14 Colorado opinions name it 2 courts 1946–2025 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Colorado courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Chevron Oil Co. v. Husonred2 sentences1987Second, the court must “ ‘weigh the merits and demerits [of retroactive application] in each case by looking to the history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective application will further or retard its operation.’” Id. at 106-07 , 92 S.Ct. at 355 (quoting Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629 , 85 S.Ct. 1731, 1738 , 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965)). 1987Second, the court must “ ‘weigh the merits and demerits [of retroactive application] in each case by looking to the history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective application will further or retard its operation.’” Id. at 106-07 , 92 S.Ct. at 355 (quoting Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629 , 85 S.Ct. 1731, 1738 , 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965)). | 1 | 4 |
Van Diest v. Towlegreen2 sentences2016See Van Diest v. Towle, 179 P.2d 984, 987 (Colo. 1947) (recounting in detail the history of the doctrine). 2016See Van Diest v. Towle, 116 Colo. 204 , 179 P.2d 984, 987 (1947) (recounting in detail the history of the doctrine). | 1 | 1 |
People v. O'NEALgreen1 sentence2015See § 24-214, C.R.S. 2014; People v. O'Neal, 228 P.3d 211, 214-15 (Colo.App.2009) (reciting the history of the rule in Colorado). | 1 | 1 |
Garg v. MacOmb County Community Mental Health Servicesgreen2 sentences2007See generally Sumner v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 427 Mich. 505 , 398 N.W.2d 368 (1986) (cited in Gallagher for its discussion of the history of the doctrine), overruled by Garg v. Macomb County Cmty. Mental Health Servs., 472 Mich. 263 , 696 N.W.2d 646 (2005). 2007See generally Sumner v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 427 Mich. 505 , 398 N.W.2d 368 (1986) (cited in Gallagher for its discussion of the history of the doctrine), overruled by Garg v. Macomb County Cmty. Mental Health Servs., 472 Mich. 263 , 696 N.W.2d 646 (2005). | 1 | 1 |
Thomas v. Panggreen2 sentences1993See Furstein, 590 A.2d at 943 (quoting Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill.2d 406, 413 , 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960)) ("[T]he rule had its origins in a social system in which `the landowner was sovereign within his own boundaries' and owed a licensee only the duty not to injure him wilfully or wantonly."); Young, 569 A.2d at 1175 (noting that the rule originally developed in the context of landowner liability law); Thomas, 811 P.2d at 823 (noting that, historically, the rule was explained in the context of landowner liability, where firemen were classified as licensees); Winn, 777 P.2d at 724 (noting that land 1993See Furstein, 590 A.2d at 943 (quoting Dini v. Naiditch, 20 I11.2d 406, 413, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960)) (“[T]he rule had its origins in a social system in which ‘the landowner was sovereign within his own boundaries’ and owed a licensee only the duty not to injure him wilfully or wantonly.”); Young, 569 A.2d at 1175 (noting that the rule originally developed in the context of landowner liability law); Thomas, 811 P.2d at 823 (noting that, historically, the rule was explained in the context of landowner liability, where firemen were classified as licensees); Winn, 111 P.2d at 724 (noting that lando | 1 | 1 |
Dini v. Naiditchgreen2 sentences1993See Furstein, 590 A.2d at 943 (quoting Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill.2d 406, 413 , 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960)) ("[T]he rule had its origins in a social system in which `the landowner was sovereign within his own boundaries' and owed a licensee only the duty not to injure him wilfully or wantonly."); Young, 569 A.2d at 1175 (noting that the rule originally developed in the context of landowner liability law); Thomas, 811 P.2d at 823 (noting that, historically, the rule was explained in the context of landowner liability, where firemen were classified as licensees); Winn, 777 P.2d at 724 (noting that land 1993See Furstein, 590 A.2d at 943 (quoting Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill.2d 406, 413 , 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960)) ("[T]he rule had its origins in a social system in which `the landowner was sovereign within his own boundaries' and owed a licensee only the duty not to injure him wilfully or wantonly."); Young, 569 A.2d at 1175 (noting that the rule originally developed in the context of landowner liability law); Thomas, 811 P.2d at 823 (noting that, historically, the rule was explained in the context of landowner liability, where firemen were classified as licensees); Winn, 777 P.2d at 724 (noting that land | 1 | 1 |
Furstein v. Hillgreen2 sentences1993See Furstein, 590 A.2d at 943 (quoting Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill.2d 406, 413 , 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960)) ("[T]he rule had its origins in a social system in which `the landowner was sovereign within his own boundaries' and owed a licensee only the duty not to injure him wilfully or wantonly."); Young, 569 A.2d at 1175 (noting that the rule originally developed in the context of landowner liability law); Thomas, 811 P.2d at 823 (noting that, historically, the rule was explained in the context of landowner liability, where firemen were classified as licensees); Winn, 777 P.2d at 724 (noting that land 1993See Furstein, 590 A.2d at 943 (quoting Dini v. Naiditch, 20 I11.2d 406, 413, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960)) (“[T]he rule had its origins in a social system in which ‘the landowner was sovereign within his own boundaries’ and owed a licensee only the duty not to injure him wilfully or wantonly.”); Young, 569 A.2d at 1175 (noting that the rule originally developed in the context of landowner liability law); Thomas, 811 P.2d at 823 (noting that, historically, the rule was explained in the context of landowner liability, where firemen were classified as licensees); Winn, 111 P.2d at 724 (noting that lando | 1 | 1 |
Kreski v. Modern Wholesale Electric Supply Co.green2 sentences1993See Furstein, 590 A.2d at 943 (quoting Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill.2d 406, 413 , 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960)) ("[T]he rule had its origins in a social system in which `the landowner was sovereign within his own boundaries' and owed a licensee only the duty not to injure him wilfully or wantonly."); Young, 569 A.2d at 1175 (noting that the rule originally developed in the context of landowner liability law); Thomas, 811 P.2d at 823 (noting that, historically, the rule was explained in the context of landowner liability, where firemen were classified as licensees); Winn, 777 P.2d at 724 (noting that land 1993See Furstein, 590 A.2d at 943 (quoting Dini v. Naiditch, 20 I11.2d 406, 413, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960)) (“[T]he rule had its origins in a social system in which ‘the landowner was sovereign within his own boundaries’ and owed a licensee only the duty not to injure him wilfully or wantonly.”); Young, 569 A.2d at 1175 (noting that the rule originally developed in the context of landowner liability law); Thomas, 811 P.2d at 823 (noting that, historically, the rule was explained in the context of landowner liability, where firemen were classified as licensees); Winn, 111 P.2d at 724 (noting that lando | 1 | 1 |
Flowers v. Rock Creek Terrace Ltd. Partnershipgreen2 sentences1993See Furstein, 590 A.2d at 943 (quoting Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill.2d 406, 413 , 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960)) ("[T]he rule had its origins in a social system in which `the landowner was sovereign within his own boundaries' and owed a licensee only the duty not to injure him wilfully or wantonly."); Young, 569 A.2d at 1175 (noting that the rule originally developed in the context of landowner liability law); Thomas, 811 P.2d at 823 (noting that, historically, the rule was explained in the context of landowner liability, where firemen were classified as licensees); Winn, 777 P.2d at 724 (noting that land 1993See Furstein, 590 A.2d at 943 (quoting Dini v. Naiditch, 20 I11.2d 406, 413, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960)) (“[T]he rule had its origins in a social system in which ‘the landowner was sovereign within his own boundaries’ and owed a licensee only the duty not to injure him wilfully or wantonly.”); Young, 569 A.2d at 1175 (noting that the rule originally developed in the context of landowner liability law); Thomas, 811 P.2d at 823 (noting that, historically, the rule was explained in the context of landowner liability, where firemen were classified as licensees); Winn, 111 P.2d at 724 (noting that lando | 1 | 1 |
Winn v. Frashergreen1 sentence1993See Furstein, 590 A.2d at 943 (quoting Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill.2d 406, 413 , 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960)) ("[T]he rule had its origins in a social system in which `the landowner was sovereign within his own boundaries' and owed a licensee only the duty not to injure him wilfully or wantonly."); Young, 569 A.2d at 1175 (noting that the rule originally developed in the context of landowner liability law); Thomas, 811 P.2d at 823 (noting that, historically, the rule was explained in the context of landowner liability, where firemen were classified as licensees); Winn, 777 P.2d at 724 (noting that land | 1 | 1 |
Young v. Sherwin-Williams Co., Inc.green2 sentences1993See Furstein, 590 A.2d at 943 (quoting Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill.2d 406, 413 , 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960)) ("[T]he rule had its origins in a social system in which `the landowner was sovereign within his own boundaries' and owed a licensee only the duty not to injure him wilfully or wantonly."); Young, 569 A.2d at 1175 (noting that the rule originally developed in the context of landowner liability law); Thomas, 811 P.2d at 823 (noting that, historically, the rule was explained in the context of landowner liability, where firemen were classified as licensees); Winn, 777 P.2d at 724 (noting that land 1993See Furstein, 590 A.2d at 943 (quoting Dini v. Naiditch, 20 I11.2d 406, 413, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960)) (“[T]he rule had its origins in a social system in which ‘the landowner was sovereign within his own boundaries’ and owed a licensee only the duty not to injure him wilfully or wantonly.”); Young, 569 A.2d at 1175 (noting that the rule originally developed in the context of landowner liability law); Thomas, 811 P.2d at 823 (noting that, historically, the rule was explained in the context of landowner liability, where firemen were classified as licensees); Winn, 111 P.2d at 724 (noting that lando | 1 | 1 |
Santangelo v. State of NYgreen2 sentences1993See Furstein, 590 A.2d at 943 (quoting Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill.2d 406, 413 , 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960)) ("[T]he rule had its origins in a social system in which `the landowner was sovereign within his own boundaries' and owed a licensee only the duty not to injure him wilfully or wantonly."); Young, 569 A.2d at 1175 (noting that the rule originally developed in the context of landowner liability law); Thomas, 811 P.2d at 823 (noting that, historically, the rule was explained in the context of landowner liability, where firemen were classified as licensees); Winn, 777 P.2d at 724 (noting that land 1993See Furstein, 590 A.2d at 943 (quoting Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill.2d 406, 413 , 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960)) ("[T]he rule had its origins in a social system in which `the landowner was sovereign within his own boundaries' and owed a licensee only the duty not to injure him wilfully or wantonly."); Young, 569 A.2d at 1175 (noting that the rule originally developed in the context of landowner liability law); Thomas, 811 P.2d at 823 (noting that, historically, the rule was explained in the context of landowner liability, where firemen were classified as licensees); Winn, 777 P.2d at 724 (noting that land | 1 | 1 |
Mignone v. Fieldcrest Millsgreen2 sentences1993See Furstein, 590 A.2d at 943 (quoting Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill.2d 406, 413 , 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960)) ("[T]he rule had its origins in a social system in which `the landowner was sovereign within his own boundaries' and owed a licensee only the duty not to injure him wilfully or wantonly."); Young, 569 A.2d at 1175 (noting that the rule originally developed in the context of landowner liability law); Thomas, 811 P.2d at 823 (noting that, historically, the rule was explained in the context of landowner liability, where firemen were classified as licensees); Winn, 777 P.2d at 724 (noting that land 1993See Furstein, 590 A.2d at 943 (quoting Dini v. Naiditch, 20 I11.2d 406, 413, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960)) (“[T]he rule had its origins in a social system in which ‘the landowner was sovereign within his own boundaries’ and owed a licensee only the duty not to injure him wilfully or wantonly.”); Young, 569 A.2d at 1175 (noting that the rule originally developed in the context of landowner liability law); Thomas, 811 P.2d at 823 (noting that, historically, the rule was explained in the context of landowner liability, where firemen were classified as licensees); Winn, 111 P.2d at 724 (noting that lando | 1 | 1 |
Krause v. US Truck Co., Inc.green2 sentences1993See Furstein, 590 A.2d at 943 (quoting Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill.2d 406, 413 , 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960)) ("[T]he rule had its origins in a social system in which `the landowner was sovereign within his own boundaries' and owed a licensee only the duty not to injure him wilfully or wantonly."); Young, 569 A.2d at 1175 (noting that the rule originally developed in the context of landowner liability law); Thomas, 811 P.2d at 823 (noting that, historically, the rule was explained in the context of landowner liability, where firemen were classified as licensees); Winn, 777 P.2d at 724 (noting that land 1993See Furstein, 590 A.2d at 943 (quoting Dini v. Naiditch, 20 I11.2d 406, 413, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960)) (“[T]he rule had its origins in a social system in which ‘the landowner was sovereign within his own boundaries’ and owed a licensee only the duty not to injure him wilfully or wantonly.”); Young, 569 A.2d at 1175 (noting that the rule originally developed in the context of landowner liability law); Thomas, 811 P.2d at 823 (noting that, historically, the rule was explained in the context of landowner liability, where firemen were classified as licensees); Winn, 111 P.2d at 724 (noting that lando | 1 | 1 |
Steelman v. Lindgreen2 sentences1993See Furstein, 590 A.2d at 943 (quoting Dini v. Naiditch, 20 Ill.2d 406, 413 , 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960)) ("[T]he rule had its origins in a social system in which `the landowner was sovereign within his own boundaries' and owed a licensee only the duty not to injure him wilfully or wantonly."); Young, 569 A.2d at 1175 (noting that the rule originally developed in the context of landowner liability law); Thomas, 811 P.2d at 823 (noting that, historically, the rule was explained in the context of landowner liability, where firemen were classified as licensees); Winn, 777 P.2d at 724 (noting that land 1993See Furstein, 590 A.2d at 943 (quoting Dini v. Naiditch, 20 I11.2d 406, 413, 170 N.E.2d 881 (1960)) (“[T]he rule had its origins in a social system in which ‘the landowner was sovereign within his own boundaries’ and owed a licensee only the duty not to injure him wilfully or wantonly.”); Young, 569 A.2d at 1175 (noting that the rule originally developed in the context of landowner liability law); Thomas, 811 P.2d at 823 (noting that, historically, the rule was explained in the context of landowner liability, where firemen were classified as licensees); Winn, 111 P.2d at 724 (noting that lando | 1 | 1 |
Farmer v. Norm \Fair Trade\" Stampgreen2 sentences1981Compare Vanadium Corp. v. Wesco Stores Co., supra, with Farmer v. Norm “Fair Trade” Stamp, Inc., 164 Colo. 156 , 433 P.2d 490 (1967). 1981Compare Vanadium Corp. v. Wesco Stores Co., supra, with Farmer v. Norm “Fair Trade” Stamp, Inc., 164 Colo. 156 , 433 P.2d 490 (1967). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Sumner v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co.red2 sentences2007See generally Sumner v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 427 Mich. 505 , 398 N.W.2d 368 (1986) (cited in Gallagher for its discussion of the history of the doctrine), overruled by Garg v. Macomb County Cmty. Mental Health Servs., 472 Mich. 263 , 696 N.W.2d 646 (2005). 2007See generally Sumner v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 427 Mich. 505 , 398 N.W.2d 368 (1986) (cited in Gallagher for its discussion of the history of the doctrine), overruled by Garg v. Macomb County Cmty. Mental Health Servs., 472 Mich. 263 , 696 N.W.2d 646 (2005). | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Linkletter v. Walker
red
2 sentences1992The second factor in Chevron, whether retrospective application of the new rule would further or retard its operation, was derived from an earlier criminal case, Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 , 85 S.Ct. 1731 , 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965), which held: Once the premise is accepted that we are neither required to apply, nor prohibited from applying a decision retrospectively, we must then weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retroactive operation will further or retard its operation. 1992The second factor in Chevron, whether retrospective application of the new rule would further or retard its operation, was derived from an earlier criminal case, Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 , 85 S.Ct. 1731 , 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965), which held: Once the premise is accepted that we are neither required to apply, nor prohibited from applying a decision retrospectively, we must then weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retroactive operation will further or retard its operation. | 3 | 1987–1992 |
cluster 2
green
1 sentence2011Id. at 70 (quoting S.Rep. | 1 | 2011–2011 |
DCB Construction Co. v. Central City Development Co.
green
2 sentences1998The court of appeals was skeptical about whether CCDC had been enriched since the construction work was "simply part of the consideration that the lessee agreed to provide to the lessor in return for the creation of a leasehold in the property by the lessor.” DCB Constr., 940 P.2d at 964 . 1998U.L.Rev. 547, 554-560 (1986)(tracing the history of the claim and noting that courts have occasionally added extra, often inappropriate, elements). [6] The court of appeals was skeptical about whether CCDC had been enriched since the construction work was "simply part of the consideration that the lessee agreed to provide to the lessor in return for the creation of a leasehold in the property by the lessor." DCB Constr., 940 P.2d at 964 . | 1 | 1998–1998 |
Marinez v. INDUSTRIAL COM'N OF STATE
green
1 sentence1991Third, the court must weigh the inequity that would be imposed by retroactive application in order to avoid injustice or hardship.” (emphasis added) Marinez v. Industrial Commission, 746 P.2d 552 (Colo.1987). | 1 | 1991–1991 |
Miller Bros., Inc. v. Public Utilities Commission
green
1 sentence1977Ind. 1955). 3 We realize this is contra to our intention to remain silent as expressed two and one-half years ago in Miller, supra. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Contract Steel Carriers, Inc. v. United States
neutral
1 sentence1977A discussion of the history of this test is found in Contract Steel Carriers v. U.S., 128 F. Supp. 25 (N.D. | 1 | 1977–1977 |
Wilson v. People
green
2 sentences1946Wilson v. People, 103 Colo. 150, 157 , 84 P. (2d) 463 . 6. 1946Wilson v. People, 103 Colo. 150, 157 , 84 P. (2d) 463 . 6. | 1 | 1946–1946 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.