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25 Oregon opinions name it 3 courts 1954–2025 4 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Oregon courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
A. G. v. Guitrongreen2 sentences2023See A. G. v. Guitron, 351 Or 465, 471, 479 , 268 P3d 589 (2011) (applying Oregon’s traditional meth- ods of statutory interpretation to the interpretation of an Oregon Rule of Civil Procedure). 2023See A. G. v. Guitron, 351 Or 465, 471, 479 , 268 P3d 589 (2011) (applying Oregon’s traditional meth- ods of statutory interpretation to the interpretation of an Oregon Rule of Civil Procedure). | 3 | 3 |
State Land Board v. SAUSEgreen2 sentences2014See Sause, 217 Or at 80; 1 Water and Water Rights § 6.03(b)(2). 10 For a history of the doctrine of accretion, see Joseph L. 2014See Sause, 217 Or at 80 ; 1 Water and Water Rights § 6.03(b)(2). 10 For a history of the doctrine of accretion, see Joseph L. | 3 | 3 |
Fort Vannoy Irrigation District v. Water Resources Commissiongreen2 sentences2020See generally Fort Vannoy Irrigation v. Water Resources Comm., 345 Or 56, 64-67 , 188 P3d 277 (2008) (describ- ing the history of the doctrine of prior appropriation in Oregon). 2020See generally Fort Vannoy Irrigation v. Water Resources Comm., 345 Or 56, 64-67 , 188 P3d 277 (2008) (describ- ing the history of the doctrine of prior appropriation in Oregon). | 2 | 2 |
State v. Huggreen2 sentences2025See State v. Hug, 186 Or App 569, 572-73 , 64 P3d 1173 , rev den, 335 Or 510 (2003) (trial court may consider “the need of the public and all defendants for expedition in the court system” in deciding whether to grant a continuance request). 2025See State v. Hug, 186 Or App 569, 572-73 , 64 P3d 1173 , rev den, 335 Or 510 (2003) (trial court may consider “the need of the public and all defendants for expedition in the court system” in deciding whether to grant a continuance request). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Sorianogreen1 sentence2015See, e.g., Soriano, 68 Or App at 648 (discussing “the derivative use problem” in the history of immunity statutes). | 1 | 1 |
Bunnell v. Employment Divisiongreen2 sentences1993See Bunnell v. Employment Division, 304 Or 11, 14-15 , 741 P2d 887 (1987) (discussing the history of the rule). 1993See Bunnell v. Employment Division, 304 Or 11, 14-15 , 741 P2d 887 (1987) (discussing the history of the rule). | 1 | 1 |
State v. Thomasgreen2 sentences1992OEC 801(4)(a)(C) provides: “A statement is not hearsay if: “(a) The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is <<* * * * * “(C) One of identification of a person made after perceiving the person.” OEC 611(3) provides in part that: “When a party calls a hostile witness, an adverse party, or a witness identified with an adverse party, interrogation may be by leading questions.” The concept of reasonable doubt predates Commonwealth v. Webster, supra. See State v. Thomas, 311 Or 182 , 185 nn 2 & 3, 806 P2d 689 (199 1992OEC 801(4)(a)(C) provides: “A statement is not hearsay if: “(a) The declarant testifies at the trial or hearing and is subject to cross-examination concerning the statement, and the statement is <<* * * * * “(C) One of identification of a person made after perceiving the person.” OEC 611(3) provides in part that: “When a party calls a hostile witness, an adverse party, or a witness identified with an adverse party, interrogation may be by leading questions.” The concept of reasonable doubt predates Commonwealth v. Webster, supra. See State v. Thomas, 311 Or 182 , 185 nn 2 & 3, 806 P2d 689 (199 | 1 | 1 |
Cain v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurancegreen2 sentences1990Enforcement of a partial assignment of a claim was permitted in equity, however, by the process of requiring joinder of all interested parties; *1234 i.e. the assignor and all partial assignees." Cain v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 47 Cal. App.3d 783, 794 , 121 Cal. Rptr. 200, 207 (1975). 1990Enforcement of a partial assignment of a claim was permitted in equity, however, by the process of requiring joinder of all interested parties; *1234 i.e. the assignor and all partial assignees." Cain v. State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Co., 47 Cal. App.3d 783, 794 , 121 Cal. Rptr. 200, 207 (1975). | 1 | 1 |
Jones v. United Statesgreen1 sentence1982See Minutes: Criminal Law Rev Comm 46-47 (June 16, 1972), Subcomm No. 2, p 5 (June 5, 1972), and p 10 (January 18, 1972). 3 It has been suggested in dicta in Jones v. United States, 357 US 493, 498-499 (1958), that another purpose of the rule is protection of privacy. | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Oregon. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Dale v. Kulongoski
green
2 sentences2019Bobo, 338 Or at 120 (citing Dale v. Kulongoski, 322 Or 240, 242-43 , 905 P2d 844 (1995)). 2019Bobo, 338 Or at 120 (citing Dale v. Kulongoski, 322 Or 240, 242-43 , 905 P2d 844 (1995)). | 1 | 2019–2019 |
State v. Lazarides
green
1 sentence2016Thus, the history of the rule’s amend- ment establishes that the current version of the rule was intended to implement the “narrow” policy rationale for Cite as 358 Or 728 (2016) 739 the rule—“the inability of the appellate court to enforce a judgment against a fleeing defendant”—as opposed to the broader “waiver of appeal” policy behind the 2011 version of the rule. | 1 | 2016–2016 |
Cranford v. McNiece
green
2 sentences2014In fact, the Supreme Court explained that the changing of the rule that “a release of one tortfeasor releases all others” is “an excellent example of the history of a rule of law based on sterile and questionable logic, rather than reality.” Cranford v. McNiece, 252 Or 446, 450 , 450 P2d 529 (1969). 2014In fact, the Supreme Court explained that the changing of the rule that “a release of one tortfeasor releases all others” is “an excellent example of the history of a rule of law based on sterile and questionable logic, rather than reality.” Cranford v. McNiece, 252 Or 446, 450 , 450 P2d 529 (1969). | 1 | 2014–2014 |
Providence Health System v. Walker
green
1 sentence2013Id. at 490 . | 1 | 2013–2013 |
Carlson v. Myers
green
2 sentences2004For that proposition, SAIF relies on Carlson v. Myers, 327 Or 213 , 959 P2d 31 (1998). 2004For that proposition, SAIF relies on Carlson v. Myers, 327 Or 213 , 959 P2d 31 (1998). | 1 | 2004–2004 |
State v. Dick
green
2 sentences1997In State v. Dick, 91 Or App 294 , 754 P2d 628 (1988), we examined the history of the rule and the purpose of the ballot measure. 1997In State v. Dick, 91 Or App 294 , 754 P2d 628 (1988), we examined the history of the rule and the purpose of the ballot measure. | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Portland General Electric Co. v. Bureau of Labor & Industries
green
2 sentences1996PGE, 317 Or. at 606 , 859 P.2d 1143 . 1996PGE, 317 Or. at 606 , 859 P.2d 1143 . | 1 | 1996–1996 |
State v. Clark
green
1 sentence1993Antedating the Civil War and the equal protection clause of the fourteenth amendment, its language reflects early egalitarian objections to favoritism and special privileges for a few rather than the concern of the Reconstruction Congress about discrimination against disfavored individuals or groups.” 291 Or at 236 . | 1 | 1993–1993 |
Clark v. Mcgee
neutral
2 sentences1983Clark v. McGee, supra , is a memorandum opinion, relying in part upon Sheridan v. Crisona, supra , affording to a chairman of the town board an absolute privilege for speech uttered to the press "acting pursuant to his duties in releasing the information to the public on an issue of legitimate public concern." The court did not identify the source of that duty. 1983Clark v. McGee, supra, is a memorandum opinion, relying in part upon Sheridan v. Crisona, supra, affording to a chairman of the town board an absolute privilege for speech uttered to the press “acting pursuant to his duties in releasing the information to the public on an issue of legitimate public concern.” The court did not identify the source of that duty. | 1 | 1983–1983 |
Gooding v. United States
green
2 sentences1982Affirmed. 1 Cf. FRCrP 41(c), which provides: “* * * The warrant shall be served in the daytime, unless the issuing authority, by appropriate provision in the warrant, and for reasonable cause shown, authorizes its execution at times other than daytime. * * *” The history of this rule is set out in Gooding v. United States, 416 US 430, 438-39 , 94 S Ct 1780 , 40 L Ed 2d 250 (1974). 2 Passing comments during the Criminal Law Revision Commission deliberations are not conclusive, but indicate that the Commission regarded this requirement as implicit. 1982Affirmed. 1 Cf. FRCrP 41(c), which provides: “* * * The warrant shall be served in the daytime, unless the issuing authority, by appropriate provision in the warrant, and for reasonable cause shown, authorizes its execution at times other than daytime. * * *” The history of this rule is set out in Gooding v. United States, 416 US 430, 438-39 , 94 S Ct 1780 , 40 L Ed 2d 250 (1974). 2 Passing comments during the Criminal Law Revision Commission deliberations are not conclusive, but indicate that the Commission regarded this requirement as implicit. | 1 | 1982–1982 |
Johnson v. New Jersey
green
2 sentences1969The fact that there is a likelihood of unreliability in the truth-determining process in itself is not enough to *48 call for the retrospective application of a rule. [2] As the Court explained in Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 729 , 86 S.Ct. 1772, 1779 , 16 L.Ed.2d 882 (1966), the question of whether retrospective application of a principle is to be made is "a question of probabilities" and the court "must take account, among other factors, of the extent to which other safeguards are available to protect the integrity of the truth-determining process at trial." If, after taking into acc 1969The fact that there is a likelihood of unreliability in the truth-determining process in itself is not enough to *48 call for the retrospective application of a rule. [2] As the Court explained in Johnson v. New Jersey, 384 U.S. 719, 729 , 86 S.Ct. 1772, 1779 , 16 L.Ed.2d 882 (1966), the question of whether retrospective application of a principle is to be made is "a question of probabilities" and the court "must take account, among other factors, of the extent to which other safeguards are available to protect the integrity of the truth-determining process at trial." If, after taking into acc | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Linkletter v. Walker
red
2 sentences1969We learn from Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 , 85 S.Ct. 1731 , 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965) that in determining whether a rule is to operate retrospectively the court is to "weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation." 381 U.S. at 629 , 85 S.Ct. at 1738 . 1969We learn from Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 , 85 S.Ct. 1731 , 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965) that in determining whether a rule is to operate retrospectively the court is to "weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation." 381 U.S. at 629 , 85 S.Ct. at 1738 . | 1 | 1969–1969 |
Makino v. Spokane, Portland & Seattle Railway Co.
neutral
2 sentences1954Co., 155 Or 317, 324 , 63 P2d 1082 , we discussed in detail the history of the doctrine of assumption of risk and the later modifications thereof. 1954Co., 155 Or 317, 324 , 63 P2d 1082 , we discussed in detail the history of the doctrine of assumption of risk and the later modifications thereof. | 1 | 1954–1954 |
Counted by distinct opinions that both name this issue and are annotated to the section; sections every opinion cites regardless of issue are not filtered here, so read the counts against the total above.
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.