res ipsa loquitur doctrine in Pennsylvania

2021See also MacNutt v. Temple University Hospital, Inc., 932 A.2d 980, 986 (Pa. Super. 2007) (en banc) (“[t]he doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is a rule of circumstantial evidence which allows plaintiffs, without direct evidence of the elements of negligence, to present their case to the jury based on an inference of negligence.”) (emphasis added).

2020On appeal, we affirmed, holding that the trial court “properly precluded [plaintiffs] from presenting their case at trial under the res ipsa loquitur doctrine.” Id. at 983 . ____________________________________________ 2 The Majority suggests our Supreme Court sanctioned giving a res ipsa charge in Quinby despite “sufficient direct evidence of negligence from plaintiff’s expert to make out a prima facie case[.]” Majority Opinion at 28 (emphasis added).

2020In Hollywood Shop, Inc. v. Pa. Gas & Water Co., 411 A.2d 509, 512 (Pa.Super. 1979), we were persuaded by the Third Circuit’s reasoning in Weigand v. Pennsylvania Railroad Company, 267 F.2d 281 (3rd Cir. 1959) (applying Pennsylvania law), that the trial judge erred in refusing to give a res ipsa loquitur instruction on such facts.

2020This Court discussed evidence falling in the “grey zone” in Smith v. City of Chester, 515 A.2d 303 , 306 (Pa. Super. 1986), noting: While it is true that a res ipsa loquitur instruction is not warranted in the face of clear and indubitable proof of negligence, it is also true that a res ipsa loquitur charge is appropriate where the facts of a case lie somewhere in a grey zone “between the case in which the plaintiff brings in no evidence of specific acts of negligence, and therefore must rely on the res ipsa loquitur inference alone, and the case in which the defendant’s negligence ‘can be cle

1946To so hold would establish a doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as to such accidents: Flanigan v. McLean, supra. There must be other evidence leading up to the fact of accident on which culpableness may be based. ‘In order to maintain the verdict the plaintiffs are bound to point to evidence which would justify men of ordinary reason and fairness in saying that the defendant’s driver, if he had exercised ordinary care, could have avoided this accident:’ Eastburn v. United States Express Co., 225 Pa. 33, 38, 39 ; Flanigan v. McLean, supra.” The judgment of the court below is reversed and is here ent

1936To so hold would establish the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as to such accidents : Flanigan v. McLean, supra. There must be other evidence leading up to the fact of accident on which culpableness may be based. ‘In order to maintain the verdict the plaintiffs are bound to point to evidence which would justify men of ordinary reason and fairness in saying that the defendant’s driver, if he had exercised ordinary care, could have avoided the accident’: Eastburn v. United States Express Co., 225 Pa. 33, 38, 39 ; Flanigan v. McLean, supra.” To the same effect are also the following cases: Gilles v

2020Crucially, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is not a substantive plank upon which to construct a count of one’s complaint; “res ipsa loquitur is neither a rule of procedure nor one of substantive tort law . . . it [is] only a shorthand expression for circumstantial proof of negligence — a rule of evidence.” Jones v. Harrisburg Polyclinic Hosp., 437 A.2d 1134, 1137 (Pa. 1981), citing Gilbert v. Korvette, Inc., 327 A.2d 94, 99 (Pa. 1974).

1997This Court first adopted the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, as defined in the Restatement (Second) of Torts § 328(D), in Gilbert v. Korvette, Inc., 457 Pa. 602 , 327 A.2d 94 (1974).

2000The Supreme Court has interpreted this exception to the general requirement of expert testimony to be applicable “where the matter is so simple or the lack of skill or care is so obvious as to be within the range of experience and comprehension of even nonprofessional persons.” Hightower-Warren v. Silk, supra at 463 n. 1, 698 A.2d at 54 n. 1. ¶ 6 The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur “allows a jury to infer the existence of negligence and causation where the injury at issue is one that does not ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence.” Sedlitsky v. Pareso, 400 Pa.Super. 1 , 582 A.2d 1314, 13

2000The Supreme Court has interpreted this exception to the general requirement of expert testimony to be applicable “where the matter is so simple or the lack of skill or care is so obvious as to be within the range of experience and comprehension of even nonprofessional persons.” Hightower-Warren v. Silk, supra at 463 n. 1, 698 A.2d at 54 n. 1. ¶ 6 The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur “allows a jury to infer the existence of negligence and causation where the injury at issue is one that does not ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence.” Sedlitsky v. Pareso, 400 Pa.Super. 1 , 582 A.2d 1314, 13

2002In the usual case the basis of past experience from which this conclusion may be drawn is common to the community, and is a matter of general knowledge, which the court recognizes on much the same basis as when it takes judicial notice of facts which everyone knows.” 10 In McDonald v. Aliquippa Hospital, supra, the court examined the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as it applied to the malfunction of machinery, including automatic doors: “ ‘This principle has been applied in cases in which machinery has malfunctioned but where there is no evidence to identify the specific reason for such malfunc

2002In the usual case the basis of past experience from which this conclusion may be drawn is common to the community, and is a matter of general knowledge, which the court recognizes on much the same basis as when it takes judicial notice of facts which everyone knows.” 10 In McDonald v. Aliquippa Hospital, supra, the court examined the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as it applied to the malfunction of machinery, including automatic doors: “ ‘This principle has been applied in cases in which machinery has malfunctioned but where there is no evidence to identify the specific reason for such malfunc

2017Appellants cite Smith v. Yohe, 194 A.2d 167 (Pa. 1963), involving the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which applies when the negligence is obvious and speaks for itself.

2005The only exception to the requirement of expert testimony “is where the matter under investigation is so simple, and the lack or want of care so obvious as to be within the range of ordinary experience of even non-professional persons, also conceptualized as the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.” Toogood, 573 Pa. at 255 , 824 A.2d at 1145 ; see also, Smith v. Yohe, 412 Pa. 94, 99 , 194 A.2d 167, 170 (1999).

2007See Ettinger, supra. ¶20 With respect to Appellant’s claim that the trial court should have given a res ipsa loquitur instruction to the jury, Pennsylvania law makes clear that the court is bound to charge the jury “only on the law applicable to the factual parameters of a particular case and that it may not instruct the jury on inapplicable legal issues.” Angelo v. Diamontoni, 871 A.2d 1276, 1279 (Pa.Super.2005), appeal denied, 585 Pa. 694 , 889 A.2d 87 (2005) (quoting Cruz v. Northeastern Hosp., 801 A.2d 602 (Pa.Super.2002)).

2007See Ettinger, supra. ¶20 With respect to Appellant’s claim that the trial court should have given a res ipsa loquitur instruction to the jury, Pennsylvania law makes clear that the court is bound to charge the jury “only on the law applicable to the factual parameters of a particular case and that it may not instruct the jury on inapplicable legal issues.” Angelo v. Diamontoni, 871 A.2d 1276, 1279 (Pa.Super.2005), appeal denied, 585 Pa. 694 , 889 A.2d 87 (2005) (quoting Cruz v. Northeastern Hosp., 801 A.2d 602 (Pa.Super.2002)).

2016See Euinger, supra. With respect to Appellant's claim that the trial court should have given a res tpsa loquitur instruction to the jury, Pennsylvania law makes clear that the court is bound to charge the jury "only on the law applicable to the factual parameters of a particular case and that it may not instruct the jury on inapplicable legal issues." Angelo v. Diamontoni, 871 A.2d 1276 , t 279 (Pa. Super. 2005), appeal denied, 585 Pa. 694 , 889 A.2d 87 (2005) (quoting Cruz v. Northeastern Hosp., 801 A.2d 602 (Pa. Super. 2002)).

2007See Ettinger, supra. ¶20 With respect to Appellant’s claim that the trial court should have given a res ipsa loquitur instruction to the jury, Pennsylvania law makes clear that the court is bound to charge the jury “only on the law applicable to the factual parameters of a particular case and that it may not instruct the jury on inapplicable legal issues.” Angelo v. Diamontoni, 871 A.2d 1276, 1279 (Pa.Super.2005), appeal denied, 585 Pa. 694 , 889 A.2d 87 (2005) (quoting Cruz v. Northeastern Hosp., 801 A.2d 602 (Pa.Super.2002)).

2016See Euinger, supra. With respect to Appellant's claim that the trial court should have given a res tpsa loquitur instruction to the jury, Pennsylvania law makes clear that the court is bound to charge the jury "only on the law applicable to the factual parameters of a particular case and that it may not instruct the jury on inapplicable legal issues." Angelo v. Diamontoni, 871 A.2d 1276 , t 279 (Pa. Super. 2005), appeal denied, 585 Pa. 694 , 889 A.2d 87 (2005) (quoting Cruz v. Northeastern Hosp., 801 A.2d 602 (Pa. Super. 2002)).

2007See Ettinger, supra. ¶20 With respect to Appellant’s claim that the trial court should have given a res ipsa loquitur instruction to the jury, Pennsylvania law makes clear that the court is bound to charge the jury “only on the law applicable to the factual parameters of a particular case and that it may not instruct the jury on inapplicable legal issues.” Angelo v. Diamontoni, 871 A.2d 1276, 1279 (Pa.Super.2005), appeal denied, 585 Pa. 694 , 889 A.2d 87 (2005) (quoting Cruz v. Northeastern Hosp., 801 A.2d 602 (Pa.Super.2002)).

2010The case authority of Toogood v. Rogal, 573 Pa. 245 , 824 A.2d 1140 (2003), disallowed a res ipsa loquitur instruction in the absence of the expert medical testimony that the plaintiff was precluded from proffering as a discovery sanction.

2010The case authority of Toogood v. Rogal, 573 Pa. 245 , 824 A.2d 1140 (2003), disallowed a res ipsa loquitur instruction in the absence of the expert medical testimony that the plaintiff was precluded from proffering as a discovery sanction.

2020Crucially, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is not a substantive plank upon which to construct a count of one’s complaint; “res ipsa loquitur is neither a rule of procedure nor one of substantive tort law . . . it [is] only a shorthand expression for circumstantial proof of negligence — a rule of evidence.” Jones v. Harrisburg Polyclinic Hosp., 437 A.2d 1134, 1137 (Pa. 1981), citing Gilbert v. Korvette, Inc., 327 A.2d 94, 99 (Pa. 1974).

2020On appeal, this Court determined the case warranted a res ipsa loquitur analysis, despite plaintiff’s inability to “aver the precise conduct of the named defendants because she was unconscious during treatment, although the circumstantial evidence points toward the negligence of one of more of the parties sued.” Jones v. Harrisburg Polyclinic Hosp., 410 A.2d 303 , 306 (Pa. Super. 1979), rev’d, Jones, 437 A.2d 1134 (Pa. 1981).

2025See also Fessenden v. Robert Packer Hosp., 97 A.3d 1225, 1230 (Pa. Super. 2014) (explaining that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur: (1) provides an exception to the general “requirement that medical malpractice claims be supported by expert testimony,” where there is “obvious negligence;” and (2) “allows a fact-finder to infer from the circumstances surrounding the injury that the harm suffered was caused by the negligence of the defendant”).

2024In those cases, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur “allows a fact-finder to infer from the circumstances surrounding the injury that the harm suffered was caused by the negligence of the defendant.” Id. (citation omitted).

2007Instead, Appellants direct our attention to the more recent opinion of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Quinby v. Plumsteadville Family Practice, Inc., 589 Pa. 183 , 907 A.2d 1061 (2006), to support their proposition that the presence of direct evidence of negligence does not preclude a plaintiff from proceeding under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.

2007Instead, Appellants direct our attention to the more recent opinion of the Pennsylvania Supreme Court in Quinby v. Plumsteadville Family Practice, Inc., 589 Pa. 183 , 907 A.2d 1061 (2006), to support their proposition that the presence of direct evidence of negligence does not preclude a plaintiff from proceeding under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.

2010Id.

2007Leone v. Thomas, 428 Pa.Super. 217 , 630 A.2d 900 (1993), appeal denied, 537 Pa. 664 , 644 A.2d 1201 (1994) (citing Smith v. City of Chester, 357 Pa.Super. 24 , 515 A.2d 303 (1986), appeal dismissed as improvidently granted, 517 Pa. 362 , 537 A.2d 812 (1988)).

1977The Superior Court reversed as to the elevator company: 223 Pa. Superior Ct. 359 , 299 A. 2d 356 (1972).

1973As we said in Gilbert v. Korvette’s, Inc., et al., 223 Pa. Superior Ct. 359 , 299 A. 2d 356 (1972), “three factors must coexist in order to invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur: (a) the defendant must owe to the plaintiff a duty of the highest degree of care; (b) the instrumentality which caused the accident was in the exclusive control of the defendant; (JMd, (c) that which happened was something that ordinarily would not have occurred if the defendant had exercised the high degree of care which the law imposes upon him.” Gilbert , at 362-363.

1977The Superior Court reversed as to the elevator company: 223 Pa. Superior Ct. 359 , 299 A. 2d 356 (1972).

1973As we said in Gilbert v. Korvette’s, Inc., et al., 223 Pa. Superior Ct. 359 , 299 A. 2d 356 (1972), “three factors must coexist in order to invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur: (a) the defendant must owe to the plaintiff a duty of the highest degree of care; (b) the instrumentality which caused the accident was in the exclusive control of the defendant; (JMd, (c) that which happened was something that ordinarily would not have occurred if the defendant had exercised the high degree of care which the law imposes upon him.” Gilbert , at 362-363.