legislative exception in Connecticut

2017The defendants contend that, to the contrary, ‘‘[w]hen the state waives sovereign immunity by statute . . . a party who wishes to sue under the legislative waiver must come clearly within its provi- sions because [s]tatutes in derogation of sovereignty should be strictly construed in favor of the state, so that its sovereignty may be upheld and not narrowed or destroyed.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Duguay v. Hopkins, 191 Conn. 222, 232 , 464 A.2d 45 (1983); see also White v. Burns, 213 Conn. 307, 312 , 567 A.2d 1195 (1990) (‘‘[w]here there is any doubt about their meaning or intent [

2017The defendants contend that, to the contrary, ‘‘[w]hen the state waives sovereign immunity by statute . . . a party who wishes to sue under the legislative waiver must come clearly within its provi- sions because [s]tatutes in derogation of sovereignty should be strictly construed in favor of the state, so that its sovereignty may be upheld and not narrowed or destroyed.’’ (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Duguay v. Hopkins, 191 Conn. 222, 232 , 464 A.2d 45 (1983); see also White v. Burns, 213 Conn. 307, 312 , 567 A.2d 1195 (1990) (‘‘[w]here there is any doubt about their meaning or intent [

1996When the state waives that immunity by statute ... a party attempting to sue under the legislative exception must come clearly within its provisions, because [statutes in derogation of sovereignty should be strictly construed in favor of the state, so that its sovereignty may be upheld and not narrowed or destroyed . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Berger, Lehman Associates, Inc. v. State, 178 Conn. 352, 356 , 422 A.2d 268 (1979).

1996When the state waives that immunity by statute ... a party attempting to sue under the legislative exception must come clearly within its provisions, because [statutes in derogation of sovereignty should be strictly construed in favor of the state, so that its sovereignty may be upheld and not narrowed or destroyed . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Berger, Lehman Associates, Inc. v. State, 178 Conn. 352, 356 , 422 A.2d 268 (1979).

2009Corp. v. Peabody, N.E., Inc., 239 Conn. 93, 101-102 , 680 A.2d 1321 (1996) (“[w]hen the state waives . . . immunity by statute ... a party attempting to sue under the legislative exception must come clearly within its provisions” [internal quotation marks omitted]).

2009Corp. v. Peabody, N.E., Inc., 239 Conn. 93, 101-102 , 680 A.2d 1321 (1996) (“[w]hen the state waives . . . immunity by statute ... a party attempting to sue under the legislative exception must come clearly within its provisions” [internal quotation marks omitted]).

2008The state's sovereign right not to be sued may be waived by the legislature, provided clear intention to that effect is disclosed by the use of express terms or by force of a necessary implication. " (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dept. of Public Works v. ECAP Construction Co., 250 Conn. 553, 558-59 , 737 A.2d 398 (1999).

2008The state's sovereign right not to be sued may be waived by the legislature, provided clear intention to that effect is disclosed by the use of express terms or by force of a necessary implication. " (Emphasis added; internal quotation marks omitted.) Dept. of Public Works v. ECAP Construction Co., 250 Conn. 553, 558-59 , 737 A.2d 398 (1999).

2001CT Page 6028 "Negligence per se operates to engraft a particular legislative standard onto the general standard of care imposed by traditional tort law principles, i.e., that standard of care to which an ordinarily prudent person would conform his conduct." Gore v. People's Savings Bank , 235 Conn. 360 , 376 , 665 A.2d 1341 (1995), on remand, 40 Conn. App. 219 , 670 A.2d 332 (1996).

2001CT Page 6028 "Negligence per se operates to engraft a particular legislative standard onto the general standard of care imposed by traditional tort law principles, i.e., that standard of care to which an ordinarily prudent person would conform his conduct." Gore v. People's Savings Bank , 235 Conn. 360 , 376 , 665 A.2d 1341 (1995), on remand, 40 Conn. App. 219 , 670 A.2d 332 (1996).

2003Hunte v. Blumenthal, 238 Conn. 146, 152 , 680 A.2d 1231 (1996); Spring v. Constantino, 168 Conn. 563, 570 , 362 A.2d 871 (1975). “[A] party attempting to sue under the legislative exception [to sovereign immunity] must come clearly within its provisions, because [statutes in derogation of sovereignty should be strictly construed in favor of the state, so that its sovereignty may be upheld and not narrowed or destroyed ....

2003Hunte v. Blumenthal, 238 Conn. 146, 152 , 680 A.2d 1231 (1996); Spring v. Constantino, 168 Conn. 563, 570 , 362 A.2d 871 (1975). “[A] party attempting to sue under the legislative exception [to sovereign immunity] must come clearly within its provisions, because [statutes in derogation of sovereignty should be strictly construed in favor of the state, so that its sovereignty may be upheld and not narrowed or destroyed ....

1995Id., 321; Ozmun v. Burns, 18 Conn. App. 677 , 680 , 559 A.2d 1143 (1989).

1995Id., 321; Ozmun v. Burns, 18 Conn. App. 677 , 680 , 559 A.2d 1143 (1989).

2016The statutorily required notice is a condition precedent to maintaining a cause of action, and if this requirement is not met, no cause of action exists." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bresnan v. Frankel , 224 Conn. 23 , 25-26, 615 A.2d 1040 (1992) ; see also Warkentin v. Burns , 223 Conn. 14 , 17-18, 610 A.2d 1287 (1992).

2016The statutorily required notice is a condition precedent to maintaining a cause of action, and if this requirement is not met, no cause of action exists." (Citations omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Bresnan v. Frankel , 224 Conn. 23 , 25-26, 615 A.2d 1040 (1992) ; see also Warkentin v. Burns , 223 Conn. 14 , 17-18, 610 A.2d 1287 (1992).

2014Addi- tionally, because ‘‘[t]he highway defect statute, § 13a- 149, is a legislative exception to the immunity that municipalities enjoyed at common law . . . as such, [it] must be strictly construed.’’ Read v. Plymouth, 110 Conn. App. 657, 663 , 955 A.2d 1255 , cert. denied, 289 Conn. 955 , 961 A.2d 421 (2008).

2014Addi- tionally, because ‘‘[t]he highway defect statute, § 13a- 149, is a legislative exception to the immunity that municipalities enjoyed at common law . . . as such, [it] must be strictly construed.’’ Read v. Plymouth, 110 Conn. App. 657, 663 , 955 A.2d 1255 , cert. denied, 289 Conn. 955 , 961 A.2d 421 (2008).

2014Addi- tionally, because ‘‘[t]he highway defect statute, § 13a- 149, is a legislative exception to the immunity that municipalities enjoyed at common law . . . as such, [it] must be strictly construed.’’ Read v. Plymouth, 110 Conn. App. 657, 663 , 955 A.2d 1255 , cert. denied, 289 Conn. 955 , 961 A.2d 421 (2008).

2014Addi- tionally, because ‘‘[t]he highway defect statute, § 13a- 149, is a legislative exception to the immunity that municipalities enjoyed at common law . . . as such, [it] must be strictly construed.’’ Read v. Plymouth, 110 Conn. App. 657, 663 , 955 A.2d 1255 , cert. denied, 289 Conn. 955 , 961 A.2d 421 (2008).

2003Finally, our analysis, for almost one century, has been guided by the rule that the legislature may waive the state’s sovereign immunity “provided clear intention to that effect is disclosed by the use of express terms or by force of a necessary implication.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dept. of Public Works v. ECAP Construction Co., 250 Conn. 553, 558-59 , 737 A.2d 398 (1999); Lacasse v. Burns, 214 Conn. 464, 468 , 572 A.2d 357 (1990); Struckman v. Burns, 205 Conn. 542, 558 , 534 A.2d 888 (1987); Duguay v. Hopkins, 191 Conn. 222, 228 , 464 A.2d 45 (1983); Baker v. Ives, 162 Conn. 295,

1990The so-called "defective highway statute" Connecticut General Statutes section 13a-144 , is such a legislative waiver of sovereign immunity where "`(t)he state, CT Page 3645 which ordinarily would not be liable, permitted itself, as a matter of grace, to be sued under the express conditions of the statute.'" Lacasse, 214 Conn. at 468 , quoting White v. Burns, 213 Conn. 307 , 312 (1990).

2000"Sovereign immunity may be waived only through a statute." Struckman v. Burns , 205 Conn. 542 , 558 , 534 A.2d 888 (1987). "[W]hen the state waives sovereign immunity by statute a party attempting to sue under the legislative exception must come clearly within its provisions, because statutes in derogation of sovereignty should be strictly construed in favor of the state, so that its sovereignty may be upheld and not narrowed or destroyed." (Brackets omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Babes v. Bennett , 247 Conn. 256 , 262 , 721 A.2d 511 (1998).

2000"Sovereign immunity may be waived only through a statute." Struckman v. Burns , 205 Conn. 542 , 558 , 534 A.2d 888 (1987). "[W]hen the state waives sovereign immunity by statute a party attempting to sue under the legislative exception must come clearly within its provisions, because statutes in derogation of sovereignty should be strictly construed in favor of the state, so that its sovereignty may be upheld and not narrowed or destroyed." (Brackets omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Babes v. Bennett , 247 Conn. 256 , 262 , 721 A.2d 511 (1998).

1993Therefore, since CUTPA does not have an explicit exemption for banks; Ebersol McCormick v. Torrington Savings Bank, 4 CSCR 499 , 500 (May 26, 1989, Pickett, J.): the courts should not read one into CUTPA for banks.

1993Also see, Andrus v. North American Bank, 6 CSCR 458 (May 13, 1991, Fuller, J.) (fact that banks are subject to state and federal regulations for certain activities does not mean that those regulations cover all actions taken by banks; CUTPA provides no explicit exemption for banks); Economic Development Associates v. CitiTrust, 6 CSCR 400 (April 22, 1991, Dranginis, J.) (CUTPA contains no express exemption for banks and as a remedial statute must be liberally construed); Westledge Real Estate, Inc. v. Suffield Bank, 3 CTLR 217 (February 11, 1991, Clark, J.) (CUTPA is to be liberally construed

1993These courts reason that the "burden of proving an exemption from CUTPA . . . is on the party claiming the exemption;" General Statutes 42-110c (b) and that courts should not "interpret legislation to enlarge on a legislative exception." State v. Turello, 183 Conn. 330 , 335 , 439 A.2d 364 (1981).

1993These courts reason that the "burden of proving an exemption from CUTPA . . . is on the party claiming the exemption;" General Statutes 42-110c (b) and that courts should not "interpret legislation to enlarge on a legislative exception." State v. Turello, 183 Conn. 330 , 335 , 439 A.2d 364 (1981).

2025The defendant points us to State v. Batts, 195 P.3d 144 (Alaska App. 2008), in which the Alaska Court of Appeals held that a legislative rule of evidence codifying the Harris impeachment exception did not violate the Alaska constitution, unless (1) the Miranda violations in question are intentional, or (2) ‘‘the police engage in interrogation (even in good faith) that any reasonable police officer would know violates Miranda.’’ Id., 157 .

2025The defendant points us to State v. Batts, 195 P.3d 144 (Alaska App. 2008), in which the Alaska Court of Appeals held that a legislative rule of evidence codifying the Harris impeachment exception did not violate the Alaska constitution, unless (1) the Miranda violations in question are intentional, or (2) ‘‘the police engage in interrogation (even in good faith) that any reasonable police officer would know violates Miranda.’’ Id., 157 .

2022The General Assembly may, by special act, authorize a person to present a claim to the . . . [c]om- missioner after the time limitations set forth in subsec- tion (a) of this section have expired if it deems such authorization to be just and equitable and makes an express finding that such authorization is supported by compelling equitable circumstances and would serve a public purpose.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Morneau v. State, supra, 150 Conn. App. 255 . ‘‘Although § 4-148 (b) provides that [s]uch finding shall not be subject to review by the Superior Court, sp

2022The General Assembly may, by special act, authorize a person to present a claim to the . . . [c]om- missioner after the time limitations set forth in subsec- tion (a) of this section have expired if it deems such authorization to be just and equitable and makes an express finding that such authorization is supported by compelling equitable circumstances and would serve a public purpose.’’ (Citation omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Morneau v. State, supra, 150 Conn. App. 255 . ‘‘Although § 4-148 (b) provides that [s]uch finding shall not be subject to review by the Superior Court, sp

2021Palmer v. United States, 520 U.S. 1162 , 117 S. Ct. 1349 , 137 L.

2021Palmer v. United States, 520 U.S. 1162 , 117 S. Ct. 1349 , 137 L.

2021Palmer v. United States, 520 U.S. 1162 , 117 S. Ct. 1349 , 137 L.

2016Kozlowski v. Commissioner of Trans- portation, 274 Conn. 497, 501 , 876 A.2d 1148 (2005); General Statutes § 13a-144.

2016Kozlowski v. Commissioner of Trans- portation, 274 Conn. 497, 501 , 876 A.2d 1148 (2005); General Statutes § 13a-144.

2014In this regard, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessar- ily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Conboy v. State, 292 Conn. 642 , 649–51, 974 A.2d 669 (2009). ‘‘The state highway liability statute is a legislative exception to the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity and is to be strictly construed in favor of the state.

2014In this regard, a court must take the facts to be those alleged in the complaint, including those facts necessar- ily implied from the allegations, construing them in a manner most favorable to the pleader.’’ (Citations omitted; footnote omitted; internal quotation marks omitted.) Conboy v. State, 292 Conn. 642 , 649–51, 974 A.2d 669 (2009). ‘‘The state highway liability statute is a legislative exception to the common law doctrine of sovereign immunity and is to be strictly construed in favor of the state.

2010“The statutory provisions of § 13a-149 have two components that must be met in order to trigger its application: (1) the plaintiff must have sustained an injury by means of a defective ‘road or bridge’ and (2) the party whom the plaintiff is suing must be *158 the ‘party bound to keep [the location where the injury was sustained] in repair.’ ” Novicki v. New Haven, 47 Conn. App. 734, 739-40 , 709 A.2d 2 (1998).

2010“The statutory provisions of § 13a-149 have two components that must be met in order to trigger its application: (1) the plaintiff must have sustained an injury by means of a defective ‘road or bridge’ and (2) the party whom the plaintiff is suing must be *158 the ‘party bound to keep [the location where the injury was sustained] in repair.’ ” Novicki v. New Haven, 47 Conn. App. 734, 739-40 , 709 A.2d 2 (1998).

2010Moreover, “when the state waives sovereign immunity by statute a party attempting to sue under the legislative exception must come clearly within its provisions, because [statutes in derogation of sovereignty should be strictly construed in favor of the state, so that its sovereignty may be upheld and not narrowed or destroyed . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dept. of Transportation v. White Oak Corp., 287 Conn. 1, 8 , 946 A.2d 1219 (2008).

2010Moreover, “when the state waives sovereign immunity by statute a party attempting to sue under the legislative exception must come clearly within its provisions, because [statutes in derogation of sovereignty should be strictly construed in favor of the state, so that its sovereignty may be upheld and not narrowed or destroyed . . . .” (Internal quotation marks omitted.) Dept. of Transportation v. White Oak Corp., 287 Conn. 1, 8 , 946 A.2d 1219 (2008).