9 Vermont opinions name it 2 courts 1838–2025 3 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Vermont courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Russell v. Paregreen2 sentences2023See Russell v. Pare, 132 Vt. 397, 404 (1974) (describing presumption). 1979Russell v. Pare, 132 Vt. 397, 404 , 321 A.2d 77, 82 (1974). | 2 | 2 |
Rosencrantz v. Shields, Inc.green1 sentence2025Rosencrantz, 28 Md. | 1 | 1 |
Matoush v. Lovingoodgreen1 sentence2024The essential character of adverse possession is “possession . . . sufficient to put another on notice, actual or imputable, of an adverse claim to the property.” 4 Tiffany Real Prop. § 1132 (3d ed.) (emphasis added); see also Matoush v. Lovingood, 177 P.3d 1262, 1270 (Colo. 2008) (“[A] party claiming to have terminated an easement by adverse possession must prove ‘that the use interferes significantly enough with the easement owner’s enjoyment of the easement to give notice that the easement is under threat.’” (citation omitted)). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Vermont. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Chavez
green
1 sentence1939U. S. v. Chavez, 175 U. S. 509 , 44 L. ed. 255, 20 Sup. Ct. 159, holds that although a grant from the sovereign cannot be conclusively presumed from mere lapse of time, the same can be presumed if the adverse claim could have had a legal commencement and there had been mány years of peaceful ownership accompanied by the usual acts of ownership. | 1 | 1939–1939 |
Commodores Point Terminal Co. v. Hudnall
neutral
1 sentence1939The case of Commodores Point Terminal Co. v. Hudnall, 283 Fed. 150 , recognizes the presumption as applying to cases within the statute. | 1 | 1939–1939 |
Kirby v. Kirby
neutral
2 sentences1918See Waterman v. Moody, supra; Kirley v. Kirley, 236 Ill. 255 , 86 N. E. 259 . 1918See Waterman v. Moody, supra; Kirley v. Kirley, 236 Ill. 255 , 86 N. E. 259 . | 1 | 1918–1918 |
Noble v. Sylvester
neutral
1 sentence1897In Noble v. Sylvester, supra, where the defendant had set up no such claims the plaintiff was allowed to recover for stone which he had severed from the realty for a particular use, away from the farm, some thirty years after he had conveyed the farm to the defendant, the defendant in the meantime not having interfered with them nor set up an adverse claim to them. | 1 | 1897–1897 |
Selleck v. Starr
neutral
1 sentence1847The case does not therefore fall within the principle of Selleck v. Starr, 6 Vt. 194 , where it was held, that the possession and claim of a less estate under the grantor was not such an adverse claim, as rendered the deed void, the claim being subordinate to and consistent with the superior title of the grantor. | 1 | 1847–1847 |
Greeno v. Munson
green
1 sentence1838Willison v. Watkins, 3 Peters’ R. 43, Greeno v. Munson & Munson, 9 Vt. 37 . | 1 | 1838–1838 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.