res ipsa loquitur doctrine in Minnesota

1986Spannus v. Otolaryngology Clinic, 308 Minn. 334, 337 , 242 N.W.2d 594, 596 (1976).

1986Spannus v. Otolaryngology Clinic, 308 Minn. 334, 337 , 242 N.W.2d 594, 596 (1976).

2017The Minnesota Supreme Court has not expressly defined the “exclusive control” element but has cautioned that “control [must be] seen as a flexible term.” Mahowald v. Minn. Gas Co., 344 N.W.2d 856, 863 (Minn. 1984) (citing W.

1986Mahowald v. Minnesota Gas Co., 344 N.W.2d 856, 862-63 (Minn.1984).

2017Although “the doctrine has no application where all of the facts and circumstances appear in evidence” or “where the cause of the accident is known and is not in question,” Johnson, 255 Minn. at 25-26 , 95 N.W.2d at 502 , “the mere presence or possibility of other causes is not sufficient to preclude the inference of negligence on the part of defendant where the evidence reasonably excuses those causes.” Rinkel v. Lee’s Plumbing & Heating Co., 257 Minn. 14, 19 , 99 N.W.2d 779, 783 (1959).

2017Although “the doctrine has no application where all of the facts and circumstances appear in evidence” or “where the cause of the accident is known and is not in question,” Johnson, 255 Minn. at 25-26 , 95 N.W.2d at 502 , “the mere presence or possibility of other causes is not sufficient to preclude the inference of negligence on the part of defendant where the evidence reasonably excuses those causes.” Rinkel v. Lee’s Plumbing & Heating Co., 257 Minn. 14, 19 , 99 N.W.2d 779, 783 (1959).

1977Thus, our focus in determining the propriety of submitting the case to the jury, accompanied by a res ipsa loquitur instruction, is on the singular act of the breaking of the blade. 1. .The general doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was succinctly summarized in Holten v. Parker, 302 Minn. 167, 173 , 224 N. W. 2d 139, 144 (1974): “* * * There are three requirements for the application of the doctrine under our decisions.

1977Thus, our focus in determining the propriety of submitting the case to the jury, accompanied by a res ipsa loquitur instruction, is on the singular act of the breaking of the blade. 1. .The general doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was succinctly summarized in Holten v. Parker, 302 Minn. 167, 173 , 224 N. W. 2d 139, 144 (1974): “* * * There are three requirements for the application of the doctrine under our decisions.

1945In Heff-ter v. Northern States Power Co. 173 Minn. 215, 218 , 217 N. W. 102, 103 , this court stated: * * Nor does it [doctrine of res ipsa loquitur] apply where an unexplained accident may be attributable to one of several causes for some of which defendant is not responsible.” On the evidence in this case, we conclude that the doctrine has no application, and that plaintiff was not entitled to an instruction permitting the jury to apply the doctrine to the facts presented to them.

1945In Heff-ter v. Northern States Power Co. 173 Minn. 215, 218 , 217 N. W. 102, 103 , this court stated: * * Nor does it [doctrine of res ipsa loquitur] apply where an unexplained accident may be attributable to one of several causes for some of which defendant is not responsible.” On the evidence in this case, we conclude that the doctrine has no application, and that plaintiff was not entitled to an instruction permitting the jury to apply the doctrine to the facts presented to them.

1984In addition, although the issue was not raised in appellants' motion for a new trial, the trial court thought Spannaus v. Otolaryngology Clinic and Professional Associates, 308 Minn. 334 , 242 N.W.2d 594 (1976), prevented the application of the doctrine to a case in which there were multiple defendants. [4] The trial court correctly observed that an essential prerequisite to the application of res ipsa loquitur is that the person to be charged have "exclusive control" of the instrumentality causing the harm, Boutang v. Twin City Motor Bus Co., 248 Minn. 240 , 80 N.W.2d 30 (1956); Johnson v. *8

1984In addition, although the issue was not raised in appellants' motion for a new trial, the trial court thought Spannaus v. Otolaryngology Clinic and Professional Associates, 308 Minn. 334 , 242 N.W.2d 594 (1976), prevented the application of the doctrine to a case in which there were multiple defendants. [4] The trial court correctly observed that an essential prerequisite to the application of res ipsa loquitur is that the person to be charged have "exclusive control" of the instrumentality causing the harm, Boutang v. Twin City Motor Bus Co., 248 Minn. 240 , 80 N.W.2d 30 (1956); Johnson v. *8

2017See Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal.2d 486 , 154 P.2d 687, 691 (1944).

2017See Ybarra v. Spangard, 25 Cal.2d 486 , 154 P.2d 687, 691 (1944).

2017See, e.g., Curtis v. Lein, 169 Wash.2d 884 , 239 P.3d 1078, 1083 (2010) (explaining that res ipsa loquitur can apply unless evidence is “completely explanatory of how an accident occurred” another way); Cunningham v. Hayes, 463 S.W.2d 555, 562 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971) (reasoning that requiring a plaintiff to exclude any other cause would “undermine the doctrine”). “‘When the injury might, with equal probability, have resulted from the acts of others as well as from the acts of defendant, proof of facts, other than of injury, from which defendant’s negligence can be inferred must be made before the

2017See, e.g., Curtis v. Lein, 169 Wash.2d 884 , 239 P.3d 1078, 1083 (2010) (explaining that res ipsa loquitur can apply unless evidence is “completely explanatory of how an accident occurred” another way); Cunningham v. Hayes, 463 S.W.2d 555, 562 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971) (reasoning that requiring a plaintiff to exclude any other cause would “undermine the doctrine”). “‘When the injury might, with equal probability, have resulted from the acts of others as well as from the acts of defendant, proof of facts, other than of injury, from which defendant’s negligence can be inferred must be made before the

2017See, e.g., Curtis v. Lein, 169 Wash.2d 884 , 239 P.3d 1078, 1083 (2010) (explaining that res ipsa loquitur can apply unless evidence is “completely explanatory of how an accident occurred” another way); Cunningham v. Hayes, 463 S.W.2d 555, 562 (Mo. Ct. App. 1971) (reasoning that requiring a plaintiff to exclude any other cause would “undermine the doctrine”). “‘When the injury might, with equal probability, have resulted from the acts of others as well as from the acts of defendant, proof of facts, other than of injury, from which defendant’s negligence can be inferred must be made before the

1994Similarly, in Lovejoy v. Minneapolis-Moline Power Implement Co., 248 Minn. 319, 332 , 79 N.W.2d 688, 697 (1956), the supreme court affirmed the trial court’s refusal to instruct on the res ipsa loquitur doctrine where there was substantial conflicting evidence about the cause of the injury.

1994Similarly, in Lovejoy v. Minneapolis-Moline Power Implement Co., 248 Minn. 319, 332 , 79 N.W.2d 688, 697 (1956), the supreme court affirmed the trial court’s refusal to instruct on the res ipsa loquitur doctrine where there was substantial conflicting evidence about the cause of the injury.

1992See, e.g., Warrick v. Giron, 290 N.W.2d 166, 169 (Minn.1980); Young v. Caspers, 311 Minn. 391, 398-99 , 249 N.W.2d 713, 717 (Minn.1977); Fleming v. Hallum, 350 N.W.2d 417, 419 (Minn.App.1984).

1992See, e.g., Warrick v. Giron, 290 N.W.2d 166, 169 (Minn.1980); Young v. Caspers, 311 Minn. 391, 398-99 , 249 N.W.2d 713, 717 (Minn.1977); Fleming v. Hallum, 350 N.W.2d 417, 419 (Minn.App.1984).

1992See, e.g., Warrick v. Giron, 290 N.W.2d 166, 169 (Minn.1980); Young v. Caspers, 311 Minn. 391, 398-99 , 249 N.W.2d 713, 717 (Minn.1977); Fleming v. Hallum, 350 N.W.2d 417, 419 (Minn.App.1984).

1992See, e.g., Warrick v. Giron, 290 N.W.2d 166, 169 (Minn.1980); Young v. Caspers, 311 Minn. 391, 398-99 , 249 N.W.2d 713, 717 (Minn.1977); Fleming v. Hallum, 350 N.W.2d 417, 419 (Minn.App.1984).

1992See, e.g., Warrick v. Giron, 290 N.W.2d 166, 169 (Minn.1980); Young v. Caspers, 311 Minn. 391, 398-99 , 249 N.W.2d 713, 717 (Minn.1977); Fleming v. Hallum, 350 N.W.2d 417, 419 (Minn.App.1984).

1992See, e.g., Warrick v. Giron, 290 N.W.2d 166, 169 (Minn.1980); Young v. Caspers, 311 Minn. 391, 398-99 , 249 N.W.2d 713, 717 (Minn.1977); Fleming v. Hallum, 350 N.W.2d 417, 419 (Minn.App.1984).

1990The trial court correctly granted summary judgment on the res ipsa loquitur claim after determining that neither the instrumentality causing the accident nor the controller of that instrumentality could be identified. 2.Joint Enterprise The two elements of vicarious liability under joint enterprise are set out in another hunting case, Delgado v. Lohmar, 289 N.W.2d 479, 482 (Minn.1979): (1) a mutual understanding for a common purpose, and (2) a right to a voice in the direction and control of the means used to carry out the common purpose.

1986See Rinkel v. Lee’s Plumbing & Heating Co., 257 Minn. 14, 19 , 99 N.W.2d 779, 782 (1959) (negligent plumbing); Anderson v. Burdick Grain Co., 363 N.W.2d 797, 800 (Minn.Ct.App.1985), pet. for rev. denied, (Minn. May 1, 1985) (explosion); see also Heath v. Wolesky, 181 Minn. 492, 493-94 , 233 N.W. 239, 240 (1930) (res ipsa loquitur instruction conditioned on jury’s repudiation of other causes proper).

1986See Rinkel v. Lee’s Plumbing & Heating Co., 257 Minn. 14, 19 , 99 N.W.2d 779, 782 (1959) (negligent plumbing); Anderson v. Burdick Grain Co., 363 N.W.2d 797, 800 (Minn.Ct.App.1985), pet. for rev. denied, (Minn. May 1, 1985) (explosion); see also Heath v. Wolesky, 181 Minn. 492, 493-94 , 233 N.W. 239, 240 (1930) (res ipsa loquitur instruction conditioned on jury’s repudiation of other causes proper).

1986See Rinkel v. Lee’s Plumbing & Heating Co., 257 Minn. 14, 19 , 99 N.W.2d 779, 782 (1959) (negligent plumbing); Anderson v. Burdick Grain Co., 363 N.W.2d 797, 800 (Minn.Ct.App.1985), pet. for rev. denied, (Minn. May 1, 1985) (explosion); see also Heath v. Wolesky, 181 Minn. 492, 493-94 , 233 N.W. 239, 240 (1930) (res ipsa loquitur instruction conditioned on jury’s repudiation of other causes proper).

1979As this court so aptly stated in Hestbeck v. Hennepin County, 297 Minn. 419, 424 , 212 N.W.2d 361, 365 (1973): “ ‘The thing or situation speaks for itself’ is usually abbreviated by using the Latin phrase ‘res ipsa loquitur.’ It is merely another way of characterizing the minimal kind of circumstantial evidence which is legally sufficient to warrant an inference of negligence.

1979As this court so aptly stated in Hestbeck v. Hennepin County, 297 Minn. 419, 424 , 212 N.W.2d 361, 365 (1973): “ ‘The thing or situation speaks for itself’ is usually abbreviated by using the Latin phrase ‘res ipsa loquitur.’ It is merely another way of characterizing the minimal kind of circumstantial evidence which is legally sufficient to warrant an inference of negligence.