res ipsa loquitur doctrine in Texas

2021Res Ipsa Loquitur A res ipsa loquitur instruction may be used in particular cases when “the circumstances surrounding the accident constitute sufficient evidence of the defendant’s negligence to support such a finding.” Haddock v. Arnspiger, 793 S.W.2d 948, 950 (Tex. 1990) (citing Mobil Chem.

2018The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is a “rule of evidence by which negligence may be inferred by the jury; it is not a separate cause of action from negligence.” Haddock v. Arnspiger, 793 S.W.2d 948, 950 (Tex. 1990).

2023Co. v. Bell, 517 S.W.2d 245, 251 (Tex. 1974).

1999The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is only applicable when “two factors are present: (1) the character of the accident is such that it would not ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence; and (2) the instrumentality causing the injury is shown to have been under the management and control of the defendant.” Id. at 251 .

2008Compare Trammell v. Whitlock, 150 Tex. 500, 505 , 242 S.W.2d 157, 159 (1951) (The presumption of bailee negligence “is said to be based on the just and common sense view that the party in possession or control of an article is more likely to know and more properly charged with explaining the damage to it or disappearance of it than the bailor who entrusted it to his care.”), with Marathon Oil Co. v. Sterner, 632 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Tex. 1982) (Pursuant to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, negligence can be inferred when the character of an accident is such that it would not 1 Claims for breaches

2008Compare Trammell v. Whitlock , 150 Tex. 500, 505 , 242 S.W.2d 157, 159 (1951) (The presumption of bailee negligence "is said to be based on the just and common sense view that the party in possession or control of an article is more likely to know and more properly charged with explaining the damage to it or disappearance of it than the bailor who entrusted it to his care."), with Marathon Oil Co. v. Sterner , 632 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Tex. 1982) (Pursuant to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, negligence can be inferred when the character of an accident is such that it would not ordinarily occur in

2025Id. (“Even if the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies to [the plaintiff’s] claim, she would still be required to file an expert report under section 74.351.”); see Hector v. Christus Health Gulf Coast, 175 S.W.3d 832, 837 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. denied) (stating that res ipsa loquitur “might preclude the need for expert testimony” “at the trial stage,” but rejecting idea “that the Legislature intended for it to eliminate the procedural requirement of an expert report at the commencement of litigation”).

2016See Hector v. Christus Health Gulf Coast, 175 S.W.3d 832, 839 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. denied) (“Other courts, including this one, have noted that even if res ipsa loquitur does apply to a certain [medical malpractice] case, an expert report or some form of expert testimony is still required.”); see also Sherman v. HealthSouth Specialty Hosp., Inc., 397 S.W.3d 869, 876 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2013, pet. denied) (stating that even if the res ipsa loquitur doctrine applied to Sherman’s claims, section 74.351 still required her to file an expert report because the expert report requireme

1970The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, long recognized as "merely a rule of evidence" [Wichita Falls Traction Co. v. Elliott, 125 Tex. 248 , 81 S.W.2d 659, 664 (1935)], is incompatible with the venue practice developed in Texas.

1970The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, long recognized as "merely a rule of evidence" [Wichita Falls Traction Co. v. Elliott, 125 Tex. 248 , 81 S.W.2d 659, 664 (1935)], is incompatible with the venue practice developed in Texas.

2022See Sanders, 498 S.W.3d at 258 .

2019See Sterner, 632 S.W.2d at 574 (Because there were two possible defendants, either of which could have been separately negligent in performing its own duty, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was not applicable.); Sanders v. Naes Cent., Inc., 498 S.W.3d 256, 261 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2016, no pet.) (concluding trial court properly granted summary judgment in favor of defendant because res ipsa loquitur was not applicable when there was more than 10 one potential cause of the accident and there was no evidence that it was more probable the accident was caused by defendant’s negligence).

1989See Mobile Chemical Co. v. Bell, 517 S.W.2d 245, 252 (Tex.1974), and Owen v. Brown, 447 S.W.2d 883, 886 (Tex.1969).

1978Owen v. Brown, 447 S.W.2d 883 (Tex.1969); Mobil Chemical Co. v. Bell, 517 S.W.2d 245 (Tex. *665 1974).

2025Inc., 820 S.W.2d 217, 220 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1991, no writ) (trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a res ipsa loquitur instruction when the plaintiffs “presented no expert knowledge that concrete walls do not ordinarily fall in the absence of negligence” and general knowledge could not support the contention); Rebel Drilling Co., L.P. v. Nabors Drilling USA, Inc., No. 14-02-00841-CV, 2004 Tex. App. LEXIS 8320 , 2004 WL 2058260 , at *13 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] Sept. 16, 2004, no pet.) (mem. op.) (res ipsa jury instruction properly denied where no proof of general knowle

2024Id. –7– (concluding res ipsa loquitur did not apply because no evidence that because fence was electrified, City Public Service must have necessarily acted negligently); Soto v. Tex. Indus., Inc., 820 S.W.2d 217, 219 (Tex. App.—Fort Worth 1991, no writ) (holding trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying a res ipsa loquitur instruction when plaintiff “presented no expert knowledge that concrete walls do not ordinarily fall in the absence of negligence” and general knowledge could not support that contention).

2007Furthermore, unless the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies, a plaintiff generally must provide expert testimony to prove that the alleged medical negligence proximately caused the injury. (1) Linan v. Rosales , 155 S.W.3d 298, 302-03 (Tex. App.--El Paso 2004, pet. denied); see also Roark v. Allen , 633 S.W.2d 804, 809 (Tex. 1982) ("Expert testimony is necessary when the alleged negligence is of such a nature as not to be within the experience of the layman.").

2007Furthermore, unless the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies, a plaintiff generally must provide expert testimony to prove that the alleged medical negligence proximately caused the injury. 1 Linan v. Rosales, 155 S.W.3d 298, 302-03 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2004, pet. denied); see also Roark v. Allen, 633 S.W.2d 804, 809 (Tex.1982) (“Expert testimony is necessary when the alleged negligence is of such a nature as not to be within the experience of the layman.”).

2007Furthermore, unless the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies, a plaintiff generally must provide expert testimony to prove that the alleged medical negligence proximately caused the injury. (1) Linan v. Rosales , 155 S.W.3d 298, 302-03 (Tex. App.--El Paso 2004, pet. denied); see also Roark v. Allen , 633 S.W.2d 804, 809 (Tex. 1982) ("Expert testimony is necessary when the alleged negligence is of such a nature as not to be within the experience of the layman.").

2007Furthermore, unless the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies, a plaintiff generally must provide expert testimony to prove that the alleged medical negligence proximately caused the injury. 1 Linan v. Rosales, 155 S.W.3d 298, 302-03 (Tex.App.-El Paso 2004, pet. denied); see also Roark v. Allen, 633 S.W.2d 804, 809 (Tex.1982) (“Expert testimony is necessary when the alleged negligence is of such a nature as not to be within the experience of the layman.”).

2025App.—San Antonio 1960, writ ref’d) (“In order to invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur there are four elements which must be pleaded and proved: [stating elements].”) (emphasis added); Prieto v. Val Verde Memorial Hospital, 747 S.W.2d 487, 489 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1988, no writ) (“The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may not be invoked where the petition alleges specific acts of negligence on the part of a defendant, and does not generally allege negligence or specifically plead reliance on res ipsa.”) (citing Francis v. Bob Meador Company, Inc., 517 S.W.2d 693, 696 (Tex. Civ.

1988Francis v. Bob Meador Company, Inc., 517 S.W.2d 693, 696 (Tex.Civ.App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 1974, no writ) (and cases cited therein).

2016See Hector v. Christus Health Gulf Coast, 175 S.W.3d 832, 839 (Tex.App.Houston [14th Dist.] 2005, pet. denied) (“Other courts, including this one, have noted that even if res ipsa loquitur does apply to a certain [medical malpractice] case, an expert report or some form of expert testimony is still required.”); see also Sherman v. HealthSouth Specialty Hosp., Inc., 397 S.W.3d 869, 876 (Tex.App.-Dallas 2013, pet. denied) (stating that even if the res ipsa loquitur doctrine applied to Sherman’s claims, section 74.351 still required her to file an expert report because the expert report requireme

2016Sherman v. HealthSouth Specialty Hosp., Inc., 397 S.W.3d 869, 875 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2013, pet. denied) (discussing doctrine of res ipsa loquitur); Thomas v. Uzoka, 290 S.W.3d 437, 445 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2009, pet. denied) (discussing negligence per se).

2015Id. at 839 ; Ruiz v. Walgreen Co., 79 S.W.3d 235, 239 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.).

2005See Hector , 2005 WL 1981303, at *4-5 ; Ruiz v. Walgreen Co. , 79 S.W.3d 235, 239-40 (Tex. App.—Houston [14th Dist.] 2002, no pet.); Tex. Civ.

2008Compare Trammell v. Whitlock, 150 Tex. 500, 505 , 242 S.W.2d 157, 159 (1951) (The presumption of bailee negligence “is said to be based on the just and common sense view that the party in possession or control of an article is more likely to know and more properly charged with explaining the damage to it or disappearance of it than the bailor who entrusted it to his care.”), with Marathon Oil Co. v. Sterner, 632 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Tex. 1982) (Pursuant to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, negligence can be inferred when the character of an accident is such that it would not 1 Claims for breaches

2008Compare Trammell v. Whitlock, 150 Tex. 500, 505 , 242 S.W.2d 157, 159 (1951) (The presumption of bailee negligence “is said to be based on the just and common sense view that the party in possession or control of an article is more likely to know and more properly charged with explaining the damage to it or disappearance of it than the bailor who entrusted it to his care.”), with Marathon Oil Co. v. Sterner, 632 S.W.2d 571, 573 (Tex. 1982) (Pursuant to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, negligence can be inferred when the character of an accident is such that it would not 1 Claims for breaches

2005Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, however, proximate cause may be inferred when the “injury would ordinarily not have occurred but for negligence, and defendant’s negligence is probable.” Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway, 135 S.W.3d 598, 604 (Tex. 2004) (concurring 9 opinion).

2005Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur , however, proximate cause may be inferred when the "injury would ordinarily not have occurred but for negligence, and defendant's negligence is probable." Ford Motor Co. v. Ridgway , 135 S.W.3d 598, 604 (Tex. 2004) (concurring opinion).

1972The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was stated with admirable simplicity in the case of Honea v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 143 Tex. 272 , 183 S.W.2d 968, 969 , 160 A.L.R. 1445 (1944): “Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of evidence whereby negligence of the alleged wrongdoer may be inferred from the mere fact that the accident happened, provided (1) the character of the accident and the circumstances attending it lead reasonably to the belief that, in the absence of negligence, it would not have occurred, and (2) the thing which caused the injury is shown to have been under the management and control of

1972The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was stated with admirable simplicity in the case of Honea v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 143 Tex. 272 , 183 S.W.2d 968, 969 , 160 A.L.R. 1445 (1944): “Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of evidence whereby negligence of the alleged wrongdoer may be inferred from the mere fact that the accident happened, provided (1) the character of the accident and the circumstances attending it lead reasonably to the belief that, in the absence of negligence, it would not have occurred, and (2) the thing which caused the injury is shown to have been under the management and control of

2016See Marathon Oil Co. v. Sterner, 632 S.W.2d 571, 574 (Tex. 1982) (holding that where there were two possible defendants, either of which could have been separately negligent in performing its own duty, doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was not applicable); Bond, 388 S.W.2d at 685 ; Mathis, 189 S.W.3d at 846 .

1972The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was stated with admirable simplicity in the case of Honea v. Coca Cola Bottling Co., 143 Tex. 272 , 183 S.W.2d 968, 969 , 160 A.L.R. 1445 (1944): “Res ipsa loquitur is a rule of evidence whereby negligence of the alleged wrongdoer may be inferred from the mere fact that the accident happened, provided (1) the character of the accident and the circumstances attending it lead reasonably to the belief that, in the absence of negligence, it would not have occurred, and (2) the thing which caused the injury is shown to have been under the management and control of

2016In Martin, after holding that some medical experts' affidavits were incompetent to support the defendant doctor's, summary judgment, we went on to hold that the underlying claim—that the patient had received a broken toe while undergoing hemorrhoid surgery— would also invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. 694 S.W.2d at 238-40 .

1999Martin v. Petta, 694 S.W.2d 233, 239 (Tex.App.—Fort Worth 1985, writ ref’d n.r.e.). 35 .

2018With regard to the “control” factor, “[t]he doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies only where the instrumentalities causing the injury are shown to have been wholly in the care of the defendant and not to have been meddled with by the person injured or third parties.” Id. at 48 .

2006"The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is not a separate cause of action, but rather a rule of evidence by which negligence may be inferred by the jury." Trejo v. Laredo Nat'l Bank , 185 S.W.3d 43, 47 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 2005, no pet.) (citing Haddock v. Arnspiger , 793 S.W.2d 948, 950 (Tex. 1990)).

2015Transitional Care Ctrs. of Tex., Inc. v. Palacios, 46 S.W.3d 873 (Tex.2001)…………………………………………………………………….8, 22 Beckwith v. White, 285 S.W.3d 56, 62 (Tex. App.—Houston [1st Dist.] 2009, no pet.)………………………………………………………………………………22 Benish v. Grottie, 281 S.W.3d 184 (Tex. App. – Fort Worth 2009, pet denied)……………………………………………………………………….......30 Doctors Hosp. at Renaissance, Ltd. v. Meja, No. 13-12-00602-CV, 2014 WL 5859592 (Tex.App. – Corpus Christi Aug.1, 2013, pet. filed) (mem.op.)…...13 Good Shepherd Medical Center-Linden, Inc. v. Twilley, 422 S.W.3d 782 (Tex. App. – Texarkana, Mar. 1, 2013, pet. denie

1975Harle v. Krchnak, Tex.Civ.App., NWH, 422 S.W.2d 810 ; Shockley v. Payne, Tex.Civ.App., NRE, 348 S.W.2d 775 ; Bell v. Umstattd, Tex.Civ.App., NRE, 401 S.W.2d 306 .

1990Id. at 30 (citations omitted).

1990Id. at 30 (citations omitted).