11 Hawaii opinions name it 2 courts 1965–2025 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Hawaii courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Medina v. Figueredgreen2 sentences2024This exception is "rare in application," id., and applies in instances such as "when an operation leaves a sponge in the patient's interior, or removes or injures an inappropriate part of his anatomy, or when a tooth is dropped down his windpipe or he suffers a serious burn from a hot water bottle, or when instruments are not sterilized." Id. (citing Medina, 3 Haw. 2013Medina v. Figuered, 3 Haw.App. 186, 188 , 647 P.2d 292, 294 (1982) (citing Prosser, Law of Torts § 39 at 214 (1978)). | 2 | 4 |
Ciacci v. Woolleygreen2 sentences1978Generally speaking, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur provides that “whenever a thing that produced an injury is shown to have been under the control and management of the defendant and the occurrence is such as in the ordinary course of events does not happen if due care has been exercised, the fact of the injury itself will be deemed to afford sufficient evidence to support a recovery in the absence of any explanation by the defendant tending to show that the injury was not due to his want of care.” Ciacci v. Wooley, 33 Haw. 247, 257 (1934). “[T]he doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is merely pro 1966As to maintenance practices, defendant’s expert testified that in normal use a pleasure boat is drydocked every eight months, though six months is “quite common if you’re trying to get best speed,” that as to checking on the standing rigging “a normally prudent fellow” would make a visual inspection every two or three months, and that for prudent practice the riggings should be renewed every ten years — “It isn’t done, but it should be.” The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies “whenever a thing that produced an injury is shown to.have been under the control and management of the defendant an | 2 | 3 |
ROSENBERG BY ROSENBERG v. Cahillgreen2 sentences2024The exception is similar to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, and when applied, transforms a medical malpractice case "into an ordinary negligence case, thus obviating the necessity of expert testimony to establish the applicable standard of care." Craft, 78 Hawai#i at 298, 893 P.2d at 149 (citing Rosenberg by Rosenberg v. Cahill, 99 N.J. 318 , 492 A.2d 371, 374 (1985)). 2024The exception is similar to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, and when applied, transforms a medical malpractice case "into an ordinary negligence case, thus obviating the necessity of expert testimony to establish the applicable standard of care." Craft, 78 Hawai#i at 298, 893 P.2d at 149 (citing Rosenberg by Rosenberg v. Cahill, 99 N.J. 318 , 492 A.2d 371, 374 (1985)). | 2 | 2 |
Guanzon v. Kalamaugreen2 sentences1978Generally speaking, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur provides that “whenever a thing that produced an injury is shown to have been under the control and management of the defendant and the occurrence is such as in the ordinary course of events does not happen if due care has been exercised, the fact of the injury itself will be deemed to afford sufficient evidence to support a recovery in the absence of any explanation by the defendant tending to show that the injury was not due to his want of care.” Ciacci v. Wooley, 33 Haw. 247, 257 (1934). “[T]he doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is merely pro 1978Generally speaking, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur provides that “whenever a thing that produced an injury is shown to have been under the control and management of the defendant and the occurrence is such as in the ordinary course of events does not happen if due care has been exercised, the fact of the injury itself will be deemed to afford sufficient evidence to support a recovery in the absence of any explanation by the defendant tending to show that the injury was not due to his want of care.” Ciacci v. Wooley, 33 Haw. 247, 257 (1934). “[T]he doctrine of res ipsa loquitur is merely pro | 2 | 2 |
Carlos v. MTL, INC.green1 sentence2025In addition, Aiona wrongly argues that because "Hanohano knew about the investigation, then the County failed in its legal duty [not to disclose] under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur." A plaintiff asserting res ipsa loquitur must establish that: (1) the occurrence "must be one which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone's negligence"; (2) the occurrence "must be caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant"; and (3) the occurrence "must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff." Carlos v. MTL | 1 | 1 |
Turner v. Willisgreen2 sentences1994Under the res ipsa loquitur theory, then, “[t]he fact of the casualty and the attendant circumstances may themselves furnish all the proof of negligence that the injured person is able to offer or that it is necessary to offer” “without further proof ... of the defendant’s duty and of his negligence to perform it.” Turner v. Willis, 59 Haw. 319, 324-25 , 582 P.2d 710, 714 (1978) (quoting Ciacci v. Woolley, 33 Haw. 247, 257, 258 (1934)). 1994Under the res ipsa loquitur theory, then, “[t]he fact of the casualty and the attendant circumstances may themselves furnish all the proof of negligence that the injured person is able to offer or that it is necessary to offer” “without further proof ... of the defendant’s duty and of his negligence to perform it.” Turner v. Willis, 59 Haw. 319, 324-25 , 582 P.2d 710, 714 (1978) (quoting Ciacci v. Woolley, 33 Haw. 247, 257, 258 (1934)). | 1 | 1 |
Cozine v. Hawaiian Catamaran, Ltd.green2 sentences1978In Cozine v. Hawaiian Catamaran, Ltd., 49 Haw. 77, 87 , 412 P.2d 669, 678 (1966), we stated that “an instruction covering the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should permit, but not compel, an inference of negligence.” See Guanzon v. Kalamau, 48 Haw. 330, 335 , 402 P.2d 289, 292 (1965) (note 3). 1978In Cozine v. Hawaiian Catamaran, Ltd., 49 Haw. 77, 87 , 412 P.2d 669, 678 (1966), we stated that “an instruction covering the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur should permit, but not compel, an inference of negligence.” See Guanzon v. Kalamau, 48 Haw. 330, 335 , 402 P.2d 289, 292 (1965) (note 3). | 1 | 1 |
Winter v. Schermangreen2 sentences1978Winter v. Scherman, 57 Haw. 279, 282 , 554 P.2d 1137, 1139 (1976). 1978Winter v. Scherman, 57 Haw. 279, 282 , 554 P.2d 1137, 1139 (1976). | 1 | 1 |
Morgan v. Yamadagreen2 sentences1966As to maintenance practices, defendant's expert testified that in normal use a pleasure boat is drydocked every eight months, though six months is "quite common if you're trying to get best speed," that as to checking on the standing rigging "a normally prudent fellow" would make a visual inspection every two or three months, and that for prudent practice the riggings should be renewed every ten years "It isn't done, but it should be." The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies "whenever a thing that produced an injury is shown to have been under the control and management of the defendant an 1966As to maintenance practices, defendant’s expert testified that in normal use a pleasure boat is drydocked every eight months, though six months is “quite common if you’re trying to get best speed,” that as to checking on the standing rigging “a normally prudent fellow” would make a visual inspection every two or three months, and that for prudent practice the riggings should be renewed every ten years — “It isn’t done, but it should be.” The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies “whenever a thing that produced an injury is shown to.have been under the control and management of the defendant an | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Hawaii. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Craft v. Peebles
green
2 sentences2008The exception is similar to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, and when applied, transforms a medical malpractice case “into an ordinary negligence case, thus obviating the necessity of expert testimony to establish the applicable standard of care.” Craft, 78 Hawai'i at 298 , 893 P.2d at 149 (citing Rosenberg by Rosenberg v. Cahill, 99 N.J. 318 , 492 A.2d 371, 374 (1985)). 2008The exception is similar to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, and when applied, transforms a medical malpractice case “into an ordinary negligence case, thus obviating the necessity of expert testimony to establish the applicable standard of care.” Craft, 78 Hawai'i at 298 , 893 P.2d at 149 (citing Rosenberg by Rosenberg v. Cahill, 99 N.J. 318 , 492 A.2d 371, 374 (1985)). | 1 | 2008–2008 |
Cannamore v. Bi-State Development Agency
green
1 sentence1994For example, in Cannamore v. Bi-State Development Agency, 484 S.W.2d 308 (Mo.1972), a passenger sought to apply the res ipsa loquitur doctrine in a tort action to recover damages for personal injuries sustained in a fall while alighting from the defendant’s bus. | 1 | 1994–1994 |
Bond v. Otis Elevator Company
green
1 sentence1981Bond v. Otis Elevator Co., 388 S.W.2d 681 (Tex. 1965). | 1 | 1981–1981 |
Stilwell v. Hertz Drivurself Stations, Inc.
green
1 sentence1978Opportunity shall be given to make the objection out of the hearing of the jury. [Emphasis added.] 4 Appellees cite these cases in support of this proposition: White Auto Stores, Inc. v.Reyes, 223 F.2d 298 (10th Cir. 1955); Sinclair Refining Co. v. Howell, 222 F.2d 637 (5th Cir. 1955); Stilwell v. Hertz Drivurself Stations, Inc., 174 F.2d 714 (3d Cir. 1949). 5 We make no definitive finding as to appellants’ contention that a res ipsa loquitur instruction was inappropriate given the evidence produced by appellees at trial. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Sinclair Refining Company v. George L. Howell
green
1 sentence1978Opportunity shall be given to make the objection out of the hearing of the jury. [Emphasis added.] 4 Appellees cite these cases in support of this proposition: White Auto Stores, Inc. v.Reyes, 223 F.2d 298 (10th Cir. 1955); Sinclair Refining Co. v. Howell, 222 F.2d 637 (5th Cir. 1955); Stilwell v. Hertz Drivurself Stations, Inc., 174 F.2d 714 (3d Cir. 1949). 5 We make no definitive finding as to appellants’ contention that a res ipsa loquitur instruction was inappropriate given the evidence produced by appellees at trial. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
White Auto Stores v. Reyes
green
1 sentence1978Opportunity shall be given to make the objection out of the hearing of the jury. [Emphasis added.] 4 Appellees cite these cases in support of this proposition: White Auto Stores, Inc. v.Reyes, 223 F.2d 298 (10th Cir. 1955); Sinclair Refining Co. v. Howell, 222 F.2d 637 (5th Cir. 1955); Stilwell v. Hertz Drivurself Stations, Inc., 174 F.2d 714 (3d Cir. 1949). 5 We make no definitive finding as to appellants’ contention that a res ipsa loquitur instruction was inappropriate given the evidence produced by appellees at trial. | 1 | 1978–1978 |
Territory of Hawaii v. Cutad
green
1 sentence1966Territory v. Cutad, 37 Haw. 182, 186 ; [5] State v. Evans, 45 Haw. 622, 636 , 372 P.2d 365, 374 ; State v. Clyde, 47 Haw. 345, 357 , 388 P.2d 846, 853 . | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Sung Wha Kim Lyu v. Shinn
green
2 sentences1966Defendant would state the rule in the terms of Lyu v. Shinn, 40 Haw. 198, 202 , and would have the court hold the doctrine inapplicable, in the absence of expert testimony, “where the common knowledge or experience of men is not extensive enough to permit it to be said that the plaintiff’s condition would not have existed éxcept for negligence of the person to be charged.” But the court there was discussing the applicability of the doctrine in malpractice suits where, as stated, citing Ewing v. Goode, 78 Fed. 442 , 443: “If * * * a failure to cure were held to be evidence, however slight, of n 1966Defendant would state the rule in the terms of Lyu v. Shinn, 40 Haw. 198, 202 , and would have the court hold the doctrine inapplicable, in the absence of expert testimony, “where the common knowledge or experience of men is not extensive enough to permit it to be said that the plaintiff’s condition would not have existed éxcept for negligence of the person to be charged.” But the court there was discussing the applicability of the doctrine in malpractice suits where, as stated, citing Ewing v. Goode, 78 Fed. 442 , 443: “If * * * a failure to cure were held to be evidence, however slight, of n | 1 | 1966–1966 |
State v. Clyde
green
2 sentences1966Territory v. Cutad, 37 Haw. 182, 186 ; [5] State v. Evans, 45 Haw. 622, 636 , 372 P.2d 365, 374 ; State v. Clyde, 47 Haw. 345, 357 , 388 P.2d 846, 853 . 1966Territory v. Cutad, 37 Haw. 182, 186 ; [5] State v. Evans, 45 Haw. 622, 636 , 372 P.2d 365, 374 ; State v. Clyde, 47 Haw. 345, 357 , 388 P.2d 846, 853 . | 1 | 1966–1966 |
State v. Evans
green
2 sentences1966Territory v. Cutad, 37 Haw. 182, 186 ; [5] State v. Evans, 45 Haw. 622, 636 , 372 P.2d 365, 374 ; State v. Clyde, 47 Haw. 345, 357 , 388 P.2d 846, 853 . 1966Territory v. Cutad, 37 Haw. 182, 186 ; [5] State v. Evans, 45 Haw. 622, 636 , 372 P.2d 365, 374 ; State v. Clyde, 47 Haw. 345, 357 , 388 P.2d 846, 853 . | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Ewing v. Goode
green
2 sentences1966Defendant would state the rule in the terms of Lyu v. Shinn, 40 Haw. 198, 202 , and would have the court hold the doctrine inapplicable, in the absence of expert testimony, “where the common knowledge or experience of men is not extensive enough to permit it to be said that the plaintiff’s condition would not have existed éxcept for negligence of the person to be charged.” But the court there was discussing the applicability of the doctrine in malpractice suits where, as stated, citing Ewing v. Goode, 78 Fed. 442 , 443: “If * * * a failure to cure were held to be evidence, however slight, of n 1966Defendant would state the rule in the terms of Lyu v. Shinn, 40 Haw. 198, 202 , and would have the court hold the doctrine inapplicable, in the absence of expert testimony, “where the common knowledge or experience of men is not extensive enough to permit it to be said that the plaintiff’s condition would not have existed éxcept for negligence of the person to be charged.” But the court there was discussing the applicability of the doctrine in malpractice suits where, as stated, citing Ewing v. Goode, 78 Fed. 442 , 443: “If * * * a failure to cure were held to be evidence, however slight, of n | 1 | 1966–1966 |
Vespe v. DiMarco
green
2 sentences1965Vespe v. DiMarco, 43 N.J. 430 , 204 A.2d 874 . 1965Vespe v. DiMarco, 43 N.J. 430 , 204 A.2d 874 . | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Lorenc v. Chemirad Corp.
green
2 sentences1965Lorenc v. Chemirad Corp., 37 N.J. 56 , 179 A.2d 401 . 1965Lorenc v. Chemirad Corp., 37 N.J. 56 , 179 A.2d 401 . | 1 | 1965–1965 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.