legislative privilege in Iowa

1997In re E.B.L., 501 N.W.2d 547, 549 (Iowa 1993). “[T]he General Assembly has carefully crafted a legislative framework for state intercession into the parent-child relationship while protecting wherever possible the integrity of the family unit.” In re I.L.G.R., 433 N.W.2d 681, 689 (Iowa 1988).

1992The Iowa legislature “has carefully crafted a legislative framework for State intercession into the parent-child relationship while protecting wherever possible the integrity of the family unit.” In re I.L.G.R., 433 N.W.2d at 689 .

2006That is a clear abuse of judicial authority, inflicted on a critical component of our system of justice, and it requires that we look beyond the general rule to draw out an exception that “reversible error does not depend on a showing of prejudice in an individual case.” Ballard, 329 U.S. at 195 , 67 S.Ct. at 265 , 91 L.Ed. at 186 (footnote omitted).

2006That is a clear abuse of judicial authority, inflicted on a critical component of our system of justice, and it requires that we look beyond the general rule to draw out an exception that “reversible error does not depend on a showing of prejudice in an individual case.” Ballard, 329 U.S. at 195 , 67 S.Ct. at 265 , 91 L.Ed. at 186 (footnote omitted).

2004K.A.S., 499 N.W.2d at 566 (“exelud[ing] indigent parents in an adoption proceeding from the class of indigent parents entitled to counsel creates an impermissible, underinclu-sive legislative classification, because the classification does not include all who are similarly situated”).

2004K.A.S., 499 N.W.2d at 565 ; cf. Iowa Code § 910.2 (providing for reimbursement in criminal cases).

2017Id. at 37.

2017Id. at 37 .

2024Some courts have stated that “[r]edistricting litigation presents a particularly appropriate circumstance for qualifying the state legislative privilege because judicial inquiry into legislative intent is specifically contemplated as part of the resolution of the core issue that such cases present.” Bethune-Hill, 114 F. Supp. 3d at 337 ; see also League of Women Voters of Fla., 132 So. 3d at 147 (concluding the legislative privilege was outweighed by the “compelling, competing interest [of] ensuring compliance with article III, section 20(a) [of the Florida constitution], which specifically ou

2024The district court applied the wrong analysis when it relied on gerrymandering cases, where some courts hold that “judicial inquiry into legislative intent is specifically contemplated as part of the resolution of the 4 core issue that such cases present.” Bethune-Hill v. Va. State Bd. of Elections, 114 F. Supp. 3d 323, 337 (E.D.

2024And even then, some federal courts applying the federal common law legislative privilege have rejected “call[s] for a categorical exception [to the legislative privilege] whenever a constitutional claim directly implicates the government’s intent.” Lee v. City of 23 Los Angeles, 908 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2018) (noting a categorical “exception would render the privilege ‘of little value.’ ” (quoting Tenney, 341 U.S. at 377 )).

2024See Tenney, 341 U.S. at 376 (holding that state legislators were enti- tled to absolute immunity from suit under federal common law and concluding that in enacting 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Congress did not, without more specific lan- guage, intend § 1983 liability to “impinge on a tradition so well grounded in his- tory and reason”); see also Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44 , 49-52 (1998) (ex- tending absolute immunity to local legislators).

2024And even then, some federal courts applying the federal common law legislative privilege have rejected “call[s] for a categorical exception [to the legislative privilege] whenever a constitutional claim directly implicates the government’s intent.” Lee v. City of 23 Los Angeles, 908 F.3d 1175, 1188 (9th Cir. 2018) (noting a categorical “exception would render the privilege ‘of little value.’ ” (quoting Tenney, 341 U.S. at 377 )).

2024See Tenney, 341 U.S. at 376 (holding that state legislators were enti- tled to absolute immunity from suit under federal common law and concluding that in enacting 42 U.S.C. § 1983 Congress did not, without more specific lan- guage, intend § 1983 liability to “impinge on a tradition so well grounded in his- tory and reason”); see also Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. 44 , 49-52 (1998) (ex- tending absolute immunity to local legislators).

2024See Johnson, 383 U.S. at 180-85 (holding that federal prosecutors could not question a senator about a speech he gave on the House floor that helped form the basis for bribery charges against him).

2024The legislative privilege the Legislators rely on is an evidentiary privilege that protects legislators “against both compulsory testimony and compulsory production of evidence.” Edwards v. Vesilind, 790 S.E.2d 469, 478 (Va. 2016); see also Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Williams, 62 F.3d 408, 418 , 420-21 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“A party is no more entitled to compel congressional testimony—or production of documents—than it is to sue congressmen.”).

2024The legislative privilege the Legislators rely on is an evidentiary privilege that protects legislators “against both compulsory testimony and compulsory production of evidence.” Edwards v. Vesilind, 790 S.E.2d 469, 478 (Va. 2016); see also Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Williams, 62 F.3d 408, 418 , 420-21 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“A party is no more entitled to compel congressional testimony—or production of documents—than it is to sue congressmen.”).

2024The Fifth Circuit similarly held that state legislators’ communications with third parties were protected from discovery after finding that the legislative privilege was not waived merely because the requested information had been communicated outside the legisla- ture: “An exception for communications ‘outside the legislature’ would swallow the rule almost whole, because ‘[m]eeting with “interest” groups . . . is a part and parcel of the modern legislative procedures through which legislators receive in- formation possibly bearing on the legislation they are to consider.’ ” La Union Del Puebl

2024See, e.g., Edwards, 790 S.E.2d at 476 (“Legislative privilege arose in the young American nation from the same underlying principles [of free- dom of speech and legislative immunity in parliamentary law], combined with the uniquely American emphasis on separation of powers and representative government.”); League of Women Voters of Fla., 132 So. 3d at 144 (“These factors, however, are not conclusive because there is another important factor that weighs in favor of recognizing the privilege—the doctrine of separation of powers.”).

2024The legislative privilege the Legislators rely on is an evidentiary privilege that protects legislators “against both compulsory testimony and compulsory production of evidence.” Edwards v. Vesilind, 790 S.E.2d 469, 478 (Va. 2016); see also Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Williams, 62 F.3d 408, 418 , 420-21 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (“A party is no more entitled to compel congressional testimony—or production of documents—than it is to sue congressmen.”).

2024See, e.g., League of Women Voters of Fla., 132 So. 3d at 146 (recognizing a legislative privilege to “ensure that the separation of powers is maintained so that the Legislature can accomplish its role of enacting legislation in the public interest without undue interference”).

2024See, e.g., Edwards, 790 S.E.2d at 476 (“Legislative privilege arose in the young American nation from the same underlying principles [of free- dom of speech and legislative immunity in parliamentary law], combined with the uniquely American emphasis on separation of powers and representative government.”); League of Women Voters of Fla., 132 So. 3d at 144 (“These factors, however, are not conclusive because there is another important factor that weighs in favor of recognizing the privilege—the doctrine of separation of powers.”).

2024“Legislative immunity . . . protects legislators from suit arising from their legitimate legislative actions.” Wash. Suburban Sanitary Comm’n, 666 F. Supp. 2d at 531 (emphasis added).

2024A legislative privilege “is a derivative of legislative immunity.” Wash. Suburban Sanitary Comm’n, 666 F. Supp. 2d at 531 (addressing the differences between legislative immunity and legislative privilege).

2019Id. at 330 (observing that the "legislature did not mandate a contested hearing process to review and award tax credits").

2016In State v. Carter, 602 N.W.2d 818, 821-22 (Iowa 1999), the Iowa Supreme Court addressed the legislative definition of first-degree sexual abuse and, specifically, the provision requiring the commission of a serious injury “in the course of” committing sexual abuse.

1998Harris v. Hornbaker, 98 Wash.2d 650 , 658 P.2d 1219, 1224 (1983); see 1 Davis, Administrative Law § 7.8, at 347.

1998Harris v. Hornbaker, 98 Wash.2d 650 , 658 P.2d 1219, 1224 (1983); see 1 Davis, Administrative Law § 7.8, at 347.

1997In re E.B.L., 501 N.W.2d 547, 549 (Iowa 1993). “[T]he General Assembly has carefully crafted a legislative framework for state intercession into the parent-child relationship while protecting wherever possible the integrity of the family unit.” In re I.L.G.R., 433 N.W.2d 681, 689 (Iowa 1988).

1994City of Sioux City v. Greater Sioux City Press Club, 421 N.W.2d 895, 897 (Iowa 1988).

1988See In re D.P., 431 N.W.2d 777, 778 (Iowa 1988); In re A.C., 415 N.W.2d 609, 613 (Iowa 1987).

1988See In re D.P., 431 N.W.2d 777, 778 (Iowa 1988); In re A.C., 415 N.W.2d 609, 613 (Iowa 1987).

1985This position was reaffirmed in Gorrie v. Heckler, 606 F.Supp. 368, 371 (D.Minn.1985), where the Secretary argued that this presumption was allowed because in passing DEFRA, paragraph 38, “Congress intended to create a legislative presumption of availability of income as to the individual and as to the family in recognition of the fact that family members who live together most likely share expenses.” V.

1981The scope of this requirement was restricted in Janson v. Fulton, 162 N.W.2d 438, 443 (Iowa 1968) (emphasis added): “We think the legislative requirement that one of the designated trained persons be the only person who may withdraw such body substancefs] was intended to be limited to withdrawal of blood or other body substances by artificial means."