adverse claim in Alabama

2018See Blalock v. Conzelman , 751 So.2d 2 (Ala. 1999) ; Harkins & Co. v. Lewis , 535 So.2d 104 , 117 (Ala. 1988) ("Ordinary acts of ownership, consistent with permissive possession, are not sufficient to constitute an adverse holding capable of ever ripening into a title."); and Cotton v. May , 293 Ala. 212 , 215, 301 So.2d 168 , 170 (1974) ("[A] permissive possession does not ripen into title adverse to the owner unless there has been such a repudiation of the permissive possession as to afford notice of an adverse claim.").

2018See Blalock v. Conzelman , 751 So.2d 2 (Ala. 1999) ; Harkins & Co. v. Lewis , 535 So.2d 104 , 117 (Ala. 1988) ("Ordinary acts of ownership, consistent with permissive possession, are not sufficient to constitute an adverse holding capable of ever ripening into a title."); and Cotton v. May , 293 Ala. 212 , 215, 301 So.2d 168 , 170 (1974) ("[A] permissive possession does not ripen into title adverse to the owner unless there has been such a repudiation of the permissive possession as to afford notice of an adverse claim.").

1995The "equitable lien" concept, for example, does not help AmSouth, because "knowledge of an adverse claim to the title is fatal to the ... claim for [an equitable lien]." Manning v. Wingo, 577 So.2d 865, 869 (Ala. 1991); Gresham v. Ware, 79 Ala. 192, 199 (1885).

1995The "equitable lien" concept, for example, does not help AmSouth, because "knowledge of an adverse claim to the title is fatal to the . . . claim for [an equitable lien]." Manning v. Wingo , 577 So.2d 865 , 869 (Ala. 1991); Gresham v. Ware , 79 Ala. 192 , 199 (1885).

2018See Blalock v. Conzelman , 751 So.2d 2 (Ala. 1999) ; Harkins & Co. v. Lewis , 535 So.2d 104 , 117 (Ala. 1988) ("Ordinary acts of ownership, consistent with permissive possession, are not sufficient to constitute an adverse holding capable of ever ripening into a title."); and Cotton v. May , 293 Ala. 212 , 215, 301 So.2d 168 , 170 (1974) ("[A] permissive possession does not ripen into title adverse to the owner unless there has been such a repudiation of the permissive possession as to afford notice of an adverse claim.").

2018See Blalock v. Conzelman , 751 So.2d 2 (Ala. 1999) ; Harkins & Co. v. Lewis , 535 So.2d 104 , 117 (Ala. 1988) ("Ordinary acts of ownership, consistent with permissive possession, are not sufficient to constitute an adverse holding capable of ever ripening into a title."); and Cotton v. May , 293 Ala. 212 , 215, 301 So.2d 168 , 170 (1974) ("[A] permissive possession does not ripen into title adverse to the owner unless there has been such a repudiation of the permissive possession as to afford notice of an adverse claim.").

2018See Blalock v. Conzelman , 751 So.2d 2 (Ala. 1999) ; Harkins & Co. v. Lewis , 535 So.2d 104 , 117 (Ala. 1988) ("Ordinary acts of ownership, consistent with permissive possession, are not sufficient to constitute an adverse holding capable of ever ripening into a title."); and Cotton v. May , 293 Ala. 212 , 215, 301 So.2d 168 , 170 (1974) ("[A] permissive possession does not ripen into title adverse to the owner unless there has been such a repudiation of the permissive possession as to afford notice of an adverse claim.").

2018See Blalock v. Conzelman , 751 So.2d 2 (Ala. 1999) ; Harkins & Co. v. Lewis , 535 So.2d 104 , 117 (Ala. 1988) ("Ordinary acts of ownership, consistent with permissive possession, are not sufficient to constitute an adverse holding capable of ever ripening into a title."); and Cotton v. May , 293 Ala. 212 , 215, 301 So.2d 168 , 170 (1974) ("[A] permissive possession does not ripen into title adverse to the owner unless there has been such a repudiation of the permissive possession as to afford notice of an adverse claim.").

2008See Ex parte Clark, 643 So.2d 977, 978 (Ala.1994) (stating that “[a] defendant in an action for partition of real estate or for the sale of real estate for a division of the proceeds, who denies the plaintiffs title or sets up an adverse claim, is entitled to a jury trial on demand, if the demand complies with Rule 38(b), Ala. R.

1997Second, this Court has previously written: “A defendant in an action for partition of real estate or for the sale of real estate for a division of the proceeds, who denies the plaintiffs title or sets up an adverse claim, is entitled to a jury trial on demand, if the demand complies with Rule 38(b), Ala.R.Civ.P.; Ala.Code 1975, § 6-8-1.” Ex parte Clark, 643 So.2d 977, at 978 (Ala.1994).

1995The "equitable lien" concept, for example, does not help AmSouth, because "knowledge of an adverse claim to the title is fatal to the ... claim for [an equitable lien]." Manning v. Wingo, 577 So.2d 865, 869 (Ala. 1991); Gresham v. Ware, 79 Ala. 192, 199 (1885).

1995The "equitable lien" concept, for example, does not help AmSouth, because "knowledge of an adverse claim to the title is fatal to the . . . claim for [an equitable lien]." Manning v. Wingo , 577 So.2d 865 , 869 (Ala. 1991); Gresham v. Ware , 79 Ala. 192 , 199 (1885).

2024See Ballard v. Johns, 84 Ala. 70, 71 , 4 So. 24 , 25 (1888) (noting that a separate, but similar, statutory provision "denies to the probate court the power and jurisdiction to adjudicate, on a petition for the partition of lands, adverse claims and titles," and concluding that, "[i]f during the pendency or trial of the petition, it is made known to [the probate court] that there is a substantial adverse claim asserted by any one, the statute makes it obligatory upon [the probate court] to decline further jurisdiction of the matter").

2007For example, in Ballard v. Johns , 84 Ala. 70 , 4 So. 24 (1888), the Alabama Supreme Court noted that § 3512 of the Alabama Code of 1887 (now § 35-6-55 , Ala. Code 1975) "denies to the probate court the power and jurisdiction to adjudicate, on a petition for the partition of lands, adverse claims and titles," and concluded that "[i]f during the pendency or trial of the petition, it is made known to [the probate judge] that there is a substantial adverse claim asserted by any one, the statute makes it obligatory upon [the judge] to decline further jurisdiction of the matter." 84 Ala. at 71 , 4

1938The construction of Section 9334 of the Code (Michie) contained in Strange v. King, 228 Ala. 511 , 154 So. 115 ; Sandlin v. Anders, 210 Ala. 396 , 98 So. 299 ; Marshall v. Rogers, 230 Ala. 305 , 160 So. 865 , is to the effect that in partition' suits of lands by metes and bounds, or by sale for division when the same cannot be equitably divided among the owners, if the defendant denies the title of the complainant, or asserts an adverse claim or title in himself, such bill need not be dismissed, but the trial court may direct the issue' as to the title of the complainant, or as to such adverse

1938The construction of Section 9334 of the Code (Michie) contained in Strange v. King, 228 Ala. 511 , 154 So. 115 ; Sandlin v. Anders, 210 Ala. 396 , 98 So. 299 ; Marshall v. Rogers, 230 Ala. 305 , 160 So. 865 , is to the effect that in partition' suits of lands by metes and bounds, or by sale for division when the same cannot be equitably divided among the owners, if the defendant denies the title of the complainant, or asserts an adverse claim or title in himself, such bill need not be dismissed, but the trial court may direct the issue' as to the title of the complainant, or as to such adverse

2025App. 2016) ("Because White paid rent for the leased property until at least 2003, his possession of the leased property could not, as a matter of law, have been hostile until 2003, at the earliest."); Calhoun v. Smith, 387 So. 2d 821, 824 (Ala. 1980) (noting that "the prescribed period of time for adverse possession will not begin to run until notice of the adverse claim, or hostility, has been brought home to the true owner"); and Stewart v. Childress, 269 Ala. 87, 93 , 111 So. 2d 8, 13 (1959) ("Limitations begin to run from the date of notice of hostility but are not operative before hostili

2025App. 2016) ("Because White paid rent for the leased property until at least 2003, his possession of the leased property could not, as a matter of law, have been hostile until 2003, at the earliest."); Calhoun v. Smith, 387 So. 2d 821, 824 (Ala. 1980) (noting that "the prescribed period of time for adverse possession will not begin to run until notice of the adverse claim, or hostility, has been brought home to the true owner"); and Stewart v. Childress, 269 Ala. 87, 93 , 111 So. 2d 8, 13 (1959) ("Limitations begin to run from the date of notice of hostility but are not operative before hostili

2025App. 2016) ("Because White paid rent for the leased property until at least 2003, his possession of the leased property could not, as a matter of law, have been hostile until 2003, at the earliest."); Calhoun v. Smith, 387 So. 2d 821, 824 (Ala. 1980) (noting that "the prescribed period of time for adverse possession will not begin to run until notice of the adverse claim, or hostility, has been brought home to the true owner"); and Stewart v. Childress, 269 Ala. 87, 93 , 111 So. 2d 8, 13 (1959) ("Limitations begin to run from the date of notice of hostility but are not operative before hostili

2010Thus, to satisfy these two elements, the claimant must provide evidence tending to show that his acts of dominion and control over the property were of such character and distinction as would reasonably notify the landowner that an adverse claim is being asserted against his land.” Strickland v. Maricos, 566 So.2d 229, 232 (Ala.1990).

2010Thus, to satisfy these two elements, the claimant must provide evidence tending to show that his acts of dominion and control over the property were of such character and distinction as would reasonably notify the landowner that an adverse claim is being asserted against his land.” Strickland v. Markos, 566 So.2d 229, 232 (Ala.1990) (emphasis added).

2007Fountain Fin., Inc. v. Hines , 788 So.2d 155 , 159 (Ala. 2000) (quoting Singh v. INS , 213 F.3d 1050 , 1054 n. 8 (9th Cir.2000)).

2007Fountain Fin., Inc. v. Hines, 788 So.2d 155, 159 (Ala.2000) (quoting Singh v. INS, 213 F.3d 1050 , 1054 n. 8 (9th Cir.2000)).

2006I simply do not think that the adverse presumption arising from the husband's invocation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, even when coupled with the other factors in this case, should be considered evidence "sufficiently strong to lead the guarded discretion of a reasonable and just mind to the conclusion of adultery as a necessary inference." Boldon v. Boldon , 354 So.2d 275 , 276 (Ala.Civ.App. 1978) (emphasis added).

2006I simply do not think that the adverse presumption arising from the husband's invocation of his Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, even when coupled with the other factors in this case, should be considered evidence "sufficiently strong to lead the guarded discretion of a reasonable and just mind to the conclusion of adultery as a necessary inference." Boldon v. Boldon, 354 So.2d 275, 276 (Ala.Civ.App.1978)(emphasis added).

2005See Godwin v. Dorgan , 811 So.2d 503 (Ala. 2001); Shirley v. Mazzone , 591 So.2d 469 (Ala. 1991); and Jernigan v. Jernigan , 678 So.2d 1169 (Ala.Civ.App. 1996).

1997See also Ellett v. Wade , 47 Ala. 456 , 466 (1872) [where the court stated 'I have not been *Page 457 able to find any case, either in this country or in England, where the court of chancery has assumed jurisdiction to give relief to a complainant, who has made improvements upon land, the legal title to which was in the defendant.' (citations omitted)].

1994See Jones v. Jones, 423 So.2d 158 (Ala.1982).