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12 Arizona opinions name it 2 courts 1960–2014 0 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Arizona courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Richardson v. Heneygreen2 sentences2014Cf. Richardson v. Heney, 18 Ariz. 186, 194-95 , 157 P. 980, 983-84 (1916) (joint-venture partner in a “special and confidential” relationship owed disclosure duty to partner); see generally Hill, 151 Ariz. at 84 , 725 P.2d at 1118 (“This is not the place to trace the history of the doctrine of caveat emptor.”). 9 As we stated above in discussing Restatement Second § 551, a seller’s duty to disclose in a situation such as present here is a product of the “continuing development of modern business ethics,” not the historic common law. 2014Cf. Richardson v. Heney, 18 Ariz. 186, 194-95 , 157 P. 980, 983-84 (1916) (joint-venture partner in a “special and confidential” relationship owed disclosure duty to partner); see generally Hill, 151 Ariz. at 84 , 725 P.2d at 1118 (“This is not the place to trace the history of the doctrine of caveat emptor.”). 9 As we stated above in discussing Restatement Second § 551, a seller’s duty to disclose in a situation such as present here is a product of the “continuing development of modern business ethics,” not the historic common law. | 2 | 2 |
Hill v. Jonesgreen2 sentences2014Cf. Richardson v. Heney, 18 Ariz. 186, 194-95 , 157 P. 980, 983-84 (1916) (joint-venture partner in a “special and confidential” relationship owed disclosure duty to partner); see generally Hill, 151 Ariz. at 84 , 725 P.2d at 1118 (“This is not the place to trace the history of the doctrine of caveat emptor.”). 9 As we stated above in discussing Restatement Second § 551, a seller’s duty to disclose in a situation such as present here is a product of the “continuing development of modern business ethics,” not the historic common law. 2014Cf. Richardson v. Heney, 18 Ariz. 186, 194-95 , 157 P. 980, 983-84 (1916) (joint-venture partner in a “special and confidential” relationship owed disclosure duty to partner); see generally Hill, 151 Ariz. at 84 , 725 P.2d at 1118 (“This is not the place to trace the history of the doctrine of caveat emptor.”). 9 As we stated above in discussing Restatement Second § 551, a seller’s duty to disclose in a situation such as present here is a product of the “continuing development of modern business ethics,” not the historic common law. | 2 | 2 |
State v. SUPERIOR COURT, IN AND FOR CTY. OF PIMAgreen2 sentences2003In State v. Superior Court, 138 Ariz. 4, 6-7 , 672 P.2d 956, 958-59 (App. 1983), this court noted that it was anomalous to mandate custody in jail pending sentencing for those likely to be granted probation and suggested that “the rule should be changed to give the trial court discretion to continue the defendant on bond if there is a reasonable probability that the defendant will be placed on probation.”6 In 1989, a Maricopa County Superior Court judge petitioned our supreme court to change the rule, expressing the same sentiment. 2003In State v. Superior Court, 138 Ariz. 4, 6-7 , 672 P.2d 956, 958-59 (App. 1983), this court noted that it was anomalous to mandate custody in jail pending sentencing for those likely to be granted probation and suggested that “the rule should be changed to give the trial court discretion to continue the defendant on bond if there is a reasonable probability that the defendant will be placed on probation.”6 In 1989, a Maricopa County Superior Court judge petitioned our supreme court to change the rule, expressing the same sentiment. | 2 | 2 |
Linkletter v. Walkerred2 sentences1982In applying *437 this rule, “we must * * * weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retroactive operation will further or retard its operation.” Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629 , 85 S.Ct. 1731, 1738 , 14 L.Ed.2d 601, 608 (1965). 1982In applying *437 this rule, “we must * * * weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retroactive operation will further or retard its operation.” Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629 , 85 S.Ct. 1731, 1738 , 14 L.Ed.2d 601, 608 (1965). | 1 | 3 |
State v. Woodygreen2 sentences1967See State v. Woody, 7 Ariz. App. 26 , 435 P.2d 861 (1967), for some of the history of this rule. 2 . 1967See State v. Woody, 7 Ariz. App. 26 , 435 P.2d 861 (1967), for some of the history of this rule. 2 . | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Arizona. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
Nelson v. Industrial Com'n of Arizona
green
2 sentences1983Id. 134 Ariz. at 374 , 656 P.2d at 1235 . 1983Id. 134 Ariz. at 374 , 656 P.2d at 1235 . | 2 | 1983–1983 |
Cipriano v. City of Houma
green
2 sentences1979Finally, we have weighed the inequity imposed by retroactive application, for `[w]here a decision of this Court could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis in our cases for avoiding the "injustice or hardship" by a holding of nonretroactivity.' Cipriano v. City of Houma, supra, 395 U.S. [701], at 706, 89 S.Ct. [1897], at 1900 [ 23 L.Ed.2d 647 ]." 404 U.S. at 106-107 , 92 S.Ct. at 355 . 1979Second, it has been stressed that ‘we must * * * weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation.’ Linkletter v. Walker, supra, 381 U.S. [618], at 629, 85 S.Ct. [1731], at 1738 [ 14 L.Ed.2d 601 ], Finally, we have weighed the inequity imposed by retroactive application, for ‘[w]here a decision of this Court could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis in our cases for avoiding the “injustice or hards | 2 | 1977–1979 |
Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson
red
2 sentences1979Second, it has been stressed that ‘we must * * * weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation.’ Linkletter v. Walker, supra, 381 U.S. [618], at 629, 85 S.Ct. [1731], at 1738 [ 14 L.Ed.2d 601 ], Finally, we have weighed the inequity imposed by retroactive application, for ‘[w]here a decision of this Court could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis in our cases for avoiding the “injustice or hards 1979Second, it has been stressed that ‘we must * * * weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation.’ Linkletter v. Walker, supra, 381 U.S. [618], at 629, 85 S.Ct. [1731], at 1738 [ 14 L.Ed.2d 601 ], Finally, we have weighed the inequity imposed by retroactive application, for ‘[w]here a decision of this Court could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis in our cases for avoiding the “injustice or hards | 2 | 1977–1979 |
Seely v. White Motor Co.
green
2 sentences1973The history of the doctrine of strict liability in tort indicates that it was designed, not to undermine the warranty provisions of the sales act or of the Uniform Commercial Code but, rather, to govern the distinct problem of physical injuries.” 45 Cal.Rptr. at 21 , 403 P.2d at 149 . 1973The history of the doctrine of strict liability in tort indicates that it was designed, not to undermine the warranty provisions of the sales act or of the Uniform Commercial Code but, rather, to govern the distinct problem of physical injuries.” 45 Cal.Rptr. at 21 , 403 P.2d at 149 . | 1 | 1973–1973 |
Mull v. Roosevelt Irr. Dist.
green
2 sentences1960As stated in Mull v. Roosevelt Irrigation District, supra, 77 Ariz. at page 347 , 272 P.2d at page 344 : “There are numerous cases upon this subject but running through the history of the principle and the decisions based thereon imposing liability under such conditions is generally the idea of deceit or camouflage. * * * It is an act or omission of the defendant which gives a dangerous instrumentality or condition an innocent appearance to the unwary licensee. * * * Failure to provide protection against injury from its existence must be the equivalent of a willful and wanton act.” In the inst 1960As stated in Mull v. Roosevelt Irrigation District, supra, 77 Ariz. at page 347 , 272 P.2d at page 344 : “There are numerous cases upon this subject but running through the history of the principle and the decisions based thereon imposing liability under such conditions is generally the idea of deceit or camouflage. * * * It is an act or omission of the defendant which gives a dangerous instrumentality or condition an innocent appearance to the unwary licensee. * * * Failure to provide protection against injury from its existence must be the equivalent of a willful and wanton act.” In the inst | 1 | 1960–1960 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.