15 Alabama opinions name it 3 courts 1922–2013 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Alabama courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Bogan v. Scott-Harrisgreen2 sentences2009See, e.g., Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 46 , 118 S.Ct. 966 , 140 L.Ed.2d 79 (1998) (Tt is well established that federal, state, and regional legislators are entitled to absolute immunity from civil liability for their legislative activities.’). 2009See, e.g., Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44, 46 , 118 S.Ct. 966 , 140 L.Ed.2d 79 (1998) (Tt is well established that federal, state, and regional legislators are entitled to absolute immunity from civil liability for their legislative activities.’). | 3 | 3 |
Turley v. United Statesgreen2 sentences2009See also Turley v. United States , 503 F.Supp.2d 912 , 916 (N.D.Ohio 2007) ("Defenses are as available to [a de facto officer] as they are to a duly appointed officer."). (a) The Zoning Ordinance Applying the legislative-immunity doctrine, this Court recently said: '"[T]he tort liability rule for public officials and employees of Restatement (Second) of Torts , § 895D, Public Officers (1974), is consistent with Alabama's case law development in the area of "substantive immunity." That section of the Restatement provides: "`". . . . "` "(2) A public officer acting within the general scope of hi 2009See also Turley v. United States, 503 F.Supp.2d 912, 916 (N.D.Ohio 2007) (“Defenses are as available to [a de facto officer] as they are to a duly appointed officer.”). (a) The Zoning Ordinance Applying the legislative-immunity doctrine, this Court recently said: “‘[T]he tort liability rule for public officials and employees of Restatement (Second) of Torts, § 895D, Public Officers (1974), is consistent with Alabama’s ease law development in the area of “substantive immunity.” That section of the Restatement provides: [[Image here]] “ ‘ “(2) A public officer acting within the general scope of | 2 | 2 |
Marion v. Hallgreen1 sentence2013“It is beyond doubt that the Speech or Debate Clause protects against inquiry into acts that occur in the regular course of the legislative process and into the motivation for those acts.” United States v. Brewster, 408 U.S. 501, 525 , 92 S.Ct. 2531 , 33 L.Ed.2d 507 (1971) (quoted in Marion v. Hall, 429 So.2d 937, 944 (Ala.1983) (Torbert, C.J., concurring specially)). | 1 | 1 |
Smith v. Stategreen1 sentence2013See Smith v. State, 446 So.2d 68, 72 (Ala.Crim.App.1984) (noting that in an earlier ease “the actual offense occurred prior to [January 1, 1980,] and [the defendant] was therefore tried under the common law as required by the criminal code ” and citing Ala.Code 1975, § 13A-1-7(e) (emphasis added)). | 1 | 1 |
Families Concerned About Nerve Gas Incineration v. ADEMgreen1 sentence2002The EPA Guidance from which the 10 -5 standard was derived states that the standard cannot be relied on to create enforceable rights, that it is not binding, and that it is subject to change. `The touchstone of a [legislative] rule is that it establishes a binding norm. [However,] [i]f the agency "remains free to consider the individual facts in the various cases that arise, then agency action in question has not established a binding norm."' The record before us establishes that, in calculating the risk to human health or the environment from the incineration of chemical weapons, ADEM has res | 1 | 1 |
Cooper v. State Ex Rel. Hawkinsgreen2 sentences1950See, Cooper v. State, 226 Ala. 288 , 147 So. 432 ; Dearborn v. Johnson, 234 Ala. 84 , 173 So. 864 ; Howell v. Johnson, 34 Ala.App. 570 , 42 So.2d 644 , certiorari denied Ala.Sup., 42 So.2d 649 , In the Opinion of the Justices, 249 Ala. 511 , 31 So.2d 721 , we were responding to a legislative inquiry as to a proposed act applicable to counties of 400,000 population or more according to the last or any subsequent federal census, which would require the payment to such counties of a license tax of one cent on each gallon of gasoline. 1950See, Cooper v. State, 226 Ala. 288 , 147 So. 432 ; Dearborn v. Johnson, 234 Ala. 84 , 173 So. 864 ; Howell v. Johnson, 34 Ala.App. 570 , 42 So.2d 644 , certiorari denied Ala.Sup., 42 So.2d 649 , In the Opinion of the Justices, 249 Ala. 511 , 31 So.2d 721 , we were responding to a legislative inquiry as to a proposed act applicable to counties of 400,000 population or more according to the last or any subsequent federal census, which would require the payment to such counties of a license tax of one cent on each gallon of gasoline. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Alabama. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
United States v. Brewster
green
2 sentences1983The Court in United States v. Brewster , 408 U.S. 501 , 507 , 92 S.Ct. 2531 , 2535 , 33 L.Ed.2d 507 (1971), noted the import of the Speech or Debate Clause: "The immunities of the Speech or Debate Clause were not written into the Constitution simply for the personal or private benefit of Members of Congress, but to protect the integrity of the legislative process by insuring the independence of individual legislators." Legislative immunity extends beyond mere statements made in the legislative chambers. 1983The Court in United States v. Brewster , 408 U.S. 501 , 507 , 92 S.Ct. 2531 , 2535 , 33 L.Ed.2d 507 (1971), noted the import of the Speech or Debate Clause: "The immunities of the Speech or Debate Clause were not written into the Constitution simply for the personal or private benefit of Members of Congress, but to protect the integrity of the legislative process by insuring the independence of individual legislators." Legislative immunity extends beyond mere statements made in the legislative chambers. | 2 | 1983–2013 |
Opinion of the Justices
green
2 sentences1988When there is only a minimum, the Court thought a more liberal application of the principle should be made. ". . . . " In the Opinion of the Justices , 249 Ala. 511 , 31 So.2d 721 , we were responding to a legislative inquiry as to a proposed act applicable to counties of 400,000 population or more according to the last or any subsequent federal census, which would require the payment to such counties of a license tax of one cent on each gallon of gasoline. 1988When there is only a minimum, the Court thought a more liberal application of the principle should be made. ". . . . " In the Opinion of the Justices , 249 Ala. 511 , 31 So.2d 721 , we were responding to a legislative inquiry as to a proposed act applicable to counties of 400,000 population or more according to the last or any subsequent federal census, which would require the payment to such counties of a license tax of one cent on each gallon of gasoline. | 2 | 1950–1988 |
Tutwiler Drug Co., Inc. v. City of Birmingham
green
1 sentence2007In Tutwiler Drug Co. v. City of Birmingham , 418 So.2d 102 , 104-05 (Ala. 1982), this Court stated: "[T]he tort liability rule for public officials and employees of Restatement (Second) of Torts , § 895D, Public Officers (1974), is consistent with Alabama's case law development in the area of `substantive immunity.' That section of the Restatement provides: "`. . . . "`(2) A public officer acting within the general scope of his authority is immune from tort liability for an act or omission involving the exercise of a judicial or legislative function. '" (Emphasis added.) This legislative immun | 1 | 2007–2007 |
Echols v. State
green
2 sentences2004In Echols v. State, 47 Ala.App. 23 , 249 So.2d 639 (1971), this Court discussed the origin of plain-error review in Alabama; it quoted the legislative rule in force at that time: “Section 10 of said Act reads as follows: “ ‘In all cases of automatic appeals the Appellate Court may consider, at its discretion, any testimony that was seriously prejudicial to the rights of the appellant, and may reverse thereon even though no lawful objection or exception was made thereto. 2004In Echols v. State, 47 Ala.App. 23 , 249 So.2d 639 (1971), this Court discussed the origin of plain-error review in Alabama; it quoted the legislative rule in force at that time: “Section 10 of said Act reads as follows: “ ‘In all cases of automatic appeals the Appellate Court may consider, at its discretion, any testimony that was seriously prejudicial to the rights of the appellant, and may reverse thereon even though no lawful objection or exception was made thereto. | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Webster v. Byrd
green
1 sentence2003"As one court has stated, `the availability of an absolute privilege must be reserved for those situations where the public interest is so vital and apparent that it mandates complete freedom of expression without inquiry into a defendant's motives.'" Webster v. Byrd , 494 So.2d 31 , 35 (Ala. 1986) (quoting Supry v. Bolduc , 112 N.H. 274 , 276 , 293 A.2d 767 , 769 (1972)). "'An absolutely privileged communication is one in respect of which, by reason of the occasion on which, or the matter in reference to which, it is made, no remedy can be had in a civil action, however hard it may bear upon | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Supry v. Bolduc
green
2 sentences2003"As one court has stated, `the availability of an absolute privilege must be reserved for those situations where the public interest is so vital and apparent that it mandates complete freedom of expression without inquiry into a defendant's motives.'" Webster v. Byrd , 494 So.2d 31 , 35 (Ala. 1986) (quoting Supry v. Bolduc , 112 N.H. 274 , 276 , 293 A.2d 767 , 769 (1972)). "'An absolutely privileged communication is one in respect of which, by reason of the occasion on which, or the matter in reference to which, it is made, no remedy can be had in a civil action, however hard it may bear upon 2003"As one court has stated, `the availability of an absolute privilege must be reserved for those situations where the public interest is so vital and apparent that it mandates complete freedom of expression without inquiry into a defendant's motives.'" Webster v. Byrd , 494 So.2d 31 , 35 (Ala. 1986) (quoting Supry v. Bolduc , 112 N.H. 274 , 276 , 293 A.2d 767 , 769 (1972)). "'An absolutely privileged communication is one in respect of which, by reason of the occasion on which, or the matter in reference to which, it is made, no remedy can be had in a civil action, however hard it may bear upon | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Beck v. State
green
1 sentence1982The target of appellant's challenge of said opinion is that part of the opinion in which it was held that the unconstitutional part of the Alabama death penalty statute then under consideration which precludes the judge from instructing the jury on lesser included offenses, even though a lesser included offense is supported by the evidence, did not vitiate the statute in its entirety and that the statute could be and was "salvaged by severing the preclusion clause and adopting [judicially] a procedure which would preserve the legislative requirement that the jury fix the punishment at death if | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Chaney v. State
neutral
1 sentence1964Freeman v. State, 21 Ala.App. 629 , 111 So. 188 ; Jones, Alabama Jury Instruction, § 6556. | 1 | 1964–1964 |
Freeman v. State
neutral
1 sentence1964Freeman v. State, 21 Ala.App. 629 , 111 So. 188 ; Jones, Alabama Jury Instruction, § 6556. | 1 | 1964–1964 |
Dearborn v. Johnson
green
2 sentences1950See, Cooper v. State, 226 Ala. 288 , 147 So. 432 ; Dearborn v. Johnson, 234 Ala. 84 , 173 So. 864 ; Howell v. Johnson, 34 Ala.App. 570 , 42 So.2d 644 , certiorari denied Ala.Sup., 42 So.2d 649 , In the Opinion of the Justices, 249 Ala. 511 , 31 So.2d 721 , we were responding to a legislative inquiry as to a proposed act applicable to counties of 400,000 population or more according to the last or any subsequent federal census, which would require the payment to such counties of a license tax of one cent on each gallon of gasoline. 1950See, Cooper v. State, 226 Ala. 288 , 147 So. 432 ; Dearborn v. Johnson, 234 Ala. 84 , 173 So. 864 ; Howell v. Johnson, 34 Ala.App. 570 , 42 So.2d 644 , certiorari denied Ala.Sup., 42 So.2d 649 , In the Opinion of the Justices, 249 Ala. 511 , 31 So.2d 721 , we were responding to a legislative inquiry as to a proposed act applicable to counties of 400,000 population or more according to the last or any subsequent federal census, which would require the payment to such counties of a license tax of one cent on each gallon of gasoline. | 1 | 1950–1950 |
Howell v. Johnson
neutral
1 sentence1950See, Cooper v. State, 226 Ala. 288 , 147 So. 432 ; Dearborn v. Johnson, 234 Ala. 84 , 173 So. 864 ; Howell v. Johnson, 34 Ala.App. 570 , 42 So.2d 644 , certiorari denied Ala.Sup., 42 So.2d 649 , In the Opinion of the Justices, 249 Ala. 511 , 31 So.2d 721 , we were responding to a legislative inquiry as to a proposed act applicable to counties of 400,000 population or more according to the last or any subsequent federal census, which would require the payment to such counties of a license tax of one cent on each gallon of gasoline. | 1 | 1950–1950 |
Howell v. Johnson
neutral
2 sentences1950See, Cooper v. State, 226 Ala. 288 , 147 So. 432 ; Dearborn v. Johnson, 234 Ala. 84 , 173 So. 864 ; Howell v. Johnson, 34 Ala.App. 570 , 42 So.2d 644 , certiorari denied Ala.Sup., 42 So.2d 649 , In the Opinion of the Justices, 249 Ala. 511 , 31 So.2d 721 , we were responding to a legislative inquiry as to a proposed act applicable to counties of 400,000 population or more according to the last or any subsequent federal census, which would require the payment to such counties of a license tax of one cent on each gallon of gasoline. 1950See, Cooper v. State, 226 Ala. 288 , 147 So. 432 ; Dearborn v. Johnson, 234 Ala. 84 , 173 So. 864 ; Howell v. Johnson, 34 Ala.App. 570 , 42 So.2d 644 , certiorari denied Ala.Sup., 42 So.2d 649 , In the Opinion of the Justices, 249 Ala. 511 , 31 So.2d 721 , we were responding to a legislative inquiry as to a proposed act applicable to counties of 400,000 population or more according to the last or any subsequent federal census, which would require the payment to such counties of a license tax of one cent on each gallon of gasoline. | 1 | 1950–1950 |
American Ins. Co. v. Newberry
neutral
1 sentence1936Pate v. State, 19 Ala.App. 642 , 99 So. 833 ; Berry v. State, 20 Ala.App. 102 , 100 So. 922 . *121 During the argument the following occurred: “While R. | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Berry v. State
neutral
1 sentence1936Pate v. State, 19 Ala.App. 642 , 99 So. 833 ; Berry v. State, 20 Ala.App. 102 , 100 So. 922 . *121 During the argument the following occurred: “While R. | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Pate v. State
neutral
2 sentences1936Pate v. State, 19 Ala.App. 642 , 99 So. 833 ; Berry v. State, 20 Ala.App. 102 , 100 So. 922 . *121 During the argument the following occurred: “While R. 1936Pate v. State, 19 Ala.App. 642 , 99 So. 833 ; Berry v. State, 20 Ala.App. 102 , 100 So. 922 . *121 During the argument the following occurred: “While R. | 1 | 1936–1936 |
Truax v. Corrigan
green
1 sentence1922That is not such as was condemned in Bailey v. State, supra; Truax v. Corrigan, supra; Chicago, M. & St P. R. | 1 | 1922–1922 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.