15 Maine opinions name it 2 courts 1847–2008 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Maine courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Gagner v. Kittery Water Districtgreen2 sentences2008One who has "knowledge of such facts as would lead a fair and prudent man, using ordinary caution, to make further inquiries" is chargeable with notice of "the facts by which ordinary diligence he would have ascertained." Gagner v. Kittery Water Dist., Me., 385 A,2d 206, 207 (Me. 1978) (quoting Knapp, 79 Me. at 204 , 9 A. at 124 ). 1981One who has “knowledge of such facts as would lead a fair and prudent man, using ordinary caution, to make further inquiries” is chargeable with notice of “the facts which by ordinary diligence he would have ascertained.” Gagner v. Kittery Water Dist., Me., 385 A.2d 206, 207 (1978), quoting from Knapp v. Bailey, 79 Me. 195, 204 , 9 A. 122, 124 (1887). | 2 | 2 |
Knapp v. Baileygreen2 sentences2008One who has "knowledge of such facts as would lead a fair and prudent man, using ordinary caution, to make further inquiries" is chargeable with notice of "the facts by which ordinary diligence he would have ascertained." Gagner v. Kittery Water Dist., Me., 385 A,2d 206, 207 (Me. 1978) (quoting Knapp, 79 Me. at 204 , 9 A. at 124 ). 2008One who has "knowledge of such facts as would lead a fair and prudent man, using ordinary caution, to make further inquiries" is chargeable with notice of "the facts by which ordinary diligence he would have ascertained." Gagner v. Kittery Water Dist., Me., 385 A,2d 206, 207 (Me. 1978) (quoting Knapp, 79 Me. at 204 , 9 A. at 124 ). | 1 | 2 |
Frost Vacationland Properties, Inc. v. Palmergreen2 sentences2005See Frost Vacationland Properties Inc. v. Palmer, 1999 ME 15 { 12, 723 A.2d at 421-22 . 2005See Frost Vacationland Properties Inc. v. Palmer, 1999 ME 15 { 12, 723 A.2d at 421-22 . | 1 | 1 |
Emerson v. Maine Rural Missions Ass'ngreen2 sentences1999“Such notice need not be actual; it is sufficient to prove acts so open[, visible,] and notorious that the owner’s knowledge of them and of their adverse character may be presumed.” Emerson, 560 A.2d at 3 . (citations omitted); see also Estate of Stone, 621 A.2d at 854 . [¶ 12] The MacLeod family’s possession and use of the parcel were sufficiently apparent to put the true owner on notice that they were making an adverse claim of ownership. 1999See Emerson, 560 A,2d at 3 . | 1 | 1 |
Estate of Stone v. Hansongreen1 sentence1999“Such notice need not be actual; it is sufficient to prove acts so open[, visible,] and notorious that the owner’s knowledge of them and of their adverse character may be presumed.” Emerson, 560 A.2d at 3 . (citations omitted); see also Estate of Stone, 621 A.2d at 854 . [¶ 12] The MacLeod family’s possession and use of the parcel were sufficiently apparent to put the true owner on notice that they were making an adverse claim of ownership. | 1 | 1 |
Falvo v. Pejepscot Industrial Park, Inc.green2 sentences1998Park, Inc., 1997 ME 66, ¶ 13 , 691 A.2d 1240, 1244 (“A claimant asserting a prescriptive easement must prove that the true owner knew of the adverse claim and acquiesced.”). 1998Park, Inc., 1997 ME 66, ¶ 13 , 691 A.2d 1240, 1244 (“A claimant asserting a prescriptive easement must prove that the true owner knew of the adverse claim and acquiesced.”). | 1 | 1 |
Glidden v. Beldengreen1 sentence1997Glidden v. Belden, 684 A.2d 1306, 1317 (Me.1996). | 1 | 1 |
Ricker v. Hibbardgreen1 sentence1984Our Court has recognized that “[i]t is not unusual for an adverse possession to begin under a mistake as to title, perhaps it is so in most cases where a party is honest.” Richardson v. Watts, 94 Me. 476, 487 , 48 A. 180, 185 (1901), quoting Ricker v. Hibbard, 73 Me. 105, 107 (1881). | 1 | 1 |
Richardson v. Wattsgreen2 sentences1984Our Court has recognized that “[i]t is not unusual for an adverse possession to begin under a mistake as to title, perhaps it is so in most cases where a party is honest.” Richardson v. Watts, 94 Me. 476, 487 , 48 A. 180, 185 (1901), quoting Ricker v. Hibbard, 73 Me. 105, 107 (1881). 1984Our Court has recognized that “[i]t is not unusual for an adverse possession to begin under a mistake as to title, perhaps it is so in most cases where a party is honest.” Richardson v. Watts, 94 Me. 476, 487 , 48 A. 180, 185 (1901), quoting Ricker v. Hibbard, 73 Me. 105, 107 (1881). | 1 | 1 |
Holden v. Pagegreen2 sentences1984See Holden v. Page, 118 Me. 242 , 107 A. 492 (1919) (payment of taxes, though not probative of possession, tends to prove claim of title). 1984See Holden v. Page, 118 Me. 242 , 107 A. 492 (1919) (payment of taxes, though not probative of possession, tends to prove claim of title). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Duguaygreen2 sentences1970“With reference in (b) to the conversation with the juror, and in (c) to the social visit at the recreation room, I consider the applicable rule to be that prejudice will be presumed until rebutted. ‘In reaching this conclusion we apply the principle that by a separation of the jury and a conversation with a third party by a juror, prejudice will be presumed until rebutted by the State.’ ****** ‘A respondent is sufficiently protected if the State is compelled to rebut the adverse presumption by clear and convincing proof.’ State v. Duguay (1962) 158 Me. 61, 67, 69 , 178 A.2d 129 ; State v. Woo 1970“With reference in (b) to the conversation with the juror, and in (c) to the social visit at the recreation room, I consider the applicable rule to be that prejudice will be presumed until rebutted. ‘In reaching this conclusion we apply the principle that by a separation of the jury and a conversation with a third party by a juror, prejudice will be presumed until rebutted by the State.’ ****** ‘A respondent is sufficiently protected if the State is compelled to rebut the adverse presumption by clear and convincing proof.’ State v. Duguay (1962) 158 Me. 61, 67, 69 , 178 A.2d 129 ; State v. Woo | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Maine. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Maine Gravel Services, Inc. v. Haining
green
2 sentences2006Maine Gravel Sewices, 171c. v.Ui7iizi11g, 1998 ME 18 , 7 6, 704 A.2d at 419 . .The - circumstances of this particuiar case indicate that Mr. Hill was iiii-~tir~iioiisly marking the boundaries and asserting his control over the land. 2006Maine Gravel Sewices, 171c. v.Ui7iizi11g, 1998 ME 18 , 7 6, 704 A.2d at 419 . .The - circumstances of this particuiar case indicate that Mr. Hill was iiii-~tir~iioiisly marking the boundaries and asserting his control over the land. | 2 | 1999–2006 |
Striefel v. Charles-Keyt-Leaman Partnership
green
2 sentences2006Streifel, 1999 h4E 113, n5, 733 A.2d at 991 . sufficiently apparent to put the true owner on notice that the claimant was malung an adverse claim of ownership. 3. 2002Hence, a claimant will fail to satisfy the requirements of openness, visibility, and notoriety unless the possession and use were sufficiently apparent to put the true owner on notice that the claimant was making an adverse claim of ownership.” Id. | 2 | 2002–2006 |
Landry v. Giguere
green
1 sentence2001Such an occupation would be conditional and could. not form the basis of an adverse possession claim. /d. (citing Landry v. Giguere, 127 Me. 264, 268 , 143 A 1, 2-3 (1928)4. | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Howe v. Natale
green
1 sentence1998McMullen v. Dowley, 418 A.2d at 1152 . 6 [¶7] The defendants contend that, consistent with reasonable forestry practices, their logging has been continuous over fifty years, and the court found that the use made of the property by the defendants was “in kind and degree the same as the use and enjoyment to be expected of the average owner of such property.” Howe v. Natale, 451 A.2d at 1200 . | 1 | 1998–1998 |
McMullen v. Dowley
green
1 sentence1998McMullen v. Dowley, 418 A.2d at 1152 . 6 [¶7] The defendants contend that, consistent with reasonable forestry practices, their logging has been continuous over fifty years, and the court found that the use made of the property by the defendants was “in kind and degree the same as the use and enjoyment to be expected of the average owner of such property.” Howe v. Natale, 451 A.2d at 1200 . | 1 | 1998–1998 |
State v. Woods
green
2 sentences1970“With reference in (b) to the conversation with the juror, and in (c) to the social visit at the recreation room, I consider the applicable rule to be that prejudice will be presumed until rebutted. ‘In reaching this conclusion we apply the principle that by a separation of the jury and a conversation with a third party by a juror, prejudice will be presumed until rebutted by the State.’ ****** ‘A respondent is sufficiently protected if the State is compelled to rebut the adverse presumption by clear and convincing proof.’ State v. Duguay (1962) 158 Me. 61, 67, 69 , 178 A.2d 129 ; State v. Woo 1970“With reference in (b) to the conversation with the juror, and in (c) to the social visit at the recreation room, I consider the applicable rule to be that prejudice will be presumed until rebutted. ‘In reaching this conclusion we apply the principle that by a separation of the jury and a conversation with a third party by a juror, prejudice will be presumed until rebutted by the State.’ ****** ‘A respondent is sufficiently protected if the State is compelled to rebut the adverse presumption by clear and convincing proof.’ State v. Duguay (1962) 158 Me. 61, 67, 69 , 178 A.2d 129 ; State v. Woo | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Parker v. Prescott
neutral
2 sentences1950This was that: “To exclude real estate from the area described in a recorded deed, the grantee must have actual knowledge of the adverse claim of ownership prior to accepting the deed; otherwise the real estate is included and conveyed by a deed from its record owner to a new grantee.” The defendant, pressing his allegation that the refusal to give it constituted error, cites us to Parker v. Prescott, 86 Me. 241 ; 29 A. 1007 , and 45 Am. 1950This was that: “To exclude real estate from the area described in a recorded deed, the grantee must have actual knowledge of the adverse claim of ownership prior to accepting the deed; otherwise the real estate is included and conveyed by a deed from its record owner to a new grantee.” The defendant, pressing his allegation that the refusal to give it constituted error, cites us to Parker v. Prescott, 86 Me. 241 ; 29 A. 1007 , and 45 Am. | 1 | 1950–1950 |
Orthodox Congregational Society v. Inhabitants of Greenwich
green
1 sentence1906Soc’y v. Greenwich, 145 Mass. 112 , the court say: “Under the public statutes any person in possession of real property claiming an estate of freehold therein.....may file a petition . ... against any person making an adverse claim.’ .... | 1 | 1906–1906 |
Gayetty v. Bethune
green
1 sentence1847Bealey v. Shaw, 6 East. 208; Gayetty v. Bethune, 14 Mass. R. 49 ; Sargent v. Ballard, 9 Pick. 251; Tinkham, v. Arnold, 3 Greenl. 120; Colvin v. Burnet, 17 Wend. 564 . | 1 | 1847–1847 |
Colvin v. Burnet
green
1 sentence1847Bealey v. Shaw, 6 East. 208; Gayetty v. Bethune, 14 Mass. R. 49 ; Sargent v. Ballard, 9 Pick. 251; Tinkham, v. Arnold, 3 Greenl. 120; Colvin v. Burnet, 17 Wend. 564 . | 1 | 1847–1847 |
Parker & Edgarton v. Foote
green
1 sentence1847This doctrine has been examined and- its want of sound principle exposed in the case of Parker v. Foote, 19 Wend. 309 . | 1 | 1847–1847 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.