history rule in Washington

1998Second, it has been stressed that “we must . . . weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation.” Finally, we have weighed the inequity imposed by retroactive application, for “[wjhere a decision of this Court could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis in our cases for avoiding the ‘injustice or hardship’ by a holding of nonretroactivity.” Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07 , 92 S. Ct.

1998Second, it has been stressed that “we must . . . weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation.” Finally, we have weighed the inequity imposed by retroactive application, for “[wjhere a decision of this Court could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis in our cases for avoiding the ‘injustice or hardship’ by a holding of nonretroactivity.” Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07 , 92 S. Ct.

2005App. 838, 873-84 , 827 P.2d 1024 (1992) (surveying the history of the clause)); see also generally Jeffrey W.

2005Co. of Omaha, 64 Wash.App. 838, 873-84 , 827 P.2d 1024 (1992) (surveying the history of the clause); see also generally Jeffrey W.

2007Second, it has been stressed that “we must.. . weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation.” Linkletter v. Walker, [ 381 U.S. 618, 629 , 85 S. Ct. 1731 , 14 L.

2007Second, it has been stressed that “we must.. . weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation.” Linkletter v. Walker, [ 381 U.S. 618, 629 , 85 S. Ct. 1731 , 14 L.

2018Once we start down this path, it will become quite easy to dismiss as trivial or de minimis any number of constitutional errors so long as we convince ourselves that the trial, on the whole, was fair, or more generally that "justice demands we affirm." Id. ¶470 Recognition of a triviality standard inevitably results in trivializing constitutional violations, as the history of this standard in other jurisdictions bears out.

2015Once we start down this path, it will become quite easy to dismiss as trivial or de minimis any number of constitutional errors so long as we convince ourselves that the trial, on the whole, was fair, or more generally that "justice demands we affirm." Id. ¶428 Recognition of a triviality standard inevitably results in trivializing constitutional violations, as the history of this standard in other jurisdictions bears out.

2014The distinction was important at the time the rule was drafted because the bail bondsmen system had grown into “full and odorous bloom.” Schilb, 404 U.S. at 359 .

2014The distinction was important at the time the rule was drafted because the bail bondsmen system had grown into "full and odorous bloom." Schlib, 404 U.S. at 359 .

2011Under our current criminal rules, "[t]he court shall allow a defendant to withdraw the defendant's plea of guilty whenever it appears that the withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice." CrR 4.2(f). [4] "This court will overturn a trial court's denial of a motion to withdraw a plea only for abuse of discretion." State v. Bao Sheng Zhao, 157 Wash.2d 188, 197 , 137 P.3d 835 (2006) (citing State v. Marshall, 144 Wash.2d 266, 280 , 27 P.3d 192 (2001)). ¶ 13 Since the Court of Appeals considered this case, we have reviewed the history of the standard we apply to a motion to withdraw a

2011Under our current criminal rules, “[t]he court shall allow a defendant to withdraw the defendant’s plea of guilty whenever it appears that the withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.” CrR 4.2(f). 4 “This court will overturn a trial court’s denial of a motion to withdraw a plea only for abuse of discretion.” State v. Bao Sheng Zhao, 157 Wn.2d 188, 197 , 137 P.3d 835 (2006) (citing State v. Marshall, 144 Wn.2d 266, 280 , 27 P.3d 192 (2001)). ¶13 Since the Court of Appeals considered this case, we have, reviewed the history of the standard we apply to a motion to withdraw a plea.

2011Under our current criminal rules, "[t]he court shall allow a defendant to withdraw the defendant's plea of guilty whenever it appears that the withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice." CrR 4.2(f). [4] "This court will overturn a trial court's denial of a motion to withdraw a plea only for abuse of discretion." State v. Bao Sheng Zhao, 157 Wash.2d 188, 197 , 137 P.3d 835 (2006) (citing State v. Marshall, 144 Wash.2d 266, 280 , 27 P.3d 192 (2001)). ¶ 13 Since the Court of Appeals considered this case, we have reviewed the history of the standard we apply to a motion to withdraw a

2011Under our current criminal rules, “[t]he court shall allow a defendant to withdraw the defendant’s plea of guilty whenever it appears that the withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.” CrR 4.2(f). 4 “This court will overturn a trial court’s denial of a motion to withdraw a plea only for abuse of discretion.” State v. Bao Sheng Zhao, 157 Wn.2d 188, 197 , 137 P.3d 835 (2006) (citing State v. Marshall, 144 Wn.2d 266, 280 , 27 P.3d 192 (2001)). ¶13 Since the Court of Appeals considered this case, we have, reviewed the history of the standard we apply to a motion to withdraw a plea.

2011A.N.J., 168 Wash.2d at 106-07 , 225 P.3d 956 .

2011A.N.J., 168 Wn.2d at 106-07 .

2011Under our current criminal rules, "[t]he court shall allow a defendant to withdraw the defendant's plea of guilty whenever it appears that the withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice." CrR 4.2(f). [4] "This court will overturn a trial court's denial of a motion to withdraw a plea only for abuse of discretion." State v. Bao Sheng Zhao, 157 Wash.2d 188, 197 , 137 P.3d 835 (2006) (citing State v. Marshall, 144 Wash.2d 266, 280 , 27 P.3d 192 (2001)). ¶ 13 Since the Court of Appeals considered this case, we have reviewed the history of the standard we apply to a motion to withdraw a

2011Under our current criminal rules, “[t]he court shall allow a defendant to withdraw the defendant’s plea of guilty whenever it appears that the withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.” CrR 4.2(f). 4 “This court will overturn a trial court’s denial of a motion to withdraw a plea only for abuse of discretion.” State v. Bao Sheng Zhao, 157 Wn.2d 188, 197 , 137 P.3d 835 (2006) (citing State v. Marshall, 144 Wn.2d 266, 280 , 27 P.3d 192 (2001)). ¶13 Since the Court of Appeals considered this case, we have, reviewed the history of the standard we apply to a motion to withdraw a plea.

2011Under our current criminal rules, "[t]he court shall allow a defendant to withdraw the defendant's plea of guilty whenever it appears that the withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice." CrR 4.2(f). [4] "This court will overturn a trial court's denial of a motion to withdraw a plea only for abuse of discretion." State v. Bao Sheng Zhao, 157 Wash.2d 188, 197 , 137 P.3d 835 (2006) (citing State v. Marshall, 144 Wash.2d 266, 280 , 27 P.3d 192 (2001)). ¶ 13 Since the Court of Appeals considered this case, we have reviewed the history of the standard we apply to a motion to withdraw a

2011Under our current criminal rules, “[t]he court shall allow a defendant to withdraw the defendant’s plea of guilty whenever it appears that the withdrawal is necessary to correct a manifest injustice.” CrR 4.2(f). 4 “This court will overturn a trial court’s denial of a motion to withdraw a plea only for abuse of discretion.” State v. Bao Sheng Zhao, 157 Wn.2d 188, 197 , 137 P.3d 835 (2006) (citing State v. Marshall, 144 Wn.2d 266, 280 , 27 P.3d 192 (2001)). ¶13 Since the Court of Appeals considered this case, we have, reviewed the history of the standard we apply to a motion to withdraw a plea.

2010In order to answer this question, we must discuss the basic history and framework of Washington workers' compensation law, our decision in Flanigan, 123 Wash.2d 418 , 869 P.2d 14 , and the meaning of a post- Flanigan legislative amendment, RCW 51.24.030(5). ¶ 11 Washington State has abolished workplace injury torts and established Title 51 RCW, the workers' compensation statutes.

2010In order to answer this question, we must discuss the basic history and framework of Washington workers’ compensation law, our decision in Flanigan, 123 Wn.2d 418 , and the meaning of a post -Flanigan legislative amendment, RCW 51.24.030(5). ¶11 Washington State has abolished workplace injury torts and established Title 51 RCW, the workers’ compensation statutes.

1998Second, it has been stressed that "we must ... weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation." Finally, we have weighed the inequity imposed by retroactive application, for *1247 "[w]here a decision of this Court could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis in our cases for avoiding the `injustice or hardship' by a holding of nonretroactivity." Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07 , 92 S.C

1998Second, it has been stressed that "we must ... weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation." Finally, we have weighed the inequity imposed by retroactive application, for *1247 "[w]here a decision of this Court could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis in our cases for avoiding the `injustice or hardship' by a holding of nonretroactivity." Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07 , 92 S.C

2007Id. ¶ 17 To determine whether application of CrRLJ 3.3(c)(2)(ii) requires a showing of due diligence by the State, it is helpful to trace the history of that standard as applied to the time-for-trial rule.

2007Id. ¶17 To determine whether application of CrRLJ 3.3(c)(2)(ii) requires a showing of due diligence by the State, it is helpful to trace the history of that standard as applied to the time-for-trial rule.

1986Finally, we have weighed the inequity imposed by retroactive application, for " [w]here a decision of this Court could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis in our cases for avoiding the 'injustice or hardship' by a holding of nonretroactivity." Brown, 98 Wn.2d at 50-51 .

1986Finally, we have weighed the inequity imposed by retroactive application, for "[w]here a decision of this Court could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is *279 ample basis in our cases for avoiding the `injustice or hardship' by a holding of nonretroactivity." Brown, 98 Wn.2d at 50-51 . [2] Applying the Brown factors to this case, it is clear that Reeves should be applied retroactively.

1986Finally, we have weighed the inequity imposed by retroactive application, for " [wjhere a decision of this Court could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis in our cases for avoiding the 'injustice or hardship' by a holding of nonretroactivity." Taskett v. KING Broadcasting Co., 86 Wn.2d 439, 448 , 546 P.2d 81 (1976) (citing Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 , 30 L.

1986Finally, we have weighed the inequity imposed by retroactive application, for " [wjhere a decision of this Court could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis in our cases for avoiding the 'injustice or hardship' by a holding of nonretroactivity." Taskett v. KING Broadcasting Co., 86 Wn.2d 439, 448 , 546 P.2d 81 (1976) (citing Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 , 30 L.

2025History also reveals that what began as a gradual delegation of rule making No. 103006-1 Madsen, J., dissenting power from the legislature to the judiciary ended abruptly when this court, for the first time, asserted inherent authority in State v. Smith, 84 Wn.2d 498, 501 , 527 P.2d 674 (1974), which subsequent decisions interpreted as the complete and final say on procedural issues.

2025History also reveals that what began as a gradual delegation of rule making No. 103006-1 Madsen, J., dissenting power from the legislature to the judiciary ended abruptly when this court, for the first time, asserted inherent authority in State v. Smith, 84 Wn.2d 498, 501 , 527 P.2d 674 (1974), which subsequent decisions interpreted as the complete and final say on procedural issues.

2024Id. at 167-68 .

2021E.g., Oregon v. Goodenow, 251 Or.

2020App. 79, 100-01 , 44 P.3d 8 (2002), to illustrate that hiring and retention are “carried out primarily at the departmental level.” Resp’t’s Br. at 2.

2020The history of the doctrine regarding executive officials illustrates its limited scope. 22 Spalding, 161 U.S. at 498-99 . 23 Glenny and Skerrett cite Oda v. State, 111 Wn.

2020The history of the doctrine regarding executive officials illustrates its limited scope. 22 Spalding, 161 U.S. at 498-99 . 23 Glenny and Skerrett cite Oda v. State, 111 Wn.

2018As observed in Justice Souter’s concurring opinion in Giles, the history of the doctrine provides a “substantial indication that the Sixth Amendment was meant to require some degree of intent to thwart the judicial process before thinking it reasonable to hold the confrontation right forfeited; otherwise the right would in practical terms boil down to a measure of reliable hearsay, a view rejected in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 , 124 S. Ct. 1354 , 158 L.

2018As observed in Justice Souter’s concurring opinion in Giles, the history of the doctrine provides a “substantial indication that the Sixth Amendment was meant to require some degree of intent to thwart the judicial process before thinking it reasonable to hold the confrontation right forfeited; otherwise the right would in practical terms boil down to a measure of reliable hearsay, a view rejected in Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 , 124 S. Ct. 1354 , 158 L.

2011A.N.J., 168 Wash.2d at 106-07 , 225 P.3d 956 .

2006Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364 , 53 S.Ct. 145 , 77 L.Ed. 360 (1932). ¶ 14 Although a new rule of law announced in a civil case is usually applied retroactively, in Chevron Oil the United States Supreme Court has suggested three factors to consider to determine whether a case should be given prospective application or selective prospectivity: (1) the decision to be applied prospectively must establish a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed; (2) weigh th

2006Co., 287 U.S. 358, 364 , 53 S.Ct. 145 , 77 L.Ed. 360 (1932). ¶ 14 Although a new rule of law announced in a civil case is usually applied retroactively, in Chevron Oil the United States Supreme Court has suggested three factors to consider to determine whether a case should be given prospective application or selective prospectivity: (1) the decision to be applied prospectively must establish a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed; (2) weigh th

2004Nat'l Can II, 109 Wash.2d at 881 , 749 P.2d 1286 (citing Chevron Oil, 404 U.S. at 106-07 , 92 S.Ct. 349 ).

1988The majority spells out the history of the doctrine and indicates its demise in the case of Washington Fed'n of State Employees, Coun. 28 v. State, 101 Wn.2d 536 , 682 P.2d 869 (1984).

1988The majority spells out the history of the doctrine and indicates its demise in the case of Washington Fed'n of State Employees, Coun. 28 v. State, 101 Wn.2d 536 , 682 P.2d 869 (1984).