res ipsa loquitur doctrine in New York

2024“In a proper case, under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the law allows a jury to consider the circumstantial evidence and infer that the defendant was negligent in some unspecified way.” (Morejon v Rais Const. Co., 7 NY3d 203, 205-206 [2006]).

2024In the alternative, the Court finds that this is the rare case in which a "plaintiff's circumstantial proof is so convincing and the defendant's response so weak that the inference of defendant's negligence is inescapable" and thus that summary judgment is warranted based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur ( Morejon v Rais Const. Co. , 7 NY3d 203, 209 [2006]).

2014In order for a plaintiff to rely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, three core elements must be Present—“[first, the event must be of a kind that ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence; second, it must be caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant; and third, it must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff’ (Kambat, 89 NY2d at 494 ).

2014In order for a plaintiff to rely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, three core elements must be Present—“[first, the event must be of a kind that ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence; second, it must be caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant; and third, it must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff’ (Kambat, 89 NY2d at 494 ).

2025SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO RES IPSA LOOUITOR In order to invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, three criteria must be met: (I) The event must be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone's negligence; (2) it must be caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant; (3) it must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the Plaintiff (see Dermatossian v New York City Transit Authority, 67 NY2d 219 , 501 NYS 2d 784 [1986]; see also Kambat v St.

2025SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS TO RES IPSA LOOUITOR In order to invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, three criteria must be met: (I) The event must be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone's negligence; (2) it must be caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant; (3) it must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the Plaintiff (see Dermatossian v New York City Transit Authority, 67 NY2d 219 , 501 NYS 2d 784 [1986]; see also Kambat v St.

2020For that reason, the Court of Appeals has articulated how the first element of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine may be satisfied with expert proof that "bridge[s] the gap between [the jury's] common knowledge, which does not encompass the specialized knowledge and experience necessary to reach a conclusion that the occurrence would not normally take place in the absence of negligence, and the common knowledge of physicians, which does" ( id. at 212 [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see James v Wormuth , 21 NY3d at 547 ).

2020Once plaintiff satisfies the burden of proof on these three elements, the res ipsa loquitur doctrine permits the jury to infer negligence from the mere fact of the occurrence'" ( Bernard v Bernstein , 126 AD3d at 835 [citation omitted], quoting States v Lourdes Hosp. , 100 NY2d at 211-212 ).

2025The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies "to occurrences '[w]here the actual or specific cause of an accident is unknown' " ( James v Wormuth , 21 NY3d 540, 546 [2013], quoting Kambat v St.

2020"To establish a prima facie case of negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, a plaintiff must establish that (1) the event is of a kind that ordinarily does not occur absent negligence; (2) the event was caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant; and (3) the plaintiff did not voluntarily create or contribute to the event" ( Dilligard v City of New York , 170 AD3d 955 , 956; see James v Wormuth , 21 NY3d 540, 546 ).

2014To the extent that the second cause of action, as amplified by the bill of particulars, may be read to allege common-law negligence, we conclude that the court properly determined that defendants met their burden on their motion by establishing that they did not have exclusive control of the mirror, i.e., one of the necessary conditions for the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, and that plaintiff failed to raise an issue of fact (cf. Herbst, 112 AD3d at 1374 ; see generally Zuckerman, 49 NY2d at 562 ).

2014To the extent that the second cause of action, as amplified by the bill of particulars, may be read to allege common-law negligence, we conclude that the court properly determined that defendants met their burden on their motion by establishing that they did not have exclusive control of the mirror, i.e., one of the necessary conditions for the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, and that plaintiff failed to raise an issue of fact (cf. Herbst, 112 AD3d at 1374 ; see generally Zuckerman, 49 NY2d at 562 ).

2020Although plaintiff sought to rely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which does not require her to establish the actual or specific cause of the accident ( see Abbott v Page Airways , 23 NY2d 502, 512-513 [1969]), she nevertheless proffered expert testimony demonstrating that the collapse was most likely caused by a flaring of the riser's locking mechanism, a condition caused by "wear and tear" and which allegedly could have been discovered with proper inspection and maintenance.

2020Contrary to defendant's contention, plaintiff's proffer of this specific expert evidence of negligence did not preclude her from also relying on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur ( see Abbott v Page Airways , 23 NY2d at 512-513 ).

2020Francis Hosp. , 89 NY2d 489, 494 [1997]; Norton v Albany County Airport Auth. , 52 AD3d 871, 875 [2008]).

2011In addition, Supreme Court properly found that plaintiffs had failed to establish one of the conditions precedent for invocation of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. “[T]he evidentiary doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may be invoked to allow the factfinder to infer negligence from the mere happening of an event” (States v Lourdes Hosp., 100 NY2d 208, 211 [2003]; see Norton v Albany County Airport Auth., 52 AD3d 871, 875 [2008]).

2001Moreover, it ignores the reality that courts and juries must often rely upon “a commonsense appraisal of the probative value of circumstantial evidence. [The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur] requires evidence which shows at least probability that a particular accident could not have occurred without legal wrong by the defendant * * * In the administration of the law we must be satisfied with proof which leads to a conclusion with probable certainty where absolute certainty is impossible.” (George Foltis, Inc. v City of New York, 287 NY 108, 115 .) Needless to add, the jury is free to accept or r

1978The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is a rule of evidence from which a permissible inference of negligence may be drawn (Foltis, Inc. v City of New York, 287 NY 108).

2013That doctrine “does not apply here because, inter alia, defendant was not in exclusive control of the instrumentality that allegedly caused plaintiffs injuries,” i.e., the chair (Moore v Ortolano, 78 AD3d 1652, 1653 [2010]; see Chini v Wendcentral Corp., 262 AD2d 940, 940 [1999], lv denied 94 NY2d 752 [1999]).

2013That doctrine “does not apply here because, inter alia, defendant was not in exclusive control of the instrumentality that allegedly caused plaintiffs injuries,” i.e., the chair (Moore v Ortolano, 78 AD3d 1652, 1653 [2010]; see Chini v Wendcentral Corp., 262 AD2d 940, 940 [1999], lv denied 94 NY2d 752 [1999]).

2016Auth., 291 AD2d 225 [1st Dept 2002] [res ipsa loquitur was applicable on summary judgment motion where pedestrian was struck by a piece of ceiling while waiting for a train on a subway platform], cited by Flossos v Waterside Redevelopment Co., L.P., 108 AD3d 647 [2d Dept 2013] [genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applied, precluding summary judgment for owner and managers of an apartment building on painter’s negligence claim, seeking to recover damages for injuries he sustained when a piece of ceiling he was painting fell down on him, propelling

2014Auth., 291 AD2d 225, 227 [1st Dept 2002]).

2023Thus, Marcato may still be held liable under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur ( see Ianotta v Tishman Speyer Props., Inc. , 46 AD3d 297, 299 [1st Dept 2007]).

2023Thus, Marcato may still be held liable under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur ( see Ianotta v Tishman Speyer Props., Inc. , 46 AD3d 297, 299 [1st Dept 2007]).

2009The circumstances of this case do not warrant the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (see Feblot v New York Times Co., 32 NY2d 486, 495 [1973]; Parris v Port of N.Y.

2008The plaintiffs failed to establish their prima facie entitlement to judgment as a matter of law based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, since the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate that the instrumentality that controls the door closure was within Thys sen’s exclusive control (see Feblot v New York Times Co., 32 NY2d 486 [1973]; see also Graham v Wohl, 283 AD2d 261 [2001]; Reefe v Economy El. of N.Y. 282 AD2d 591 [2001]; LoTruglio v Saks Fifth Ave., 281 AD2d 399 [2001]; Cacciolo v Port Auth. of N.Y. & N.J., 186 AD2d 528 [1992]).

2024The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur allows an inference of negligence to be drawn where (1) the event is of a type that does not normally occur in the absence of negligence, (2) it was caused by an instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendants, and (3) plaintiff's actions did not contribute in any way to the occurrence ( Hodges v Royal Realty Corp. , 42 AD3d 350, 351-352 [1st Dept 2007]).

2014Since Tortorella Heating’s heater replacement work did not involve the use of chemicals, plaintiff cannot invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to hold it liable for the damage allegedly caused by chemicals to the vinyl lining of his pool (see Edelman, 117 AD3d at 641 ; see also Hodges v Royal Realty Corp., 42 AD3d 350 [1st Dept 2007]).

2013That doctrine “does not apply here because, inter alia, defendant was not in exclusive control of the instrumentality that allegedly caused plaintiffs injuries,” i.e., the chair (Moore v Ortolano, 78 AD3d 1652, 1653 [2010]; see Chini v Wendcentral Corp., 262 AD2d 940, 940 [1999], lv denied 94 NY2d 752 [1999]).

2012Consequently, under the circumstances here, the plaintiff could not invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (see Miles v Hicksville U.F.S.D., 56 AD3d at 626; Dulgov v City of New York, 33 AD3d 584, 585 [2006]; Loiacono v Stuyvesant Bagels, Inc., 29 AD3d at 538 ; Chini v Wendcentral Corp., 262 AD2d 940 [1999]).

2021Here, the evidence supporting exclusivity of control afforded a rational basis for concluding that " 'it is more likely than not' " that plaintiff's injuries were caused by defendants' negligence ( Kambat , 89 NY2d at 494 ; see Backus v Kaleida Health , 91 AD3d 1284, 1286 [4th Dept 2012]).

2014Francis Hosp., 89 NY2d 489, 494 [1997]; Backus v Kaleida Health, 91 AD3d 1284, 1285 [2012]).

2018Only in the rarest cases will a plaintiff be awarded summary judgment, or judgment as a matter of law in the course of a trial, by relying upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur ( see id. at 209 ; Lau v Ky, 63 AD3d 801, 801 ).

2016Furthermore, the plaintiff failed to meet her initial burden based on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur because she did not establish, prima facie, that her alleged injury was one that would not ordinarily have occurred in the absence of someone’s negligence (see Rakauskas v Arden Shell Corp., 134 AD3d 1087, 1087 [2015]; Lau v Ky, 63 AD3d 801, 801 [2009]).

2018For the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to apply, a plaintiff must establish the following: "(1) the event must be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone's negligence; (2) it must be caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant; (3) it must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff" ( Corcoran v Banner Super Mkt., 19 NY2d 425, 430 ; see Morejon v Rais Constr.

2008However, “[t]he rigid requirement of ‘exclusive control’ has been relaxed by application of a more flexible common-sense approach to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur” (Lindenauer v State of New York, 45 AD2d 73, 75 [1974], quoting Corcoran v Banner Super Mkt., 19 NY2d 425, 431 [1967]).

1996Although defendants presented evidence of their exercise of proper care during the surgery and of another possible cause of the injury, "it does not negative the evidence that this was an unusual and extraordinary occurrence on which the jury could infer negligencé under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur” (Fogal v Genesee Hosp., 41 AD2d 468, 476 ).

1992The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may not apply because plaintiff failed to show that the instrumentality was within defendant’s exclusive control after plaintiff ascended the ladder (see generally, Fogal v Genesee Hosp., 41 AD2d 468, 474-475 ).

1992Furthermore, the plaintiffs presented sufficient proof which, if believed, could lead the fact-finder to infer negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (see, Cornacchia v Mount Vernon Hosp., 93 AD2d 851, 852 ; Fogal v Genesee Hosp., 41 AD2d 468 ; Pipers v Rosenow, 39 AD2d 240, 243 ).

1989Finally, the plaintiff should not have been given permission to amend the complaint to assert the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, as she has totally failed to establish that her injury is of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence (see, Pipers v Rosenow, 39 AD2d 240 ).

1978It has been stated that under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, not applicable here, no notice need be proven (see Dittiger v Isal Realty Corp., 290 NY 492, 494 ; Griffen v Manice, 166 NY 188, 193, 196 ; Katz v Goldring, 237 App Div 824 ; 1 Shearman and Redfield, Negligence [rev ed], § 56; 6 Schwartz, Trial of Accident Cases, § 6041, p 6:21-5; Kramer, Rules of Evidence in Negligence Cases [3d ed], p 35). .

1975Assoc. v City of New York ( 47 AD2d 300, 303 ): "In Feblot v New York Times Co. ( 32 NY2d 486, 498-499 ) now Chief Judge Breitel found it useful in his concurring opinion to add some comments on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur: 'The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is only a species of the more general principle that circumstantial evidence of sufficient probative weight may permit the jury to find negligence (e. g., Griffen v Manice, 166 NY 188, 194-195 ; Prosser, Torts [4th ed.], at p 212).

1998Co., 97 AD2d 197, 201-202 .) The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur “simply recognizes what we know from our everyday experience: that some accidents by their very nature would ordinarily not happen without negligence * * * Res ipsa loquitur does not create a presumption in favor of the plaintiff but merely «permits the inference of negligence to be drawn from the circumstance of the occurrence * * * The rule has the effect of creating a prima facie case of negligence sufficient for submission to the jury, and the jury may — but is not required to — draw the permissible inference”.

1987In addition, the trial court did not err in instructing the jury as to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (see, Weeden v Armor Elevator Co., 97 AD2d 197, 205, 207 ; see also, Dermatossian v New York City Tr.

2020To rely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, the plaintiff must show that "(1) the event is of the kind that ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone's negligence; (2) the instrumentality that caused the injury is within the defendants' exclusive control; and (3) the injury is not the result of any voluntary action by the plaintiff" ( McCarthy v Northern Westchester Hosp. , 139 AD3d 825, 827 ; see James v Wormuth , 21 NY3d 540, 546 ).

2020Here, in opposition to the defendants' prima facie showing, the plaintiff failed to raise a triable issue of fact regarding the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, as he did not demonstrate that the injury was of a kind that ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence or that the injury was caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendants ( see Pagano v Cohen , 164 AD3d 516 , 518; McCarthy v Northern Westchester Hosp. , 139 AD3d at 828 ; cf. Swoboda v Fontanetta , 131 AD3d 1042, 1045 ).

2017Under these circumstances, the plaintiff raised a triable issue of fact as to the homeowner’s exclusive control of the deck step and whether an inference of negligence is warranted under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur (see Herbst v Lakewood Shores Condominium Assn., 112 AD3d 1373, 1374-1375 [2013]; Hoffman v United Methodist Church, 76 AD3d 541 , 543 [2010]).

2014To the extent that the second cause of action, as amplified by the bill of particulars, may be read to allege common-law negligence, we conclude that the court properly determined that defendants met their burden on their motion by establishing that they did not have exclusive control of the mirror, i.e., one of the necessary conditions for the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, and that plaintiff failed to raise an issue of fact (cf. Herbst, 112 AD3d at 1374 ; see generally Zuckerman, 49 NY2d at 562 ).