legislative rule in Wisconsin

2011Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803); [State ex rel.

2009Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 , 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803); Stitt, 114 Wis.2d at 367 , 338 N.W.2d 684 ; McDonald v. State, 80 Wis. 407, 411-12 , 50 N.W. 185 (1891). ¶ 20 Therefore, because both Wis. Stat. § 111.92 (1)(a) and Article IV, Section 17(2) require the legislature to take additional actions to amend existing law or to create new law, [13] and we have jurisdiction to interpret the Wisconsin Constitution and the Wisconsin Statutes, we have the authority to evaluate legislative compliance with § 111.92(1)(a).

2002Dist., 116 Wis. 2d 388, 392 , 342 N.W.2d 682 (1984) ("Public policy and public interest favor the public's right to inspect public records."); Newspapers, Inc. v. Breier, 89 Wis. 2d 417, 426-427 , 279 N.W.2d 179 (1979) (recognizing the legislative presumption that "where a public record is involved, the denial of inspection is contrary to the public policy and the public interest").

2002Dist., 116 Wis. 2d 388, 392 , 342 N.W.2d 682 (1984) ("Public policy and public interest favor the public's right to inspect public records."); Newspapers, Inc. v. Breier, 89 Wis. 2d 417, 426-427 , 279 N.W.2d 179 (1979) (recognizing the legislative presumption that "where a public record is involved, the denial of inspection is contrary to the public policy and the public interest").

2014Fund, 2006 WI 91, ¶117 , 293 Wis. 2d 38 , 717 N.W.2d 216 . 2 No. 2012AP829 ¶4 Applying this legislative test, we conclude that pursuant to the prohibition on anti-stacking clauses in Wis. Stat. § 632.32 (6)(d), State Farm cannot use the drive-other-car exclusion in the Beldings' policy to prevent them from stacking the uninsured motorist coverage of up to three vehicles owned and insured by them.

2014Fund, 2006 WI 91, ¶117 , 293 Wis. 2d 38 , 717 N.W.2d 216 . 2 No. 2012AP829 ¶4 Applying this legislative test, we conclude that pursuant to the prohibition on anti-stacking clauses in Wis. Stat. § 632.32 (6)(d), State Farm cannot use the drive-other-car exclusion in the Beldings' policy to prevent them from stacking the uninsured motorist coverage of up to three vehicles owned and insured by them.

2014Fund, 2006 WI 91, ¶117 , 293 Wis. 2d 38 , 717 N.W.2d 216 . 2 No. 2012AP829 ¶4 Applying this legislative test, we conclude that pursuant to the prohibition on anti-stacking clauses in Wis. Stat. § 632.32 (6)(d), State Farm cannot use the drive-other-car exclusion in the Beldings' policy to prevent them from stacking the uninsured motorist coverage of up to three vehicles owned and insured by them.

2011Milwaukee Journal Sentinel v. Dep't of Admin., 2009 WI 79, ¶¶ 19-20 , 319 Wis. 2d 439 , 768 N.W.2d 700 (concluding that "we have the authority to evaluate legislative compliance with § 111.92(1)" because "even if the statute might otherwise be characterized as a legislative rule of proceeding, we may interpret the statute and apply it to the legislative action to determine whether that action complies with the relevant constitutional mandates").

2011Milwaukee Journal Sentinel v. Dep't of Admin., 2009 WI 79, ¶¶ 19-20 , 319 Wis. 2d 439 , 768 N.W.2d 700 (concluding that "we have the authority to evaluate legislative compliance with § 111.92(1)" because "even if the statute might otherwise be characterized as a legislative rule of proceeding, we may interpret the statute and apply it to the legislative action to determine whether that action complies with the relevant constitutional mandates").

2010Ctr., Inc., 2007 WI 87, ¶ 37 , 302 Wis.2d 358 , 735 N.W.2d 30 .

2010Ctr., Inc., 2007 WI 87, ¶ 37 , 302 Wis.2d 358 , 735 N.W.2d 30 .

2009Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 , 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803); Stitt, 114 Wis.2d at 367 , 338 N.W.2d 684 ; McDonald v. State, 80 Wis. 407, 411-12 , 50 N.W. 185 (1891). ¶ 20 Therefore, because both Wis. Stat. § 111.92 (1)(a) and Article IV, Section 17(2) require the legislature to take additional actions to amend existing law or to create new law, [13] and we have jurisdiction to interpret the Wisconsin Constitution and the Wisconsin Statutes, we have the authority to evaluate legislative compliance with § 111.92(1)(a).

2009Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 , 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803); Stitt, 114 Wis.2d at 367 , 338 N.W.2d 684 ; McDonald v. State, 80 Wis. 407, 411-12 , 50 N.W. 185 (1891). ¶ 20 Therefore, because both Wis. Stat. § 111.92 (1)(a) and Article IV, Section 17(2) require the legislature to take additional actions to amend existing law or to create new law, [13] and we have jurisdiction to interpret the Wisconsin Constitution and the Wisconsin Statutes, we have the authority to evaluate legislative compliance with § 111.92(1)(a).

2009Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 , 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803); Stitt, 114 Wis.2d at 367 , 338 N.W.2d 684 ; McDonald v. State, 80 Wis. 407, 411-12 , 50 N.W. 185 (1891). ¶ 20 Therefore, because both Wis. Stat. § 111.92 (1)(a) and Article IV, Section 17(2) require the legislature to take additional actions to amend existing law or to create new law, [13] and we have jurisdiction to interpret the Wisconsin Constitution and the Wisconsin Statutes, we have the authority to evaluate legislative compliance with § 111.92(1)(a).

2009Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 , 2 L.Ed. 60 (1803); Stitt, 114 Wis.2d at 367 , 338 N.W.2d 684 ; McDonald v. State, 80 Wis. 407, 411-12 , 50 N.W. 185 (1891). ¶ 20 Therefore, because both Wis. Stat. § 111.92 (1)(a) and Article IV, Section 17(2) require the legislature to take additional actions to amend existing law or to create new law, [13] and we have jurisdiction to interpret the Wisconsin Constitution and the Wisconsin Statutes, we have the authority to evaluate legislative compliance with § 111.92(1)(a).

2008In resolving ambiguities, "[i]t is fundamental that we must favor a construction of a statute or regulation which will fulfill the intent of the statute or regulation over one which defeats its manifest object." Baierl v. McTaggart, 2001 WI 107, ¶ 21 , 245 Wis.2d 632 , 629 N.W.2d 277 citing Shands v. Castrovinci, 115 Wis.2d 352, 356 , 340 N.W.2d 506 (1983). ¶ 27 It is often difficult to discern the difference between an interpretive rule and a legislative rule, as they lie upon a "hazy continuum." American Hospital Ass'n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1045 (D.C.Cir.1987).

2008In resolving ambiguities, "[i]t is fundamental that we must favor a construction of a statute or regulation which will fulfill the intent of the statute or regulation over one which defeats its manifest object." Baierl v. McTaggart, 2001 WI 107, ¶ 21 , 245 Wis.2d 632 , 629 N.W.2d 277 citing Shands v. Castrovinci, 115 Wis.2d 352, 356 , 340 N.W.2d 506 (1983). ¶ 27 It is often difficult to discern the difference between an interpretive rule and a legislative rule, as they lie upon a "hazy continuum." American Hospital Ass'n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1045 (D.C.Cir.1987).

2008Id.

2008Id.

2008In resolving ambiguities, "[i]t is fundamental that we must favor a construction of a statute or regulation which will fulfill the intent of the statute or regulation over one which defeats its manifest object." Baierl v. McTaggart, 2001 WI 107, ¶ 21 , 245 Wis.2d 632 , 629 N.W.2d 277 citing Shands v. Castrovinci, 115 Wis.2d 352, 356 , 340 N.W.2d 506 (1983). ¶ 27 It is often difficult to discern the difference between an interpretive rule and a legislative rule, as they lie upon a "hazy continuum." American Hospital Ass'n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1045 (D.C.Cir.1987).

2008In resolving ambiguities, "[i]t is fundamental that we must favor a construction of a statute or regulation which will fulfill the intent of the statute or regulation over one which defeats its manifest object." Baierl v. McTaggart, 2001 WI 107, ¶ 21 , 245 Wis.2d 632 , 629 N.W.2d 277 citing Shands v. Castrovinci, 115 Wis.2d 352, 356 , 340 N.W.2d 506 (1983). ¶ 27 It is often difficult to discern the difference between an interpretive rule and a legislative rule, as they lie upon a "hazy continuum." American Hospital Ass'n v. Bowen, 834 F.2d 1037, 1045 (D.C.Cir.1987).

2007Feldmann also argues the "heightened level of dangerousness" ascribed to those who have already engaged in a concrete act of sexual violence "can no longer be presumed." See id. at 322 . 3 He asserts that his release into the community has rebutted the legislative presumption that he presents a heightened level of dangerousness. *483 ¶ 16.

2002A contemporaneous case, Anderson v. Rountree, 1 Pin. 115 (1841), examined the nature of the legislative privilege from arrest in terms of the civil law, though it interpreted a territorial statute which provided: [N]o member of the legislative assembly shall be liable to arrest on a service of any civil process issued by any of the courts of this Territory during any such session of the legislative assembly, or for ten days previous to the commencement or subsequent to the termination of any session; and any member in arrest during the period of such exemption shall be entitled to an immediate

2002Id. at 123 .

1998In Bell v. Horton, 669 N.E.2d 546 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995), the court did not even consider whether statements of legislative witnesses were subpoenaed or sworn, and ignored the issue presented here by instead applying conditional privilege based on statements made to a public officer with the authority to take action in the public interest. ¶ 80.

1998In Bell v. Horton, 669 N.E.2d 546 (Ohio Ct. App. 1995), the court did not even consider whether statements of legislative witnesses were subpoenaed or sworn, and ignored the issue presented here by instead applying conditional privilege based on statements made to a public officer with the authority to take action in the public interest. ¶ 80.

1989While, as we have demonstrated earlier in this opinion, the "microwave" provision does not reasonably lead to the conclusion that all radio transmissions are protected "wire communications," it is also apparent that the cordless telephone technology does not fit comfortably with the types of communication that reasonably should be afforded the presumption of privacy given by law in respect to "wire communications." We conclude, therefore, that, under the law as it existed prior to 1988, the radio portion of a cordless *104 telephone conversation is not a protected "wire communication." [1] If

1989While, as we have demonstrated earlier in this opinion, the “microwave” provision does not reasonably lead to the conclusion that all radio transmissions are protected ‘’wire communications,” it is also apparent that the cordless telephone technology does not fit comfortably with the types of communication that reasonably should be afforded the presumption of privacy given by law in respect to “wire communications.” We conclude, therefore, that, under the law as it existed prior to 1988, the radio portion of a cordless telephone conversation is not a protected “wire communication.” If a cordle

1989In Beckon, 36 Wis. 2d at 518 , we stated: We pointed out in Youmans that if an action were brought to compel the production of documents the officer could then, if he wished, stand upon the reasons given, and the documents could be examined by the court in camera to determine whether in light of the reasons specified the inspection of the documents would cause harm to the public interest that would outweigh the presumptive benefit to be derived from granting inspection.

1986I previously issued an opinion on December 8, 1976, that the legislative framework found in the school transportation statutes clearly evince an intent on the part of the Legislature that children transported to and from school and children being transported while engaged in extracurricular activities should be transported in vehicles meeting certain safety standards and driven by persons meeting certain requirements. 65 Op. Att'y Gen. 298 (1976). *Page 152 Section 121.52 spells out vehicle, operator and driver requirements for vehicles operated under contract or for compensation.

1984The court held that the Wisconsin legislature had declared the public policy by setting the standard, and “we believe it is sufficient to hold that the legislative standard prescribed here does not violate the concepts of fair play and substantial justice embodied in the due process requirements of the state and federal constitutions.” Id. at 363 , 262 N.W.2d at 236 .

1984The court held that the Wisconsin legislature had declared the public policy by setting the standard, and “we believe it is sufficient to hold that the legislative standard prescribed here does not violate the concepts of fair play and substantial justice embodied in the due process requirements of the state and federal constitutions.” Id. at 363 , 262 N.W.2d at 236 .

1979If any person shall violate any provision of this section, or shall fail, neglect or refuse to obey any order made by the commission hereunder, or any judgment or decree made by any court upon such an order, for every such violation, failure or refusal such person shall forfeit not less than $25 nor more than $150. 2 In Garcia v. Hargrove, 52 Wis.2d 289 , 190 N.W.2d 181 (1971), the court did not adopt the legislative standard specified in §176.30, Stats., which makes sale of intoxicants to a minor or intoxicated person a criminal offense.

1979If any person shall violate any provision of this section, or shall fail, neglect or refuse to obey any order made by the commission hereunder, or any judgment or decree made by any court upon such an order, for every such violation, failure or refusal such person shall forfeit not less than $25 nor more than $150. 2 In Garcia v. Hargrove, 52 Wis.2d 289 , 190 N.W.2d 181 (1971), the court did not adopt the legislative standard specified in §176.30, Stats., which makes sale of intoxicants to a minor or intoxicated person a criminal offense.