holeman green | 1 | 1944–1944 |
| Roe v. Doe ex dem. Morrison neutral | 1 | 1944–1944 |
| Graham v. Mitchell neutral | 1 | 1944–1944 |
| Clark v. White green | 1 | 1944–1944 |
| Bradley v. Shelton green | 1 | 1944–1944 |
| Kirschner v. Western & Atlantic Railroad neutral | 1 | 1944–1944 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.