65 New Jersey opinions name it 3 courts 1950–2025 9 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by New Jersey courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Gilbert v. Gladdengreen2 sentences2014Gilbert v. Gladden, 87 N.J. 275, 292-93 (1981). 2014Gilbert v. Gladden, 87 N.J. 275, 292-93 (1981). | 3 | 3 |
Bedford v. Riellogreen2 sentences2017Our goal in interpreting the NJFCA, or any other legislative enactment, is to construe and interpret its terms and provisions in a way that gives meaning to every part and produces "a harmonious whole." Bedford v. Riello, 195 N.J. 210, 224 (2008). 2016Our goal in interpreting the NJFCA, or any other legislative enactment, is to construe and interpret its terms and provisions in a way that gives meaning to every part and produces "a harmonious whole." Bedford v. Riello, 195 N.J. 210, 224 (2008). | 2 | 2 |
Allen v. Fauvergreen2 sentences2017In other words, a legislative waiver of sovereign immunity must be expressed clearly and unambiguously, Allen v. Fauver, 167 N.J. 69, 77-78 (2001), and a retroactive waiver of sovereign immunity requires the clearest of expression. 2017In other words, a legislative waiver of sovereign immunity must be expressed clearly and unambiguously, Allen v. Fauver, 167 N.J. 69, 77-78 (2001), and a retroactive waiver of sovereign immunity requires the clearest of expression. | 2 | 2 |
Troth v. Stategreen2 sentences1999See, e.g., Troth v. State, 117 N.J. 258 , 566 A. 2d 515 (1989) (did the legislative immunity with respect to the maintenance of natural lands take precedence over the statutory liability for a defective condition of a man-made dam?); Kolitch v. Lindedahl, 100 N.J. 485 , 497 A. 2d 183 (1985) (did the legislative immunity for establishing a speed limit take precedence over a negligent failure to warn of dangerous curve in the road?). 1999See, e.g., Troth v. State, 117 N.J. 258 , 566 A. 2d 515 (1989) (did the legislative immunity with respect to the maintenance of natural lands take precedence over the statutory liability for a defective condition of a man-made dam?); Kolitch v. Lindedahl, 100 N.J. 485 , 497 A. 2d 183 (1985) (did the legislative immunity for establishing a speed limit take precedence over a negligent failure to warn of dangerous curve in the road?). | 2 | 2 |
Ward v. Scottgreen2 sentences1987See, e.g., Keyes Martin & Co v. Director, Division of Purchase & Property, 99 N.J. 244, 254-262 (1985) (“public interest”); Burton v. Sills, 53 N.J. 86, 90-91 (1968), appeal dism. 394 US. 812, 89 S.Ct. 1486 , 22 L.Ed.2d 748 (1969) (“public health, safety or welfare”); Ward v. Scott, 11 N.J. 117, 123-124 (1952) (“public convenience and necessity”). 1982Shelton College v. State Bd. of Ed., 48 N.J. 501, 516-518 (1967); Ward v. Scott, 11 N.J. 117, 123 (1952); Toms River Affiliates v. Environmental Protection Dep't, 140 N.J. | 2 | 2 |
Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co.green2 sentences1966In response, the defendants urge that the legislative requirement for the additional certification was designed “to facilitate administration of the acts” (cf. Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U. S. 495, 511 , 57 S. Ct. 868, 873 , 81 L. 1966In response, the defendants urge that the legislative requirement for the additional certification was designed “to facilitate administration of the acts” (cf. Carmichael v. Southern Coal & Coke Co., 301 U. S. 495, 511 , 57 S. Ct. 868, 873 , 81 L. | 2 | 2 |
D.D. v. University of Medicine & Dentistrygreen2 sentences2025Courts faced with applications for leave to file a late notice of claim, therefore, must proceed with their evaluation mindful of the Legislature's direction that the proofs demonstrate circumstances that are not merely sufficient, but that they instead be extraordinary. [D.D., 213 N.J. at 148-49 .] The party seeking leave to file a late notice of claim bears the burden of establishing extraordinary circumstances justifying the late filing. 2018Trial courts must assess claims of extraordinary circumstances consistent with this legislative framework to avoid "excessive or inappropriate exceptions." See D.D., 213 N.J. at 149 . | 1 | 7 |
Walton v. Visgilgreen2 sentences2005Statutory analysis: Counsel for the parties agree, and the court so finds, in keeping with [Walton v. Visgil, 248 N.J.Super. 642, 649 , 591 A.2d 1018 (App.Div.1991) ], that as the combined net Caplan family income exceeds $150,800 per year, the court must initially apply the guidelines maximum total child support for two children, and supplement this award with an additional support amount based upon the actual family income and the dispositive legislative factors set forth in N.J.SA 2A:34-23[a], * * * * This court finds and concludes that for purposes of calculating support for Daniel and Jac 2005Statutory analysis: Counsel for the parties agree, and the court so finds, in keeping with [Walton v. Visgil, 248 N.J.Super. 642, 649 , 591 A.2d 1018 (App.Div.1991) ], that as the combined net Caplan family income exceeds $150,800 per year, the court must initially apply the guidelines maximum total child support for two children, and supplement this award with an additional support amount based upon the actual family income and the dispositive legislative factors set forth in N.J.SA 2A:34-23[a], * * * * This court finds and concludes that for purposes of calculating support for Daniel and Jac | 1 | 2 |
Daniel Tumpson v. James Farina (072813)green1 sentence2022Tumpson v. A-0227-21 12 Farina, 218 N.J. 450, 467 (2014) (quoting Wilson ex rel. | 1 | 1 |
Mendez v. SOUTH JERSEY TRANSP.green1 sentence2021Courts faced with applications for leave to file a late notice of claim, therefore, must proceed with their evaluation mindful of the Legislature's direction that the proofs demonstrate circumstances that are not merely sufficient, but that they instead be extraordinary. [D.D., 213 N.J. at 148-49 .] Medical conditions meet the extraordinary circumstances standard if they are "severe or debilitating" and have a "consequential impact on the claimant's A-3655-19 18 very ability to pursue redress and attend to the filing of a claim." Id. at 149-50 ; See also Mendez, 416 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Weiss v. New Jersey Transitgreen1 sentence2017Transit, 128 N.J. 376, 381 (1992) (quoting Henschke v. Borough of Clayton, 251 N.J. | 1 | 1 |
Airwork Service Division v. Director, Division of Taxationgreen2 sentences2013See Airwork, supra, 2 N.J.Tax at 343-44 , where the court held that if Taxation imposed an assessment “in pursuant to statutory authority, such in compliance with the legislative standard embodied” in the statute, then, that “standard cannot be vitiated by an erroneous construction thereof by the Division of Taxation” (relying upon “settled” federal tax law applicable to “to all types of taxes that the Commissioner of Internal Revenue is empowered retroactively to correct mistakes of law in the application of the tax laws to particular transactions, even where the taxpayer relied to his detrim 2013This is so “even where the taxpayer proves detrimental reliance upon such construction.” Id. at 344 . | 1 | 1 |
Interstate 78 Office Park, Ltd. v. Tewksbury Townshipgreen1 sentence2006In Interstate 78 Office Park, Ltd. v. Tewksbury Tp., 11 N.J.Tax 172, 181 (Tax 1990), this court explained the reason that an application is required: This legislative requirement for the filing of the farmland assessment application is to notice the assessor as to the exact agricultural or horticultural use the owner is claiming and the facts relied upon in support thereof so the assessor may check it out and make an informed determination whether the application sets forth a claim recognized by the act and whether the facts found by him support the claim---- When the assessor makes his physic | 1 | 1 |
Maw v. Adv. Clinical Communicationsgreen2 sentences2004The dissent below is in accord with our analysis in respect of its discussion of both the purpose of CEPA, Maw, supra, 359 N.J.Super. at 444-446 , 820 A.2d at 119-121 (Cuff, J.A.D., dissenting), and our precedent construing CEPA Id. at 446-47 , 820 A.2d at 120-21 . 2004The dissent below is in accord with our analysis in respect of its discussion of both the purpose of CEPA, Maw, supra, 359 N.J.Super. at 444-446 , 820 A.2d at 119-121 (Cuff, J.A.D., dissenting), and our precedent construing CEPA Id. at 446-47 , 820 A.2d at 120-21 . | 1 | 1 |
| Acierno v. Cloutiergreen | 1 | 1 |
| Moore v. Smithgreen | 1 | 1 |
| cluster 532535green | 1 | 1 |
| cluster 487759green | 1 | 1 |
| Feldman v. Lederle Laboratoriesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| BURTON v. Sillsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Burton v. Sillsgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Keyes Martin & Co. v. Director, Div. of Purchasegreen | 1 | 1 |
| Exxon Corp. v. Huntgreen | 1 | 1 |
| City of Clifton v. Zweirgreen | 1 | 1 |
| P, T & L Construction Co. v. Commissioner, Department of Transportationgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Shelton College v. State Board of Educationgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Toms River Affiliates v. DEPT., ENVIRON. PROTEC.green | 1 | 1 |
| Leimann v. Board of Adjustment, Cranford Tp.green | 1 | 1 |
| Wilson v. City of Long Branchgreen | 1 | 1 |
| New Jersey Pharmaceutical Ass'n v. Furmangreen | 1 | 1 |
| State v. Giordanogreen | 1 | 1 |
| Rescue Army v. Municipal Court of Los Angelesgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in New Jersey. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Kolitch v. Lindedahl
green
2 sentences1999See, e.g., Troth v. State, 117 N.J. 258 , 566 A. 2d 515 (1989) (did the legislative immunity with respect to the maintenance of natural lands take precedence over the statutory liability for a defective condition of a man-made dam?); Kolitch v. Lindedahl, 100 N.J. 485 , 497 A. 2d 183 (1985) (did the legislative immunity for establishing a speed limit take precedence over a negligent failure to warn of dangerous curve in the road?). 1999See, e.g., Troth v. State, 117 N.J. 258 , 566 A. 2d 515 (1989) (did the legislative immunity with respect to the maintenance of natural lands take precedence over the statutory liability for a defective condition of a man-made dam?); Kolitch v. Lindedahl, 100 N.J. 485 , 497 A. 2d 183 (1985) (did the legislative immunity for establishing a speed limit take precedence over a negligent failure to warn of dangerous curve in the road?). | 2 | 1992–1999 |
Congini by Congini v. PORTERSVILLE ETC.
green
2 sentences1989See Macleary v. Hines, 817 F. 2d 1081 (3rd Cir.1987); Mitseff v. Wheeler, 38 Ohio St. 3d 112 , 526 N.E. 2d 798 (1988); Koback v. Crook, 123 Wis. 2d 259 , 366 N.W. 2d 857 (1985), and Congini v. Portersville Valve Co., 504 Pa. 157 , 470 A. 2d 515 (1983), all of which adopt the legislative standard of conduct relating to underage consumption of alcohol as applicable to tort liability. 1989See Macleary v. Hines, 817 F. 2d 1081 (3rd Cir.1987); Mitseff v. Wheeler, 38 Ohio St. 3d 112 , 526 N.E. 2d 798 (1988); Koback v. Crook, 123 Wis. 2d 259 , 366 N.W. 2d 857 (1985), and Congini v. Portersville Valve Co., 504 Pa. 157 , 470 A. 2d 515 (1983), all of which adopt the legislative standard of conduct relating to underage consumption of alcohol as applicable to tort liability. | 2 | 1989–1989 |
Sweezy v. New Hampshire Ex Rel. Wyman
green
2 sentences1973Sweezy v. New Hampshire by Wyman, 354 U.S. 234 , 77 S.Ct. 1203 , 1 L.Ed. 2d 1311 (1957), which they cite, dealt with a legislative inquiry into political associations. 1973Sweezy v. New Hampshire by Wyman, 354 U.S. 234 , 77 S.Ct. 1203 , 1 L.Ed. 2d 1311 (1957), which they cite, dealt with a legislative inquiry into political associations. | 2 | 1970–1973 |
Kelly Greene v. Aig Casualty Company
green
1 sentence2024The employer's right to reimbursement of a certain portion of the worker's compensation benefits paid to an injured employee is, therefore, a vital part of the current legislative framework that contains numerous provisions designed A-1194-22 10 to encourage "the employer to make prompt voluntary payments, thereby affording the employee needed funds for medical treatment and the replacement of lost wages." Greene, 433 N.J. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Hirth v. City of Hoboken
green
2 sentences2024The Hirth court stated "the only hearing required before adoption of a . . . municipal ordinance[] is a legislative hearing before the governing body." Id. at 165 (citing N.J.S.A. 40:49-2(b)). 2024This means there usually "is no administrative record other than whatever report the planning board may have submitted to the governing body." Ibid. | 1 | 2024–2024 |
Lyons v. City of Camden
green
2 sentences2004The Lyons Court stated that in the context of hearings in prerogative writs actions, "there is no sound reason why the plaintiffs may not produce for testimonial examination any witnesses who testified or made reports or furnished documents on matters relating to the board's finding of blight at the legislative hearing." 48 N.J. at 534 , 226 A. 2d 625 . 2004The Lyons Court stated that in the context of hearings in prerogative writs actions, "there is no sound reason why the plaintiffs may not produce for testimonial examination any witnesses who testified or made reports or furnished documents on matters relating to the board's finding of blight at the legislative hearing." 48 N.J. at 534 , 226 A. 2d 625 . | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Warren County Community College v. Warren County Board of Chosen Freeholders
green
2 sentences2003Warren County, supra, 350 N.J.Super. at 508 , 796 A.2d 257 . 2003Warren County, supra, 350 N.J.Super. at 508 , 796 A.2d 257 . | 1 | 2003–2003 |
State Board of Optometrists v. S. S. Kresge Co.
neutral
2 sentences2003Kresge Co., 113 N.J.L. 287, 295 , 174 A. 353 , modified by, 115 N.J.L. 495 , 181 A. 152 (1935). 2003Kresge Co., 113 N.J.L. 287, 295 , 174 A. 353 , modified by, 115 N.J.L. 495 , 181 A. 152 (1935). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
New Jersey State Board of Optometrists v. S. S. Kresge Co.
green
2 sentences2003Kresge Co., 113 N.J.L. 287, 295 , 174 A. 353 , modified by, 115 N.J.L. 495 , 181 A. 152 (1935). 2003Kresge Co., 113 N.J.L. 287, 295 , 174 A. 353 , modified by, 115 N.J.L. 495 , 181 A. 152 (1935). | 1 | 2003–2003 |
Alloway v. Bradlees, Inc.
green
1 sentence2002Ibid. | 1 | 2002–2002 |
Bogan v. Scott-Harris
green
2 sentences2002The Court found that legislative immunity "has long been recognized in Anglo-American law" and has "a venerable tradition." Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. at 48-49 , 118 S.Ct. at 970 , 140 L.Ed. 2d at 85 . 2002The Court found that legislative immunity "has long been recognized in Anglo-American law" and has "a venerable tradition." Bogan v. Scott-Harris, 523 U.S. at 48-49 , 118 S.Ct. at 970 , 140 L.Ed. 2d at 85 . | 1 | 2002–2002 |
State v. Ramseur
green
2 sentences2001In affirmatively answering the question of whether contemporary standards in our society deem capital punishment to be an appropriate penalty for murder, the Court relied, among other things, on the legislative passage of a death penalty statute in 1982, five years earlier, as presumptive evidence that it accords with community standards; the absence of “other evidence” of community standards to rebut the legislative presumption; and the actions of juries in imposing twenty-six death sentences between 1982 and 1987 as a “true reflection of society’s morality.” Id. at 172-73 , 524 A.2d 188 . 2001In affirmatively answering the question of whether contemporary standards in our society deem capital punishment to be an appropriate penalty for murder, the Court relied, among other things, on the legislative passage of a death penalty statute in 1982, five years earlier, as presumptive evidence that it accords with community standards; the absence of “other evidence” of community standards to rebut the legislative presumption; and the actions of juries in imposing twenty-six death sentences between 1982 and 1987 as a “true reflection of society’s morality.” Id. at 172-73 , 524 A.2d 188 . | 1 | 2001–2001 |
Watkins v. Nelson
green
2 sentences2000However, to overcome that presumption, "the appropriate legislative standard set for judicial inquiry is the best interests, i.e., `benefit' of the children as required in the circumstances." Ibid. 2000However, to overcome that presumption, “the appropriate legislative standard set for judicial inquiry is the best interests, i.e., ‘benefit’ of the children as required in the circumstances.” Ibid. | 1 | 2000–2000 |
Dudewicz v. Norris Schmid, Inc
green
1 sentence1999This plain reading was supported by the legislative analysis, which recognized that “employees are naturally reluctant to inform on an employer or a colleague.” Ibid. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Todd v. Sheridan
green
2 sentences1999Consistent with Todd v. Sheridan, 268 N.J.Super. 387, 398-399 , 633 A. 2d 1009 (App.Div.1993), the trial judge was not required to give an absolute preference to the biological father in this case, but properly weighed his parentage as a substantial element in the best interests balance, along with all of the other circumstances. 1999Consistent with Todd v. Sheridan, 268 N.J.Super. 387, 398-399 , 633 A. 2d 1009 (App.Div.1993), the trial judge was not required to give an absolute preference to the biological father in this case, but properly weighed his parentage as a substantial element in the best interests balance, along with all of the other circumstances. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
Washington Market Enterprises, Inc. v. City of Trenton
green
1 sentence1999Ibid. | 1 | 1999–1999 |
| Gravel v. United States green | 1 | 1995–1995 |
| State v. Cannon green | 1 | 1994–1994 |
| Henschke v. Borough of Clayton green | 1 | 1992–1992 |
| State v. Gardner green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Mitseff v. Wheeler green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Koback v. Crook green | 1 | 1989–1989 |
| Barry v. THE COCA COLA CO. green | 1 | 1986–1986 |
| Lake Country Estates, Inc. v. Tahoe Regional Planning Agency green | 1 | 1984–1984 |
| Willis v. Dept. of Cons. & Ec. Dev. green | 1 | 1980–1980 |
| Spencer v. Texas green | 1 | 1975–1975 |
| Garfield v. United States Ex Rel. Allison green | 1 | 1969–1969 |
| Robert R. Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Company green | 1 | 1969–1969 |
| Yee Hem v. United States green | 1 | 1968–1968 |
| State v. Lisena green | 1 | 1968–1968 |
| State v. Lisena green | 1 | 1968–1968 |
| Tot v. United States green | 1 | 1968–1968 |
| State v. Ross green | 1 | 1965–1965 |
| NJ ST. BAR ASS'N v. Northern NJ Mortgage Associates green | 1 | 1964–1964 |
| McGrain v. Daugherty green | 1 | 1957–1957 |
| Conlon v. BD. OF PUBLIC WORKS, CITY OF PATERSON green | 1 | 1957–1957 |
| Hertz Washmobile System v. South Orange green | 1 | 1957–1957 |
| Norwegian Nitrogen Products Co. v. United States green | 1 | 1950–1950 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.