14 Nevada opinions name it 1 courts 1934–2024 2 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Nevada courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Szydel v. Markmangreen2 sentences2024See NRS 41A.100(1) (providing expert "evidence is not required and a rebuttable presumption that the personal injury or death was caused by negligence arises where evidence is presented" of any of five specific circumstances);3 see also Szydel v. Markman, 121 Nev. 453, 454 , 117 P.3d 200, 201 (2005) ("We conclude that the expert affidavit requirement does not apply when the malpractice action is based solely on the res ipsa loquitur doctrine."). 2024See NRS 41A.100(1) (providing expert "evidence is not required and a rebuttable presumption that the personal injury or death was caused by negligence arises where evidence is presented" of any of five specific circumstances);3 see also Szydel v. Markman, 121 Nev. 453, 454 , 117 P.3d 200, 201 (2005) ("We conclude that the expert affidavit requirement does not apply when the malpractice action is based solely on the res ipsa loquitur doctrine."). | 5 | 6 |
Johnson v. Egtedargreen2 sentences1998This court recently decided the case of Johnson v. Egtedar, 112 Nev. 428 , 915 P.2d 271 (1996), and had occasion to review whether a res ipsa loquitur instruction should be given when similar facts to the case at bar were presented. 1998This court recently decided the case of Johnson v. Egtedar, 112 Nev. 428 , 915 P.2d 271 (1996), and had occasion to review whether a res ipsa loquitur instruction should be given when similar facts to the case at bar were presented. | 2 | 3 |
Born v. Eisenmangreen2 sentences2017Johnson v. Egtedar, 112 Nev. 428, 433, 915 P.2d 271, 274 (1996) ("We believe the [I..] egislature intended NRS 41A.100 to replace, rather than supplement, the classic res ipsa loquitur formulation in medical malpractice cases where it is factually applicable."); see also Szydel, 121 Nev. at 459-60, 117 P.3d at 204-05 (stating that any res ipsa claim filed without an expert affidavit must meet the prima facie requirements for a res ipsa loquitur case as set forth in NRS 41A.100(1)(a)- (e)); Born v. Eisenman, 114 Nev. 854, 859, 962 P.2d 1227, 1230 (1998) ("[T]he more traditional res ipsa loquitu 2017Johnson v. Egtedar, 112 Nev. 428, 433, 915 P.2d 271, 274 (1996) ("We believe the [I..] egislature intended NRS 41A.100 to replace, rather than supplement, the classic res ipsa loquitur formulation in medical malpractice cases where it is factually applicable."); see also Szydel, 121 Nev. at 459-60, 117 P.3d at 204-05 (stating that any res ipsa claim filed without an expert affidavit must meet the prima facie requirements for a res ipsa loquitur case as set forth in NRS 41A.100(1)(a)- (e)); Born v. Eisenman, 114 Nev. 854, 859, 962 P.2d 1227, 1230 (1998) ("[T]he more traditional res ipsa loquitu | 2 | 2 |
Fernandez v. Admirandgreen2 sentences2017In his complaint, Peck cited NRS 41A.100(1)(a) and Fernandez v. Admirand, 108 Nev. 963, 969, 843 P.2d 354, 358 (1992), in which we referenced NRS 41A.100(1) and recognized that expert testimony may not be necessary in medical malpractice cases where the alleged wrongdoing "is a matter of common knowledge of laymen." While Peck referenced the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, he did not claim that he had surgery. 2017In his complaint, Peck cited NRS 41A.100(1)(a) and Fernandez v. Admirand, 108 Nev. 963, 969, 843 P.2d 354, 358 (1992), in which we referenced NRS 41A.100(1) and recognized that expert testimony may not be necessary in medical malpractice cases where the alleged wrongdoing "is a matter of common knowledge of laymen." While Peck referenced the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, he did not claim that he had surgery. | 2 | 2 |
Las Vegas Hospital Ass'n v. Gaffneygreen2 sentences1979As this court stated in Hospital Ass'n v. Gaffney, 64 Nev. 225, 234-35 , 180 P.2d 594, 599 (1947), the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur "is an exception to the general rule that negligence is not to be presumed, but must be affirmatively proved," and [t]he inference which the doctrine permits is grounded upon the fact that the chief evidence of the true cause, whether culpable *614 or innocent, is practically accessible to the defendant but inaccessible to the injured person. 1979As this court stated in Hospital Ass'n v. Gaffney, 64 Nev. 225, 234-35 , 180 P.2d 594, 599 (1947), the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur "is an exception to the general rule that negligence is not to be presumed, but must be affirmatively proved," and [t]he inference which the doctrine permits is grounded upon the fact that the chief evidence of the true cause, whether culpable *614 or innocent, is practically accessible to the defendant but inaccessible to the injured person. | 1 | 2 |
Evans v. Dean Witter Reynolds, Inc.green2 sentences2004However, as discussed above, substantial evidence supported the jury's verdict as to the res ipsa loquitur issue. [51] NRCP 59(a)(1) provides for a new trial upon a showing of "[i]rregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury, master, or adverse party, or any order of the court, or master, or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented from having a fair trial." [52] We concluded above that the district court properly submitted Jury Instruction No. 27, the res ipsa loquitur instruction, and Jury Instruction No. 28, the adverse inference instruction. [53] NRCP 59(a)(7) provides 2004However, as discussed above, substantial evidence supported the jury's verdict as to the res ipsa loquitur issue. [51] NRCP 59(a)(1) provides for a new trial upon a showing of "[i]rregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury, master, or adverse party, or any order of the court, or master, or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented from having a fair trial." [52] We concluded above that the district court properly submitted Jury Instruction No. 27, the res ipsa loquitur instruction, and Jury Instruction No. 28, the adverse inference instruction. [53] NRCP 59(a)(7) provides | 1 | 1 |
Mahan v. Hafengreen2 sentences2004However, as discussed above, substantial evidence supported the jury's verdict as to the res ipsa loquitur issue. [51] NRCP 59(a)(1) provides for a new trial upon a showing of "[i]rregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury, master, or adverse party, or any order of the court, or master, or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented from having a fair trial." [52] We concluded above that the district court properly submitted Jury Instruction No. 27, the res ipsa loquitur instruction, and Jury Instruction No. 28, the adverse inference instruction. [53] NRCP 59(a)(7) provides 2004However, as discussed above, substantial evidence supported the jury's verdict as to the res ipsa loquitur issue. [51] NRCP 59(a)(1) provides for a new trial upon a showing of "[i]rregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury, master, or adverse party, or any order of the court, or master, or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented from having a fair trial." [52] We concluded above that the district court properly submitted Jury Instruction No. 27, the res ipsa loquitur instruction, and Jury Instruction No. 28, the adverse inference instruction. [53] NRCP 59(a)(7) provides | 1 | 1 |
Moore Ex Rel. Moore v. Bannengreen2 sentences2004However, as discussed above, substantial evidence supported the jury's verdict as to the res ipsa loquitur issue. [51] NRCP 59(a)(1) provides for a new trial upon a showing of "[i]rregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury, master, or adverse party, or any order of the court, or master, or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented from having a fair trial." [52] We concluded above that the district court properly submitted Jury Instruction No. 27, the res ipsa loquitur instruction, and Jury Instruction No. 28, the adverse inference instruction. [53] NRCP 59(a)(7) provides 2004However, as discussed above, substantial evidence supported the jury's verdict as to the res ipsa loquitur issue. [51] NRCP 59(a)(1) provides for a new trial upon a showing of "[i]rregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury, master, or adverse party, or any order of the court, or master, or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented from having a fair trial." [52] We concluded above that the district court properly submitted Jury Instruction No. 27, the res ipsa loquitur instruction, and Jury Instruction No. 28, the adverse inference instruction. [53] NRCP 59(a)(7) provides | 1 | 1 |
Bialer v. St. Mary's Hospitalgreen2 sentences1977Mary’s Hosp., 83 Nev. 241, 243 , 427 P.2d 957, 958 (1967), this court said: For the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to apply, three conditions must be met: (1) the event must be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence; (2) the event must be caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant; and (3) the event must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff. 1977Mary’s Hosp., 83 Nev. 241, 243 , 427 P.2d 957, 958 (1967), this court said: For the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to apply, three conditions must be met: (1) the event must be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone’s negligence; (2) the event must be caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant; and (3) the event must not have been due to any voluntary action or contribution on the part of the plaintiff. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Nevada. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Sierra Pacific Power Company v. Anderson
green
2 sentences2004However, as discussed above, substantial evidence supported the jury's verdict as to the res ipsa loquitur issue. [51] NRCP 59(a)(1) provides for a new trial upon a showing of "[i]rregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury, master, or adverse party, or any order of the court, or master, or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented from having a fair trial." [52] We concluded above that the district court properly submitted Jury Instruction No. 27, the res ipsa loquitur instruction, and Jury Instruction No. 28, the adverse inference instruction. [53] NRCP 59(a)(7) provides 2004However, as discussed above, substantial evidence supported the jury's verdict as to the res ipsa loquitur issue. [51] NRCP 59(a)(1) provides for a new trial upon a showing of "[i]rregularity in the proceedings of the court, jury, master, or adverse party, or any order of the court, or master, or abuse of discretion by which either party was prevented from having a fair trial." [52] We concluded above that the district court properly submitted Jury Instruction No. 27, the res ipsa loquitur instruction, and Jury Instruction No. 28, the adverse inference instruction. [53] NRCP 59(a)(7) provides | 1 | 2004–2004 |
Austin v. Dilday
neutral
2 sentences1988Relying on Austin v. Dilday, 55 Nev. 357 , 34 P.2d 1073 (1934), noted in Annotation, Modern Trends as to Pleading a Particular Cause of Injury or Act of Negligence as Waiving or *301 Barring the Right to Rely on Res Ipsa Loquitur, 2 A.L.R.3d 1335 (1965), Landmark contends that res ipsa loquitur is not applicable in this case because Moore, instead of relying on general allegations of negligence, set out specific acts or omissions in her complaint. 1988Relying on Austin v. Dilday, 55 Nev. 357 , 34 P.2d 1073 (1934), noted in Annotation, Modern Trends as to Pleading a Particular Cause of Injury or Act of Negligence as Waiving or *301 Barring the Right to Rely on Res Ipsa Loquitur, 2 A.L.R.3d 1335 (1965), Landmark contends that res ipsa loquitur is not applicable in this case because Moore, instead of relying on general allegations of negligence, set out specific acts or omissions in her complaint. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Otis Elevator Co. v. Reid
green
2 sentences1988In Otis Elevator Co. v. Reid, 101 Nev. 515 , 706 P.2d 1378 (1985), we explained the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as follows: A res ipsa inference of negligence is permitted when one entity is shown to be in exclusive control of the instrumentality causing harm, where the accident is one that does not ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence, and-where the defendant is in a better position to explain the cause of the accident. 1988In Otis Elevator Co. v. Reid, 101 Nev. 515 , 706 P.2d 1378 (1985), we explained the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur as follows: A res ipsa inference of negligence is permitted when one entity is shown to be in exclusive control of the instrumentality causing harm, where the accident is one that does not ordinarily occur in the absence of negligence, and-where the defendant is in a better position to explain the cause of the accident. | 1 | 1988–1988 |
Johnson v. Watkins
neutral
2 sentences1957Appellants have called our attention to sundry cases in which this court has considered the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, including Johnson v. Watkins, 70 Nev. 156 , 262 P.2d 237 , and Las Vegas Hospital Association v. Gaffney, 64 Nev. 225 , 180 P.2d 594 , but we find in those cases nothing contrary to the views herein expressed. 1957Appellants have called our attention to sundry cases in which this court has considered the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, including Johnson v. Watkins, 70 Nev. 156 , 262 P.2d 237 , and Las Vegas Hospital Association v. Gaffney, 64 Nev. 225 , 180 P.2d 594 , but we find in those cases nothing contrary to the views herein expressed. | 1 | 1957–1957 |
Jordan v. Coca Cola Bottling Co.
green
1 sentence1951As support-for this contention appellants rely on the recent case of Jordan v. Coca Cola Bottling Co. of Utah, Utah, 218 P.2d 660, 664 , where it is said: “Whereas the almost inescapable conclusion to be drawn from the existence of a deleterious substance in a can which has remained sealed prior to being opened by the ultimate consumer, is that such substance must necessarily have been in the can at the time it was sealed, no such conclusion is required where the sealing is such that it can be removed and replaced without detection. | 1 | 1951–1951 |
Marovich v. Central California Traction Co.
green
1 sentence1934R. 1462: “The general rule is that, where the plaintiff in his complaint gives the explanation of the cause of the accident, that is to say, where the plaintiff, instead of relying upon a general allegation of negligence, sets *363 out specifically the negligent acts or omissions complained of, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not apply.” See, also, Marovich v. Central Cal. Traction Co., 191 Cal. 295 , 216 Pac. 595 ; 19 Cal. Jur. p. 713, sec. 127. | 1 | 1934–1934 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.