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173 Illinois opinions name it 3 courts 1900–2025 6 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Illinois courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Metz v. Central Illinois Electric & Gas Co.green2 sentences2022Res Ipsa Loquitur - 19 - 2022 IL App (2d) 220042-U ¶ 63 Our supreme court recently recounted the nature and purpose of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine (“ ‘the thing speaks for itself’ ”) as follows: “ ‘When a thing which caused the injury is shown to be under the control or management of the party charged with negligence and the occurrence is such as in the ordinary course of things would not have happened if the person so charged had used proper care, the accident itself affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the party charged, that it arose from want of proper care. 2022Id. -9- ¶ 32 Res Ipsa Loquitur ¶ 33 We described the nature and purpose of res ipsa loquitur, “the thing speaks for itself,” in Metz v. Central Illinois Electric & Gas Co., 32 Ill. 2d 446, 448-49 (1965): “When a thing which caused the injury is shown to be under the control or management of the party charged with negligence and the occurrence is such as in the ordinary course of things would not have happened if the person so charged had used proper care, the accident itself affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the party charged, that it arose from want of proper ca | 6 | 31 |
Heastie v. Robertsgreen2 sentences2020“Our sole inquiry is whether the allegations in plaintiff’s complaint were sufficient to state a cause of action for negligence based on the res ipsa loquitur doctrine.” Heastie, 226 Ill. 2d at 542 . ¶ 64 Res ipsa loquitur permits an inference of negligence from otherwise inexplicable facts. 2020“Our sole inquiry is whether the allegations in plaintiff’s complaint were sufficient to state a cause of action for negligence based on the res ipsa loquitur doctrine.” Heastie, 226 Ill. 2d at 542 . ¶ 64 Res ipsa loquitur permits an inference of negligence from otherwise inexplicable facts. | 5 | 9 |
Dyback v. Webergreen2 sentences2003In Gatlin v. Ruder, 137 Ill. 2d 284, 295 , 560 N.E.2d 586 (1990)), the supreme court, quoting Spidle v. Steward, 79 Ill. 2d 1, 5-6 , 402 N.E.2d 216 (1980), stated: “ ‘The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is a species of circumstantial evidence permitting the trier of fact to draw an inference of negligence if plaintiff demonstrates that he or she was injured “(1) in an occurrence that ordinarily does not happen in the absence of negligence, (2) by an agency or instrumentality within the defendant’s exclusive control ***.” [Citations.]’ ” The supreme court has also stated, “[w]hen res ipsa loquitur i 2003In Gatlin v. Ruder, 137 Ill. 2d 284, 295 , 560 N.E.2d 586 (1990)), the supreme court, quoting Spidle v. Steward, 79 Ill. 2d 1, 5-6 , 402 N.E.2d 216 (1980), stated: “ ‘The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is a species of circumstantial evidence permitting the trier of fact to draw an inference of negligence if plaintiff demonstrates that he or she was injured “(1) in an occurrence that ordinarily does not happen in the absence of negligence, (2) by an agency or instrumentality within the defendant’s exclusive control ***.” [Citations.]’ ” The supreme court has also stated, “[w]hen res ipsa loquitur i | 4 | 15 |
Britton v. University of Chicago Hospitalsgreen2 sentences2020“Moreover, the res ipsa loquitur doctrine applies only when the facts proved by the plaintiff admit of the single inference that the accident would not have happened unless the defendant had been negligent.” Britton v. University of Chicago Hospitals, 382 Ill. 2020“Moreover, the res ipsa loquitur doctrine applies only when the facts proved by the plaintiff admit of the single inference that the accident would not have happened unless the defendant had been negligent.” Britton v. University of Chicago Hospitals, 382 Ill. | 4 | 4 |
Kolakowski v. Vorisgreen2 sentences2022Kolakowski v. Voris, 83 Ill. 2d 388, 396 (1980) (“a plaintiff’s only recourse is to rely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur” where he is placed in the care and custody of defendants during surgery); id. (“ ‘The control, at one time or another, of one or more of the various agencies or instrumentalities which might have harmed the plaintiff was in the hands of every defendant or of his employees or temporary servants. 2022Kolakowski v. Voris, 83 Ill. 2d 388, 396 (1980) (“a plaintiff’s only recourse is to rely on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur” where he is placed in the care and custody of defendants during surgery); id. (“ ‘The control, at one time or another, of one or more of the various agencies or instrumentalities which might have harmed the plaintiff was in the hands of every defendant or of his employees or temporary servants. | 3 | 14 |
Gatlin v. Rudergreen2 sentences2003In Gatlin v. Ruder, 137 Ill. 2d 284, 295 , 560 N.E.2d 586 (1990)), the supreme court, quoting Spidle v. Steward, 79 Ill. 2d 1, 5-6 , 402 N.E.2d 216 (1980), stated: “ ‘The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is a species of circumstantial evidence permitting the trier of fact to draw an inference of negligence if plaintiff demonstrates that he or she was injured “(1) in an occurrence that ordinarily does not happen in the absence of negligence, (2) by an agency or instrumentality within the defendant’s exclusive control ***.” [Citations.]’ ” The supreme court has also stated, “[w]hen res ipsa loquitur i 2003In Gatlin v. Ruder, 137 Ill. 2d 284, 295 , 560 N.E.2d 586 (1990)), the supreme court, quoting Spidle v. Steward, 79 Ill. 2d 1, 5-6 , 402 N.E.2d 216 (1980), stated: “ ‘The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is a species of circumstantial evidence permitting the trier of fact to draw an inference of negligence if plaintiff demonstrates that he or she was injured “(1) in an occurrence that ordinarily does not happen in the absence of negligence, (2) by an agency or instrumentality within the defendant’s exclusive control ***.” [Citations.]’ ” The supreme court has also stated, “[w]hen res ipsa loquitur i | 3 | 10 |
Raleigh v. Alcon Laboratories, Inc.green2 sentences2020Raleigh v. Alcon Laboratories, Inc., 403 Ill. 2020Raleigh v. Alcon Laboratories, Inc., 403 Ill. | 3 | 3 |
Walker v. Rumergreen2 sentences2020Our supreme court said, “[a]lthough ordinarily only ultimate facts, and not conclusions or inferences, are to be pleaded, we are of the opinion that in the pleading of a cause of action in medical malpractice cases under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, reliance on the doctrine should be alleged.” Walker v. Rumer, 72 Ill. 2d 495, 502 (1978). 2020Our supreme court said, “[a]lthough ordinarily only ultimate facts, and not conclusions or inferences, are to be pleaded, we are of the opinion that in the pleading of a cause of action in medical malpractice cases under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, reliance on the doctrine should be alleged.” Walker v. Rumer, 72 Ill. 2d 495, 502 (1978). | 2 | 11 |
Drewick v. Interstate Terminals, Inc.green2 sentences1980The trial court must in the first instance decide whether, as a matter of law, the res ipsa loquitur doctrine applies at all. ( Drewick v. Interstate Terminals, Inc. (1969), 42 Ill.2d 345, 349 .) It will not apply unless a duty of care is owed by the defendant to the plaintiff. 1980The majority cites Drewick v. Interstate Terminals, Inc. (1969), 42 Ill. 2d 345 , as illustrating “the preferred approach” for determining the application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. | 2 | 7 |
Darrough v. Glendale Heights Community Hospitalgreen2 sentences2020In accord with Walker, “[b]ecause Illinois requires fact pleading [citation], res ipsa loquitur is often pleaded as a separate claim.” Darrough v. Glendale Heights Community Hospital, 234 Ill. 2003Our supreme court said in Metz v. Central Illinois Electric & Gas Co. , 32 Ill. 2d 446, 448-49 , 207 N.E.2d 305 (1965) : "When a thing which caused the injury is shown to be under the control or management of the party charged with negligence and the occurrence is such as in the ordinary course of things would not have happened if the person so charged had used proper care, the accident itself affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the party charged, that it arose from want of proper care. [Citations.] This in essence is the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur , and its pur | 2 | 4 |
Johnson v. Armstronggreen2 sentences2025For a res ipsa loquitur claim, the plaintiff must “prove that he was injured (1) in an occurrence that ordinarily does not happen in the absence of negligence (the probability element) (2) by an agency or instrumentality within the defendant’s exclusive control (the control element).” Johnson v. Armstrong, 2022 IL 127942, ¶ 35 (2022). ¶ 21 Here, Puccetti alleged that Kathleen was injured as a result of Franciscan’s negligence, and that Kathleen’s injury was the sort that does not normally happen in the absence of negligence. 2022Res Ipsa Loquitur - 19 - 2022 IL App (2d) 220042-U ¶ 63 Our supreme court recently recounted the nature and purpose of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine (“ ‘the thing speaks for itself’ ”) as follows: “ ‘When a thing which caused the injury is shown to be under the control or management of the party charged with negligence and the occurrence is such as in the ordinary course of things would not have happened if the person so charged had used proper care, the accident itself affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the party charged, that it arose from want of proper care. | 2 | 3 |
Roberts v. City of Sterlinggreen2 sentences2017See Roberts v. City of Sterling, 22 Ill. 2017See Roberts v. City of Sterling, 22 Ill. | 2 | 3 |
| Rahic v. Satellite Air-Land Motor Service, Inc.green | 2 | 2 |
| Silverman v. General Motors Corp.green | 2 | 2 |
Lynch v. Precision MacHine Shop, Ltd.green2 sentences1993The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies only where the surrounding circumstances indicate that the injury was not the result of any voluntary act or neglect on the part of the plaintiff. ( Lynch v. Precision Machine Shop, Ltd. (1982), 93 Ill.2d 266 , 66 Ill.Dec. 643 , 443 N.E.2d 569 .) That is not the case here. 1993The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies only where the surrounding circumstances indicate that the injury was not the result of any voluntary act or neglect on the part of the plaintiff. ( Lynch v. Precision Machine Shop, Ltd. (1982), 93 Ill.2d 266 , 66 Ill.Dec. 643 , 443 N.E.2d 569 .) That is not the case here. | 1 | 7 |
Ybarra v. Spangardgreen2 sentences1991In this connection, it is noteworthy that it was but a few short years ago that our supreme court decried the difficulty of getting ‘the doctors and nurses in attendance [at an anesthetized plaintiff’s surgical operation to] voluntarily *** disclose the identity of the negligent person and the facts establishing liability’ occurring during surgery, and applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, expressly adopting the ruling and reasoning of the California Supreme Court in Ybarra v. Spangard (1944), 25 Cal. 2d 486, 490-92 , 154 P.2d 687, 689-90 . 1991In this connection, it is noteworthy that it was but a few short years ago that our supreme court decried the difficulty of getting ‘the doctors and nurses in attendance [at an anesthetized plaintiff’s surgical operation to] voluntarily *** disclose the identity of the negligent person and the facts establishing liability’ occurring during surgery, and applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, expressly adopting the ruling and reasoning of the California Supreme Court in Ybarra v. Spangard (1944), 25 Cal. 2d 486, 490-92 , 154 P.2d 687, 689-90 . | 1 | 4 |
| Kirchner v. Kuhlmangreen | 1 | 2 |
| Bell v. Hutsellgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Erzrumly v. Dominick's Finer Foods, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Wilson v. Michelgreen | 1 | 1 |
| Auton v. Logan Landfill, Inc.green | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Illinois. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Spidle v. Steward
green
2 sentences2003In Gatlin v. Ruder, 137 Ill. 2d 284, 295 , 560 N.E.2d 586 (1990)), the supreme court, quoting Spidle v. Steward, 79 Ill. 2d 1, 5-6 , 402 N.E.2d 216 (1980), stated: “ ‘The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is a species of circumstantial evidence permitting the trier of fact to draw an inference of negligence if plaintiff demonstrates that he or she was injured “(1) in an occurrence that ordinarily does not happen in the absence of negligence, (2) by an agency or instrumentality within the defendant’s exclusive control ***.” [Citations.]’ ” The supreme court has also stated, “[w]hen res ipsa loquitur i 2003In Gatlin v. Ruder, 137 Ill. 2d 284, 295 , 560 N.E.2d 586 (1990)), the supreme court, quoting Spidle v. Steward, 79 Ill. 2d 1, 5-6 , 402 N.E.2d 216 (1980), stated: “ ‘The res ipsa loquitur doctrine is a species of circumstantial evidence permitting the trier of fact to draw an inference of negligence if plaintiff demonstrates that he or she was injured “(1) in an occurrence that ordinarily does not happen in the absence of negligence, (2) by an agency or instrumentality within the defendant’s exclusive control ***.” [Citations.]’ ” The supreme court has also stated, “[w]hen res ipsa loquitur i | 18 | 1980–2003 |
Bollenbach v. Bloomenthal
red
2 sentences1981(Feldman v. Chicago Railways Co., 289 Ill. 25 ; Bollenhach v. Bloomenthal, 341 Ill. 539 .) This in essence is the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, and its purpose is to allow proof of negligence by circumstantial evidence when the direct evidence concerning cause of injury is primarily within the knowledge and control of the defendant.” (Emphasis added.) ( 32 Ill. 2d 446, 448-49 , 207 N.E.2d 305, 307 .) In subsequent portions of the Metz case the court then uses the standard of “exclusive control” of the instrumentality as a requisite to the application of the doctrine. 1978(Feldman v. Chicago Railways Co. 289 Ill. 25 ; Bollenbach v. Bloomenthal, 341 Ill. 539 .) This in essence is the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, and its purpose is to allow proof of negligence by circumstantial evidence when the direct evidence concerning cause of injury is primarily within the knowledge and control of the defendant. *** Whether the doctrine applies in a given case is a question of law which must be decided by the court, but once this has been answered in the affirmative, it is for the trier of fact to weigh the evidence and determine whether the circumstantial evidence of negl | 17 | 1932–1981 |
Feldman v. Chicago Railways Co.
green
2 sentences1981(Feldman v. Chicago Railways Co., 289 Ill. 25 ; Bollenhach v. Bloomenthal, 341 Ill. 539 .) This in essence is the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, and its purpose is to allow proof of negligence by circumstantial evidence when the direct evidence concerning cause of injury is primarily within the knowledge and control of the defendant.” (Emphasis added.) ( 32 Ill. 2d 446, 448-49 , 207 N.E.2d 305, 307 .) In subsequent portions of the Metz case the court then uses the standard of “exclusive control” of the instrumentality as a requisite to the application of the doctrine. 1978(Feldman v. Chicago Railways Co. 289 Ill. 25 ; Bollenbach v. Bloomenthal, 341 Ill. 539 .) This in essence is the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, and its purpose is to allow proof of negligence by circumstantial evidence when the direct evidence concerning cause of injury is primarily within the knowledge and control of the defendant. *** Whether the doctrine applies in a given case is a question of law which must be decided by the court, but once this has been answered in the affirmative, it is for the trier of fact to weigh the evidence and determine whether the circumstantial evidence of negl | 11 | 1930–1981 |
Imig v. Beck
green
2 sentences2022Id. -9- ¶ 32 Res Ipsa Loquitur ¶ 33 We described the nature and purpose of res ipsa loquitur, “the thing speaks for itself,” in Metz v. Central Illinois Electric & Gas Co., 32 Ill. 2d 446, 448-49 (1965): “When a thing which caused the injury is shown to be under the control or management of the party charged with negligence and the occurrence is such as in the ordinary course of things would not have happened if the person so charged had used proper care, the accident itself affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the party charged, that it arose from want of proper ca 1993Our supreme court expounded on the nature of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine in Imig v. Beck (1986), 115 Ill. 2d 18 , 503 N.E.2d 324 , where it explained: “[R]es ipsa loquitur *** raises an inference of negligence from otherwise inexplicable facts and circumstances by allowing proof of general negligence through circumstantial evidence. [Citations.] To raise the factual inference of negligence, the plaintiff must demonstrate (1) that the agency or instrumentality causing personal injury or property damage was, at the time of the creation of the condition causing the injury or damage, under the | 7 | 1989–2022 |
Edgar County Bank & Trust Co. v. Paris Hospital, Inc.
green
2 sentences1992(Ward v. K mart Corp. (1990), 136 Ill. 2d 132, 140 .) Although proximate cause must be established by normal manners of proof (Edgar County Bank & Trust Co. v. Paris Hospital, Inc. (1974), 57 Ill. 2d 298, 304 ), the evidentiary doctrine of res ipsa loquitur permits evidence of a defendant’s exclusive control of the instrumentality that caused a plaintiff’s injury and the unlikelihood of such injury absent the defendant’s negligence as circumstantial evidence of negligence in lieu of direct evidence (see Dyback v. Weber (1986), 114 Ill. 2d 232, 241 (with adoption of comparative negligence, free 1978The requirements for res ipsa loquitur were set out by the supreme court in Metz v. Central Illinois Electric & Gas Co. (1965), 32 Ill. 2d 446, 448-49 , 207 N.E.2d 305, 307 , as follows: “When a thing which caused the injury is shown to be under the control or management of the party charged with negligence and the occurrence is such as in the ordinary course of things would not have happened if the person so charged had used proper care, the accident itself affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the party charged, that it arose from want of proper care. [Citations.] | 7 | 1975–1992 |
Chicago Union Traction Co. v. Giese
green
2 sentences1949In Chicago Union Traction Co. v. Giese, 229 Ill. 260 , the court said (263): “When a thing which has caused an injury is shown to be under the management of the party charged with negligence, and the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those who have the management use proper care, the accident itself affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the party charged, that it arose from the want of proper care. 1935Co., 289 Ill. 25 ; Chicago Union Traction Co. v. Giese, 229 Ill. 260 .) Many cases of this and other jurisdictions have been cited wherein injuries received by passersby from objects falling from buildings have been held to be governed by the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, and, in our opinion, the applicability of the doctrine to the facts in the instant case requires neither elaboration nor the citation of authorities. | 7 | 1919–1949 |
Erckman v. Northern Illinois Gas Co.
green
2 sentences1985The presence of some control or possession in another does not necessarily destroy the application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine; the nature of the surrounding circumstances and of the intervening control or possession in another determine whether or not the doctrine may be applied. ( Erckman v. Northern Illinois Gas Co. (1965), 61 Ill. 1985App.3d 910, 911 .) The inference of negligence raised by the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not "disappear" when specific evidence of negligence is admitted. ( Kolakowski v. Voris (1980), 83 Ill.2d 388, 397 .) As stated in Erckman v. Northern Illinois Gas Co. (1965), 61 Ill. | 6 | 1968–1992 |
Cobb v. Marshall Field & Co.
green
2 sentences1975Although the trial court instructed the jury on res ipsa, we believe that the doctrine is inapplicable to the present case and that the trial court correctly granted judgment n.o.v. • 4, 5 In order to apply the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, plaintiff must *499 establish that the injury was caused by an agent or instrumentality within the control or management of defendant, that plaintiff was free from contributory negligence, and that the result is one not occurring without negligence in the control or management of the agency or instrumentality. ( Cobb v. Marshall Field & Co. (1959), 22 Ill. 1974(Cobb v. Marshall Field & Company, 22 Ill.App.2d 143 , 159 N.E.2d 520 .) The mere fact that plaintiff has alleged certain specific acts of negligence in the complaint does not mean he could not' also rely, alternatively, upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur if it can be proven. | 6 | 1963–1975 |
O'Rourke v. Marshall Field & Co.
green
2 sentences1975That is a theory of liability founded on the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. (58 Am.Jur.2d Negligence § 474-475 (1971); O'Rourke v. Marshall Field & Co., 307 Ill. 197 .) But, under res ipsa loquitur, except where the intervening possession had been momentary in time ( Johnson v. Stevens Building Catering Co., 323 Ill. 1935The Supreme Court laid down the rule of conduct applicable where the question of negligence is involved, in the case of O’Rourke v. Marshall Field & Co., 307 Ill. 197 , as follows: .“The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not, as is supposed, apply to this case. | 5 | 1930–1975 |
Rinck v. Palos Hills Consolidated High School District No. 230
green
2 sentences1993"The purpose of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine is to allow proof of negligence by circumstantial evidence when the direct evidence concerning the cause of the injury is primarily within the knowledge and control of defendant. [Citations.] To prevail under a res ipsa loquitur theory, plaintiff must establish: `(1) that the occurrence is one that ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence and (2) that the defendant had exclusive control of the instrumentality that caused the injury.'" ( Saieva v. Budget Rent-A-Car (1992), 227 Ill.App.3d 519, 528-29 , 169 Ill.Dec. 334, 340 , 591 N.E.2 1993"The purpose of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine is to allow proof of negligence by circumstantial evidence when the direct evidence concerning the cause of the injury is primarily within the knowledge and control of defendant. [Citations.] To prevail under a res ipsa loquitur theory, plaintiff must establish: `(1) that the occurrence is one that ordinarily does not occur in the absence of negligence and (2) that the defendant had exclusive control of the instrumentality that caused the injury.'" ( Saieva v. Budget Rent-A-Car (1992), 227 Ill.App.3d 519, 528-29 , 169 Ill.Dec. 334, 340 , 591 N.E.2 | 4 | 1982–1993 |
Sullivan v. Edward Hospital
green
2 sentences2025Id. at 109 . ¶ 12 Plaintiff claims to have sought to offer expert testimony from Dr. Patterson that what occurred here constituted a “never event” to support the application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine. 2007The basis for that petition was that the appellate court’s interpretation and application of the res ipsa loquitur doctrine in this case was inconsistent with this court’s decision in Sullivan v. Edward Hospital, 209 Ill. 2d 100 (2004), and represented an unwarranted expansion of the doctrine. | 3 | 2007–2025 |
Turner v. Wallace
green
2 sentences1980In Turner v. Wallace (1966), 71 Ill. 1980In Turner v. Wallace (1966), 71 Ill. | 3 | 1969–1980 |
Jackson v. 919 CORPORATION
green
2 sentences1973Respondent also takes the position that claimant may not rely upon the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur because this doctrine may be invoked only on charges of general negligence, citing three cases: Jackson vs. 919 Corp., et al, 344 Ill. 1967In Metz v. Central Illinois Electric & Gas Co., 32 Ill2d 446, 448, 207 NE2d 305 , the court stated: “When a thing which caused the injury is shown to be under the control or management of the party charged with negligence and the occurrence is such as in the ordinary course of things would not have happened if the person so charged had used proper care, the accident itself affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of an explanation by the party charged, that it arose from want of proper care. [Citing cases.] This in essence is the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, and its purpose is to allow pr | 3 | 1966–1973 |
Chicago Union Traction Co. v. Newmiller
green
2 sentences1938It may be added that the particular force and justice of the presumption, regarded as a rule throwing upon the party charged the duty of producing evidence, consists in the circumstance that the chief evidence of the true cause, whether culpable or innocent, is practically accessible to him but inaccessible to the injured person.” In Chicago Union Traction Co. v. Newmiller, 215 Ill. 383 , the court said at p. 386: “Where an injury occurs to a person who is a passenger, in the exercise of ordinary care, upon the car of a common carrier, by some defect in the machinery wholly under the control o 1908Co. v. Newmiller, 215 Ill. 383 , the injury resulted from an explosion in the controller of an electric motor, and it was said that the case fell fairly within the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur. | 3 | 1908–1938 |
O'Callaghan v. Dellwood Park Co.
green
2 sentences1935The same rule is laid down in O’Callaghan v. Dellwood Park Co., 242 Ill. 336 . 1920The same rule is laid down in O’Callaghan v. Dellwood Park Co., 242 Ill. 336 . | 3 | 1919–1935 |
Illinois Central Railroad v. Swift
neutral
2 sentences1919Co. v. Swift, 213 Ill. 307, 316 , the court says the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur only applies when the accident is such as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those in control use proper care. 1911Co. v. Swift, 213 Ill. 307 , that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur only applies where the accident is snch as in the ordinary course of things does not happen if those in control use proper care, takes this case from under the operation of that doctrine, for there is no sufficient evidence that this accident might not, in the ordinary working of the device have happened to anybody who, at any time the clam came through the port hatch was standing where the plaintiff was standing, nor any evidence that there was anything unusual in the swinging or dropping or general management of the “clam” o | 3 | 1911–1919 |
| Seef v. Ingalls Memorial Hospital green | 2 | 2020–2020 |
| Adams v. Family Planning Associates Medical Group, Inc. green | 2 | 2007–2019 |
| Collins v. Superior Air-Ground Ambulance Service, Inc. green | 2 | 2017–2017 |
| Vertin v. Mau green | 2 | 2015–2015 |
| Bernardi v. Chicago Steel Container Corp. green | 2 | 1991–2007 |
| Golden v. Kishwaukee Community Health Services Center, Inc. green | 2 | 2003–2003 |
| Taylor v. City of Beardstown green | 2 | 1989–1996 |
| Farnor v. Irmco Corp. green | 2 | 1994–1994 |
| Loizzo v. St. Francis Hospital green | 2 | 1988–1994 |
| Montgomery Elevator Co. v. Gordon green | 2 | 1986–1992 |
| Kruger v. Newkirk green | 2 | 1989–1992 |
| Tipton v. Texaco, Inc. green | 2 | 1986–1992 |
| Pedrick v. Peoria & Eastern Railroad green | 2 | 1988–1992 |
| Alvis v. Ribar green | 2 | 1985–1986 |
| Ybarra v. Cross green | 2 | 1977–1986 |
| Hahn v. Eastern Illinois Office Equipment Co. green | 2 | 1985–1985 |
| Cox v. Yellow Cab Co. neutral | 2 | 1975–1981 |
| Hunter v. Alfina green | 2 | 1980–1981 |
| Walker v. Rumer green | 2 | 1978–1979 |
| Kerby v. Chicago Motor Coach Co. green | 2 | 1966–1976 |
| Roberts v. City of Rockford green | 2 | 1946–1958 |
| Barnes v. Danville Street Railway & Right Co. neutral | 2 | 1932–1958 |
| Coal Creek Drainage & Levee District v. Sanitary District green | 2 | 1930–1932 |
| Hart v. Washington Park Club green | 2 | 1900–1921 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.