legislative privilege in Florida

2019In making this assessment, it is necessary to ascertain the character of the allegedly negligent governmental act or omission.” And in Wallace v. Dean, 3 So. 3d 1035, 1044-45 (Fla. 2009) (footnotes omitted) (citations omitted), this Court stated: When addressing the issue of governmental liability under Florida law, we have repeatedly recognized that a duty analysis is conceptually distinct from any later inquiry regarding whether the governmental entity remains sovereignly immune from suit notwithstanding the legislative waiver present in section 768.28, Florida Statutes.

2018As the Florida Supreme Court observed, "[w]hen addressing the issue of governmental liability under Florida law, we have repeatedly recognized that a duty analysis is conceptually distinct from any later inquiry regarding whether the governmental entity remains sovereignly immune from suit notwithstanding the legislative waiver present in section 768.28, Florida Statutes." Id. (footnote omitted).

2018In other words, "[i]f no duty of care is owed with respect to alleged negligent conduct, then there is no governmental liability, and the question of whether the sovereign should be immune from suit need not be reached." Pollock v. Fla. Dep't of Highway Patrol, 882 So. 2d 928, 932 (Fla. 2004); see also Wallace, 3 So. 3d at 1045 ("[T]he presence of sovereign immunity does not render the State's actions -5- nontortious[;] it simply means that the State has not consented to suit in its courts with regard to certain claims[ ].

2011See, e.g., Pollock v. Fla. Dep’t of Highway Patrol, 882 So.2d 928, 932-33 (Fla.2004) (‘If no duty of care is owed with respect to alleged negligent conduct, then there is no governmental liability, and the question of whether the sovereign should be immune from suit need not be reached.’” ).... [SJovereign immunity may shield the government from an action in its courts (i.e., a lack of subject-matter jurisdiction) even when the State may otherwise be liable to an injured party for its tortious conduct.

2013See Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 615 , 92 S.Ct. 2614 , 33 L.Ed.2d 583 (1972).

2013See Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 615 , 92 S.Ct. 2614 , 33 L.Ed.2d 583 (1972).

2005See § 61.30(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2003); Rainsberger v. Rainsberger, 819 So.2d 275, 276 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002). *769 The trial court declined to apply the adjustment, reasoning that in the past, the father had not spent 40 percent of overnights yearly with the children.

2005See § 61.30(1)(a), Fla. Stat. (2004); Rainsberger v. Rainsberger, 819 So.2d 275, 276 (Fla. 2d DCA 2002).

2000See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 726 , 102 S.Ct. 3331 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1090 (1982) (observing that under intermediate scrutiny the legislative analysis behind a law must be “reasoned”, and judicial analysis of the law must be “searching”).

2000See Mississippi Univ. for Women v. Hogan, 458 U.S. 718, 726 , 102 S.Ct. 3331 , 73 L.Ed.2d 1090 (1982) (observing that under intermediate scrutiny the legislative analysis behind a law must be “reasoned”, and judicial analysis of the law must be “searching”).

1936See In re Seven Barrels of Wine, 79 Fla. 1 , 83 South.

1936See In re Seven Barrels of Wine, 79 Fla. 1 , 83 South.

2015See League of Women Voters of Fla. v. Fla. House of Representatives (Apportionment IV), 132 So. 3d 135, 138 (Fla. 2013) (addressing and largely rejecting claims of legislative privilege); League of Women Voters of Fla. v. Data Targeting, Inc. (Apportionment V), 140 So. 3d 510, 514 (Fla. 2014) (permitting the use during trial of evidence obtained from non-party political consultants, pending further Cognizant that this Court’s role is not to select a redistricting map that performs better for one political party or another, but is instead to uphold the purposes of the constitutional provision a

2014League of Women Voters, 132 So.3d at 154 .

2013The Legislature contends that the order departs from the essential requirements of law because it permits discovery of information protected by the legislative privilege recognized by this Court in Florida House of Representatives v. Expedia, Inc., 85 So.3d 517 (Fla. 1st DCA 2012).

2013The Court explained that the legislative privilege has its roots in both the common law and the separation of powers provision of the Florida Constitution, id. at 522-24 , and the Court reasoned that “[t]he power vested in the legislature under the Florida Constitution would be severely compromised if legislators were required to appear in court to explain why they voted a particular way or to describe their process of gathering information on a bill.” Id. at 524 (emphasis added).

2013Although the dissent relies heavily on the historical roots of the legislative privilege and the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Tenney, 341 U.S. 367 , 71 S.Ct. 783 , Tenney was “a civil action brought by a private plaintiff to vindicate private rights.” Gillock, 445 U.S. at 372 , 100 S.Ct. 1185 .

2013Although the dissent relies heavily on the historical roots of the legislative privilege and the United States Supreme Court’s decision in Tenney, 341 U.S. 367 , 71 S.Ct. 783 , Tenney was “a civil action brought by a private plaintiff to vindicate private rights.” Gillock, 445 U.S. at 372 , 100 S.Ct. 1185 .

1988We recognized that identification of these immune functions would be difficult and adopted a case-by-case method of identifying these functions based on Evangelical United Brethren Church v. State, 67 Wash.2d 246 , 407 P.2d 440 (1965), and Johnson v. State, 69 Cal.2d 782 , 73 Cal. Rptr. 240 , 447 P.2d 352 (1968).

1988We recognized that identification of these immune functions would be difficult and adopted a case-by-case method of identifying these functions based on Evangelical United Brethren Church v. State, 67 Wash.2d 246 , 407 P.2d 440 (1965), and Johnson v. State, 69 Cal.2d 782 , 73 Cal. Rptr. 240 , 447 P.2d 352 (1968).

1984Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 , 96 S.Ct. 2882 , 49 L.Ed.2d 752 (1976).

1980"That a legislative presumption of one fact from evidence of another may not constitute a denial of due process of law or a denial of the equal protection of the law it is only essential that there shall be some rational connection between the fact proved and the ultimate fact presumed, and that the inference of one fact from proof of another shall not be so unreasonable as to be a purely arbitrary mandate." [Cases omitted.] Moreover, as we have recognized: "The process of making the determination of rationality is, by its nature, highly empirical, and in matters not within specialized judicia

2023III, § 20(a), Fla. Const.; see League of Women Voters of Fla. v. Detzner, 172 So. 3d 363 , 370–72 (Fla. 2015) (“Apportionment VII”) (affirming trial court’s determination “that the Legislature’s 2012 congressional redistricting plan was drawn in violation of the [FDA’s] prohibition on partisan intent” but directing the trial court to “require the Legislature to redraw, on an expedited basis, Congressional Districts 5, 13, 14, 21, 22, 25, 26, 27, and all other districts affected by the redrawing, pursuant to the guidelines set forth in this opinion”).

2019"A legislative inquiry may be as broad, as searching, and as exhaustive as is necessary to make effective the constitutional powers of Congress." Townsend , 95 F.2d at 361 (citation omitted).

2018Council 79 , 784 So.2d at 408-09 (holding that a trial court had no authority to prohibit a legislative hearing, an inherent part of the legislative process); id. at 410 (Quince, J., concurring in part) (noting that "courts cannot enjoin the Legislature from performing its constitutional legislative functions"); Serrano v. Priest , 18 Cal.3d 728 , 135 Cal.Rptr. 345 , 557 P.2d 929 , 941 (1976) (holding that courts may not order a legislature "to enact or not to enact ... specific legislation").

2018Council 79 , 784 So.2d at 408-09 (holding that a trial court had no authority to prohibit a legislative hearing, an inherent part of the legislative process); id. at 410 (Quince, J., concurring in part) (noting that "courts cannot enjoin the Legislature from performing its constitutional legislative functions"); Serrano v. Priest , 18 Cal.3d 728 , 135 Cal.Rptr. 345 , 557 P.2d 929 , 941 (1976) (holding that courts may not order a legislature "to enact or not to enact ... specific legislation").

2018This legislative requirement resolves the “numerous practical problems” discussed by the supreme court in Rogers regarding individuals bringing common-injury claims. 626 So. 2d at 1354 (including “determining the appropriate measure of damages to the unit whose owner sued, as distinct from the remaining units; allocating the recovered damages; litigating multiple lawsuits; incurring unnecessary costs incident to having multiple trials; having potentially contradictory adjudications; expediting resolution of controversies; and accomplishing repairs”).

2015See League of Women Voters of Fla. v. Fla. House of Representatives (Apportionment IV), 132 So. 3d 135, 138 (Fla. 2013) (addressing and largely rejecting claims of legislative privilege); League of Women Voters of Fla. v. Data Targeting, Inc. (Apportionment V), 140 So. 3d 510, 514 (Fla. 2014) (permitting the use during trial of evidence obtained from non-party political consultants, pending further Cognizant that this Court’s role is not to select a redistricting map that performs better for one political party or another, but is instead to uphold the purposes of the constitutional provision a

2014Formal rulemaking is not required when an agency issues an interpretive rule that “d[oes] not create any new law, right, duty, or have any effect independent of the statute,” but instead “‘reflects an agency’s construction of a statute that has been entrusted to the agency to administer’ and does not ‘modify] or add [] to a legal norm based on the agency’s own authority.’ ” Warshauer v. Solis, 577 F.3d 1330, 1337 (11th Cir.2009) (quoting Syncor, 127 F.3d at 94-95 ). [A]n agency interpretation of a statute which simply reiterates the legislature’s statutory mandate and does not place upon the s

2014Formal rulemaking is not required when an agency issues an interpretive rule that “d[oes] not create any new law, right, duty, or have any effect independent of the statute,” but instead “‘reflects an agency’s construction of a statute that has been entrusted to the agency to administer’ and does not ‘modify] or add [] to a legal norm based on the agency’s own authority.’ ” Warshauer v. Solis, 577 F.3d 1330, 1337 (11th Cir.2009) (quoting Syncor, 127 F.3d at 94-95 ). [A]n agency interpretation of a statute which simply reiterates the legislature’s statutory mandate and does not place upon the s

2014Co., 581 So.2d 193, 196 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); cf. S.D. v. Ubbelohde, 330 F.3d 1014, 1028 (8th Cir.2003) (“Where a policy statement purports to create substantive requirements, it can be a legislative rule regardless of the agency’s characterization.” (citing Syncor Int’l Corp. v. Shalala, 127 F.3d 90, 94 (D.C.Cir.1997))).

2014Co., 581 So.2d 193, 196 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); cf. S.D. v. Ubbelohde, 330 F.3d 1014, 1028 (8th Cir.2003) (“Where a policy statement purports to create substantive requirements, it can be a legislative rule regardless of the agency’s characterization.” (citing Syncor Int’l Corp. v. Shalala, 127 F.3d 90, 94 (D.C.Cir.1997))).

2014Co., 581 So.2d 193, 196 (Fla. 1st DCA 1991); cf. S.D. v. Ubbelohde, 330 F.3d 1014, 1028 (8th Cir.2003) (“Where a policy statement purports to create substantive requirements, it can be a legislative rule regardless of the agency’s characterization.” (citing Syncor Int’l Corp. v. Shalala, 127 F.3d 90, 94 (D.C.Cir.1997))).

2013See, e.g., Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Williams, 62 F.3d 408, 420 (D.C.Cir.1995) (rejecting the proposition that the Speech and Debate Clause only applies when members of Congress' or their aides are personally questioned because “[djocumentary evidence can Certainly be as revealing as oral communications” and “indications as- to what Congress is looking at provide clues as to what Congress is doing, or might be about to do”); Ariz. Indep.