legislative presumption in Illinois

1987Its effect is to create a legislative presumption in favor of the present custodian, thereby promoting the stability and continuity of the child’s custodial and environmental relationship which is not to be overturned lightly.’ ” (In re Custody of Sussenbach (1985), 108 Ill. 2d 489, 499 , 485 N.E.2d 367, 371 , quoting In re Marriage of Wechselberger (1983), 115 Ill.

1987Its effect is to create a legislative presumption in favor of the present custodian, thereby promoting the stability and continuity of the child’s custodial and environmental relationship which is not to be overturned lightly.’ ” (In re Custody of Sussenbach (1985), 108 Ill. 2d 489, 499 , 485 N.E.2d 367, 371 , quoting In re Marriage of Wechselberger (1983), 115 Ill.

1987Stat. 1983, ch. 40, par. 610(b)) reflects a legislative presumption in favor of the custodial parent in order to promote stability and continuity in the environment. ( In re Custody of Dykhuis (1985), 131 Ill.

1987(In re Custody of Dykhuis (1985), 131 Ill.

1989(In re Custody of Harne (1979), 77 Ill. 2d 414, 420-21 ; Wechselberger, 115 Ill.

1985(See In re Custody of Harne (1979), 77 Ill. 2d 414, 421 , 396 N.E.2d 499, 502 , in which it was stated that this presumption was created to promote stability and continuity in the child’s custodial and environmental relationships; and In re Custody of Dykhuis (1985), 131 Ill.

2019The first amendment does not guarantee the right of a spectator to shout during a legislative hearing so as to disrupt the orderly processes of the proceeding." Id. at 142 . ¶ 27 Here, defendant, like Seelig, argues that his conduct was protected by the first amendment in that he merely "had a conversation with Krysztopa about the security at Keith School." This is flagrantly disingenuous.

2019The first amendment does not guarantee the right of a spectator to shout during a legislative hearing so as to disrupt the orderly processes of the proceeding.” Id. at 142 . ¶ 27 Here, defendant, like Seelig, argues that his conduct was protected by the first amendment in that he merely “had a conversation with Krysztopa about the security at Keith School.” This is flagrantly disingenuous.

2016This burden has been met in previous cases through evidence of other entities that would have been able to benefit from the legislative privilege, but for some limiting exclusionary provision.” Id. at 151 . ¶ 56 After reviewing our case law, we concluded that the plaintiffs failed to overcome the strong presumption of constitutionality with evidence that the benefit to the property owner was denied to any other similarly situated person or entity.

2016This burden has been met in previous cases through evidence of other entities that would have been able to benefit from the legislative privilege, but for some limiting exclusionary provision.” Id. at 151 . ¶ 56 After reviewing our case law, we concluded that the plaintiffs failed to overcome the strong presumption of constitutionality with evidence that the benefit to the property owner was denied to any other similarly situated person or entity.

2016This court recognized this expressly in Harinek when we said that “although, absent a statutory immunity, governmental units are now liable in tort on the same basis as private tortfeasors, the public duty rule nevertheless prevents such units from being held liable for their failure to provide adequate governmental services.” (Emphasis added.) Harinek, 181 Ill. 2d at 345 .

2016This court recognized this expressly in Harinek when we said that “although, absent a statutory immunity, governmental units are now liable in tort on the same basis as private tortfeasors, the public duty rule nevertheless prevents such units from being held liable for their failure to provide adequate governmental services.” (Emphasis added.) Harinek, 181 Ill. 2d at 345 .

2007Fields, 163 Ill. 2d at 478-79 .

2007Fields, 163 Ill. 2d at 478-79 .

2006For instance, in In re Petition of the Village of Vernon Hills, 168 Ill. 2d 117 (1995), the legislature created a mechanism whereby a non-home-rule municipality with more than one fire protection district may transfer territory served by one district into another district.

2006For instance, in In re Petition of the Village of Vernon Hills, 168 Ill. 2d 117 (1995), the legislature created a mechanism whereby a non-home-rule municipality with more than one fire protection district may transfer territory served by one district into another district.

1985In re Marriage of Pease (1982), 106 Ill.

1985In re Marriage of Pease (1982), 106 Ill.

2025Id. at 488 .

2024Indeed, in People v. Davis, 2023 IL App (1st) 231856, ¶ 34 , the reviewing court gave effect to the oral pronouncement of the trial court where it conflicted with the written detention order. ¶ 16 People v. Odehnal, 2024 IL App (5th) 230877-U , reversed a detention order based, at least in part, upon deficiencies in the written order.

2009Fate, 159 Ill.2d at 270 , 201 Ill.Dec. 117 , 636 N.E.2d 549 .

2009Fate, 159 Ill. 2d at 270 .

1999While this is true, it must be remembered that the purpose of this presumption is to promote the stability and continuity of the child’s custodial and environmental relationships. [Citation.] In the instant case, that goal is better served by modification of custody.” Shoff, 179 Ill.

1994App. 3d 228, 233 , 492 N.E.2d 1006, 1009 , a case similar to this one, the appellate court held the legislative presumption of section 610 in favor of the present custodian applied to the primary physical custodian in a joint custody case.

1994In In re Marriage of Kartholl (1986), 143 Ill.App.3d 228, 233 , 97 Ill.Dec. 347, 350 , 492 N.E.2d 1006, 1009 , a case similar to this one, the appellate court held the legislative presumption of section 610 in favor of the present custodian applied to the primary physical custodian in a joint custody case.

1994Co. v. Turnipseed (1910), 219 U.S. 35, 42-43 , 55 L.

1994Co. v. Turnipseed (1910), 219 U.S. 35, 42-43 , 55 L.

1993The rule that a property owner must seek local relief from a zoning ordinance before going to court is a judicial policy rather than a legislative rule. ( 24 Ill. 2d at 259 .) Unlike MacNeal, the rule in the case at bar requiring review of permits through the Review Law is not a judicial policy, but is an administrative rule promulgated with legislative authority.

1993App. 3d 253 , 541 N.E.2d 245 .) The effect of this section is to create a legislative presumption in favor of the present custodian, thus promoting the continuity and stability of the child’s custodial and environmental relationship which is not to be overturned lightly.

1993App. 3d 253 , 541 N.E.2d 245 .) The effect of this section is to create a legislative presumption in favor of the present custodian, thus promoting the continuity and stability of the child’s custodial and environmental relationship which is not to be overturned lightly.

1993(In re Marriage of Eldert (1987), 158 Ill.

1993App.3d 253 , 133 Ill.Dec. 408 , 541 N.E.2d 245 .) The effect of this section is to create a legislative presumption in favor of the present custodian, thus promoting the continuity and stability of the child's custodial and environmental relationship which is not to be overturned lightly. ( In re Marriage of Kramer (1991), 211 Ill.App.3d 401 , 155 Ill.Dec. 909 , 570 N.E.2d 422 .) The discretion of the trial court with respect to a change of custody is not unlimited ( Applegate v. Applegate (1980), 80 Ill.App.3d 81 , 35 Ill.Dec. 496 , 399 N.E.2d 330 ), but rather is tempered by the desire for f

1993App.3d 253 , 133 Ill.Dec. 408 , 541 N.E.2d 245 .) The effect of this section is to create a legislative presumption in favor of the present custodian, thus promoting the continuity and stability of the child's custodial and environmental relationship which is not to be overturned lightly. ( In re Marriage of Kramer (1991), 211 Ill.App.3d 401 , 155 Ill.Dec. 909 , 570 N.E.2d 422 .) The discretion of the trial court with respect to a change of custody is not unlimited ( Applegate v. Applegate (1980), 80 Ill.App.3d 81 , 35 Ill.Dec. 496 , 399 N.E.2d 330 ), but rather is tempered by the desire for f