legislative rule in West Virginia

2011Quoting Kincaid v. Mangum, 189 W.Va. 404, 411-12 , 432 S.E.2d 74, 81-82 (1993) (“[0]ur legislature does not simply review the rules recommended by the agencies, but, instead gives our rules the same effect as statutes.” (citation omitted)), clarified by Swiger v. UGI/AmeriGas, Inc., 216 W.Va. 756 , 613 S.E.2d 904 (2005).

2011Quoting Kincaid v. Mangum, 189 W.Va. 404, 411-12 , 432 S.E.2d 74, 81-82 (1993) (“[0]ur legislature does not simply review the rules recommended by the agencies, but, instead gives our rules the same effect as statutes.” (citation omitted)), clarified by Swiger v. UGI/AmeriGas, Inc., 216 W.Va. 756 , 613 S.E.2d 904 (2005).

2021Va. 573 , 466 S.E.2d 424 (1995) (“If legislative intent is not clear, a reviewing court may not simply impose its own construction of the statute in reviewing a legislative rule.

2019The Appalachian Power Court noted generally that "a legislative rule should be ignored only if the agency has exceeded its constitutional or statutory authority or it is arbitrary or capricious." Id . at 585, 466 S.E.2d at 436 .

2015This Court has repeatedly recognized that in addition to express powers, “administrative agencies also possess ‘such powers as are reasonably and necessarily implied in the exercise of their duties in accomplishing the purposes of the act.’” McDaniel v. West Virginia Div. of Labor, 214 W.Va. 719, 727 , 591 S.E.2d 277, 285 (2003) (quoting State Human Rights Comm’n v. Pauley, 158 W.Va. 495, 498, 212 S.E.2d 77, 78 (1975)); accord, PNGI Charles Town Gaming, LLC v. W.Va.

2015This Court has repeatedly recognized that in addition to express powers, “administrative agencies also possess ‘such powers as are reasonably and necessarily implied in the exercise of their duties in accomplishing the purposes of the act.’” McDaniel v. West Virginia Div. of Labor, 214 W.Va. 719, 727 , 591 S.E.2d 277, 285 (2003) (quoting State Human Rights Comm’n v. Pauley, 158 W.Va. 495, 498, 212 S.E.2d 77, 78 (1975)); accord, PNGI Charles Town Gaming, LLC v. W.Va.

2015This Court has repeatedly recognized that in addition to express powers, “administrative agencies also possess ‘such powers as are reasonably and necessarily implied in the exercise of their duties in accomplishing the purposes of the act.’” McDaniel v. West Virginia Div. of Labor, 214 W.Va. 719, 727 , 591 S.E.2d 277, 285 (2003) (quoting State Human Rights Comm’n v. Pauley, 158 W.Va. 495, 498, 212 S.E.2d 77, 78 (1975)); accord, PNGI Charles Town Gaming, LLC v. W.Va.

2015This Court has repeatedly recognized that in addition to express powers, “administrative agencies also possess ‘such powers as are reasonably and necessarily implied in the exercise of their duties in accomplishing the purposes of the act.’” McDaniel v. West Virginia Div. of Labor, 214 W.Va. 719, 727 , 591 S.E.2d 277, 285 (2003) (quoting State Human Rights Comm’n v. Pauley, 158 W.Va. 495, 498, 212 S.E.2d 77, 78 (1975)); accord, PNGI Charles Town Gaming, LLC v. W.Va.

2014See Syl. pt. 5, State v. General Daniel Morgan Post No. 548, V.F.W., 144 W.Va. 137 , 107 S.E.2d 353 (1959) (“When a statute [or rule] is clear and unambiguous and the [drafter’s] intent is plain, the statute [or rule] should not be interpreted by the courts, and in such case it is the duty of the courts not to construe but to apply the statute [or rule].”).

2014See Syl. pt. 5, State v. General Daniel Morgan Post No. 548, V.F.W., 144 W.

2021Va. Code, 29A-1-2(d) [1982], and such a legislative rule has the force and effect of law.” Syllabus point 5, Smith v. West Virginia Human Rights Commission, 216 W.

2016Human Rights Comm’n, 216 W.Va. 2 , 602 S.E,2d 445 (2004), holds: “A regulation that is proposed by an agency and approved by the Legislature is a ‘legislative rule’, as defined by the State- Administrative Procedures Act, W.Va, Code, 29A-l-2(d) [1982], and such a legislative rule, has the force and effect of law.” Accord ,syl. pt. 2, State ex rel.

2001Barker v. Manchin, 167 W.Va. 155 , 279 S.E.2d 622 (1981), in which we struck as unconstitutional provisions of our Administrative Procedures Act [27] that empowered a legislative rule-making review committee to veto rules and regulations validly promulgated by administrative agencies pursuant to delegation of the legislature's rule-making authority.

2001Barker v. Manchin, 167 W.Va. 155 , 279 S.E.2d 622 (1981), in which we struck as unconstitutional provisions of our Administrative Procedures Act [27] that empowered a legislative rule-making review committee to veto rules and regulations validly promulgated by administrative agencies pursuant to delegation of the legislature's rule-making authority.

2020Va. 748, 763 , 434 S.E.2d 420, 435 (1993) (stating that “unless we are to abandon our logic and common sense, we cannot help but conclude that the statutory scheme surrounding these bonds bespeaks a legislative requirement that they be funded”). 15 IV.

1993To accept the premise that the Legislature is not bound to fund the bonds and would allow a default, thereby impairing the credit rating of the State, assumes a naivete on our part that we simply do not possess.” 189 W.Va. at 763 , 434 S.E.2d at 435 .

2013Callaghan v. West Virginia Civil Seivice Commission, 166 W.Va. 117 , 273 S.E.2d 72 (1980), we concluded that a standard contained in a legislative rule was the equivalent of a standard contained in a statute, since “[p]rocedures and rules properly promulgated by an administrative agency with authority to enforce a law will be upheld so long as they are reasonable and do not enlarge, amend or repeal substantive rights created by statute.” Finch, 229 W.Va. at 156 n. 5, 727 S.E.2d at 832 -33 n. 5. 12 .Kyriazis, 192 W.Va. at 66, 450 S.E.2d at 655 . 13 .

2013Callaghan v. West Virginia Civil Seivice Commission, 166 W.Va. 117 , 273 S.E.2d 72 (1980), we concluded that a standard contained in a legislative rule was the equivalent of a standard contained in a statute, since “[p]rocedures and rules properly promulgated by an administrative agency with authority to enforce a law will be upheld so long as they are reasonable and do not enlarge, amend or repeal substantive rights created by statute.” Finch, 229 W.Va. at 156 n. 5, 727 S.E.2d at 832 -33 n. 5. 12 .Kyriazis, 192 W.Va. at 66, 450 S.E.2d at 655 . 13 .

2007Recently, this court reiterated that a legislative rule can be deemed "unenforceable if the regulation was beyond the constitutional or statutory authority extended to the agency involved or if the rule is determined to be arbitrary or capricious." Swiger v. UGI/AmeriGas, Inc., 216 W.Va. 756, 763 , 613 S.E.2d 904, 911 (2005), citing Syl.

2007Recently, this court reiterated that a legislative rule can be deemed "unenforceable if the regulation was beyond the constitutional or statutory authority extended to the agency involved or if the rule is determined to be arbitrary or capricious." Swiger v. UGI/AmeriGas, Inc., 216 W.Va. 756, 763 , 613 S.E.2d 904, 911 (2005), citing Syl.

1990Further, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Handley v. Union Carbide Corp., 804 F.2d 265 (4th Cir.1986) in interpreting the amended statute indicated that [t]he statute now states that `in enacting the immunity provisions of this chapter, the legislature intended to create a legislative standard for loss of that immunity of more narrow application and containing more specific mandatory elements than the common law tort system concept and standard of willful, wanton and reckless misconduct.' Id. at 269 (quoting W.Va.Code § 23-4-2(c)(1)).

1990Further, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals in Handley v. Union Carbide Corp., 804 F.2d 265 (4th Cir.1986) in interpreting the amended statute indicated that [t]he statute now states that `in enacting the immunity provisions of this chapter, the legislature intended to create a legislative standard for loss of that immunity of more narrow application and containing more specific mandatory elements than the common law tort system concept and standard of willful, wanton and reckless misconduct.' Id. at 269 (quoting W.Va.Code § 23-4-2(c)(1)).

2025Va. 116, 120 , 829 S.E.2d 747, 751 (2019) (“A legislative rule has the force of a statute[.]”); Summers v. W.

2023See Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall, 274 U.S. 284 , 47 S.Ct. 639 (1927) (finding that the predecessor to the West Virginia severance tax avoided invalidation under the commerce clause of the United States Constitution because the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia had judicially limited the State Tax Commissioner’s method of determining gross proceeds in Hope Natural Gas v. Hall, 102 W.Va. 272 , 135 S.E. 582 (1926)) and syl. pt. 2, Soto v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 142 W.Va. 373 , 95 S.E.2d 769 (1956) (extending the judicially imposed wellhead valuation limitation to restrict the Tax Commissio

2023See Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall, 274 U.S. 284 , 47 S.Ct. 639 (1927) (finding that the predecessor to the West Virginia severance tax avoided invalidation under the commerce clause of the United States Constitution because the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia had judicially limited the State Tax Commissioner’s method of determining gross proceeds in Hope Natural Gas v. Hall, 102 W.Va. 272 , 135 S.E. 582 (1926)) and syl. pt. 2, Soto v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 142 W.Va. 373 , 95 S.E.2d 769 (1956) (extending the judicially imposed wellhead valuation limitation to restrict the Tax Commissio

2023See Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall, 274 U.S. 284 , 47 S.Ct. 639 (1927) (finding that the predecessor to the West Virginia severance tax avoided invalidation under the commerce clause of the United States Constitution because the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia had judicially limited the State Tax Commissioner’s method of determining gross proceeds in Hope Natural Gas v. Hall, 102 W.Va. 272 , 135 S.E. 582 (1926)) and syl. pt. 2, Soto v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 142 W.Va. 373 , 95 S.E.2d 769 (1956) (extending the judicially imposed wellhead valuation limitation to restrict the Tax Commissio

2023See Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall, 274 U.S. 284 , 47 S.Ct. 639 (1927) (finding that the predecessor to the West Virginia severance tax avoided invalidation under the commerce clause of the United States Constitution because the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia had judicially limited the State Tax Commissioner’s method of determining gross proceeds in Hope Natural Gas v. Hall, 102 W.Va. 272 , 135 S.E. 582 (1926)) and syl. pt. 2, Soto v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 142 W.Va. 373 , 95 S.E.2d 769 (1956) (extending the judicially imposed wellhead valuation limitation to restrict the Tax Commissio

2023See Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall, 274 U.S. 284 , 47 S.Ct. 639 (1927) (finding that the predecessor to the West Virginia severance tax avoided invalidation under the commerce clause of the United States Constitution because the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia had judicially limited the State Tax Commissioner’s method of determining gross proceeds in Hope Natural Gas v. Hall, 102 W.Va. 272 , 135 S.E. 582 (1926)) and syl. pt. 2, Soto v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 142 W.Va. 373 , 95 S.E.2d 769 (1956) (extending the judicially imposed wellhead valuation limitation to restrict the Tax Commissio

2023See Hope Natural Gas Co. v. Hall, 274 U.S. 284 , 47 S.Ct. 639 (1927) (finding that the predecessor to the West Virginia severance tax avoided invalidation under the commerce clause of the United States Constitution because the Supreme Court of Appeals of West Virginia had judicially limited the State Tax Commissioner’s method of determining gross proceeds in Hope Natural Gas v. Hall, 102 W.Va. 272 , 135 S.E. 582 (1926)) and syl. pt. 2, Soto v. Hope Natural Gas Co., 142 W.Va. 373 , 95 S.E.2d 769 (1956) (extending the judicially imposed wellhead valuation limitation to restrict the Tax Commissio

2021Co. 06/27/95), the legislative rule, on its face, is devoid of any fixed number of respectively weighted standards that 7 “[L]egislative changes resulted in the creation of a successor tribunal to the Tax Commissioner’s Office of Hearings and Appeals: the Office of Tax Appeals.” Concept Min., Inc. v. Helton, 217 W.

2021Va. 298, 300 , 617 S.E.2d 845, 847 (2005).