adverse claim in California

2025(Kumar, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 1123; see Mayer, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1240 [plaintiffs’ possession disturbed and statute of limitations on quiet title claim began to run when 11 they were notified by letter from tax collector their property had been sold at public auction for nonpayment of taxes].) This case is therefore distinguishable from cases in which courts have found “[the] mere notice of an adverse claim is not enough to commence the owner’s statute of limitations.” (Salazar, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 478 ; see id. at p. 482 [notice of default insufficient to dispute or distu

2025(Kumar, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 1123; see Mayer, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1240 [plaintiffs’ possession disturbed and statute of limitations on quiet title claim began to run when 11 they were notified by letter from tax collector their property had been sold at public auction for nonpayment of taxes].) This case is therefore distinguishable from cases in which courts have found “[the] mere notice of an adverse claim is not enough to commence the owner’s statute of limitations.” (Salazar, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 478 ; see id. at p. 482 [notice of default insufficient to dispute or distu

2025Each day’s assertion of such adverse claim gives a renewed cause of action to quiet title until such action is brought.” (Secret Valley Land Co. v. Perry (1921) 187 Cal. 420 , 426–427.) 10 all property taxes on the property.

1960(Liebrand v. Otto, 56 Cal. 248 .) The continued assertion of an adverse claim constitutes from day to day a new cause of action.” Appellant places considerable reliance in the holding in *228 Secret Valley Land Co. v. Perry, supra, 187 Cal. 420 .

2021(People v. Flores, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 397; see People v. Cook (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1334, 1351 [trial court does not have to give an instruction allowing the jury “to draw inferences more favorable to the defense, based on the prosecution’s failure to preserve . . . evidence,” where “no bad faith failure to preserve the evidence [is] shown”]; People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 811 [“[a]lthough an adverse instruction may be a proper response to a due process violation,” where there is “no such violation,” the trial court is “not required to impose any sanction, including jury instructions”]

2021(People v. Flores, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 397; see People v. Cook (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1334, 1351 [trial court does not have to give an instruction allowing the jury “to draw inferences more favorable to the defense, based on the prosecution’s failure to preserve . . . evidence,” where “no bad faith failure to preserve the evidence [is] shown”]; People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 811 [“[a]lthough an adverse instruction may be a proper response to a due process violation,” where there is “no such violation,” the trial court is “not required to impose any sanction, including jury instructions”]

2017(Cf. Fleming v. Howard (1906) 150 Cal. 28, 30 [ 87 P. 908 ]; Miller v. Johnston (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 289, 294 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 699 ].) In view of our conclusion that Vieira’s evidence did not, as a matter of law, compel the conclusion that its occupation of the private road was sufficiently hostile to McCoys’ right-of-way as to provide notice of an adverse claim, we need not consider the adequacy of evidence supporting other findings.

2017(Cf. Fleming v. Howard (1906) 150 Cal. 28, 30 [ 87 P. 908 ]; Miller v. Johnston (1969) 270 Cal.App.2d 289, 294 [ 75 Cal.Rptr. 699 ].) In view of our conclusion that Vieira’s evidence did not, as a matter of law, compel the conclusion that its occupation of the private road was sufficiently hostile to McCoys’ right-of-way as to provide notice of an adverse claim, we need not consider the adequacy of evidence supporting other findings.

2000In overruling the objection the court stated: “It is generally recognized that a provision for attorney’s fees will be applicable even though the action is instigated by the obligor rather than the obligee. ‘Attorney’s fees may be recovered where the adverse claim is made by the mortgagor or grantor. . . .’ ” (Id. at p. 832; see Techow v. Pollack (1952) 111 Cal.App.2d 556, 558 [ 244 P.2d 915 ]; Hewlett v. Evans (1922) 56 Cal.App. 344, 347 [ 205 P. 492 ].) 10 In Boyd v. Oscar Fisher Co. (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 368 [ 258 Cal.Rptr. 473 ], an attorney’s fees clause was contained in invoices sent by

2000In overruling the objection the court stated: “It is generally recognized that a provision for attorney’s fees will be applicable even though the action is instigated by the obligor rather than the obligee. ‘Attorney’s fees may be recovered where the adverse claim is made by the mortgagor or grantor. . . .’ ” (Id. at p. 832; see Techow v. Pollack (1952) 111 Cal.App.2d 556, 558 [ 244 P.2d 915 ]; Hewlett v. Evans (1922) 56 Cal.App. 344, 347 [ 205 P. 492 ].) 10 In Boyd v. Oscar Fisher Co. (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 368 [ 258 Cal.Rptr. 473 ], an attorney’s fees clause was contained in invoices sent by

1969Such evidence raises a presumption that the road is used with an adverse claim of right to do so, and in the absence of evidence of mere permissive use of the' road, it will be sufficient upon which to sustain a judgment quieting title to the easement therein.” (Wallace v. Whitmore (1941) 47 Cal.App.2d 369, 372-373 [ 117 P.2d 926 ], See also Van Amersfoort v. Young (1951) 105 Cal.App.2d 22, 25-27 [ 332 P.2d 569 ]; Shonafelt v. Busath (1944) 66 Cal.App.2d 5, 7-9 [ 151 P.2d 873 ]; Crawford v. Lambert (1934) 136 Cal.App. 617, 621 [ 29 P.2d 428 ]; and Wells v. Dias (1922) 57 Cal.App. 670, 672 [ 20

1969Such evidence raises a presumption that the road is used with an adverse claim of right to do so, and in the absence of evidence of mere permissive use of the' road, it will be sufficient upon which to sustain a judgment quieting title to the easement therein.” (Wallace v. Whitmore (1941) 47 Cal.App.2d 369, 372-373 [ 117 P.2d 926 ], See also Van Amersfoort v. Young (1951) 105 Cal.App.2d 22, 25-27 [ 332 P.2d 569 ]; Shonafelt v. Busath (1944) 66 Cal.App.2d 5, 7-9 [ 151 P.2d 873 ]; Crawford v. Lambert (1934) 136 Cal.App. 617, 621 [ 29 P.2d 428 ]; and Wells v. Dias (1922) 57 Cal.App. 670, 672 [ 20

1954The lower owner is injured at once and the law gives him a remedy, and, if he fails to avail himself of it, the appropriation may, by lapse of time, ripen into an absolute right.’ (Bathgate v. Irvine, 126 Cal. 135, 141 [ 58 P. 442, 444 , 77 Am.St.Rep. 158 ]; Pyramid Land etc. Co. v. Scott, 51 Cal.App. 634, 638 [ 197 P. 398 ].) An upper riparian owner may gain a right by prescription as against the rights of the lower riparian *571 owner by proof that the latter had actual notice of the adverse claim of the upper owner, or that the circumstances were such, as for instance the use of all the wat

1954The lower owner is injured at once and the law gives him a remedy, and, if he fails to avail himself of it, the appropriation may, by lapse of time, ripen into an absolute right.’ (Bathgate v. Irvine, 126 Cal. 135, 141 [ 58 P. 442, 444 , 77 Am.St.Rep. 158 ]; Pyramid Land etc. Co. v. Scott, 51 Cal.App. 634, 638 [ 197 P. 398 ].) An upper riparian owner may gain a right by prescription as against the rights of the lower riparian *571 owner by proof that the latter had actual notice of the adverse claim of the upper owner, or that the circumstances were such, as for instance the use of all the wat

2016The use may be such that the trier of fact is justified in inferring an adverse claim and user and imputing constructive knowledge thereof to the owner.’ ” (Id. at pp. 40-41, quoting O’Banion v. Borba (1948) 32 Cal.2d 145, 148-149 [ 195 P.2d 10 ].) Each inquiry depends on “ ‘the facts and circumstances attending the use.’ ” (County of Los Angeles v. Berk (1980) 26 Cal.3d 201, 214 [ 161 Cal.Rptr. 742 , 605 P.2d 381 ], citations omitted (Berk); see Mulch v. Nagle (1921) 51 Cal.App. 559, 567 [ 197 P. 421 ] [“Whether a particular strip of land has been dedicated or abandoned to the public for high

2016The use may be such that the trier of fact is justified in inferring an adverse claim and user and imputing constructive knowledge thereof to the owner.’” (Id. at pp. 40-41, quoting O’Banion v. Borba (1948) 32 Cal.2d 145, 148-149 .) Each inquiry depends on “‘the facts and circumstances attending the use.’” (County of Los Angeles v. Berk (1980) 26 Cal.3d 201, 214 (Berk), citation omitted; Mulch v. Nagle (1921) 51 Cal.App. 559, 567 [“Whether a particular strip of land has been dedicated or abandoned to the public for highway purposes depends upon the circumstances of each case”].) An owner may a

2021(People v. Flores, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 397; see People v. Cook (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1334, 1351 [trial court does not have to give an instruction allowing the jury “to draw inferences more favorable to the defense, based on the prosecution’s failure to preserve . . . evidence,” where “no bad faith failure to preserve the evidence [is] shown”]; People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 811 [“[a]lthough an adverse instruction may be a proper response to a due process violation,” where there is “no such violation,” the trial court is “not required to impose any sanction, including jury instructions”]

2021(People v. Flores, supra, 9 Cal.5th at p. 397; see People v. Cook (2007) 40 Cal.4th 1334, 1351 [trial court does not have to give an instruction allowing the jury “to draw inferences more favorable to the defense, based on the prosecution’s failure to preserve . . . evidence,” where “no bad faith failure to preserve the evidence [is] shown”]; People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 811 [“[a]lthough an adverse instruction may be a proper response to a due process violation,” where there is “no such violation,” the trial court is “not required to impose any sanction, including jury instructions”]

2017This knowledge may be either actual or constructive, resulting from notice either express or implied.’ (Clark v. Redlich (1957) 147 Cal.App.2d 500, 508 [ 305 P.2d 239 ].)” (Gerhard v. Stephens (1968) 68 Cal.2d 864, 903 [ 69 Cal.Rptr. 612 , 442 P.2d 692 ].) Clark elaborated that, “[although certain uses of a servient tenement by their very nature may constitute notice of an adverse claim, [citation] other uses thereof may appear to be only the reasonable exercise of proprietary rights, and would not be the basis for an implication of such notice.” (Clark, supra, at p. 508 .) What kinds of use a

2017This knowledge may be either actual or constructive, resulting from notice either express or implied.’ (Clark v. Redlich (1957) 147 Cal.App.2d 500, 508 [ 305 P.2d 239 ].)” (Gerhard v. Stephens (1968) 68 Cal.2d 864, 903 [ 69 Cal.Rptr. 612 , 442 P.2d 692 ].) Clark elaborated that, “[although certain uses of a servient tenement by their very nature may constitute notice of an adverse claim, [citation] other uses thereof may appear to be only the reasonable exercise of proprietary rights, and would not be the basis for an implication of such notice.” (Clark, supra, at p. 508 .) What kinds of use a

2017This knowledge may be either actual or constructive, resulting from notice either express or implied.’ (Clark v. Redlich (1957) 147 Cal.App.2d 500, 508 [ 305 P.2d 239 ].)” (Gerhard v. Stephens (1968) 68 Cal.2d 864, 903 [ 69 Cal.Rptr. 612 , 442 P.2d 692 ].) Clark elaborated that, “[although certain uses of a servient tenement by their very nature may constitute notice of an adverse claim, [citation] other uses thereof may appear to be only the reasonable exercise of proprietary rights, and would not be the basis for an implication of such notice.” (Clark, supra, at p. 508 .) What kinds of use a

2017This knowledge may be either actual or constructive, resulting from notice either express or implied.’ (Clark v. Redlich (1957) 147 Cal.App.2d 500, 508 [ 305 P.2d 239 ].)” (Gerhard v. Stephens (1968) 68 Cal.2d 864, 903 [ 69 Cal.Rptr. 612 , 442 P.2d 692 ].) Clark elaborated that, “[although certain uses of a servient tenement by their very nature may constitute notice of an adverse claim, [citation] other uses thereof may appear to be only the reasonable exercise of proprietary rights, and would not be the basis for an implication of such notice.” (Clark, supra, at p. 508 .) What kinds of use a

1956The possession must be adverse, and the record owner must either have actual knowledge of the claims of the adverse claimant, or, as this' court said in Wood v. Davidson, 62 Cal.App.2d 885, 890 [ 145 P.2d 659 ] : “. . . the possession must be so open, visible and notorious that it will raise a presumption of notice to him of the adverse claim.” In Shonafelt v. Busath, 66 Cal.App.2d 5, 7 [ 151 P.2d 873 ], the court laid down the following rule which has been generally stated in many eases: . . to establish an easement in the lands of another by prescription, ... all the elements necessary to ac

1956The possession must be adverse, and the record owner must either have actual knowledge of the claims of the adverse claimant, or, as this' court said in Wood v. Davidson, 62 Cal.App.2d 885, 890 [ 145 P.2d 659 ] : “. . . the possession must be so open, visible and notorious that it will raise a presumption of notice to him of the adverse claim.” In Shonafelt v. Busath, 66 Cal.App.2d 5, 7 [ 151 P.2d 873 ], the court laid down the following rule which has been generally stated in many eases: . . to establish an easement in the lands of another by prescription, ... all the elements necessary to ac

1965So long as the adverse claim lies dormant and inactive, the owner of the superior title may not be incommoded by it, and has the privilege of allowing it to stand indefinitely.” (31 Cal. Jur.2d 552.) Under similar circumstances, where a plaintiff and his grantor had always remained in possession of real property and a defendant was never in possession, the court said: “The right of the plaintiffs to have their title to the land quieted, as against a claim asserted by the defendant under this deed, was not barred, and could not be, while the plaintiffs and their grantors remained in the actual

1965So long as the adverse claim lies dormant and inactive, the owner of the superior title may not be incommoded by it, and has the privilege of allowing it to stand indefinitely.” (31 Cal. Jur.2d 552.) Under similar circumstances, where a plaintiff and his grantor had always remained in possession of real property and a defendant was never in possession, the court said: “The right of the plaintiffs to have their title to the land quieted, as against a claim asserted by the defendant under this deed, was not barred, and could not be, while the plaintiffs and their grantors remained in the actual

1992(City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando (1975) 14 Cal.3d 199, 269 [ 123 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 537 P.2d 1250 ]; Jaffray v. Mies (1947) 80 Cal.App.2d 291, 293 [ 181 P.2d 672 ].) In Jaffray a quiet title decree was rendered against the claimant to property.

1992(City of Los Angeles v. City of San Fernando (1975) 14 Cal.3d 199, 269 [ 123 Cal.Rptr. 1 , 537 P.2d 1250 ]; Jaffray v. Mies (1947) 80 Cal.App.2d 291, 293 [ 181 P.2d 672 ].) In Jaffray a quiet title decree was rendered against the claimant to property.

2013(See People v. Cooper (1991) 53 Cal.3d 771, 811 ; People v. Zamora (1980) 28 Cal.3d 88, 96 .) However, absent bad faith, a defendant is not entitled to any sanction, including an adverse-inference jury instruction, even when such an instruction is specifically requested: “Although an adverse instruction may be a proper response to a due process violation [citation], there was no such violation in this case.

1993As the California Supreme Court has stated in response to the argument that at a minimum, the trial court should have given a favorable jury instruction under People v. Zamora, supra, 28 Cal.3d 88 : “Although an adverse instruction may be a proper response to a due process violation [citation], there was no such violation in this case.

1958The ease of Smith v. Skrbek, 71 Cal.App.2d 351 [ 162 P.2d 674 ], cited by appellants, says that the “use of the roadway must be so obvious as to constitute implied notice of the adverse claim.” This standard is met in full measure at bar.

1958The ease of Smith v. Skrbek, 71 Cal.App.2d 351 [ 162 P.2d 674 ], cited by appellants, says that the “use of the roadway must be so obvious as to constitute implied notice of the adverse claim.” This standard is met in full measure at bar.

2025(Kumar, supra, 71 Cal.App.5th at p. 1123; see Mayer, supra, 43 Cal.4th at p. 1240 [plaintiffs’ possession disturbed and statute of limitations on quiet title claim began to run when 11 they were notified by letter from tax collector their property had been sold at public auction for nonpayment of taxes].) This case is therefore distinguishable from cases in which courts have found “[the] mere notice of an adverse claim is not enough to commence the owner’s statute of limitations.” (Salazar, supra, 236 Cal.App.4th at p. 478 ; see id. at p. 482 [notice of default insufficient to dispute or distu

2018However, the general rule in quiet title actions (usually articulated in cases involving real property, not personal property) is that the statute of limitations “‘“does not run against one in possession of land.”’” (Salazar v. Thomas (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 467, 477 ; accord, Muktarian v. Barmby (1965) 63 Cal.2d 558, 560 (Muktarian); Crestmar Owners Assn. v. 12 Stapakis (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1223, 1228 .) Even if a party in possession knows of a potential adverse claim, “there is no reason to put him to the expense and inconvenience of litigation until such a claim is pressed against him.” (M

2024The use may be such that the trier of fact is justified in inferring an adverse claim and user and imputing constructive knowledge thereof to the owner.” ’ [Citation.] Each inquiry depends on ‘ “the facts and circumstances attending the use.” ’ ” ( Coldwater, supra, 1 Cal.App.5th at pp. 1027-1028; Gion, at pp. 40-41; County of Los Angeles v. Berk (1980) 26 Cal.3d 201, 214 .) After March 4, 1972, an implied dedication to the public may be created under particular circumstances when a governmental entity has visibly improved, maintained, or cleaned private land by the expenditure of public 10 Su

2016The use may be such that the trier of fact is justified in inferring an adverse claim and user and imputing constructive knowledge thereof to the owner.’” (Id. at pp. 40-41, quoting O’Banion v. Borba (1948) 32 Cal.2d 145, 148-149 .) Each inquiry depends on “‘the facts and circumstances attending the use.’” (County of Los Angeles v. Berk (1980) 26 Cal.3d 201, 214 (Berk), citation omitted; Mulch v. Nagle (1921) 51 Cal.App. 559, 567 [“Whether a particular strip of land has been dedicated or abandoned to the public for highway purposes depends upon the circumstances of each case”].) An owner may a

2016In reviewing the landowners’ argument that “there is not sufficient evidence to satisfy the Gion-Dietz[, supra, 2 Cal.3d 29 ] criteria,” the Blasius court explained: “[T]he critical question of fact [is] whether the use shown to have been made of the property by the public is ‘“such that the trier of fact is justified in inferring an adverse claim and user and imputing constructive knowledge thereof to the owner.”’” (Blasius, at pp. 824–825.) Emphasizing that the testimony showed (as it did in this case) that the public used the road in the belief they had the right to do so, the court observe

2016In reviewing the landowners’ argument that “there is not sufficient evidence to satisfy the Gion-Dietz[, supra, 2 Cal.3d 29 ] criteria,” the Blasius court explained: “[T]he critical question of fact [is] whether the use shown to have been made of the property by the public is ‘“such that the trier of fact is justified in inferring an adverse claim and user and imputing constructive knowledge thereof to the owner.”’” (Blasius, at pp. 824–825.) Emphasizing that the testimony showed (as it did in this case) that the public used the road in the belief they had the right to do so, the court observe

2023(Bulwer Consolidated Mining Co. v. Standard Consolidated Mining Co. (1890) 83 Cal. 589, 609 (Bulwer).) 2.

1906Co., 83 Cal. 589 , [ 28 Pac. 1102 ], that the purpose of averring an adverse claim is to notify defendant of the nature of the action and requiring him to set forth and litigate any adverse title he may claim to have or to disclaim having such title expressly or by default; that “the only material issues tendered by a complaint in this class of cases relates to the title of the real property described in the complaint; therefore there was no necessity for a finding upon the formal but immaterial issue, as to whether the *152 defendant had asserted an adverse title before the commencement of th

2018However, the general rule in quiet title actions (usually articulated in cases involving real property, not personal property) is that the statute of limitations “‘“does not run against one in possession of land.”’” (Salazar v. Thomas (2015) 236 Cal.App.4th 467, 477 ; accord, Muktarian v. Barmby (1965) 63 Cal.2d 558, 560 (Muktarian); Crestmar Owners Assn. v. 12 Stapakis (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1223, 1228 .) Even if a party in possession knows of a potential adverse claim, “there is no reason to put him to the expense and inconvenience of litigation until such a claim is pressed against him.” (M

2009If nothing earlier had alerted plaintiffs that they were not obtaining free and clear title to their properties, this gave them actual knowledge of the existence of the deed restriction and of defendants’ prior nondisclosure of this condition. *1395 Plaintiffs also argue that a person holding legal title may bring an action to quiet title at any time that a “hostile claim is asserted in some manner to jeopardize the superior title.” Crestmar Owners Assn. v. Stapakis (2007) 157 Cal.App.4th 1223, 1228 [ 69 Cal.Rptr.3d 231 ] explained, “the statute of limitations for an action to quiet title does

2016The use may be such that the trier of fact is justified in inferring an adverse claim and user and imputing constructive knowledge thereof to the owner.’ ” (Id. at pp. 40-41, quoting O’Banion v. Borba (1948) 32 Cal.2d 145, 148-149 [ 195 P.2d 10 ].) Each inquiry depends on “ ‘the facts and circumstances attending the use.’ ” (County of Los Angeles v. Berk (1980) 26 Cal.3d 201, 214 [ 161 Cal.Rptr. 742 , 605 P.2d 381 ], citations omitted (Berk); see Mulch v. Nagle (1921) 51 Cal.App. 559, 567 [ 197 P. 421 ] [“Whether a particular strip of land has been dedicated or abandoned to the public for high

2016In reviewing the landowners’ argument that “there is not sufficient evidence to satisfy the Gion-Dietz[, supra, 2 Cal.3d 29 ] criteria,” the Blasius court explained: “[T]he critical question of fact [is] whether the use shown to have been made of the property by the public is ‘“such that the trier of fact is justified in inferring an adverse claim and user and imputing constructive knowledge thereof to the owner.”’” (Blasius, at pp. 824–825.) Emphasizing that the testimony showed (as it did in this case) that the public used the road in the belief they had the right to do so, the court observe

2000In overruling the objection the court stated: “It is generally recognized that a provision for attorney’s fees will be applicable even though the action is instigated by the obligor rather than the obligee. ‘Attorney’s fees may be recovered where the adverse claim is made by the mortgagor or grantor. . . .’ ” (Id. at p. 832; see Techow v. Pollack (1952) 111 Cal.App.2d 556, 558 [ 244 P.2d 915 ]; Hewlett v. Evans (1922) 56 Cal.App. 344, 347 [ 205 P. 492 ].) 10 In Boyd v. Oscar Fisher Co. (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 368 [ 258 Cal.Rptr. 473 ], an attorney’s fees clause was contained in invoices sent by

2000In overruling the objection the court stated: “It is generally recognized that a provision for attorney’s fees will be applicable even though the action is instigated by the obligor rather than the obligee. ‘Attorney’s fees may be recovered where the adverse claim is made by the mortgagor or grantor. . . .’ ” (Id. at p. 832; see Techow v. Pollack (1952) 111 Cal.App.2d 556, 558 [ 244 P.2d 915 ]; Hewlett v. Evans (1922) 56 Cal.App. 344, 347 [ 205 P. 492 ].) 10 In Boyd v. Oscar Fisher Co. (1989) 210 Cal.App.3d 368 [ 258 Cal.Rptr. 473 ], an attorney’s fees clause was contained in invoices sent by