res ipsa loquitur doctrine in Georgia

1963This court in Sinkovitz v. Peters Land Co., 5 Ga. App. 788 (2) ( 64 SE 93 ) in discussing the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, stated that “Where something unusual happens with respect to a defendant’s property over which he has control, and by such extraordinary occurrence a plaintiff is injured (the occurrence being such as does not happen if reasonable care has been used), an inference may arise that the injury was due to the defendant’s negligence.” In Palmer Brick Co. v. Chenall, 119 Ga. 837, 842 ( 47 SE 329 ), it was held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable, under certain

1963This court in Sinkovitz v. Peters Land Co., 5 Ga. App. 788 (2) ( 64 SE 93 ) in discussing the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, stated that “Where something unusual happens with respect to a defendant’s property over which he has control, and by such extraordinary occurrence a plaintiff is injured (the occurrence being such as does not happen if reasonable care has been used), an inference may arise that the injury was due to the defendant’s negligence.” In Palmer Brick Co. v. Chenall, 119 Ga. 837, 842 ( 47 SE 329 ), it was held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable, under certain

2008"Where there is any intervention of an intermediary cause which produces or could produce the injury complained of, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is . . . [in]applicable." (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Parker v. Dailey, 226 Ga. 643, 645 (1), 177 S.E.2d 44 (1970).

2008"Where there is any intervention of an intermediary cause which produces or could produce the injury complained of, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is . . . [in]applicable." (Citations and punctuation omitted.) Parker v. Dailey, 226 Ga. 643, 645 (1), 177 S.E.2d 44 (1970).

1982See generally Hill v. Hospital Auth. of Clarke County, 137 Ga. App. 633, 640 (8) ( 224 SE2d 739 ) (1976); Young v. Yarn, 136 Ga. App. 737, 739 ( 222 SE2d 113 ) (1975); Hayes v. Brown, 108 Ga. App. 360, 366 ( 133 SE2d 102 ) (1963). 2.

1982See generally Hill v. Hospital Auth. of Clarke County, 137 Ga. App. 633, 640 (8) ( 224 SE2d 739 ) (1976); Young v. Yarn, 136 Ga. App. 737, 739 ( 222 SE2d 113 ) (1975); Hayes v. Brown, 108 Ga. App. 360, 366 ( 133 SE2d 102 ) (1963). 2.

1963This court in Sinkovitz v. Peters Land Co., 5 Ga. App. 788 (2) ( 64 SE 93 ) in discussing the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, stated that “Where something unusual happens with respect to a defendant’s property over which he has control, and by such extraordinary occurrence a plaintiff is injured (the occurrence being such as does not happen if reasonable care has been used), an inference may arise that the injury was due to the defendant’s negligence.” In Palmer Brick Co. v. Chenall, 119 Ga. 837, 842 ( 47 SE 329 ), it was held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable, under certain

1963This court in Sinkovitz v. Peters Land Co., 5 Ga. App. 788 (2) ( 64 SE 93 ) in discussing the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, stated that “Where something unusual happens with respect to a defendant’s property over which he has control, and by such extraordinary occurrence a plaintiff is injured (the occurrence being such as does not happen if reasonable care has been used), an inference may arise that the injury was due to the defendant’s negligence.” In Palmer Brick Co. v. Chenall, 119 Ga. 837, 842 ( 47 SE 329 ), it was held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is applicable, under certain

2020Center, 253 Ga. App. 768, 770 ( 560 SE2d 333 ) (2002) (the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur “is one of necessity in cases where there is no evidence of consequence showing negligence on the part of the defendant.”) (citation omitted). 4 This Court may exercise jurisdiction to address a preemption defense where it does not involve a direct constitutional challenge to an entire statute, ordinance or regulation on preemption grounds.

2020Center, 253 Ga. App. 768, 770 ( 560 SE2d 333 ) (2002) (the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur “is one of necessity in cases where there is no evidence of consequence showing negligence on the part of the defendant.”) (citation omitted). 4 This Court may exercise jurisdiction to address a preemption defense where it does not involve a direct constitutional challenge to an entire statute, ordinance or regulation on preemption grounds.

2007After both parties rested, the trial court ruled during the charge conference that it would give Doyle’s request to charge the jury on the *55 doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. 1 Cheek argued that the doctrine was “applicable only in the absence of evidence as to the external cause of the injury.” In this case, he continued, because there was evidence that the road’s banking could have caused or contributed to the accident, it did not apply, citing Floyd v. Swift & Co., 59 Ga. App. 154 ( 200 SE 531 ) (1938).

2007After both parties rested, the trial court ruled during the charge conference that it would give Doyle’s request to charge the jury on the *55 doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. 1 Cheek argued that the doctrine was “applicable only in the absence of evidence as to the external cause of the injury.” In this case, he continued, because there was evidence that the road’s banking could have caused or contributed to the accident, it did not apply, citing Floyd v. Swift & Co., 59 Ga. App. 154 ( 200 SE 531 ) (1938).

2013Specialty, 286 Ga. App. 53, 56 ( 648 SE2d 664 ) (2007) (The plaintiff must establish three elements for the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to apply: “(1) the injury ordinarily would not occur in the absence of negligence; (2) the injury was caused by an agent or instrument within the defendant’s exclusive control; and (3) the injury was not due to any voluntary action or contribution on plaintiff’s part.”) (citation omitted).

2013Specialty, 286 Ga. App. 53, 56 ( 648 SE2d 664 ) (2007) (The plaintiff must establish three elements for the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to apply: “(1) the injury ordinarily would not occur in the absence of negligence; (2) the injury was caused by an agent or instrument within the defendant’s exclusive control; and (3) the injury was not due to any voluntary action or contribution on plaintiff’s part.”) (citation omitted).

2007Committee of Baptist Convention, 65 Ga.App. 840, 842 ( 16 SE2d 605 ) (1941).” Persinger v. Step by Step &c., 253 Ga. App. 768, 772 ( 560 SE2d 333 ) (2002).

2002Committee of the Baptist Convention, 65 Ga. App. 840, 842 ( 16 SE2d 605 ) (1941).

2007In the case he cites to support that proposition, the Supreme Court simply held that res ipsa did not apply because the plaintiff presented no evidence regarding “the manner in which the injury occurred.” Parker v. Dailey, 226 Ga. 643, 645 (1) ( 177 SE2d 44 ) (1970). 3 Miller v. Gerber Products Co., 207 Ga. 385, 388 ( 62 SE2d 174 ) (1950).

2007In the case he cites to support that proposition, the Supreme Court simply held that res ipsa did not apply because the plaintiff presented no evidence regarding “the manner in which the injury occurred.” Parker v. Dailey, 226 Ga. 643, 645 (1) ( 177 SE2d 44 ) (1970). 3 Miller v. Gerber Products Co., 207 Ga. 385, 388 ( 62 SE2d 174 ) (1950).

1992“The elements of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine are: ‘ “(1) injury of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence; (2) it must be caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant; and (3) it must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff.” ’ [Cits.] Further, ‘(t)he accident must also be “of a kind which, in the absence of proof of some external cause, does not ordi *114 narily happen without negligence.” ’ [Cit.] Moreover, ‘ “(r)es ipsa loquitur should be applied with caution and

1992“The elements of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine are: ‘ “(1) injury of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence; (2) it must be caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant; and (3) it must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff.” ’ [Cits.] Further, ‘(t)he accident must also be “of a kind which, in the absence of proof of some external cause, does not ordi *114 narily happen without negligence.” ’ [Cit.] Moreover, ‘ “(r)es ipsa loquitur should be applied with caution and

1994See Harrison v. Southeastern Fair Assn., 104 Ga. App. 596 (3), 605-608 ( 122 SE2d 330 ) (1961); Parker v. Dailey, 226 Ga. 643, 645 ( 177 SE2d 44 ) (1970)." Southern Bell Tel. &c.

1994See Harrison v. Southeastern Fair Assn., 104 Ga. App. 596 (3), 605-608 ( 122 SE2d 330 ) (1961); Parker v. Dailey, 226 Ga. 643, 645 ( 177 SE2d 44 ) (1970)." Southern Bell Tel. &c.

1986Auth. of Clarke County, 137 Ga. App. 633, 641 ( 224 SE2d 739 ) (1976).

1986Auth. of Clarke County, 137 Ga. App. 633, 641 ( 224 SE2d 739 ) (1976).

1994The requirement that the plaintiff show that “the defendant owned, operated, and maintained, or controlled and was responsible for the management and maintenance of the thing doing the damage” was established in those words in Chenall v. Palmer Brick Co., 117 Ga. 106, 109 ( 43 SE 443 ) (1902), “the first case in which a court of this State dealt directly with the res ipsa loquitur doctrine in a personal injury action . . .” (Criswell Baking Co. v. Milligan, 77 Ga. App. 861, 869 ( 50 SE2d 136 ) (1948)), and has continued, in those same words, to this day.

1994The requirement that the plaintiff show that “the defendant owned, operated, and maintained, or controlled and was responsible for the management and maintenance of the thing doing the damage” was established in those words in Chenall v. Palmer Brick Co., 117 Ga. 106, 109 ( 43 SE 443 ) (1902), “the first case in which a court of this State dealt directly with the res ipsa loquitur doctrine in a personal injury action . . .” (Criswell Baking Co. v. Milligan, 77 Ga. App. 861, 869 ( 50 SE2d 136 ) (1948)), and has continued, in those same words, to this day.

1970"There is now quite general agreement that the fact that the plaintiff . . . has possession of an exploding bottle . . . which the defendant has manufactured [or bottled] will not prevent the application of res ipsa loquitur when the evidence reasonably eliminates other explanations than the defendant’s negligence.” Prosser on Torts (2d Ed.) 206, § 42 "Where ... a bottle explodes, the inference of negligence may still point to the manufacturer or bottler if the proof eliminates the probability of other causes, even though the mishap occurs at a time and place remote from defendant’s control.”

1970"There is now quite general agreement that the fact that the plaintiff . . . has possession of an exploding bottle . . . which the defendant has manufactured [or bottled] will not prevent the application of res ipsa loquitur when the evidence reasonably eliminates other explanations than the defendant’s negligence.” Prosser on Torts (2d Ed.) 206, § 42 "Where ... a bottle explodes, the inference of negligence may still point to the manufacturer or bottler if the proof eliminates the probability of other causes, even though the mishap occurs at a time and place remote from defendant’s control.”

1993We do not agree. “ ‘The elements of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine are: “ ‘(1) injury of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence; (2) it must be caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant; and (3) it must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff.’ ” (Cits.) Further, “(t)he accident must also be ‘of a kind which, in the absence of proof of some external cause, does not ordinarily happen without negligence.’ ” (Cit.) Moreover, “ ‘(r)es ipsa loquitur should be applied with

1993We do not agree. “ ‘The elements of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine are: “ ‘(1) injury of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence; (2) it must be caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant; and (3) it must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff.’ ” (Cits.) Further, “(t)he accident must also be ‘of a kind which, in the absence of proof of some external cause, does not ordinarily happen without negligence.’ ” (Cit.) Moreover, “ ‘(r)es ipsa loquitur should be applied with

1987Richmond Hospital Authority v. Hines, 121 Ga. App. 537 , 174 SE2d 364 (1970); Macon Coca-Cola Co. v. Chancey, supra.” (Emphasis supplied.) Kicklighter v. Nails by Jannee, 616 F2d 734, 739, supra. In the case sub judice, although Dallas Glass admitted in its answer to plaintiffs’ complaint that defendant W.

1987Richmond Hospital Authority v. Hines, 121 Ga. App. 537 , 174 SE2d 364 (1970); Macon Coca-Cola Co. v. Chancey, supra.” (Emphasis supplied.) Kicklighter v. Nails by Jannee, 616 F2d 734, 739, supra. In the case sub judice, although Dallas Glass admitted in its answer to plaintiffs’ complaint that defendant W.

1970Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Danneman, 25 Ga. App. 43 ( 102 SE 542 ); Macon Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Chancey, 216 Ga. 61 ( 114 SE2d 517 ).

1970Atlanta Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Danneman, 25 Ga. App. 43 ( 102 SE 542 ); Macon Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Chancey, 216 Ga. 61 ( 114 SE2d 517 ).

2020Fox v. Norfolk Southern Corp., 342 Ga. App. 38, 44 (1) ( 802 SE2d 319 ) (2017). 14 Hardware exercised ordinary care.

2020Fox v. Norfolk Southern Corp., 342 Ga. App. 38, 44 (1) ( 802 SE2d 319 ) (2017). 14 Hardware exercised ordinary care.

2019As this Court has recently reiterated, “res ipsa loquitur is a legal maxim that means the transaction or thing speaks for itself.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Family Thrift, Inc. v. Birthrong, 336 Ga. App. 601, 604 (2) ( 785 SE2d 547 ) (2016).

2019As this Court has recently reiterated, “res ipsa loquitur is a legal maxim that means the transaction or thing speaks for itself.” (Citation and punctuation omitted.) Family Thrift, Inc. v. Birthrong, 336 Ga. App. 601, 604 (2) ( 785 SE2d 547 ) (2016).

2018See Hawkins v. OB-GYN Assocs. , P.A. , 290 Ga.App. 892 , 894 (1), 660 S.E.2d 835 (2008) ("[T]he doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply in a malpractice case.

2018See Hawkins v. OB-GYN Assocs. , P.A. , 290 Ga.App. 892 , 894 (1), 660 S.E.2d 835 (2008) ("[T]he doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply in a malpractice case.

2018Obviously, the standard of review on an appeal from a jury verdict is different than that for summary judgment, and “the fact that a moving party has failed to prevail at the summary judgment stage does not 6 In fact, in Stevenson, supra, 211 Ga. App. at 573 , the majority rejected the dissent’s contention that the appropriate test in a food poisoning case was a res ipsa loquitur analysis.

2018Id. at 574 (1).

2016Aderhold v. Lowe’s Home Centers, 284 Ga. App. 294, 295 ( 643 SE2d 811 ) (2007).

2016Aderhold v. Lowe’s Home Centers, 284 Ga. App. 294, 295 ( 643 SE2d 811 ) (2007).

2011“The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should be applied with caution and only in extreme cases; and it does not apply when there is an intermediary cause which could have produced the injury.” (Citations omitted.) Sams v. Wal-Mart Stores, 228 Ga. App. 314, 316 ( 491 SE2d 517 ) (1997).

2011“The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should be applied with caution and only in extreme cases; and it does not apply when there is an intermediary cause which could have produced the injury.” (Citations omitted.) Sams v. Wal-Mart Stores, 228 Ga. App. 314, 316 ( 491 SE2d 517 ) (1997).