legislative hearing in District of Columbia

11 District of Columbia opinions name it 1 courts 1972–2015 0 in the last five years

The cases below were cited by District of Columbia courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.

Followed or applied (7)

Case	Followed	Cited
Roscoe L. Jones v. District of Columbia, a Municipal Corporation, the Ellen Real Estate Corporation v. District of Columbia, a Municipal Corporationgreen cadc · 1963 · cited in 2 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 1972–1975 2 sentences 1975Agencies perform the functions in three ways: by formal rulemaking, informal rulemak-ing, and trial-type adjudication. 12 In Jones v. District of Columbia, 116 U.S.App.D.C. 301 , 303-04, 323 F.2d 306, 308-09 (1963), rulemaking which is quasi-legislative in nature was distinguished from adjudication which is by its nature quasi-judicial: A legislative hearing relates to “the making of a rule for the future.” As distinguished from a judicial inquiry, it is a non-adversary proceeding which seeks to devise broad policy applicable to the public generally, or a substantial segment thereof, rather th 1975Agencies perform the functions in three ways: by formal rulemaking, informal rulemaking, and trial-type adjudication. [12] In Jones v. District of Columbia, 116 U.S.App.D.C. 301 , 303-04, 323 F.2d 306, 308-09 (1963), rulemaking which is quasi-legislative in nature was distinguished from adjudication which is by its nature quasi-judicial: A legislative hearing relates to "the making of a rule for the future." As distinguished from a judicial inquiry, it is a non-adversary proceeding which seeks to devise broad policy applicable to the public generally, or a substantial segment thereof, rather t	2	2
Holiday v. United Statesgreen dc · 1996 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 2015–2015 1 sentence 2015To prevent the automatic abatement of pending prosecutions, legislatures enacted general savings statutes that “shifted the legislative presumption from one of abatement unless otherwise specified to one of non-abatement in the absence of contrary legislative direction.” Id. at 66-67 (internal quotation marks omitted).	1	1
Dorsey v. District of Columbiagreen dc · 2007 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007 1 sentence 2007See D.C.Code § 1-301.42 (2001); see also, e.g., Dorsey v. District of Columbia, 917 A.2d 639, 642-43 (D.C.2007) (the District of Columbia’s legislative immunity statute, patterned after the speech or debate clause of the United States Constitution, "clothes D.C.	1	1
Dominion Cogen, D.C., Inc. v. District of Columbiagreen dcd · 1995 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 2007–2007 1 sentence 2007City Council members with immunity from lawsuits ... for conduct undertaken in their legislative capacities.” (quoting Dominion Cogen, D.C., Inc. v. District of Columbia, 878 F.Supp. 258, 262 (D.D.C.1995))); Fields v. Office of Eddie Bernice Johnson, 373 U.S.App.	1	1
Monarch Cablevision, Inc. v. City Councilgreen calctapp · 1966 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 1998–1998 2 sentences 1998In Monarch Cablevision, Inc. v. City Council of Pacific Grove, 239 Cal.App.2d 206 , 48 Cal.Rptr. 550 (1966), a legislative hearing determined which of two bidders would be awarded a community antenna television franchise. 1998In Monarch Cablevision, Inc. v. City Council of Pacific Grove, 239 Cal.App.2d 206 , 48 Cal.Rptr. 550 (1966), a legislative hearing determined which of two bidders would be awarded a community antenna television franchise.	1	1
Robert R. Prentis v. Atlantic Coast Line Companygreen · 1908 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 1972–1972 1 sentence 1972We must ask whether the hearing, which under the statute must precede any amendment to existing zoning regulations, 11 was primarily adjudicatory or legislative. 12 It is elementary that the action of an administrative tribunal is adjudicatory in character if it is particular and immediate, rather than, as in the case of legislative or rule making action, general and future in effect. . . . [Philadelphia Co. v. SEC, 84 U.S.App.D.C. 73 , 81, 175 F.2d 808, 816 (1948), vacated as moot, 337 U.S. 901 , 69 S.Ct. 1047 , 93 L.Ed. 1715 (1949).] In Jones v. District of Columbia, 116 U.S.App.D.C. 301 , 3	1	1
Philadelphia Co. v. Securities & Exchange Commissiongreen cadc · 1949 · cited in 1 District of Columbia opinions naming this issue, 1972–1972 1 sentence 1972We must ask whether the hearing, which under the statute must precede any amendment to existing zoning regulations, 11 was primarily adjudicatory or legislative. 12 It is elementary that the action of an administrative tribunal is adjudicatory in character if it is particular and immediate, rather than, as in the case of legislative or rule making action, general and future in effect. . . . [Philadelphia Co. v. SEC, 84 U.S.App.D.C. 73 , 81, 175 F.2d 808, 816 (1948), vacated as moot, 337 U.S. 901 , 69 S.Ct. 1047 , 93 L.Ed. 1715 (1949).] In Jones v. District of Columbia, 116 U.S.App.D.C. 301 , 3	1	1

Distinguished, questioned or overruled (0)

Case	Negative	Cited
No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in District of Columbia. Read the followed side critically anyway.

Also cited on this issue (15)

Case	Cited	Years
Hannah v. Larche green scotus · 1960 2 sentences 1974In such hearings, “it is not necessary that the full panoply of judicial procedures be used.” Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 , 80 S.Ct. 1502, 1515 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1307 (1960). 1974In such hearings, “it is not necessary that the full panoply of judicial procedures be used.” Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420, 442 , 80 S.Ct. 1502, 1515 , 4 L.Ed.2d 1307 (1960).	2	1974–1974
Rorie v. District of Columbia Department of Human Resources green dc · 1979 2 sentences 2010When an agency has denied an application for benefits on the basis of a legislative rule adopted without compliance with the DCAPA, we typically have remanded with instructions that the agency reevaluate the petitioner’s application “as though the invalid regulation had not existed.” Rorie, 403 A.2d at 1154 . 2010When an agency has denied an application for benefits on the basis of a legislative rule adopted without compliance with the DCAPA, we typically have remanded with instructions that the agency reevaluate the petitioner's application "as though the invalid regulation had not existed." Rorie, 403 A.2d at 1154 .	1	2010–2010
Brown v. Transcon Lines green or · 1978 2 sentences 1981For other cases holding that a tort action is available to an at will employee whose dismissal violates an important public policy, see, e. g., Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58 , 417 A.2d 505 (1980); Lally v. Copygraphics, 173 N.J.Super. 162 , 413 A.2d 960 (App.Div.1980); Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363 (3d Cir. 1979); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill.2d 172 , 23 Ill.Dec. 559 , 384 N.E.2d 353 (1979); Harless v. First National Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W.Va.1978); Brown v. Transcom Lines, 284 Or. 597 , 588 P.2d 1087 (1978); Trombelta v. Detroit, Toledo & Ironton 1981For other cases holding that a tort action is available to an at will employee whose dismissal violates an important public policy, see, e. g., Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58 , 417 A.2d 505 (1980); Lally v. Copygraphics, 173 N.J.Super. 162 , 413 A.2d 960 (App.Div.1980); Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363 (3d Cir. 1979); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill.2d 172 , 23 Ill.Dec. 559 , 384 N.E.2d 353 (1979); Harless v. First National Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W.Va.1978); Brown v. Transcom Lines, 284 Or. 597 , 588 P.2d 1087 (1978); Trombelta v. Detroit, Toledo & Ironton	1	1981–1981
Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp. green nj · 1980 2 sentences 1981For other cases holding that a tort action is available to an at will employee whose dismissal violates an important public policy, see, e. g., Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58 , 417 A.2d 505 (1980); Lally v. Copygraphics, 173 N.J.Super. 162 , 413 A.2d 960 (App.Div.1980); Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363 (3d Cir. 1979); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill.2d 172 , 23 Ill.Dec. 559 , 384 N.E.2d 353 (1979); Harless v. First National Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W.Va.1978); Brown v. Transcom Lines, 284 Or. 597 , 588 P.2d 1087 (1978); Trombelta v. Detroit, Toledo & Ironton 1981For other cases holding that a tort action is available to an at will employee whose dismissal violates an important public policy, see, e. g., Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58 , 417 A.2d 505 (1980); Lally v. Copygraphics, 173 N.J.Super. 162 , 413 A.2d 960 (App.Div.1980); Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363 (3d Cir. 1979); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill.2d 172 , 23 Ill.Dec. 559 , 384 N.E.2d 353 (1979); Harless v. First National Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W.Va.1978); Brown v. Transcom Lines, 284 Or. 597 , 588 P.2d 1087 (1978); Trombelta v. Detroit, Toledo & Ironton	1	1981–1981
Robert W. Perks v. The Firestone Tire & Rubber Company green ca3 · 1979 1 sentence 1981For other cases holding that a tort action is available to an at will employee whose dismissal violates an important public policy, see, e. g., Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58 , 417 A.2d 505 (1980); Lally v. Copygraphics, 173 N.J.Super. 162 , 413 A.2d 960 (App.Div.1980); Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363 (3d Cir. 1979); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill.2d 172 , 23 Ill.Dec. 559 , 384 N.E.2d 353 (1979); Harless v. First National Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W.Va.1978); Brown v. Transcom Lines, 284 Or. 597 , 588 P.2d 1087 (1978); Trombelta v. Detroit, Toledo & Ironton	1	1981–1981
Lally v. Copygraphics green njsuperctappdiv · 1980 2 sentences 1981For other cases holding that a tort action is available to an at will employee whose dismissal violates an important public policy, see, e. g., Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58 , 417 A.2d 505 (1980); Lally v. Copygraphics, 173 N.J.Super. 162 , 413 A.2d 960 (App.Div.1980); Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363 (3d Cir. 1979); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill.2d 172 , 23 Ill.Dec. 559 , 384 N.E.2d 353 (1979); Harless v. First National Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W.Va.1978); Brown v. Transcom Lines, 284 Or. 597 , 588 P.2d 1087 (1978); Trombelta v. Detroit, Toledo & Ironton 1981For other cases holding that a tort action is available to an at will employee whose dismissal violates an important public policy, see, e. g., Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58 , 417 A.2d 505 (1980); Lally v. Copygraphics, 173 N.J.Super. 162 , 413 A.2d 960 (App.Div.1980); Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363 (3d Cir. 1979); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill.2d 172 , 23 Ill.Dec. 559 , 384 N.E.2d 353 (1979); Harless v. First National Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W.Va.1978); Brown v. Transcom Lines, 284 Or. 597 , 588 P.2d 1087 (1978); Trombelta v. Detroit, Toledo & Ironton	1	1981–1981
Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc. green ill · 1978 2 sentences 1981For other cases holding that a tort action is available to an at will employee whose dismissal violates an important public policy, see, e. g., Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58 , 417 A.2d 505 (1980); Lally v. Copygraphics, 173 N.J.Super. 162 , 413 A.2d 960 (App.Div.1980); Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363 (3d Cir. 1979); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill.2d 172 , 23 Ill.Dec. 559 , 384 N.E.2d 353 (1979); Harless v. First National Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W.Va.1978); Brown v. Transcom Lines, 284 Or. 597 , 588 P.2d 1087 (1978); Trombelta v. Detroit, Toledo & Ironton 1981For other cases holding that a tort action is available to an at will employee whose dismissal violates an important public policy, see, e. g., Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58 , 417 A.2d 505 (1980); Lally v. Copygraphics, 173 N.J.Super. 162 , 413 A.2d 960 (App.Div.1980); Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363 (3d Cir. 1979); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill.2d 172 , 23 Ill.Dec. 559 , 384 N.E.2d 353 (1979); Harless v. First National Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W.Va.1978); Brown v. Transcom Lines, 284 Or. 597 , 588 P.2d 1087 (1978); Trombelta v. Detroit, Toledo & Ironton	1	1981–1981
Tameny v. Atlantic Richfield Co. green cal · 1980 2 sentences 1981In Petermann , the employer instructed an at will employee to testify falsely at a legislative hearing and then fired the employee when he refused to commit perjury; the court held that the employer’s conduct abridged the state’s declared public policy of encouraging truthful and complete testimony and therefore constituted an abuse of the employer’s contractual rights. 5 The principles enunciated in Petermann were recently reaffirmed in Tamney v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal.3d 167 , 164 Cal.Rptr. 839 , 610 P.2d 1330 (1980), where the court made it clear that a tort as well as a contract re 1981In Petermann , the employer instructed an at will employee to testify falsely at a legislative hearing and then fired the employee when he refused to commit perjury; the court held that the employer’s conduct abridged the state’s declared public policy of encouraging truthful and complete testimony and therefore constituted an abuse of the employer’s contractual rights. 5 The principles enunciated in Petermann were recently reaffirmed in Tamney v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 27 Cal.3d 167 , 164 Cal.Rptr. 839 , 610 P.2d 1330 (1980), where the court made it clear that a tort as well as a contract re	1	1981–1981
Harless v. First National Bank in Fairmont green wva · 1978 1 sentence 1981For other cases holding that a tort action is available to an at will employee whose dismissal violates an important public policy, see, e. g., Pierce v. Ortho Pharmaceutical Corp., 84 N.J. 58 , 417 A.2d 505 (1980); Lally v. Copygraphics, 173 N.J.Super. 162 , 413 A.2d 960 (App.Div.1980); Perks v. Firestone Tire & Rubber Co., 611 F.2d 1363 (3d Cir. 1979); Kelsay v. Motorola, Inc., 74 Ill.2d 172 , 23 Ill.Dec. 559 , 384 N.E.2d 353 (1979); Harless v. First National Bank, 246 S.E.2d 270 (W.Va.1978); Brown v. Transcom Lines, 284 Or. 597 , 588 P.2d 1087 (1978); Trombelta v. Detroit, Toledo & Ironton	1	1981–1981
Davis v. Air Technical Industries, Inc. green cal · 1978 1 sentence 1980If applied so broadly, the judicial exception would eventually swallow the legislative rule that each party must pay for its own attorney.” 7 Ibid.	1	1980–1980
Stoner v. DISTRICT OF COL. POL. & FIRE., ETC. green dc · 1977 2 sentences 1977In a similar case, Stoner v. District of Columbia Police and Firemen's Retirement and Relief Board, D.C.App., 368 A.2d 524 (No. 9654, 1977), we recently noted that while nonorganic disorders (such as petitioner's psychoneurosis) fall within the statutory concept of a compensable "injury or disease," the legislative standard specifies a causal analysis which is ill-adaptable to wholly psychiatric impairments. 1977Id., at 528 and nn. 6 & 7.	1	1977–1977
Capitol Hill Restoration Society v. Zoning Commission green dc · 1972 1 sentence 1974Id. *314 The basic difference between a quasi-judicial and a quasi-legislative hearing is as follows: A legislative hearing relates to "the making of a rule for the future." As distinguished from a judicial inquiry, it is a non-adversary proceeding which seeks to devise broad policy applicable to the public generally, or a substantial segment thereof, rather than to individual parties.	1	1974–1974
Garfield v. United States Ex Rel. Allison green scotus · 1908 1 sentence 1972We must ask whether the hearing, which under the statute must precede any amendment to existing zoning regulations, 11 was primarily adjudicatory or legislative. 12 It is elementary that the action of an administrative tribunal is adjudicatory in character if it is particular and immediate, rather than, as in the case of legislative or rule making action, general and future in effect. . . . [Philadelphia Co. v. SEC, 84 U.S.App.D.C. 73 , 81, 175 F.2d 808, 816 (1948), vacated as moot, 337 U.S. 901 , 69 S.Ct. 1047 , 93 L.Ed. 1715 (1949).] In Jones v. District of Columbia, 116 U.S.App.D.C. 301 , 3	1	1972–1972
Kennedy v. Walker green scotus · 1949 2 sentences 1972We must ask whether the hearing, which under the statute must precede any amendment to existing zoning regulations, 11 was primarily adjudicatory or legislative. 12 It is elementary that the action of an administrative tribunal is adjudicatory in character if it is particular and immediate, rather than, as in the case of legislative or rule making action, general and future in effect. . . . [Philadelphia Co. v. SEC, 84 U.S.App.D.C. 73 , 81, 175 F.2d 808, 816 (1948), vacated as moot, 337 U.S. 901 , 69 S.Ct. 1047 , 93 L.Ed. 1715 (1949).] In Jones v. District of Columbia, 116 U.S.App.D.C. 301 , 3 1972We must ask whether the hearing, which under the statute must precede any amendment to existing zoning regulations, 11 was primarily adjudicatory or legislative. 12 It is elementary that the action of an administrative tribunal is adjudicatory in character if it is particular and immediate, rather than, as in the case of legislative or rule making action, general and future in effect. . . . [Philadelphia Co. v. SEC, 84 U.S.App.D.C. 73 , 81, 175 F.2d 808, 816 (1948), vacated as moot, 337 U.S. 901 , 69 S.Ct. 1047 , 93 L.Ed. 1715 (1949).] In Jones v. District of Columbia, 116 U.S.App.D.C. 301 , 3	1	1972–1972
Reilly v. Pinkus green scotus · 1949 1 sentence 1972We must ask whether the hearing, which under the statute must precede any amendment to existing zoning regulations, 11 was primarily adjudicatory or legislative. 12 It is elementary that the action of an administrative tribunal is adjudicatory in character if it is particular and immediate, rather than, as in the case of legislative or rule making action, general and future in effect. . . . [Philadelphia Co. v. SEC, 84 U.S.App.D.C. 73 , 81, 175 F.2d 808, 816 (1948), vacated as moot, 337 U.S. 901 , 69 S.Ct. 1047 , 93 L.Ed. 1715 (1949).] In Jones v. District of Columbia, 116 U.S.App.D.C. 301 , 3	1	1972–1972

Statutes the citing opinions construe

USC § 5u.s.c.551 (3)

Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.

Where else courts name it

TX 228 (1917–2026) CA 201 (1936–2026) PA 107 (1902–2026) MI 91 (1918–2025) WV 90 (1943–2025) CT 81 (1960–2025) NJ 65 (1950–2025) NY 63 (1889–2024) MD 61 (1959–2022) FL 57 (1935–2023) IL 55 (1914–2025) LA 41 (1913–2023) WA 37 (1913–2026) OR 33 (1914–2025) OH 30 (1935–2025) AZ 25 (1944–2025) IA 25 (1950–2024) WI 24 (1971–2023) KS 23 (1958–2021) RI 22 (1976–2020) CO 20 (1949–2019) NM 19 (1969–2026) NC 19 (1976–2026) KY 18 (1963–2024) MS 16 (1968–2017) AK 15 (1969–2024) AL 15 (1922–2013) UT 14 (1988–2025) MN 14 (1884–2025) IN 13 (1942–2024) ME 12 (1961–2021) WY 12 (1978–2010) TN 11 (1955–2021) GA 11 (1987–2020) DC 11 (1972–2015) MO 11 (1979–2019) VA 11 (1996–2024) ID 10 (1980–2019) NE 9 (1928–2014) OK 9 (1960–2015) NH 9 (1927–2022) VT 8 (1932–2025) MT 8 (1921–2026) DE 7 (1963–1995) MA 7 (1966–2025) SC 7 (1938–2023) NV 6 (1952–2021) AR 5 (1945–2019) HI 5 (1981–2019) ND 5 (1974–2014) SD 3 (1984–2017) VI 3 (1978–2016) PR 3 (1937–2014)

Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.

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