legislative analysis in Michigan

2020Rather than cite to the “highest quality” of legislative history in support of its argument, such as actual, official activity of the Legislature (e.g., votes and amendments), In re Certified Question, 468 Mich at 115 n 5, the department points us to a journal article and a legislative analysis.

2016While I recognize the limitations inherent in reliance on legislative analyses as an aid in the construction of a statute, see In re Certified Question, 468 Mich at 115 n 5, it is nonetheless notable when the construction of a statute, reached without reliance on a legislative analysis, conforms fully with such a legislative analysis.

2022If an insurer has no such forms in effect, it shall submit a letter to the commissioner reporting and certifying that fact. [Mich Admin Code 500.2212(1) through (5).] This Court has determined that “[a] rule adopted by an agency in accordance with the Administrative Procedures Act, MCL 24.201, et seq., is a legislative rule that has the force and effect of law.” Morley v Gen Motors Corp, 252 Mich App 287, 290 ; 651 NW2d 808 (2002).

2022If an insurer has no such forms in effect, it shall submit a letter to the commissioner reporting and certifying that fact. [Mich Admin Code 500.2212(1) through (5).] This Court has determined that “[a] rule adopted by an agency in accordance with the Administrative Procedures Act, MCL 24.201, et seq., is a legislative rule that has the force and effect of law.” Morley v Gen Motors Corp, 252 Mich App 287, 290 ; 651 NW2d 808 (2002).

2012See, e.g., Frank W Lynch & Co v Flex Technologies, Inc, 463 Mich 578, 587 ; 624 NW2d 180 (2001) (stating that “in Michigan, a legislative analysis is a feeble indicator of legislative intent and is therefore a generally unpersuasive tool of statutory construction”); In re Certified Question from the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit (Kenneth Henes v Continental Biomass), 468 Mich 109 , 115 n 5; 659 NW2d 597 (2003) (discussing why a legislative analysis, as opposed to other forms of legislative history, is a poor aid in statutory interpretation and thus “should be accorded ve

2010Further, even when reference to legislative history is appropriate, staff analyses created within the legislative branch “are entitled to little judicial consideration” because “[i]n no way can a ‘legislative analysis’ be said to officially summarize the intentions of those who have been designated by the Constitution to be participants in this legislative process, the members of the House and the Senate and the Governor.” Id. 17 Indeed, the legislative analysis cited here expressly states: “This analysis was prepared by nonpartisan Senate staff for use by the Senate in its deliberations and d

2000In People v Lardie, 207 Mich App 615, 619-620 ; 525 NW2d 504 (1994), a panel of this Court stated: “The legislative analysis of the house bill enacted as the OUIL causing death statute further demonstrates the Legis *15 lature’s objective in enacting the statute.

2000In People v Lardie, 207 Mich App 615, 619-620 ; 525 NW2d 504 (1994), a panel of this Court stated: “The legislative analysis of the house bill enacted as the OUIL causing death statute further demonstrates the Legis *15 lature’s objective in enacting the statute.

1985Consumers Power Co v Big Prairie Twp, 81 Mich App 120, 129 ; 265 NW2d 182 (1978), lv den 403 Mich 848 (1978).

1985Consumers Power Co v Big Prairie Twp, 81 Mich App 120, 129 ; 265 NW2d 182 (1978), lv den 403 Mich 848 (1978).

2003However, this Court questioned that in dicta in Detroit Edison Co v Celadon *141 Trucking Co, 248 Mich App 118 , 124 n 15; 638 NW2d 169 (2001) Further, our Supreme Court has stated that a legislative analysis is “a feeble indicator of legislative intent” because it is not an official statement of intent and may not even represent the views of a single legislator.

2003However, this Court questioned that in dicta in Detroit Edison Co v Celadon *141 Trucking Co, 248 Mich App 118 , 124 n 15; 638 NW2d 169 (2001) Further, our Supreme Court has stated that a legislative analysis is “a feeble indicator of legislative intent” because it is not an official statement of intent and may not even represent the views of a single legislator.

2000Accordingly, while the common-law economic realities test cannot be used to supersede the statute, i.e., by adding factors not in the legislative formulation of the economic realities test, those factors in the legislative test can be construed by reference to the case law development of those same factors. [Hoste, supra, 572 .] Here, the wcac differed with the magistrate and concluded that the magistrate’s decision was not supported by substantial evidence.

2000Accordingly, while the common-law economic realities test cannot be used to supersede the *397 statute, i.e., by adding factors not in the legislative formulation of the economic realities test, those factors in the legislative test can be construed by reference to the case law development of those same factors. [ Hoste, supra, at 572 , 592 N.W.2d 360 .] Here, the WCAC differed with the magistrate and concluded that the magistrate's decision was not supported by substantial evidence.

1994The legislative analysis of HB 4221 reveals a *469 legislative concern with those who but for their disability could have received unemployment compensation as a substitute income. [ MacDonald, supra at 153 , see also CAVANAGH, J., dissenting at 156-157.] By enacting § 3107a, the Legislature intended to remedy the situation in which a claimant is precluded from receiving any work-loss benefits because the claimant is unemployed at the time of the accident.

1994The legislative analysis of HB 4221 reveals a legislative concern with those who but for their disability could have received unemployment compensation as a substitute income. [MacDonald, supra at 153 , see also Cavanagh, J., dissenting at 156-157.] By enacting § 3107a, the Legislature intended to remedy the situation in which a claimant is precluded from receiving any work-loss benefits because the claimant is unemployed at the time of the accident.

1980Both Elbert v Saginaw, 363 Mich 463 ; 109 NW2d 879 (1961), and Lapasinskas v Quick, 17 Mich App 733 ; 170 NW2d 318 (1969), rejected the injection of parental fault onto the record of a case against parents.

1980Both Elbert v Saginaw, 363 Mich 463 ; 109 NW2d 879 (1961), and Lapasinskas v Quick, 17 Mich App 733 ; 170 NW2d 318 (1969), rejected the injection of parental fault onto the record of a case against parents.

1980Both Elbert v Saginaw, 363 Mich 463 ; 109 NW2d 879 (1961), and Lapasinskas v Quick, 17 Mich App 733 ; 170 NW2d 318 (1969), rejected the injection of parental fault onto the record of a case against parents.

1980Both Elbert v Saginaw, 363 Mich 463 ; 109 NW2d 879 (1961), and Lapasinskas v Quick, 17 Mich App 733 ; 170 NW2d 318 (1969), rejected the injection of parental fault onto the record of a case against parents.

2024In White, 421 Mich at 199 , a private cause of action was not permitted because the legislative framework of the worker’s compensation act is such that in exchange for receiving compensation for injuries, there is no tort cause of action.

2024See, e.g., Interstate Natural Gas Ass’n of America v Fed Energy Regulatory Comm, 350 US App DC 366, 407; 285 F3d 18 (2002); see also American Hosp Ass’n, 266 US App DC at 198 (observing that agency statements lacking the force and effect of law are those that “are not determinative of issues or rights addressed” and that do not “conclusively affect rights of private parties”) (quotation marks and citation omitted); Detroit Base Coalition for Human Rights of Handicapped v Dep’t of Social Servs, 431 Mich 172, 189 ; 428 NW2d 335 (1988) (holding that agencies are bound to follow their own rules).

2024In Miller v Miller, 264 Mich App 497 , 503 n 8; 691 NW2d 788 (2004) (quotation marks and citation omitted), rev’d on other grounds 474 Mich 27 (2005), this Court recognized, by citing to the legislative analysis of the DRAA, that while MCR 3.216 “allows a court to order arbitration,” it did not “provide standards or guidelines for such arbitration.” In other words, MCR 3.216 permitted arbitration but did not regulate it.

2024In Miller v Miller, 264 Mich App 497 , 503 n 8; 691 NW2d 788 (2004) (quotation marks and citation omitted), rev’d on other grounds 474 Mich 27 (2005), this Court recognized, by citing to the legislative analysis of the DRAA, that while MCR 3.216 “allows a court to order arbitration,” it did not “provide standards or guidelines for such arbitration.” In other words, MCR 3.216 permitted arbitration but did not regulate it.

2024In Miller v Miller, 264 Mich App 497 , 503 n 8; 691 NW2d 788 (2004) (quotation marks and citation omitted), rev’d on other grounds 474 Mich 27 (2005), this Court recognized, by citing to the legislative analysis of the DRAA, that while MCR 3.216 “allows a court to order arbitration,” it did not “provide standards or guidelines for such arbitration.” In other words, MCR 3.216 permitted arbitration but did not regulate it.

2024Finally, in Grand Traverse Co, 450 Mich at 468 , the subject statute explicitly prohibited a private cause of action.

2022In interpreting an administrative rule, the rule’s “words and phrases must be applied and interpreted according to their plain and ordinary meanings.” In re Estate of Klein, 316 Mich App 329 , 333- 334; 891 NW2d 544 (2016). -6- Defendant relies on New England Mut Life Ins Co v Gray, 786 F2d 406 (CA 6, 1986),3 to argue the insurance policy is not contrary to public policy because it was not issued or delivered to an individual in Michigan.

2019Nevertheless, after finding an irreconcilable conflict between USA’s coverages and the requirements of the no-fault act, the dissent relies on Citizens Ins Co of America v Federated Mut Ins Co, 448 Mich 225 ; 531 NW2d 138 (1995), to underscore its point that the authorizing language found in the financial responsibility act cannot validate a policy that violates the no- fault act.

2019Nevertheless, after finding an irreconcilable conflict between USA’s coverages and the requirements of the no-fault act, the dissent relies on Citizens Ins Co of America v Federated Mut Ins Co, 448 Mich 225 ; 531 NW2d 138 (1995), to underscore its point that the authorizing language found in the financial responsibility act cannot validate a policy that violates the no- fault act.

2019In 1976, the Legislature qualified this language with five exceptions, subsections (a) through (e), which are maintained in the current version of the statute.1 In USAA Ins Co v Houston Gen Ins Co, 220 Mich App 386, 391-392 ; 559 NW2d 98 (1996), this Court explained that the exceptions were intended to “eas[e] the financial burden on the operators of vehicles used in government- sponsored transportation programs or providing service to nonprofit organizations.” The Houston majority supported this inference by quoting a legislative analysis reciting that public and government-sponsored bus comp

2019In 1976, the Legislature qualified this language with five exceptions, subsections (a) through (e), which are maintained in the current version of the statute.1 In USAA Ins Co v Houston Gen Ins Co, 220 Mich App 386, 391-392 ; 559 NW2d 98 (1996), this Court explained that the exceptions were intended to “eas[e] the financial burden on the operators of vehicles used in government- sponsored transportation programs or providing service to nonprofit organizations.” The Houston majority supported this inference by quoting a legislative analysis reciting that public and government-sponsored bus comp

2019Id. at ___; slip op at 3-4 (quotation marks omitted).

2018"Where an issue is first presented in a motion for reconsideration, it is not properly preserved." Vushaj , 284 Mich.App. at 519 , 773 N.W.2d 758 (2009). 5 Further, while this Court in Fraser noted, albeit without relying on it, that "the legislative analysis of the statute at issue clearly indicates that the purpose of the [ACEA] is to prevent the existence and use of false academic credentials in the state of Michigan," the only issue before the Court in Fraser related to the issuance of a false academic credential in violation of MCL 390.1604(1).

2018"Where an issue is first presented in a motion for reconsideration, it is not properly preserved." Vushaj , 284 Mich.App. at 519 , 773 N.W.2d 758 (2009). 5 Further, while this Court in Fraser noted, albeit without relying on it, that "the legislative analysis of the statute at issue clearly indicates that the purpose of the [ACEA] is to prevent the existence and use of false academic credentials in the state of Michigan," the only issue before the Court in Fraser related to the issuance of a false academic credential in violation of MCL 390.1604(1).

2018Lastly, this conclusion was the conclusion reached by the Tax Tribunal. “[T]his Court will generally defer to the Tax Tribunal’s interpretation of a statute that it is charged with administering and enforcing[.]” Moshier v Whitewater Twp, 277 Mich App 403, 409 ; 745 NW2d 523 (2007) (quotation marks and citation omitted).

2018Lastly, this conclusion was the conclusion reached by the Tax Tribunal. “[T]his Court will generally defer to the Tax Tribunal’s interpretation of a statute that it is charged with administering and enforcing[.]” Moshier v Whitewater Twp, 277 Mich App 403, 409 ; 745 NW2d 523 (2007) (quotation marks and citation omitted).