res ipsa loquitur doctrine in Kentucky

1967As stated in Cox v. Wilson, Ky., 267 S.W.2d 83 , 44 A.L.R.2d 830 (1954), in order to invoke the res ipsa loquitur doctrine there must be the following three requirements : 1.

1967As stated in Cox v. Wilson, Ky., 267 S.W.2d 83 , 44 A.L.R.2d 830 (1954), in order to invoke the res ipsa loquitur doctrine there must be the following three requirements : 1.

1957Plaintiffs contend that since the sudden application of the brakes and not the blowout was the caitse of the accident, the res ipsa loquitur doctrine applies and they were entitled to a directed verdict, citing Ralston v. Dossey, 289 Ky. 40 , 157 S.W.2d 739 .

1957Plaintiffs contend that since the sudden application of the brakes and not the blowout was the caitse of the accident, the res ipsa loquitur doctrine applies and they were entitled to a directed verdict, citing Ralston v. Dossey, 289 Ky. 40 , 157 S.W.2d 739 .

1950(Citations.)” ( 277 Ky. 460 , 126 S. W. 2d 879 .) In an unbroken line of cases, one of which is Atlantic Greyhound Corporation v. Franklin, 301 Ky. 867 , 192 S. W. 2d 753 , we have, held that the mere fact that an automobile skids on a slippery road does not of itself prove negligence so as to render applicable the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.

1950(Citations.)” ( 277 Ky. 460 , 126 S. W. 2d 879 .) In an unbroken line of cases, one of which is Atlantic Greyhound Corporation v. Franklin, 301 Ky. 867 , 192 S. W. 2d 753 , we have, held that the mere fact that an automobile skids on a slippery road does not of itself prove negligence so as to render applicable the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.

1971In Vernon v. Gentry, Ky., 334 S.W.2d 266 (1960), this court enumerated the conditions under which the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may be applied: "(1) The defendant must have had full management of the instrumentality which caused the injury; (2) the circumstances must be such that, according to common knowledge and the experience of mankind, the accident could not have happened if those having control and management had not been negligent; (3) the plaintiff's injury must have resulted from the accident." In the instant case, appellee concedes it was in complete control of the system and tha

1971In Vernon v. Gentry, Ky., 334 S.W.2d 266 (1960), this court enumerated the conditions under which the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur may be applied: “(1) The defendant must have had full management of the instrumentality which caused the injury; (2) the circumstances must be such that, according to common knowledge and the experience of mankind, the accident could not have happened if those having control and management had not been negligent; (3) the plaintiff’s injury must have resulted from the accident.” In the instant case, appellee concedes it was in complete control of the system and tha

1969Cf. Quillen v. Skaggs, 233 Ky. 171 , 25 S.W.2d 33 , in which this court recognized that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, although not usually applicable in malpractice cases, may be invoked in circumstances in which the generally accepted procedures are not calculated to produce the abnormal results asserted by the plaintiff.

1969Cf. Quillen v. Skaggs, 233 Ky. 171 , 25 S.W.2d 33 , in which this court recognized that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, although not usually applicable in malpractice cases, may be invoked in circumstances in which the generally accepted procedures are not calculated to produce the abnormal results asserted by the plaintiff.

1967Lewis v. Wolk, 312 Ky. 536 , 228 S.W.2d 432 , 16 A.L.R.2d 974 , is a leading case discussing the res ipsa loquitur doctrine.

1967Lewis v. Wolk, 312 Ky. 536 , 228 S.W.2d 432 , 16 A.L.R.2d 974 , is a leading case discussing the res ipsa loquitur doctrine.

1956East Kentucky Beverage Co. v. Stumbo, 313 Ky. 66 , 230 S.W.2d 106 ; Ashland Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Byrne, Ky., 258 S.W.2d 475 ; Glasgow Coca-Cola Bottling Works, Inc., v. Wilson, Ky., 264 S.W.2d 872 .

1954The facts with respect to integrity of the bottle in this case are substantially the same as those in Ashland Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Byrne, Ky., 258 S.W.2d 475 , in which we held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur would not be applied.

1949This is the language: “ ‘There must be reasonable evidence of negligence. “ ‘But where the thing is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendants, that the accident arose from want of care. ’ ’ ’ In Schechter v. Hann, 305 Ky. 794 , 205 S. W. 2d 690, 692 , we said: “The res ipsa loquitur doctrine, as stated in San *429 Juan Light & Transit Co. v. Requena, 224 U. S. 89 ,

1949This is the language: “ ‘There must be reasonable evidence of negligence. “ ‘But where the thing is shown to be under the management of the defendant or his servants, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of explanation by the defendants, that the accident arose from want of care. ’ ’ ’ In Schechter v. Hann, 305 Ky. 794 , 205 S. W. 2d 690, 692 , we said: “The res ipsa loquitur doctrine, as stated in San *429 Juan Light & Transit Co. v. Requena, 224 U. S. 89 ,

1932Cas. 608, and Watson v. Pullman Co., 238 Ky. 491 , 38 S. W. (2d) 430, 431 , as well as by a number of cases found in the annotations, supra. The facts of the Morgan case required the exercise of the highest degree of care on the part of defendant, but that fact only required an increased amount of delinquency on his part over what would be exacted of him in a case where he was required to exercise only ordinary care, and which difference has no effect upon the true scope and application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine.

1932Cas. 608, and Watson v. Pullman Co., 238 Ky. 491 , 38 S. W. (2d) 430, 431 , as well as by a number of cases found in the annotations, supra. The facts of the Morgan case required the exercise of the highest degree of care on the part of defendant, but that fact only required an increased amount of delinquency on his part over what would be exacted of him in a case where he was required to exercise only ordinary care, and which difference has no effect upon the true scope and application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine.

1926In discussing the application of the rule to controversies between master and servant, in Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company v. Allen’s Administrator, 174 Ky. 736 , 192 S. W. 863 , we said: “It may be conceded at the outset that the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, strictly speaking and confined *463 strictly within the reasons calling for its application, does not prevail in controversies between master and servant.

1926In discussing the application of the rule to controversies between master and servant, in Louisville & Nashville Railroad Company v. Allen’s Administrator, 174 Ky. 736 , 192 S. W. 863 , we said: “It may be conceded at the outset that the res ipsa loquitur doctrine, strictly speaking and confined *463 strictly within the reasons calling for its application, does not prevail in controversies between master and servant.

2026CONCLUSION As noted in Nazar, 291 S.W.3d at 604 , pursuant to the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, “juries should generally be permitted to determine a healthcare professional’s liability in a retained foreign object case.” This is such a case, and the jury should be permitted to evaluate whether Dr. Cain became a member of the surgical team and, if so, whether he and his employer are liable under comparative negligence for Lloyd’s injuries where Dr. Cain failed to find the surgical needle.

2010The Court further held that under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, "juries may—but are not required to—infer negligence from the fact that a surgical item was left in a patient's body." Id. at 603 .

1968That doctrine was applied in the case of Seale v. Coca-Cola Bottling Works of Lexington, Ky., 297 Ky. 450 , 179 S.W.2d 598 .

1968That doctrine was applied in the case of Seale v. Coca-Cola Bottling Works of Lexington, Ky., 297 Ky. 450 , 179 S.W.2d 598 .

1962The court said: “But, as it was stated in the case of Batson v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 5 Cir., 75 F.2d 154, 157 , the doctrine of rés ipsa loquitur applies ‘only when the thing shown speaks of the negligence of the defendant, not merely of the occurrence of an accident.’ ” Perhaps the fact that the bottle broke was sufficient in this case to place upon the appellees the duty to show that they had carefully handled the bottle during the time it was under their control.

1952But, as it was stated in the case of Batson v. Western Union Telegraph Co., 5 Cir., 75 F.2d 154, 157 , the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies “only when the thing shown speaks of the negligence of the defendant, not merely of the occurrence of an accident.”' The competent testimony given by Mrs. Morgan reads as follows: “Q. 10.

1961City of Corbin v. Benton, 151 Ky. 483 , 152 S.W. 241 , 43 L.R.A.,N.S., 591; City of Louisville v. Moore, 267 Ky. 536 , 102 S.W.2d 989, 990 .

1961City of Corbin v. Benton, 151 Ky. 483 , 152 S.W. 241 , 43 L.R.A.,N.S., 591; City of Louisville v. Moore, 267 Ky. 536 , 102 S.W.2d 989, 990 .

1956East Kentucky Beverage Co. v. Stumbo, 313 Ky. 66 , 230 S.W.2d 106 ; Ashland Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Byrne, Ky., 258 S.W.2d 475 ; Glasgow Coca-Cola Bottling Works, Inc., v. Wilson, Ky., 264 S.W.2d 872 .

1955East Kentucky Beverage Co. v. Stumbo, 313 Ky. 66 , 230 S.W.2d .106; Paducah Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Reynolds, Ky., 258 S.W.2d 474 ; Ashland Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Byrne, Ky., 258 S.W.2d 475 ; Glasgow Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Wilson, Ky., 264 S.W.2d 872 .

1956East Kentucky Beverage Co. v. Stumbo, 313 Ky. 66 , 230 S.W.2d 106 ; Ashland Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Byrne, Ky., 258 S.W.2d 475 ; Glasgow Coca-Cola Bottling Works, Inc., v. Wilson, Ky., 264 S.W.2d 872 .

1956East Kentucky Beverage Co. v. Stumbo, 313 Ky. 66 , 230 S.W.2d 106 ; Ashland Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Byrne, Ky., 258 S.W.2d 475 ; Glasgow Coca-Cola Bottling Works, Inc., v. Wilson, Ky., 264 S.W.2d 872 .

1953In that case, indicating our approval of the reasoning employed in Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Sullivan, 178 Tenn. 405 , 158 S. W.2d 721 , 171 A.L.R. 1200 , we held that in the case of bottled drinks with easily removable caps, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur will not be applied to create a presumption of negligence on the part of the bottler, unless there is proof showing that there has been no reasonable opportunity to tamper with the bottle or its contents in the interim between the physical control of the bottler and that of the consumer.

1953In that case, indicating our approval of the reasoning employed in Coca-Cola Bottling Works v. Sullivan, 178 Tenn. 405 , 158 S. W.2d 721 , 171 A.L.R. 1200 , we held that in the case of bottled drinks with easily removable caps, the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur will not be applied to create a presumption of negligence on the part of the bottler, unless there is proof showing that there has been no reasonable opportunity to tamper with the bottle or its contents in the interim between the physical control of the bottler and that of the consumer.

1950As was said in Droppelman v. Willingham, supra [ 293 Ky. 614 , 169 S.W.2d 813 ]: “In the present case there was evidence of negligence in addition to the mere facts of the occurrence from which an inference of negligence might be drawn, and, consequently, it was not necessary to invoke the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.” The court did not err in submitting the case to the jury.

1945Droppelman v. Willingham, 293 Ky. 614 , 169 S. W. 2d 811 .

1950(Citations.)" [ 277 Ky. 460 , 126 S.W.2d 879 .] In an unbroken line of cases, one of which is Atlantic Greyhound Corporation v. Franklin, 301 Ky. 867 , 192 S.W.2d 753 , we have held that the mere fact that an automobile skids on a slippery road does not of itself prove negligence so as to render applicable the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.

1950(Citations.)” ( 277 Ky. 460 , 126 S. W. 2d 879 .) In an unbroken line of cases, one of which is Atlantic Greyhound Corporation v. Franklin, 301 Ky. 867 , 192 S. W. 2d 753 , we have, held that the mere fact that an automobile skids on a slippery road does not of itself prove negligence so as to render applicable the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur.

1939Counsel for appellant strongly contend for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, but as said in Stephens v. Kitchen Lumber Company, 222 Ky. 736 , 2 S. W. (2d) 374 , 376: “This doctrine is based upon the idea that the circumstances surrounding an accident are of such a character as to justify a jury in reaching a conclusion that negligence was the cause of the accident.” There is nothing in the evidence on which to base a conclusion or even a remote inference of negligence on the part of appellee, and as will be seen in Stephens v. Kitchen Lumber Company, supra, and the recent c

1939Counsel for appellant strongly contend for the application of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, but as said in Stephens v. Kitchen Lumber Company, 222 Ky. 736 , 2 S. W. (2d) 374 , 376: “This doctrine is based upon the idea that the circumstances surrounding an accident are of such a character as to justify a jury in reaching a conclusion that negligence was the cause of the accident.” There is nothing in the evidence on which to base a conclusion or even a remote inference of negligence on the part of appellee, and as will be seen in Stephens v. Kitchen Lumber Company, supra, and the recent c

2026Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, “[t]here may be an inference of negligence when, according to common knowledge and experience, the accident would not have happened except for the wrongful act of the defendant.’” Arnsperger, 686 S.W.3d at 139 (quoting Jos.