res ipsa loquitur doctrine in Tennessee

2018Page Keeton, Prosser and Keeton on Torts 244 (5th ed. 1984 & Supp. 1988); see Seavers, 9 S.W.3d at 91 (“The plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she was injured by an instrumentality that was within the defendant’s exclusive control and that the injury would not ordinarily have occurred in the absence of negligence.”). “[T]he doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is . . . a rule of circumstantial evidence, not a substantive rule of negligence law.” Keeton, supra, at 244 (Supp. 1988); accord Burton, 129 S .W.3d at 525 (“Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of evidence, not a rule of law.”).

2016A res ipsa loquitur instruction is often necessary in cases where “direct evidence of a defendant’s negligence is either inaccessible to or unknown by the plaintiff.” Id. (citations omitted).

2015Armes by Armes v. Hulett, 843 S.W.2d 427, 432 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992).

2001In Armes by Armes v. Hulett, 843 S.W.2d 427 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992), this Court outlined three basic requirements needed for proper application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.

2008Brown, 496 S.W.2d at 509 .

2001Second, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should not be applied “where specific acts of negligence are alleged and where evidence in support of such allegations is presented.” Brown, 496 S.W.2d at 509 ; Ross v. Griggs, 296 S.W.2d 641, 646 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1955); Schindler v. Southern Coach Lines, 217 S.W.2d 775, 777 (Tenn. 1949).

2001First, this Court has consistently held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply in situations “where the plaintiff’s injury could reasonably have occurred even without the defendant’s negligence.” Underwood v. HCA Health Servs. of Tenn., 892 S.W.2d 423, 427 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994) (citing Cockrum v. State, 843 S.W.2d 433, 438 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992); Brown v. Univ.

1999See Cockrum v. State, 843 S.W.2d 433, 438 (Tenn. App. 1992); Brown v. University Nursing Home, Inc., 496 S.W.2d 503, 509 (Tenn. App. 1972).

2008In the Brown case, the Court of Appeals stated the following when presented with the issue of the applicability of the res ipsa doctrine under similar circumstances: In view of the fact that the doctrine has no application unless the accident in question is one of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence, Walls v. Lueking, 46 TennApp. 636, 332 S.W.2d 692 [ (1959) ], and since the Court judicially knows that the fall of an elderly person does not necessarily result alone from the negligence of another but may occur under circumstances when there is a complete absence

1972In view of the fact that the doctrine has no application unless the accident in question is one of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence, Walls v. Lueking, 46 Tenn.App. 636 , 332 S.W.2d 692 , and since the Court judicially knows that the fall of an elderly person does not necessarily result alone from the negligence of another but may occur under circumstances when there is a complete absence of negligence on the part of any third party, or even of the injured party, we think the Court correctly held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply in the cas

2015The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply, however, in situations “where the plaintiff‟s injury could reasonably have occurred even without the defendant‟s negligence.” Underwood, 892 S.W.2d at 427 .

2001First, this Court has consistently held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply in situations “where the plaintiff’s injury could reasonably have occurred even without the defendant’s negligence.” Underwood v. HCA Health Servs. of Tenn., 892 S.W.2d 423, 427 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1994) (citing Cockrum v. State, 843 S.W.2d 433, 438 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1992); Brown v. Univ.

2004The application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine merely permits the fact finder “to choose the inference of defendant’s negligence in preference to other permissible or reasonable inferences.” Id. at 785 .

1960Regarding the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the Middle Section of this Court, speaking through Felts, Judge, in Sullivan et ux. v. Crabtree, 36 Tenn. App. 469 , 258 S.W.2d 782, 783 , said: "The classic statement of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is this: `(W)here the thing (causing the harm) is shown to be under the management of defendant or his servants, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendants, that the a

2002Several cases have stated that the res ipsa loquitur doctrine cannot be invoked unless the nature and circumstances of the injuiy permit "no reasonable inference but that the injury complained of was due to the negligence of defendant....” Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Sullivan, 178 Tenn. 405, 417 , 158 S.W.2d 721, 726 (1942); Fulton v. Pfizer Hosp.

2002Several cases have stated that the res ipsa loquitur doctrine cannot be invoked unless the nature and circumstances of the injuiy permit "no reasonable inference but that the injury complained of was due to the negligence of defendant....” Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Sullivan, 178 Tenn. 405, 417 , 158 S.W.2d 721, 726 (1942); Fulton v. Pfizer Hosp.

2021As has been stated in a case involving a highway collision between a car and a horse, “[one] is not liable, if without his fault, the animals have escaped . . . [T]he doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply to actions of this nature.” Rodgers v. Webb, 335 F. Supp. 584, 585 (E.D.

2000As has been stated in a case involving a highway collision between a car and a horse, “[one] is not liable, if without his fault, the animals have escaped . . . [T]he doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply to actions of this nature.” Rodgers v. Webb, 335 F. Supp. 584, 585 (E.D.

2010P AGE K EETON, P ROSSER AND K EETON ON T ORTS 244 (5th ed. 1984 & Supp. 1988); see Seavers, 9 S.W.3d at 91 (“The plaintiff must demonstrate that he or she was injured by an -13- instrumentality that was within the defendant’s exclusive control and that the injury would not ordinarily have occurred in the absence of negligence.”). “[T]he doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is . . . a rule of circumstantial evidence, not a substantive rule of negligence law.” K EETON, supra, at 244 (Supp. 1988); accord Burton, 129 S.W.3d at 525 (“Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of evidence, not a rule of law.”).

2010It is unclear whether there is a practical difference in the effect of a permissible inference and a rebuttable presumption under the facts of this case.12 Under the traditional articulation of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, there was considerable overlap with the common knowledge exception, inasmuch as the res ipsa loquitur requirement that the injury be one which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence was often phrased in terms of “common experience” or “ordinary experience.” See, e.g., Burton, 129 S.W.3d at 523 (“Plaintiffs relying on res ipsa loquitur . . . may . . . ba

2016Once, this Court went so far as to liken res ipsa loquitur and the common knowledge exception as “Siamese twins.” Murphy v. Schwartz, 739 S.W.2d 777, 778 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986).

2016Once, this Court went so far as to liken res ipsa loquitur and the common knowledge exception as “Siamese twins.” Murphy v. Schwartz, 739 S.W.2d 777, 778 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1986).

2002While the application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine is so fact-dependent that the courts may apply it in one set of circumstances but decline to apply it in a similar set of circumstances *527 with only slight factual differences, olswanger v. Funk, 63 Tenn.App. 201, 206-07 , 470 S.W.2d 13,15-16 (1970), there is no basis for assuming that the doctrine is particularly unsuited for crop spraying cases.

2002While the application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine is so fact-dependent that the courts may apply it in one set of circumstances but decline to apply it in a similar set of circumstances *527 with only slight factual differences, olswanger v. Funk, 63 Tenn.App. 201, 206-07 , 470 S.W.2d 13,15-16 (1970), there is no basis for assuming that the doctrine is particularly unsuited for crop spraying cases.

2002Schindler v. Southern Coach Lines, Inc., 188 Tenn. 169, 173 , 217 S.W.2d 775, 777 (1949); Shivers v. Ramsey, 937 S.W.2d at 949 .

2001Second, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should not be applied “where specific acts of negligence are alleged and where evidence in support of such allegations is presented.” Brown, 496 S.W.2d at 509 ; Ross v. Griggs, 296 S.W.2d 641, 646 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1955); Schindler v. Southern Coach Lines, 217 S.W.2d 775, 777 (Tenn. 1949).

2002In modified comparative fault jurisdictions, the res ipsa loquitur doctrine will not allow a recovery by any plaintiff who is more responsible for his or her injury than the defendant. 1 Arthur Best, Comparative Negligence § 4.60 (1999). 7 .De Glopper v. Nashville Ry. & Light Co., 123 Tenn. 633, 646 , 134 S.W. 609 , 612 (1911) (holding that res ipsa loquitur cannot be invoked when "the act which caused the injury ... must be inferred from the accident itself.

1961They cite in support of this argument a number of Tennessee cases including De Glopper v. Nashville Railway Co., 123 Tenn. 633 , 134 S. W. 609 , 33 L.

1979The law with reference to the burden of proof under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was succinctly stated by Judge Matherne of this Court in the case of Ford v. Roddy Manufacturing Company, 60 Tenn.App. 495 , 448 S.W.2d 433 (1969), as follows: Where, as here, the res ipsa loquitur doctrine is applicable the burden of proof does not shift from plaintiff to the defendant, but the defendant is required to go forward with the explanatory evidence, and from all the evidence the trier of fact may or may not accept the inference as raised by the doctrine.

1979The law with reference to the burden of proof under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was succinctly stated by Judge Matherne of this Court in the case of Ford v. Roddy Manufacturing Company, 60 Tenn.App. 495 , 448 S.W.2d 433 (1969), as follows: Where, as here, the res ipsa loquitur doctrine is applicable the burden of proof does not shift from plaintiff to the defendant, but the defendant is required to go forward with the explanatory evidence, and from all the evidence the trier of fact may or may not accept the inference as raised by the doctrine.

1935“In other words, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply in cases of this kind but the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to show negligence, which maj’’ be shown by circumstantial evidence.”’ Yates v. Coca Cola Bottling Works, 14 Tenn. App., 7, 10 ; Merriman v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 17 Tenn. App., 433, 440 , 68 S. W. (2d), 149 .

1935“In other words, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply in cases of this kind but the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to show negligence, which maj’’ be shown by circumstantial evidence.”’ Yates v. Coca Cola Bottling Works, 14 Tenn. App., 7, 10 ; Merriman v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 17 Tenn. App., 433, 440 , 68 S. W. (2d), 149 .

1960There was a judgment for the defendants, and on affirming the judgment this Court rejected the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur because “it is a common and not an unusual occurrence for airplanes to stall and fall while in. operation, and without the intervention of any act upon the part of the operator.” [ 20 Tenn. App. 404 , 99 S. W. (2d) 561 .] In Towle v. Phillips, supra [ 180 Tenn. 121 , 172 S. W. (2d) 808 ], decided in 1943, the Supreme Court refused to apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur because (1) the plane had dual controls, one of which was accessible to the passenger, and (2) the

1960There was a judgment for the defendants, and on affirming the judgment this Court rejected the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur because "it is a common and not an unusual occurrence for airplanes to stall and fall while in operation, and without the intervention of any act upon the part of the operator." [ 20 Tenn. App. 404 , 99 S.W.2d 561 .] In Towle v. Phillips, supra [ 180 Tenn. 121 , 172 S.W.2d 808 ], decided in 1943, the Supreme Court refused to apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur because (1) the plane had dual controls, one of which was accessible to the passenger, and (2) the operation

1994Southeastern Aviation, Inc. v. Hurd, 209 Tenn. 639, 662 , 355 S.W.2d 436, 446 (1962); Lewis v. Casenburg, 157 Tenn. 187, 196-97 , 7 S.W.2d 808, 811 (1927); Armes v. Hulett, 843 S.W.2d 427, 432 (Tenn.Ct.App.1992); Ford v. Roddy Mfg.

1994Southeastern Aviation, Inc. v. Hurd, 209 Tenn. 639, 662 , 355 S.W.2d 436, 446 (1962); Lewis v. Casenburg, 157 Tenn. 187, 196-97 , 7 S.W.2d 808, 811 (1927); Armes v. Hulett, 843 S.W.2d 427, 432 (Tenn.Ct.App.1992); Ford v. Roddy Mfg.

1980See Southern Gas Corporation v. Brooks, 50 Tenn.App. 1 , 359 S.W.2d 570 (1961).

1970This contention is refuted by the Court of Appeals in Southern Gas Corporation v. Brooks, supra. The following is quoted from the opinion: ‘However, attorneys for plaintiff-in-error very forcefully make the argument that before one can invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the plaintiff must prove by direct evidence the act, agency or thing which caused the injury.

2026A plaintiff must prove the following elements to establish a negligence claim: “(1) a duty of care owed by the defendant to the plaintiff; (2) conduct by the defendant falling below the standard of care amounting to a breach of the duty; (3) an injury or loss; (4) causation in fact; and (5) proximate (legal) causation.” Helton v. Lawson, No. E2018-02119-COA-R3-CV, 2019 WL 6954180 , at *9 (Tenn. Ct. App. Dec. 18, 2019) (quoting Bradshaw v. Daniel, 854 S.W.2d 865, 869 (Tenn. 1993)).

2026Jenkins v. Big City Remodeling, 515 S.W.3d 843, 849 (Tenn. 2017).