res ipsa loquitur doctrine in Oklahoma

2010Qualls v. U.S. Elevator Corp., 1993 OK 135 , 863 P.2d 457, 460 . ¶ 17 Addressing issues concerning evidence of the element of exclusive control sufficient to support a res ipsa loquitur instruction, including that the question is one for the trier of fact, we stated: Whether a defendant at the critical point in contest had `exclusive control' of an instrumentality in the res ipsa loquitur sense often constitutes a mixed question of law and fact.

2010Qualls v. U.S. Elevator Corp., 1993 OK 135 , 863 P.2d 457, 460 . ¶ 17 Addressing issues concerning evidence of the element of exclusive control sufficient to support a res ipsa loquitur instruction, including that the question is one for the trier of fact, we stated: Whether a defendant at the critical point in contest had `exclusive control' of an instrumentality in the res ipsa loquitur sense often constitutes a mixed question of law and fact.

1968In support of this argument he cites Guilford v. Foster & Davis, 131 Okl. 148 , 268 P. 299 , to the effect that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may be applied to a part of a case, although other parts may be capable of proof by direct evidence.

1968In support of this argument he cites Guilford v. Foster & Davis, 131 Okl. 148 , 268 P. 299 , to the effect that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may be applied to a part of a case, although other parts may be capable of proof by direct evidence.

1955Texas Co. v. Jamison, 191 Okl. 283 , 129 P.2d 85 ; Champ-lin Refining Co. v. George, 182 Okl. 118 , 76 P.2d 895 ; Carter Oil Co. v. Independent Torpedo Co., 107 Okl. 209 , 232 P. 419 .

1955Texas Co. v. Jamison, 191 Okl. 283 , 129 P.2d 85 ; Champ-lin Refining Co. v. George, 182 Okl. 118 , 76 P.2d 895 ; Carter Oil Co. v. Independent Torpedo Co., 107 Okl. 209 , 232 P. 419 .

1997Thus, a res ipsa loquitur instruction does not necessarily reheve a plaintiff of the obligation to prove negligence, it merely gives the jury the opportunity to do so. ¶ 13 The Court of Civil Appeals’s opinion relied on Avard v. Leming, 1994 OK 121 , 889 P.2d 262 and National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Elliott, 1956 OK 182 , 298 P.2d 448 , 451 in support of its conclusion that the res ipsa loquitur doctrine was unavailable to Mitchell as a matter of law.

1997Thus, a res ipsa loquitur instruction does not necessarily reheve a plaintiff of the obligation to prove negligence, it merely gives the jury the opportunity to do so. ¶ 13 The Court of Civil Appeals’s opinion relied on Avard v. Leming, 1994 OK 121 , 889 P.2d 262 and National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Elliott, 1956 OK 182 , 298 P.2d 448 , 451 in support of its conclusion that the res ipsa loquitur doctrine was unavailable to Mitchell as a matter of law.

1995Qualls, supra note 16 at 460; Thompson, supra note 16 at 266; Turney, supra note 16 at 1304. 21 .

1983We note, however, that whereas the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is only a rule of evidence creating a rebuttable inference of negligence, see Turney v. Anspaugh, 581 P.2d 1301 (Okl.1978), the statutory provision creates a rebuttable presumption of negligence.

1958Texas Co. v. Jamison, 191 Okl. 283 , 129 P.2d 85 .

1958Texas Co. v. Jamison, 191 Okl. 283 , 129 P.2d 85 .

2009In Barnett v. Richardson, 1966 OK 101, ¶ 4 , 415 P.2d 987, 990 , the Supreme Court stated: Where an injury is patent, objective rather than subjective, the plaintiff is competent to testify as to the injury, the treatment received therefor, and the reaction of such treatment, and this testimony is sufficient for the jury to render a verdict ... and no expert medical testimony is necessary. ¶ 15 This is a common law rule usually referred to as the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.

2009In Barnett v. Richardson, 1966 OK 101, ¶ 4 , 415 P.2d 987, 990 , the Supreme Court stated: Where an injury is patent, objective rather than subjective, the plaintiff is competent to testify as to the injury, the treatment received therefor, and the reaction of such treatment, and this testimony is sufficient for the jury to render a verdict ... and no expert medical testimony is necessary. ¶ 15 This is a common law rule usually referred to as the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.

1997Thus, a res ipsa loquitur instruction does not necessarily reheve a plaintiff of the obligation to prove negligence, it merely gives the jury the opportunity to do so. ¶ 13 The Court of Civil Appeals’s opinion relied on Avard v. Leming, 1994 OK 121 , 889 P.2d 262 and National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Elliott, 1956 OK 182 , 298 P.2d 448 , 451 in support of its conclusion that the res ipsa loquitur doctrine was unavailable to Mitchell as a matter of law.

1997Thus, a res ipsa loquitur instruction does not necessarily reheve a plaintiff of the obligation to prove negligence, it merely gives the jury the opportunity to do so. ¶ 13 The Court of Civil Appeals’s opinion relied on Avard v. Leming, 1994 OK 121 , 889 P.2d 262 and National Union Fire Insurance Co. v. Elliott, 1956 OK 182 , 298 P.2d 448 , 451 in support of its conclusion that the res ipsa loquitur doctrine was unavailable to Mitchell as a matter of law.

1985Appellants cite Flick v. Crouch, 555 P.2d 1274 (Okl.1976), for the principle that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies only to cases in which there is no direct evidence to establish negligence.

1985Appellants cite Flick v. Crouch, 555 P.2d 1274 (Okl. 1976), for the principle that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies only to cases in which there is no direct evidence to establish negligence.

1985Appellants point to Norfolk & Western Ry Co. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490 , 100 S.Ct. 755 , 62 L.Ed.2d 689 (1980), where the United States Supreme Court found reversible error in the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury that such an award is not taxable in a Federal Employers Liability Act case.

1985Appellants point to Norfolk & Western Ry Co. v. Liepelt, 444 U.S. 490 , 100 S.Ct. 755 , 62 L.Ed.2d 689 (1980), where the United States Supreme Court found reversible error in the trial court's refusal to instruct the jury that such an award is not taxable in a Federal Employers Liability Act case.

1978Co. v. Henderson, supra, 237 Ind. 456 at 466 , 146 N.E.2d 531 at 537 . * * * * * * (Our omission) “Instruction No. 9, when read as a whole, correctly instructed the jury as to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.

1978Co. v. Henderson, supra, 237 Ind. 456 at 466 , 146 N.E.2d 531 at 537 . * * * * * * (Our omission) “Instruction No. 9, when read as a whole, correctly instructed the jury as to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.

1975Holland v. Stacy, 496 P.2d 1180 (Okl. 1970).

1975Holland v. Stacy, 496 P.2d 1180 (Okl.1970).

1975Nichols v. Nold, 174 Kan. 613 , 258 P.2d 317 , 38 ALR 2d 887 (1953).

1975Nichols v. Nold, 174 Kan. 613 , 258 P.2d 317 , 38 ALR 2d 887 (1953).

1975The same contention was rejected and the controversial subject laid to rest not long ago in Creswell v. Temple Milling Co., Okl., 499 P.2d 421 (1972).

1973Cohenour v. Smart, 205 Okl. 668 , 240 P.2d 91 .

1973Cohenour v. Smart, 205 Okl. 668 , 240 P.2d 91 .

1973Downs v. Longfellow Corporation, supra. *1372 As concerns whether the injury was more likely the result of negligence than some other cause, we conclude laymen were not qualified to determine that a brachial block would not ordinarily cause the injuries suffered by plaintiff unless unskillfully done.

1972In the case of Wilson v. Rule, 169 Kan. 296 , 219 P.2d 690 , it was held that in an action by motorist to recover damage to automobile as a result of striking mule which was loose on highway, doctrine of res ipsa loquitur did not apply, and that in order for motorist to recover from owner of mule for damages, motorist was required to prove that mule was loose on the highway as a result of its being intentionally turned loose or on account of the negligent failure of the owner or person responsible for its custody to keep it confined.

1972In the case of Wilson v. Rule, 169 Kan. 296 , 219 P.2d 690 , it was held that in an action by motorist to recover damage to automobile as a result of striking mule which was loose on highway, doctrine of res ipsa loquitur did not apply, and that in order for motorist to recover from owner of mule for damages, motorist was required to prove that mule was loose on the highway as a result of its being intentionally turned loose or on account of the negligent failure of the owner or person responsible for its custody to keep it confined.