res ipsa loquitur doctrine in New Jersey

2026The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which means "the thing speaks for itself," is an "evidentiary rule grounded in principles of equity." Jerista v. Murray, 185 N.J. 175, 191-92 (2005) (quoting Myrlak v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 157 N.J. 84, 95 (1999)).

2026The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which means "the thing speaks for itself," is an "evidentiary rule grounded in principles of equity." Jerista v. Murray, 185 N.J. 175, 191-92 (2005) (quoting Myrlak v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 157 N.J. 84, 95 (1999)).

2024If the cause of the mishap in question is not common knowledge to laymen but is generally known among certain A-1748-22 6 professions, expert testimony "may afford a sufficient basis for application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur." Buckelew, 87 N.J. at 527 .

2024Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, negligence may be inferred "where (a) the occurrence itself ordinarily bespeaks negligence; (b) the instrumentality was within the defendant's exclusive control; and (c) there [was] no indication in the circumstances that the injury was the result of plaintiff's own voluntary act or neglect.'" Buckelew v. Grossbard, 87 N.J. 512, 525 (1981) (quoting Bornstein v. Metro.

2026The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which means "the thing speaks for itself," is an "evidentiary rule grounded in principles of equity." Jerista v. Murray, 185 N.J. 175, 191-92 (2005) (quoting Myrlak v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 157 N.J. 84, 95 (1999)).

2026The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which means "the thing speaks for itself," is an "evidentiary rule grounded in principles of equity." Jerista v. Murray, 185 N.J. 175, 191-92 (2005) (quoting Myrlak v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 157 N.J. 84, 95 (1999)).

2005Whether an accident bespeaks negligence “depends on the balance of probabilities.” Buckelew, supra, 87 N.J. at 526 , 435 A.2d 1150 . “[A] plaintiff need not exclude all other possible causes of an accident” to invoke the res ipsa doctrine, provided that the circumstances establish “that it is more probable than not that the defendant’s negligence was a proximate cause of the mishap.” Brown, supra, 95 N.J. at 287, 291-92, 295 , 471 A.2d 25 (holding in case in which stairway abruptly collapsed that “the trial court properly instructed the jury to consider the issue of liability under the doctrin

2005Whether an accident bespeaks negligence “depends on the balance of probabilities.” Buckelew, supra, 87 N.J. at 526 , 435 A.2d 1150 . “[A] plaintiff need not exclude all other possible causes of an accident” to invoke the res ipsa doctrine, provided that the circumstances establish “that it is more probable than not that the defendant’s negligence was a proximate cause of the mishap.” Brown, supra, 95 N.J. at 287, 291-92, 295 , 471 A.2d 25 (holding in case in which stairway abruptly collapsed that “the trial court properly instructed the jury to consider the issue of liability under the doctrin

2005See id. at 136-37 , 293 A.2d 371 .

2005See id. at 136-37 , 293 A.2d 371 .

2019Thus, plaintiff failed to demonstrate the A-0445-18T2 10 window was in defendant's exclusive control as required to permit application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.4 "Res ipsa loquitur is not a panacea for the . . . doomed negligence cause of action." Id. at 400 .

2019Affirmed. 4 Because plaintiff failed to establish either of the first two factors required for application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, it is unnecessary to consider or decide whether plaintiff satisfied the third factor—that "there is no indication in the circumstances that the injury was the result of the plaintiff's own voluntary act or neglect," Szalontai, 183 N.J. at 398 (citation omitted)—other than to note that the undisputed facts presented to the motion court do not directly address this factor.

2012Essex is correct that the cases discussing the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur hold that the presumption allowed by the rule creates a permissive inference of a want of due care that a jury “may, but need not, draw.” Lorenc, supra, 37 N.J. at 71 , 179 A.2d 401 .

2012Essex is correct that the cases discussing the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur hold that the presumption allowed by the rule creates a permissive inference of a want of due care that a jury “may, but need not, draw.” Lorenc, supra, 37 N.J. at 71 , 179 A.2d 401 .

2024"Ordinarily, negligence is . . . 'a fact which must be proved and which will never be presumed,' . . . [but t]he doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, where applicable, is a method of circumstantially proving the existence of negligence." Myrlak v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 157 N.J. 84, 95 (1999) (quoting Meny v. Carlson, 6 N.J. 82, 91 (1950) and citing Tierney, 214 N.J.

2024"Ordinarily, negligence is . . . 'a fact which must be proved and which will never be presumed, . . . . [but] [t]he doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, where applicable, is a method of circumstantially proving the existence of negligence." Myrlak v. Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 157 N.J. 84, 95 (1999) (quoting Meny v. A-3748-22 12 Carlson, 6 N.J. 82, 91 (1950)).

2012The presumption does not shift the burden of proof; “the inference is still one for the jury and not for the court, and the jury may reject it as not of such quality as would move reasonable men to judgment in favor of the tendered hypothesis, even where there is no explanation by defendant.” Kahalili, supra, 26 N.J. at 606 , 141 A.2d 301 .

2012The presumption does not shift the burden of proof; “the inference is still one for the jury and not for the court, and the jury may reject it as not of such quality as would move reasonable men to judgment in favor of the tendered hypothesis, even where there is no explanation by defendant.” Kahalili, supra, 26 N.J. at 606 , 141 A.2d 301 .

2020At the outset, we conclude that the motion judge correctly concluded that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply under these facts. "[I]t is ordinarily a plaintiff's burden to prove negligence, and [negligence] is never presumed." Khan v. Singh, 200 N.J. 82, 91 (2009) (citing Hansen v. Eagle- Picher Lead Co., 8 N.J. 133, 139 (1957)).

1984Hansen v. Eagle-Picher Lead Co., 8 N.J. 133, 139-40 (1951).

2009In doing so, the court commented that: “[¡If the evidence presents a factual issue as to how an accident occurred, and the res ipsa loquitur doctrine would be applicable under only one version of the accident, the court should give a ‘conditional’ res ipsa loquitur instruction, under which the jury is directed first to decide how the accident happened and to consider res ipsa loquitur only if it finds that the accident occurred in a manner which fits the doctrine.” [Id. at 232, 706 A.2d 1151 (quoting Allendorf, supra, 266 N.J.Super. at 669 , 630 A.2d 402 ).] *99 As the panel explained, “if the

2007In that case, we stated that: "[i]f the evidence presents a factual issue as to how an accident occurred, and the res ipsa loquitur doctrine would be applicable under only one version of the accident, the court should give a `conditional' res ipsa loquitur instruction, under which the jury is directed first to decide how the accident happened and to consider res ispa loquitur only if it finds that the accident occurred in a manner which fits the doctrine." [ Id. at 232 , 706 A. 2d 1151 (quoting Allendorf v. Kaiserman Enters., 266 N.J.Super. 662, 669 , 630 A. 2d 402 (App. Div.1993)).] However,

1952Menth v. Breeze Corporation, Inc., 4 N.J. 428, 436 (1950); 22 Am.

1951Menth v. Breeze Corporation, Inc., 4 N.J. 428, 437 (1950).

2013The rule creates an allowable inference of the defendant’s want of due care when the following conditions have been shown: (a) the occurrence itself ordinarily bespeaks negligence; (b) the instrumentality [causing the injury] was within the defendant’s exclusive control; and (c) there is no indication in the circumstances that the injury was the result of the plaintiffs own voluntary act or neglect. [Szalontai v. Yazbo’s Sports Café, 183 N.J. 386, 398 , 874 A.2d 507 (2005) (quoting Brown v. Racquet Club of Bricktown, 95 N.J. 280, 288-89 , 471 A.2d 25 (1984)).] The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is

2013The rule creates an allowable inference of the defendant’s want of due care when the following conditions have been shown: (a) the occurrence itself ordinarily bespeaks negligence; (b) the instrumentality [causing the injury] was within the defendant’s exclusive control; and (c) there is no indication in the circumstances that the injury was the result of the plaintiffs own voluntary act or neglect. [Szalontai v. Yazbo’s Sports Café, 183 N.J. 386, 398 , 874 A.2d 507 (2005) (quoting Brown v. Racquet Club of Bricktown, 95 N.J. 280, 288-89 , 471 A.2d 25 (1984)).] The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is

2009The Appellate Division affirmed the verdict, concluding that “[tjhe trial court properly instructed the jury that the application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine was conditional upon the jury accepting plaintiffs version of how the accident occurred.” Id. at 670 , 630 A.2d 402 .

2009The Appellate Division affirmed the verdict, concluding that “[tjhe trial court properly instructed the jury that the application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine was conditional upon the jury accepting plaintiffs version of how the accident occurred.” Id. at 670 , 630 A.2d 402 .

1998“Where, for example, a surgical sponge is left inside a patient after an operation, it is reasonable to say the probability is that someone has been negligent.” Sanzari v. Rosenfeld, supra, 34 N.J. at 140 , 167 A.2d 625 .

1998“Where, for example, a surgical sponge is left inside a patient after an operation, it is reasonable to say the probability is that someone has been negligent.” Sanzari v. Rosenfeld, supra, 34 N.J. at 140 , 167 A.2d 625 .

1953Super. 75, 79 ( App. Div. 1949), wherein it was stated: "Our courts have established the rule that `in addition to the permissible inferences of negligence, want of due care, that may be drawn from the facts and circumstances connected with the happening of the accident itself, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the injured party may also show such other relevant facts and circumstances to the end of determining whether due care had been exercised in the sole management and control of the thing which caused the accident, and if not so exercised, whether the act resulted from the lack of

1951"In tort liability, a falling object is the common circumstance calling for the invocation and application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur." Cleary v. Camden, 118 N.J.L. 215 ( Sup. Ct. 1937), in which a number of such cases are collated.

1991The Court announced that the rule it established "does not represent the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as it has been traditionally understood." Id. at 299 , 338 A. 2d 1 .

1991The Court announced that the rule it established "does not represent the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as it has been traditionally understood." Id. at 299 , 338 A. 2d 1 .

2005The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, where applicable, is a method of circumstantially proving the existence of negligence. [ Id. at 95, 723 A.2d 45 (citations omitted).] Regardless of the doctrine’s application, a plaintiff nonetheless must satisfy its burden to proffer competent evidence that “reduces the likelihood of other causes so that the greater probability of fault lies at defendant’s door.” Jimenez v. GNOC, Corp., 286 N.J.Super. 533, 545 , 670 A.2d 24 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 145 N.J. 374 , 678 A.2d 714 (1996).

2005The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, where applicable, is a method of circumstantially proving the existence of negligence. [ Id. at 95, 723 A.2d 45 (citations omitted).] Regardless of the doctrine’s application, a plaintiff nonetheless must satisfy its burden to proffer competent evidence that “reduces the likelihood of other causes so that the greater probability of fault lies at defendant’s door.” Jimenez v. GNOC, Corp., 286 N.J.Super. 533, 545 , 670 A.2d 24 (App.Div.), certif. denied, 145 N.J. 374 , 678 A.2d 714 (1996).

2005Whether an accident bespeaks negligence “depends on the balance of probabilities.” Buckelew, supra, 87 N.J. at 526 , 435 A.2d 1150 . “[A] plaintiff need not exclude all other possible causes of an accident” to invoke the res ipsa doctrine, provided that the circumstances establish “that it is more probable than not that the defendant’s negligence was a proximate cause of the mishap.” Brown, supra, 95 N.J. at 287, 291-92, 295 , 471 A.2d 25 (holding in case in which stairway abruptly collapsed that “the trial court properly instructed the jury to consider the issue of liability under the doctrin

2005Whether an accident bespeaks negligence “depends on the balance of probabilities.” Buckelew, supra, 87 N.J. at 526 , 435 A.2d 1150 . “[A] plaintiff need not exclude all other possible causes of an accident” to invoke the res ipsa doctrine, provided that the circumstances establish “that it is more probable than not that the defendant’s negligence was a proximate cause of the mishap.” Brown, supra, 95 N.J. at 287, 291-92, 295 , 471 A.2d 25 (holding in case in which stairway abruptly collapsed that “the trial court properly instructed the jury to consider the issue of liability under the doctrin

1972Cf. Mockler v. Russman, et al., 102 N.J.

1971In doing so he relied on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, citing Mockler v. Russman, 102 N.J.

1954Cf. Mannon v. Vesper Lodge of I.O.O.F., 97 N.J.L. 215 ( E. & A. 1922); Gilroy v. Standard Oil Co., 107 N.J.L. 170, 174 ( E. & A. 1930); Smith v. Kirby, 115 N.J.L. 225, 227 ( E. & A. 1935); Cleary v. City of Camden, 118 N.J.L. 215, 221 ( Sup. Ct. 1937), affirmed 119 N.J.L. 387 ( E. & A. 1938); Forsch v. Liebhardt, 5 N.J.

1953Smith v. Kirby, supra ; Mackenzie v. Oakley, 94 N.J.L. 66 ( Sup. Ct. 1920); Beck v. Hines, 95 N.J.L. 158 ( E. & A. 1920); Journey v. Zawish, 11 N.J.

1954Cf. Mannon v. Vesper Lodge of I.O.O.F., 97 N.J.L. 215 ( E. & A. 1922); Gilroy v. Standard Oil Co., 107 N.J.L. 170, 174 ( E. & A. 1930); Smith v. Kirby, 115 N.J.L. 225, 227 ( E. & A. 1935); Cleary v. City of Camden, 118 N.J.L. 215, 221 ( Sup. Ct. 1937), affirmed 119 N.J.L. 387 ( E. & A. 1938); Forsch v. Liebhardt, 5 N.J.

1937L. 170; 151 Atl.