8 Vermont opinions name it 2 courts 1932–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Vermont courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Aube v. O'BRIENgreen1 sentence2025Where there is a conflict between a general statute of limitations and a specific statute of limitations, the latter will prevail.” Aube v. O’Brien, 140 Vt. 1, 4 (1981) (internal citations omitted). | 1 | 1 |
Cavanaugh v. Abbott Laboratoriesgreen2 sentences2005See Cavanaugh v. Abbott Labs., 145 Vt. 516, 530 , 496 A.2d 154, 162-63 (1985) (explaining that where statutory language is unambiguous,, there is no need to review legislative history). 2005See Cavanaugh v. Abbott Labs., 145 Vt. 516, 530 , 496 A.2d 154, 162-63 (1985) (explaining that where statutory language is unambiguous,, there is no need to review legislative history). | 1 | 1 |
Christy v. City of Newarkgreen1 sentence2003Christy v. City of Newark, 510 A.2d 22, 27 (N. J. 1986). | 1 | 1 |
Watkins v. Prudential Insurancegreen2 sentences1980Tyrrell v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, supra, 109 Vt. at 22 , 192 A. at 191 , 115 A.L.R. at 402 (quoting Watkins v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 315 Pa. 497, 507 , 173 A. 644, 649 , 95 A.L.R. 869, 875 (1934)). 1980Tyrrell v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, supra, 109 Vt. at 22 , 192 A. at 191 , 115 A.L.R. at 402 (quoting Watkins v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 315 Pa. 497, 507 , 173 A. 644, 649 , 95 A.L.R. 869, 875 (1934)). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Vermont. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Tyrrell v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America
green
2 sentences1980Tyrrell v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, supra, 109 Vt. at 22 , 192 A. at 191 , 115 A.L.R. at 402 (quoting Watkins v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 315 Pa. 497, 507 , 173 A. 644, 649 , 95 A.L.R. 869, 875 (1934)). 1980Tyrrell v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, supra, 109 Vt. at 22 , 192 A. at 191 , 115 A.L.R. at 402 (quoting Watkins v. Prudential Insurance Co. of America, 315 Pa. 497, 507 , 173 A. 644, 649 , 95 A.L.R. 869, 875 (1934)). | 1 | 1980–1980 |
Stack v. Boyle
green
1 sentence1974The legislative requirement that the question of whether the release of the defendant will constitute a danger to the public be considered by the Judiciary in setting conditions of release prior to trial poses no conflict with the holding in Stack v. Boyle, supra. There, the condemnable excessive bail was imposed because four persons previously convicted for the offense with which the defendants were charged had forfeited bail. | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Town of Bennington v. Vail
green
2 sentences1974Town of Bennington v. Vail, 117 Vt. 395, 398-99 , 92 A.2d 467 (1952). 1974Town of Bennington v. Vail, 117 Vt. 395, 398-99 , 92 A.2d 467 (1952). | 1 | 1974–1974 |
Morgan v. United States
green
2 sentences1966The legislative requirement of a “hearing” implies judicial standards with faithful observance of “fundamental requirements of fairness which are the essence of due process in a proceeding of a judicial nature.” Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 19 , 82 L.Ed. 1129, 1133 . 1966The legislative requirement of a “hearing” implies judicial standards with faithful observance of “fundamental requirements of fairness which are the essence of due process in a proceeding of a judicial nature.” Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 19 , 82 L.Ed. 1129, 1133 . | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Anniston City Land Co. v. State
neutral
2 sentences1932From this it follows that it is the nature of its use that would, ordinarily, determine its taxability, and it was held in Anniston City Land Co. v. State, 160 Ala. 253 , 48 So. 659 , that constitutional exemption of property “used” for a certain purpose does not warrant a legislative requirement that.it must be “owned and used” for that purpose, in order to make it exempt. 1932From this it follows that it is the nature of its use that would, ordinarily, determine its taxability, and it was held in Anniston City Land Co. v. State, 160 Ala. 253 , 48 So. 659 , that constitutional exemption of property “used” for a certain purpose does not warrant a legislative requirement that.it must be “owned and used” for that purpose, in order to make it exempt. | 1 | 1932–1932 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.