6 Nevada opinions name it 1 courts 1952–2021 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Nevada courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Western Realty Co. v. City of Renogreen2 sentences2014Realty Co., 63 Nev. at 344, 172 P.2d at 165, and the statute is impliedly repealed by the constitutional amendment. 2 Nevada's Attorney General reached the same conclusion in 2005: [TI he people, by acting to amend the minimum wage coverage and failing to include the statutory exclusions in the proposed amendment, are presumed to have intended the repeal of the existing exclusions so that the new minimum wage would be paid to all who meet its definition of "employee." Accordingly, the proposed amendment would effect an implied repeal of the exclusions from minimum wage coverage at NRS 608.250( 2014Realty Co., 63 Nev. at 344, 172 P.2d at 165, and the statute is impliedly repealed by the constitutional amendment. 2 Nevada's Attorney General reached the same conclusion in 2005: [TI he people, by acting to amend the minimum wage coverage and failing to include the statutory exclusions in the proposed amendment, are presumed to have intended the repeal of the existing exclusions so that the new minimum wage would be paid to all who meet its definition of "employee." Accordingly, the proposed amendment would effect an implied repeal of the exclusions from minimum wage coverage at NRS 608.250( | 1 | 1 |
Mengelkamp v. Listgreen2 sentences2014The Amendment's broad definition of employee and very specific exemptions necessarily and directly conflict with the legislative exception for taxicab drivers established by NRS 608.250(2)(e). 2 Therefore, the two are "irreconcilably repugnant," Mengelkamp, 88 Nev. at 546, 501 P.2d at 1034, such that "both cannot stand," W. 2014The Amendment's broad definition of employee and very specific exemptions necessarily and directly conflict with the legislative exception for taxicab drivers established by NRS 608.250(2)(e). 2 Therefore, the two are "irreconcilably repugnant," Mengelkamp, 88 Nev. at 546, 501 P.2d at 1034, such that "both cannot stand," W. | 1 | 1 |
Krick v. Krickgreen2 sentences1988Although it could be argued *608 syntactically that the quoted language relates only to property division, we interpret the statute to mean that, since 1861, alimony awards must in this jurisdiction be “just and equitable.” 3 Furthermore, as required by NRS 125.150(1), the award must be fairly related to the “respective merits” of the parties and to the “condition in which they will be left by the divorce.” The legislative standard was accepted and properly restated in Krick v. Krick, 76 Nev. 52, 59 , 348 P.2d 752, 755 (1960). 1988Although it could be argued *608 syntactically that the quoted language relates only to property division, we interpret the statute to mean that, since 1861, alimony awards must in this jurisdiction be “just and equitable.” 3 Furthermore, as required by NRS 125.150(1), the award must be fairly related to the “respective merits” of the parties and to the “condition in which they will be left by the divorce.” The legislative standard was accepted and properly restated in Krick v. Krick, 76 Nev. 52, 59 , 348 P.2d 752, 755 (1960). | 1 | 1 |
Johnson v. Steel, Inc.green2 sentences1988An example of this matters-to-be-considered approach can be found in Johnson v. Steel, Inc., 94 Nev. 483, 486 , 581 P.2d 860, 862 (1978), where we failed to mention the general statutory principles and instead focused on the “limits to their [the trial courts’] discretion,” which we defined in terms of the trial courts’ being required to follow certain “guidelines” or “matters to be considered,” which were borrowed from a previous case, Buchanan v. Buchanan, 90 Nev. 209 , 523 P.2d 1 (1974). 1988An example of this matters-to-be-considered approach can be found in Johnson v. Steel, Inc., 94 Nev. 483, 486 , 581 P.2d 860, 862 (1978), where we failed to mention the general statutory principles and instead focused on the “limits to their [the trial courts’] discretion,” which we defined in terms of the trial courts’ being required to follow certain “guidelines” or “matters to be considered,” which were borrowed from a previous case, Buchanan v. Buchanan, 90 Nev. 209 , 523 P.2d 1 (1974). | 1 | 1 |
In Re Murchison.green1 sentence1983As the Supreme Court has said, In re Murchison, 349 U.S. 133, 136 (1955): Fairness of course requires an absence of actual bias in the trial of cases. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Nevada. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Romer v. Colorado General Assembly
green
2 sentences2021We also do not consider the Senators' arguments regarding Romer v. Colorado General Assembly, 810 P.2d 215 (Colo. 1991), as that case addresses the Colorado Constitution's legislative immunity provision rather than that of the United States' Constitution. 2021We also do not consider the Senators' arguments regarding Romer v. Colorado General Assembly, 810 P.2d 215 (Colo. 1991), as that case addresses the Colorado Constitution's legislative immunity provision rather than that of the United States' Constitution. | 1 | 2021–2021 |
Buchanan v. Buchanan
green
2 sentences1988An example of this matters-to-be-considered approach can be found in Johnson v. Steel, Inc., 94 Nev. 483, 486 , 581 P.2d 860, 862 (1978), where we failed to mention the general statutory principles and instead focused on the “limits to their [the trial courts’] discretion,” which we defined in terms of the trial courts’ being required to follow certain “guidelines” or “matters to be considered,” which were borrowed from a previous case, Buchanan v. Buchanan, 90 Nev. 209 , 523 P.2d 1 (1974). 1988An example of this matters-to-be-considered approach can be found in Johnson v. Steel, Inc., 94 Nev. 483, 486 , 581 P.2d 860, 862 (1978), where we failed to mention the general statutory principles and instead focused on the “limits to their [the trial courts’] discretion,” which we defined in terms of the trial courts’ being required to follow certain “guidelines” or “matters to be considered,” which were borrowed from a previous case, Buchanan v. Buchanan, 90 Nev. 209 , 523 P.2d 1 (1974). | 1 | 1988–1988 |
McKinley Brown, Etc. v. T. A. Vance, Etc., Mary Jean Boone, Etc., Cross-Appellee v. Walter L. Dennis, Etc., Cross-Appellants
green
1 sentence1983It was interested rather in the inherent defect in the legislative framework arising from the vulnerability of the average man— as the system works in practice and as it appears to defendants and to the public.” Id. at 284 . | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Taylor v. State and Univ.
green
2 sentences1970The case of Taylor v. State and Univ., 73 Nev. 151 , 311 P.2d 733 (1957), is not apposite. 1970The case of Taylor v. State and Univ., 73 Nev. 151 , 311 P.2d 733 (1957), is not apposite. | 1 | 1970–1970 |
Finzer v. Peter
neutral
2 sentences1952When the claim substantially complies with the legislative requirement and these ends are subserved, the claim has accomplished the purpose intended.” In Friederichsen v. Renard, 247 U.S. 207 , 38 S.Ct. 450, 451 , 62 L.Ed. 1075 , the court said: “The cause of action is the wrong done, not the measure of compensation for it, or the character of the relief sought, and, considered as a matter of substance, the change in the statement of that wrong in the amended petition cannot, in any just sense, be considered a new or different cause of action.” See also Finzer v. Peter, 120 Neb. 389 , 232 N.W. 1952When the claim substantially complies with the legislative requirement and these ends are subserved, the claim has accomplished the purpose intended.” In Friederichsen v. Renard, 247 U.S. 207 , 38 S.Ct. 450, 451 , 62 L.Ed. 1075 , the court said: “The cause of action is the wrong done, not the measure of compensation for it, or the character of the relief sought, and, considered as a matter of substance, the change in the statement of that wrong in the amended petition cannot, in any just sense, be considered a new or different cause of action.” See also Finzer v. Peter, 120 Neb. 389 , 232 N.W. | 1 | 1952–1952 |
Friederichsen v. Renard
green
2 sentences1952When the claim substantially complies with the legislative requirement and these ends are subserved, the claim has accomplished the purpose intended.” In Friederichsen v. Renard, 247 U.S. 207 , 38 S.Ct. 450, 451 , 62 L.Ed. 1075 , the court said: “The cause of action is the wrong done, not the measure of compensation for it, or the character of the relief sought, and, considered as a matter of substance, the change in the statement of that wrong in the amended petition cannot, in any just sense, be considered a new or different cause of action.” See also Finzer v. Peter, 120 Neb. 389 , 232 N.W. 1952When the claim substantially complies with the legislative requirement and these ends are subserved, the claim has accomplished the purpose intended.” In Friederichsen v. Renard, 247 U.S. 207 , 38 S.Ct. 450, 451 , 62 L.Ed. 1075 , the court said: “The cause of action is the wrong done, not the measure of compensation for it, or the character of the relief sought, and, considered as a matter of substance, the change in the statement of that wrong in the amended petition cannot, in any just sense, be considered a new or different cause of action.” See also Finzer v. Peter, 120 Neb. 389 , 232 N.W. | 1 | 1952–1952 |
Weyant v. Utah Savings & Trust Co.
green
2 sentences1952In Weyant v. Utah Savings and Trust Co., 54 Utah 181 , 182 P. 189, 199 , 9 A.L.R. 1119 , the court said: “The respondents had but one state of facts to present to the court, and it is upon those facts that relief, if any is granted, must be based. 1952In Weyant v. Utah Savings and Trust Co., 54 Utah 181 , 182 P. 189, 199 , 9 A.L.R. 1119 , the court said: “The respondents had but one state of facts to present to the court, and it is upon those facts that relief, if any is granted, must be based. | 1 | 1952–1952 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.