res ipsa loquitur doctrine in Mississippi

2002She argues that as in Palmer v. Clarksdale Hosp., 206 Miss. 680 , 40 So.2d 582 (1949), the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies in the instant case because an inference of negligence is raised.

2002She argues that as in Palmer v. Clarksdale Hosp., 206 Miss. 680 , 40 So.2d 582 (1949), the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applies in the instant case because an inference of negligence is raised.

1986The text of the opinion is as follows: In Johnson v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 239 Miss. 759 , 125 So.2d 537 (1960), this Court held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applied where a bottle of Coca-Cola unexplainably exploded and injured a person.

1986The text of the opinion is as follows: In Johnson v. Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 239 Miss. 759 , 125 So.2d 537 (1960), this Court held that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applied where a bottle of Coca-Cola unexplainably exploded and injured a person.

1974In Johnson v. Foster, 202 So.2d 520 (Miss. 1967), three of the elements of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur were stated: "(1) the accident must be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone's negligence; (2) it must be caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant; and (3) it must not be due to any voluntary action on the part of the plaintiff." 202 So.2d at 524 .

1974In Johnson v. Foster, 202 So.2d 520 (Miss. 1967), three of the elements of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur were stated: "(1) the accident must be of a kind which ordinarily does not occur in the absence of someone's negligence; (2) it must be caused by an agency or instrumentality within the exclusive control of the defendant; and (3) it must not be due to any voluntary action on the part of the plaintiff." 202 So.2d at 524 .

1965Co. v. Groome, 97 Miss. 201 , 52 So. 703 (1910). *675 In Palmer v. Clarksdale Hospital, supra, it was pointed ont, at page 698, that “the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not in any instance create a case of absolute liability, but simply raises a presumption or makes out a prima facie case of negligence to the extent that the defendant is called upon to meet it with an explanation.” Again, the opinion there cited 38 Am.

1965Co. v. Groome, 97 Miss. 201 , 52 So. 703 (1910). *675 In Palmer v. Clarksdale Hospital, supra, it was pointed ont, at page 698, that “the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur does not in any instance create a case of absolute liability, but simply raises a presumption or makes out a prima facie case of negligence to the extent that the defendant is called upon to meet it with an explanation.” Again, the opinion there cited 38 Am.

1961In the case of Peerless Supply Company, Inc. v. Jeter, 218 Miss. 61 , 65 So. 2d 240 , our Court held that for the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to be applied, the cause of ‘ ‘ the injury must be in the exclusive control and management of the defendant * * *” The rule could not apply in this case since the Ross car was exceeding the speed limit.

1961In the case of Peerless Supply Company, Inc. v. Jeter, 218 Miss. 61 , 65 So. 2d 240 , our Court held that for the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur to be applied, the cause of ‘ ‘ the injury must be in the exclusive control and management of the defendant * * *” The rule could not apply in this case since the Ross car was exceeding the speed limit.

1960Since the decision of the Wheeler case in 1916 this Court has decided the case of Blount v. Houston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 184 Miss. 69 , 185 So. 241 , decided on January 2, 1939, wherein the Court applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, where the plaintiff had become ill because of drinking’ a Coca-Cola which contained a foreign substance.

1960Since the decision of the Wheeler case in 1916 this Court has decided the case of Blount v. Houston Coca-Cola Bottling Co., 184 Miss. 69 , 185 So. 241 , decided on January 2, 1939, wherein the Court applied the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, where the plaintiff had become ill because of drinking’ a Coca-Cola which contained a foreign substance.

1959Picayune Coca-Cola Bottling Co. (Miss. 1955) 82 So. 2nd, 453 , the evidence offered on behalf of the appellant was sufficient to make out a case to go to the jury under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur; but the evidence was not sufficient to warrant the giving of a peremptory instruction in favor of the appellant.

1959Picayune Coca-Cola Bottling Co. (Miss. 1955) 82 So. 2nd, 453 , the evidence offered on behalf of the appellant was sufficient to make out a case to go to the jury under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur; but the evidence was not sufficient to warrant the giving of a peremptory instruction in favor of the appellant.

2022“Because the plaintiff failed to present substantial evidence to foreclose such possibilities as these, he did not satisfy the second element of the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, according to which ‘the circumstances must be such that according to common knowledge and the experience of mankind the accident could not have happened if those having control of the 7 [instrumentality] had not been negligent.’” Id. at 158 (alteration in original) (quoting Ala. Power Co. v. Berry, 48 So. 2d 231 (Ala. 1950)). ¶14.

2018Id. at 698 .

2017Elmore asserts "this is a proper case for [the] application of the negligence doctrine of res ipsa loquitur." "Res ipsa loquitur, literally translated 'the thing speaks for itself,' is simply one form of circumstantial evidence." Gray v. BellSouth Telecomm., Inc. , 11 So.3d 1269 , 1272 (¶ 11) (Miss.

2017"Under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, negligence can be inferred in certain factual situations." Id.

1987Latham v. Hayes, supra .

1977Denman v. Denman, 242 Miss. 59 , 134 So.2d 457 (1961), was a suit by the administrator of the estate of a deceased (passenger in an automobile) charging that the defendant was driving at an unlawful rate of speed and contending that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applied.

1977Denman v. Denman, 242 Miss. 59 , 134 So.2d 457 (1961), was a suit by the administrator of the estate of a deceased (passenger in an automobile) charging that the defendant was driving at an unlawful rate of speed and contending that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur applied.

1977In Larkin v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty Company, 258 So.2d 132 (La.App.1972), the Louisiana Court, in discussing the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, stated: “The doctrine is, however, inapplicable where the injury might have been brought about by one, two, or more causes, neither of which is included nor excluded by any affirmative showing.

1977Nor does the doctrine find application where, from the nature of the facts, it is reasonable to assume that the damage may have been caused by the negligence of another or through the instrumentality or the agency of another, or when the accident might have happened as the result of two or more causes with some of which defendant had no causal connection.” 258 So.2d at 135 .

1968In the case of Fisher v. Daniels, 252 Miss. 662 , 173 So.2d 908 (1965), in which the foregoing instruction was expressly criticized, we based the criticism upon DeLaughter v. Womack, 250 Miss. 190 , 164 So.2d 762 (1964).

1968In the case of Fisher v. Daniels, 252 Miss. 662 , 173 So.2d 908 (1965), in which the foregoing instruction was expressly criticized, we based the criticism upon DeLaughter v. Womack, 250 Miss. 190 , 164 So.2d 762 (1964).

1967See Orme v. Burr, 157 Fla. 378 , 25 So.2d 870 (1946); Rupe v. Smith, 181 Kan. 606 , 313 P.2d 293 (1957); Vernon v. Gentry, 334 S.W.2d 266 , 79 A.L.R.2d 1 (Ky. 1960); Hamburger v. Katz, 10 La.

1967See Orme v. Burr, 157 Fla. 378 , 25 So.2d 870 (1946); Rupe v. Smith, 181 Kan. 606 , 313 P.2d 293 (1957); Vernon v. Gentry, 334 S.W.2d 266 , 79 A.L.R.2d 1 (Ky. 1960); Hamburger v. Katz, 10 La.

1967In affirming Sibley, 2 N.J. 458 , 66 A.2d 864 (N.J. 1949), the court noted that the bus accident occurred at 2:30 a.m. on a "very, very cold" and "blustery" night and that the roadway was "very glassy." The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was applied in this case, the court stating: A common carrier of passengers is charged with the duty of using a high degree of care for their safety. * * * Negligence was reasonably inferable from the circumstances.

1967In affirming Sibley, 2 N.J. 458 , 66 A.2d 864 (N.J. 1949), the court noted that the bus accident occurred at 2:30 a.m. on a "very, very cold" and "blustery" night and that the roadway was "very glassy." The doctrine of res ipsa loquitur was applied in this case, the court stating: A common carrier of passengers is charged with the duty of using a high degree of care for their safety. * * * Negligence was reasonably inferable from the circumstances.

1967We agree with the trial judge who stated, "The evidence is wholly insufficient to point any degree of negligence whatever to defendant." We believe this case to be governed by the cases of Daniel v. Jackson Infirmary, 173 Miss. 832 , 163 So. 447 (1935), and Oliver v. American Republic Finance Corp., 246 Miss. 829 , 152 So.2d 705 (1963).

1967We agree with the trial judge who stated, "The evidence is wholly insufficient to point any degree of negligence whatever to defendant." We believe this case to be governed by the cases of Daniel v. Jackson Infirmary, 173 Miss. 832 , 163 So. 447 (1935), and Oliver v. American Republic Finance Corp., 246 Miss. 829 , 152 So.2d 705 (1963).

1967See Orme v. Burr, 157 Fla. 378 , 25 So.2d 870 (1946); Rupe v. Smith, 181 Kan. 606 , 313 P.2d 293 (1957); Vernon v. Gentry, 334 S.W.2d 266 , 79 A.L.R.2d 1 (Ky. 1960); Hamburger v. Katz, 10 La.

1967Thus, in Weller v. Worstall (1934) 50 Ohio App 11, 3 Ohio Ops 414, 19 Ohio L Abs 479, 197 NE 410 , affd 129 Ohio St 596, 3 Ohio Ops 12, 196 NE 637 , the court expressly rejected the contention that the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur could not be invoked against the estate of one who died as a result of the accident, by saying: `It is stated that the real reason for the rule lies in the fact that the cause of injury is usually known by the defendant and unknown to the plaintiff, and that when the reason for the rule fails the rule becomes inoperative.