legislative rule in New York

1994Although the United States Supreme Court has recognized the doctrine of legislative immunity in Tenney v Brandhove ( 341 US 367, 376 ), and applied it where "legitimate legislative activity” is involved, neither Tenney nor any of the authorities relied on by the defendant Henry Spallone hold that legislators may, with impunity, obstruct a Federal Court’s attempt to remedy past acts of racial discrimination by simply refusing to comply with the Court’s lawful, remedial orders.

1994Although the United States Supreme Court has recognized the doctrine of legislative immunity in Tenney v Brandhove ( 341 US 367, 376 ), and applied it where "legitimate legislative activity” is involved, neither Tenney nor any of the authorities relied on by the defendant Henry Spallone hold that legislators may, with impunity, obstruct a Federal Court’s attempt to remedy past acts of racial discrimination by simply refusing to comply with the Court’s lawful, remedial orders.

1961The Town Board quotes from Matter of Peck Holding Corp. v. Burns ( 16 Misc 2d 256, 257-258 ), as follows: “ Whether we call the action of the Town Board in this case legislative (Matter of Tartasky v. Larkin, 13 Misc 2d 648 ; Rodgers v. Village of Tarrytown, 302 N. Y. 115 ; Matter of Cunningham v. Planning Bd. of Town of Brighton, 4 A D 2d 313), and apply the legislative test in respect to the heavy burden of proof on the petitioner (Matter of Tartasky v. Larkin, supra; Rodgers v. Village of Tarrytown, supra; Matter of Cunningham v. Planning Bd. of Town of Brighton, supra; Wiggins v. Town of S

1961The Town Board quotes from Matter of Peck Holding Corp. v. Burns ( 16 Misc 2d 256, 257-258 ), as follows: “ Whether we call the action of the Town Board in this case legislative (Matter of Tartasky v. Larkin, 13 Misc 2d 648 ; Rodgers v. Village of Tarrytown, 302 N. Y. 115 ; Matter of Cunningham v. Planning Bd. of Town of Brighton, 4 A D 2d 313), and apply the legislative test in respect to the heavy burden of proof on the petitioner (Matter of Tartasky v. Larkin, supra; Rodgers v. Village of Tarrytown, supra; Matter of Cunningham v. Planning Bd. of Town of Brighton, supra; Wiggins v. Town of S

1961The Town Board quotes from Matter of Peck Holding Corp. v. Burns ( 16 Misc 2d 256, 257-258 ), as follows: “ Whether we call the action of the Town Board in this case legislative (Matter of Tartasky v. Larkin, 13 Misc 2d 648 ; Rodgers v. Village of Tarrytown, 302 N. Y. 115 ; Matter of Cunningham v. Planning Bd. of Town of Brighton, 4 A D 2d 313), and apply the legislative test in respect to the heavy burden of proof on the petitioner (Matter of Tartasky v. Larkin, supra; Rodgers v. Village of Tarrytown, supra; Matter of Cunningham v. Planning Bd. of Town of Brighton, supra; Wiggins v. Town of S

1961The Town Board quotes from Matter of Peck Holding Corp. v. Burns ( 16 Misc 2d 256, 257-258 ), as follows: “ Whether we call the action of the Town Board in this case legislative (Matter of Tartasky v. Larkin, 13 Misc 2d 648 ; Rodgers v. Village of Tarrytown, 302 N. Y. 115 ; Matter of Cunningham v. Planning Bd. of Town of Brighton, 4 A D 2d 313), and apply the legislative test in respect to the heavy burden of proof on the petitioner (Matter of Tartasky v. Larkin, supra; Rodgers v. Village of Tarrytown, supra; Matter of Cunningham v. Planning Bd. of Town of Brighton, supra; Wiggins v. Town of S

1941Pr. 30 ; Burnham v. Morrissey, 14 Gray [Mass.], 226; People v. Learned, 5 Hun, 626 ; McGrain v. Daugherty, supra, p. 175 ; Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263 .) In the present proceeding, as we have seen, we must assume that the legislative inquiry was well intended.

1941Pr. 30 ; Burnham v. Morrissey, 14 Gray [Mass.], 226; People v. Learned, 5 Hun, 626 ; McGrain v. Daugherty, supra, p. 175 ; Sinclair v. United States, 279 U. S. 263 .) In the present proceeding, as we have seen, we must assume that the legislative inquiry was well intended.

1941Pr. 30 ; Burnham v. Morrissey, 14 Gray [Mass.], 226; People v. Learned, 5 Hun, 626 ; McGrain v. Daugherty, supra, p. 175 ; Sinclair v. United States, 279 U.S. 263 .) In the present proceeding, as we have seen, we must assume that the legislative inquiry was well intended.

1941Pr. 30 ; Burnham v. Morrissey, 14 Gray [Mass.], 226; People v. Learned, 5 Hun, 626 ; McGrain v. Daugherty, supra, p. 175 ; Sinclair v. United States, 279 U. S. 263 .) In the present proceeding, as we have seen, we must assume that the legislative inquiry was well intended.

2024Legislative privilege protects legislators and their staff from compelled testimony and disclosure of documentary evidence with respect to actions within the scope of legitimate legislative activity ( see Campaign for Fiscal Equity v State of New York , 265 AD2d 277 , 278).

2019Here, defendant demanded an automatic seal in stark contrast to a case specific analysis that demands a court to find good cause sufficient to rebut the legislative presumption of public access for any sealing, in part or whole, upon due consideration of the competing and compelling interests of the public and the parties (see Capital Newspapers, 71 NY2d at 270-271 ; 22 NYCRR § 216.1).

2017Conservation, 152 AD3d at 1018 ). 4 DEC was authorized to grant a permit after analyzing the factors set forth in ECL 15-1503 and “suitably explained” that analysis in a written response to comments by the public and rejoinders by Kiryas Joel made after the legislative hearing on the permit application (Matter of Hudson Riv.

2016In People v Rivera ( 25 NY3d 256 [2015]), the Court of Appeals made clear that disclosure may not be compelled when a client’s liberty is at stake in a criminal trial, even if the information has been conveyed for other purposes because of a legislative exception.

2009The statute does not “merely de scribe[ ] permissive and prohibited uses of signals,” or allow for a driver to avoid the strictures of the statute depending upon whether a non-signaled move can be made safely. ( 16 Misc 3d at 301 .) To the contrary, the entire statute is to be read in the strictest sense, in accordance with the Legislature’s intent: “The amended statute places the absolute duty upon the person to use the signals when preparing to make a turn or when making one of the other movements covered by this statute.” (Martinez-Lopez, 16 Misc 3d at 305 , quoting Bill Jacket, L 1964, ch

2009The statute does not “merely de scribe[ ] permissive and prohibited uses of signals,” or allow for a driver to avoid the strictures of the statute depending upon whether a non-signaled move can be made safely. ( 16 Misc 3d at 301 .) To the contrary, the entire statute is to be read in the strictest sense, in accordance with the Legislature’s intent: “The amended statute places the absolute duty upon the person to use the signals when preparing to make a turn or when making one of the other movements covered by this statute.” (Martinez-Lopez, 16 Misc 3d at 305 , quoting Bill Jacket, L 1964, ch

2009In People v Santana ( 7 NY3d 234 [2006]), the Court of Appeals addressed this issue and held that if the criminal statute contains an exception as opposed to a proviso, the accusatory instrument must allege that the crime is not within the exception.

2009(People v Rice, 44 AD3d 247 [1st Dept 2007].) It is without doubt, then, that Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1163 (a) “imposes a duty to signal a lane change under all circumstances.” (Rice, 44 AD3d at 252 .) Applying this reasoning to the case at hand, the court finds that defendant was not only required to activate her turn signal, but that she should have done so as soon as possible after she passed the first intersection, regardless of the fact that the distance to the next intersection was less than 100 feet.

2009(People v Rice, 44 AD3d 247 [1st Dept 2007].) It is without doubt, then, that Vehicle and Traffic Law § 1163 (a) “imposes a duty to signal a lane change under all circumstances.” (Rice, 44 AD3d at 252 .) Applying this reasoning to the case at hand, the court finds that defendant was not only required to activate her turn signal, but that she should have done so as soon as possible after she passed the first intersection, regardless of the fact that the distance to the next intersection was less than 100 feet.

2001As noted in Campaign for Fiscal Equity v State of New York (supra, 179 Misc 2d, at 913-914 ), there is federal authority that “certain documents generated during the course of legislative activity may be discoverable,” and this authority relies on the premise that the privilege is primarily a “use” privilege designed to protect legislators from being “dragged into court.” The Campaign for Fiscal Equity court rejected this reasoning, based on its conclusion that the privilege “is also designed to provide State legislators and other State officials acting within the legislative sphere with ‘brea

2001The Speech or Debate Clause of the New York Constitution provides that “[flor any speech or debate in either house of the legislature, the members shall not be questioned in any other place.” (NY Const, art III, § 11.) This provision has been construed as providing “at least as much protection as the immunity granted by the comparable provision of the Federal Constitution.” (People v Ohrenstein, 77 NY2d 38, 53 [1990].) The Speech or Debate Clause of the US Constitution has in turn been held to confer immunity on members of Congress for “legislative acts” — that is, acts “which are an integral

2000Auth. v American Pen Corp., 253 AD2d 366, 367 , affd 94 NY2d 154 ).

2000Auth. v American Pen Corp., 253 AD2d 366, 367 , affd 94 NY2d 154 ).

1998(See, Damiano v Damiano, 94 AD2d 132, 138-139 [1983].) Marital assets constitute all property acquired by either spouse during the marriage and before commencement of this action irrespective of title (Sorrell v Sorrell, 233 AD2d 387 [1996]), except as otherwise provided by agreement or excluded as separate property pursuant to Domestic Relations Law § 236 (B) (5) (b).

1997State Dept. of Health, 85 NY2d 326, 331-332 ).