res ipsa loquitur doctrine in Alabama

2000Alabama Power Co. v. Berry, 254 Ala. 228 , 48 So.2d 231 (1950), is the most frequently cited Alabama case on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.

2000Alabama Power Co. v. Berry, 254 Ala. 228 , 48 So.2d 231 (1950), is the most frequently cited Alabama case on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.

2013For the doctrine to apply, a plaintiff must show that: “ ‘(1) the defendant ... had full management and control of the instrumentality which caused the injury; (2) the circumstances [are] such that according to common knowledge and the experience of mankind the accident could not have happened if those having control of the [instrumentality] had not been negligent; [and] (3) the plaintiffs injury ... resulted from the accident.’ “Crabtree Industrial Waste, 728 So.2d at 156 (quoting Alabama Power Co. v. Berry, 254 Ala. 228, 236 , 48 So.2d 231, 238 (1950), and citing Ward v. Forrester Day Care,

2009For the doctrine to apply, a plaintiff must show that: “ ‘(1) the defendant ... had full management and control of the instrumentality which caused the injury; (2) the circumstances [are] such that according to common knowledge and the experience of mankind the accident could not have happened if those having control of the [instrumentality] had not been negligent; [and] (3) the plaintiffs injury ... resulted from the accident.’ “Crabtree Industrial Waste, 728 So.2d at 156 (quoting Alabama Power Co. v. Berry, 254 Ala. 228, 236 , 48 So.2d 231, 238 (1950), and citing Ward v. Forrester Day Care,

2013In Kmart Corp. v. Bassett, 769 So.2d 282, 286 (Ala.2000), we explained the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as follows: “The res ipsa loquitur doctrine allows ‘an inference of negligence where there is no direct evidence of negligence.’ Ex parte Crabtree Industrial Waste, Inc., 728 So.2d 155, 156 (Ala.1998).

2009In Kmart Corp. v. Bassett, the Alabama Supreme Court explained: “The res ipsa loquitur doctrine allows ‘an inference of negligence where there is no direct evidence of negligence.’ Ex parte Crabtree Industrial Waste, Inc., 728 So.2d 155, 156 (Ala.1998).

2013In Kmart Corp. v. Bassett, 769 So.2d 282, 286 (Ala.2000), we explained the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as follows: “The res ipsa loquitur doctrine allows ‘an inference of negligence where there is no direct evidence of negligence.’ Ex parte Crabtree Industrial Waste, Inc., 728 So.2d 155, 156 (Ala.1998).

2012Co., 769 So.2d 313, 314 (Ala.2000). “[A] mere malfunction [of the elevator] would be insufficient to invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur under Alabama law, because ‘one can reasonably conclude that the accident could have happened without any negligence on the part of the defendant! ].’ ” Kmart Corp. v. Bassett, 769 So.2d 282, 287 (Ala.2000) (quoting Ex parte Crabtree Indus.

1989This Court has recognized, at least in dicta, that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can apply in medical malpractice cases "where the injury complained of is in no way connected to the condition for which the plaintiff sought treatment." Rosemont, Inc. v. Marshall , 481 So.2d 1126 , 1130 (Ala. 1985).

1989This Court has recognized, at least in dicta, that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur can apply in medical malpractice cases "where the injury complained of is in no way connected to the condition for which the plaintiff sought treatment." Rosemont, Inc. v. Marshall, 481 So.2d 1126, 1130 (Ala. 1985).

2013In countering Morgan’s argument, Publix does not directly dispute that a pharmacist’s error in filling a prescription with the wrong medicine is sufficiently obvious as to be comprehensible by a layperson without the assistance of expert testimony; rather, Publix argues that this Court has not yet recognized this scenario as one in which expert testimony is unnecessary and that expanding the exception to include this scenario would be inappropriate in light of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which, Publix argues, the exception is founded upon. 2 However, this Court already rejected similar

2013In countering Morgan’s argument, Publix does not directly dispute that a pharmacist’s error in filling a prescription with the wrong medicine is sufficiently obvious as to be comprehensible by a layperson without the assistance of expert testimony; rather, Publix argues that this Court has not yet recognized this scenario as one in which expert testimony is unnecessary and that expanding the exception to include this scenario would be inappropriate in light of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, which, Publix argues, the exception is founded upon. 2 However, this Court already rejected similar

1989V Defendant argues that "[w]here the act or instrumentality causing the injury is unknown, there is no basis for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur," citing McClinton v. McClinton , 258 Ala. 542 , 63 So.2d 594 (1952), and Viking Motor Lodge, Inc. v. American Tobacco Co. , 286 Ala. 112 , 237 So.2d 632 (1970).

1989V Defendant argues that "[w]here the act or instrumentality causing the injury is unknown, there is no basis for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur," citing McClinton v. McClinton , 258 Ala. 542 , 63 So.2d 594 (1952), and Viking Motor Lodge, Inc. v. American Tobacco Co. , 286 Ala. 112 , 237 So.2d 632 (1970).

1989V Defendant argues that "[w]here the act or instrumentality causing the injury is unknown, there is no basis for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur," citing McClinton v. McClinton , 258 Ala. 542 , 63 So.2d 594 (1952), and Viking Motor Lodge, Inc. v. American Tobacco Co. , 286 Ala. 112 , 237 So.2d 632 (1970).

1989V Defendant argues that "[w]here the act or instrumentality causing the injury is unknown, there is no basis for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur," citing McClinton v. McClinton , 258 Ala. 542 , 63 So.2d 594 (1952), and Viking Motor Lodge, Inc. v. American Tobacco Co. , 286 Ala. 112 , 237 So.2d 632 (1970).

2024App. 2018) (quoting Alabama Power Co. v. Berry, 254 Ala. 228, 236 , 48 So. 2d 231, 238 (1950), citing in turn San Juan Light & Transit Co. v. Requena, 224 U.S. 89, 99 (1912)).

2013Returning to the instant case, we have previously stated that “ ‘[prescription drugs are likely to be complex medicines, esoteric in formula and varied in effect.’ ” Stone v. Smith, Kline & French Labs., 447 So.2d 1301, 1305 (Ala.1984) (quoting Reyes v. Wyeth Labs., 498 F.2d 1264 , 1274 (5th Cir.1974)).

2012It is a familiar principle that “[u]nchallenged jury instructions become the law of the case,” and “[t]he jury is bound to follow such instructions, even if they are erroneous.” Clark v. Black, 630 So.2d 1012, 1017 (Ala.1993).

2012Co., 769 So.2d 313, 314 (Ala.2000). “[A] mere malfunction [of the elevator] would be insufficient to invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur under Alabama law, because ‘one can reasonably conclude that the accident could have happened without any negligence on the part of the defendant! ].’ ” Kmart Corp. v. Bassett, 769 So.2d 282, 287 (Ala.2000) (quoting Ex parte Crabtree Indus.

2011Daycare & Kindergarten, Inc., 32 So.3d 591, 594 (Ala.Civ.App.2009) (quoting Ex parte Crabtree Indus.

2009The resolution of Bloom’s appeal turned on the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. 197 Ala. at 496-97 , 73 So. at 88 .

2009The resolution of Bloom’s appeal turned on the applicability of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. 197 Ala. at 496-97 , 73 So. at 88 .

2009In 1923, in Sellers v. Noah, 209 Ala. 103, 105 , 95 So. 167, 169 (1923), this Court stated: “Where a surgeon performing an operation leaves in the body of his subject, closing the wound, a foreign substance that causes injury or damage to the subject, the burden of proof passes to the impleaded surgeon to show that he exercised the stated reasonable and ordinary care, skill, and diligence in respect of the operation upon his subject, including the process of closing the wound.” In Powell v. Mullins, 479 So.2d 1119, 1126 (Ala.1985), this Court stated that “[ujnder our cases, a failure to remove

2009In discussing the general rule that requires expert testimony in a medical-malpractice action, this Court has held: “A narrow exception to this rule exists ‘ “in a case where want of skill or lack of care is so apparent ... as to be understood by a layman, and requires only common knowledge and experience to understand it.” ’ ” Ex parte HealthSouth Corp., 851 So.2d 33, 38 (Ala.2002) (quoting Tuscaloosa Orthopedic Appliance Co. v. Wyatt, 460 So.2d 156, 161 (Ala.1984), quoting in turn Dimoff v. Maitre, 432 So.2d 1225, 1226-27 (Ala.1983), quoting in turn Lloyd Noland Found., Inc. v. Harris, 295 A

2009In discussing the general rule that requires expert testimony in a medical-malpractice action, this Court has held: “A narrow exception to this rule exists ‘ “in a case where want of skill or lack of care is so apparent ... as to be understood by a layman, and requires only common knowledge and experience to understand it.” ’ ” Ex parte HealthSouth Corp., 851 So.2d 33, 38 (Ala.2002) (quoting Tuscaloosa Orthopedic Appliance Co. v. Wyatt, 460 So.2d 156, 161 (Ala.1984), quoting in turn Dimoff v. Maitre, 432 So.2d 1225, 1226-27 (Ala.1983), quoting in turn Lloyd Noland Found., Inc. v. Harris, 295 A

2009Smith v. Kennedy, 43 Ala.App. 554, 564 , 195 So.2d 820, 829 (1966) (“The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur cannot be invoked to prove wilful or wanton ... misconduct.”).

2009Smith v. Kennedy, 43 Ala.App. 554, 564 , 195 So.2d 820, 829 (1966) (“The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur cannot be invoked to prove wilful or wanton ... misconduct.”).

2009In discussing the general rule that requires expert testimony in a medical-malpractice action, this Court has held: “A narrow exception to this rule exists ‘ “in a case where want of skill or lack of care is so apparent ... as to be understood by a layman, and requires only common knowledge and experience to understand it.” ’ ” Ex parte HealthSouth Corp., 851 So.2d 33, 38 (Ala.2002) (quoting Tuscaloosa Orthopedic Appliance Co. v. Wyatt, 460 So.2d 156, 161 (Ala.1984), quoting in turn Dimoff v. Maitre, 432 So.2d 1225, 1226-27 (Ala.1983), quoting in turn Lloyd Noland Found., Inc. v. Harris, 295 A

2009In 1923, in Sellers v. Noah, 209 Ala. 103, 105 , 95 So. 167, 169 (1923), this Court stated: “Where a surgeon performing an operation leaves in the body of his subject, closing the wound, a foreign substance that causes injury or damage to the subject, the burden of proof passes to the impleaded surgeon to show that he exercised the stated reasonable and ordinary care, skill, and diligence in respect of the operation upon his subject, including the process of closing the wound.” In Powell v. Mullins, 479 So.2d 1119, 1126 (Ala.1985), this Court stated that “[ujnder our cases, a failure to remove

2009In 1923, in Sellers v. Noah, 209 Ala. 103, 105 , 95 So. 167, 169 (1923), this Court stated: “Where a surgeon performing an operation leaves in the body of his subject, closing the wound, a foreign substance that causes injury or damage to the subject, the burden of proof passes to the impleaded surgeon to show that he exercised the stated reasonable and ordinary care, skill, and diligence in respect of the operation upon his subject, including the process of closing the wound.” In Powell v. Mullins, 479 So.2d 1119, 1126 (Ala.1985), this Court stated that “[ujnder our cases, a failure to remove

2009See Ex parte Ryals, 773 So.2d 1011, 1013 (Ala.2000) ("[T]he appellate court can consider an argument against the validity of a summary judgment only to the extent that the record on appeal contains material from the trial court record presenting that argument to the trial court before or at the time of submission of the motion for summary judgment." (emphasis omitted)).