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9 Idaho opinions name it 2 courts 1951–2022 1 in the last five years
The cases below were cited by Idaho courts in a sentence that names this issue. Sides come from how each citing opinion treated the case (Syfertize flag on that citation), so a case can appear on both: that is where the law is contested. A red or yellow chip is the case's own overall treatment.
| Case | Followed | Cited |
|---|---|---|
Tenney v. Brandhovegreen2 sentences1997It thus protects Members [of congress] against prosecutions that directly impinge upon or threaten the legislative process." Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 616 , 92 S.Ct. 2614, 2622 , 33 L.Ed.2d 583 (1972). "[I]t is apparent from the history of the clause that the privilege was not born primarily of a desire to avoid private suits ... but rather to prevent intimidation by the executive and accountability before a possibly hostile judiciary." United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 180-81 , 86 S.Ct. 749, 755 , 15 L.Ed.2d 681 (1966). "[A]ny restriction on a legislator's freedom undermine 1997It thus protects Members [of congress] against prosecutions that directly impinge upon or threaten the legislative process." Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 616 , 92 S.Ct. 2614, 2622 , 33 L.Ed.2d 583 (1972). "[I]t is apparent from the history of the clause that the privilege was not born primarily of a desire to avoid private suits ... but rather to prevent intimidation by the executive and accountability before a possibly hostile judiciary." United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 180-81 , 86 S.Ct. 749, 755 , 15 L.Ed.2d 681 (1966). "[A]ny restriction on a legislator's freedom undermine | 1 | 1 |
Chevron Oil Co. v. Husonred2 sentences1991Those factors are: (1) Whether "the decision to be applied nonretroactively ... establish[es] a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied, or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed"; (2) whether, in light of "the prior history of the rule in question, [and] its purpose and effect, ... retroactive operation will further or retard its operation"; and (3) whether the decision "could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively." Chevron Oil, 404 U.S. at 106-07 , 92 S.Ct. at 1991Those factors are: (1) Whether "the decision to be applied nonretroactively ... establish[es] a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied, or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed"; (2) whether, in light of "the prior history of the rule in question, [and] its purpose and effect, ... retroactive operation will further or retard its operation"; and (3) whether the decision "could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively." Chevron Oil, 404 U.S. at 106-07 , 92 S.Ct. at | 1 | 1 |
| Case | Negative | Cited |
|---|---|---|
| No negative-treatment citations attached to this issue in Idaho. Read the followed side critically anyway. | ||
| Case | Cited | Years |
|---|---|---|
State v. Clements
green
2 sentences2013Id. at 86, 218 P.3d at 1147 . 2013Id. at 86, 218 P.3d at 1147 . | 3 | 2013–2013 |
Woodland Private Study Group v. State
green
1 sentence2022Woodland, 533 A.2d at 389–90. | 1 | 2022–2022 |
Spallone v. United States
green
2 sentences1997It thus protects Members [of congress] against prosecutions that directly impinge upon or threaten the legislative process." Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 616 , 92 S.Ct. 2614, 2622 , 33 L.Ed.2d 583 (1972). "[I]t is apparent from the history of the clause that the privilege was not born primarily of a desire to avoid private suits ... but rather to prevent intimidation by the executive and accountability before a possibly hostile judiciary." United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 180-81 , 86 S.Ct. 749, 755 , 15 L.Ed.2d 681 (1966). "[A]ny restriction on a legislator's freedom undermine 1997It thus protects Members [of congress] against prosecutions that directly impinge upon or threaten the legislative process." Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 616 , 92 S.Ct. 2614, 2622 , 33 L.Ed.2d 583 (1972). "[I]t is apparent from the history of the clause that the privilege was not born primarily of a desire to avoid private suits ... but rather to prevent intimidation by the executive and accountability before a possibly hostile judiciary." United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 180-81 , 86 S.Ct. 749, 755 , 15 L.Ed.2d 681 (1966). "[A]ny restriction on a legislator's freedom undermine | 1 | 1997–1997 |
United States v. Johnson
green
2 sentences1997It thus protects Members [of congress] against prosecutions that directly impinge upon or threaten the legislative process." Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 616 , 92 S.Ct. 2614, 2622 , 33 L.Ed.2d 583 (1972). "[I]t is apparent from the history of the clause that the privilege was not born primarily of a desire to avoid private suits ... but rather to prevent intimidation by the executive and accountability before a possibly hostile judiciary." United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 180-81 , 86 S.Ct. 749, 755 , 15 L.Ed.2d 681 (1966). "[A]ny restriction on a legislator's freedom undermine 1997It thus protects Members [of congress] against prosecutions that directly impinge upon or threaten the legislative process." Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 616 , 92 S.Ct. 2614, 2622 , 33 L.Ed.2d 583 (1972). "[I]t is apparent from the history of the clause that the privilege was not born primarily of a desire to avoid private suits ... but rather to prevent intimidation by the executive and accountability before a possibly hostile judiciary." United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 180-81 , 86 S.Ct. 749, 755 , 15 L.Ed.2d 681 (1966). "[A]ny restriction on a legislator's freedom undermine | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Kleindienst v. Mandel
green
1 sentence1997It thus protects Members [of congress] against prosecutions that directly impinge upon or threaten the legislative process.” Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 616 , 92 S.Ct. 2614, 2622 , 33 L.Ed.2d 683 (1972). “[I]t is apparent from the history of the clause that the privilege was not born primarily of a desire to avoid private suits ... but rather to prevent intimidation by the executive and accountability before a possibly hostile judiciary.” United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 180-81 , 86 S.Ct. 749, 755 , 15 L.Ed.2d 681 (1966). “[A]ny restriction on a legislator’s freedom undermine | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Gravel v. United States
green
2 sentences1997It thus protects Members [of congress] against prosecutions that directly impinge upon or threaten the legislative process." Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 616 , 92 S.Ct. 2614, 2622 , 33 L.Ed.2d 583 (1972). "[I]t is apparent from the history of the clause that the privilege was not born primarily of a desire to avoid private suits ... but rather to prevent intimidation by the executive and accountability before a possibly hostile judiciary." United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 180-81 , 86 S.Ct. 749, 755 , 15 L.Ed.2d 681 (1966). "[A]ny restriction on a legislator's freedom undermine 1997It thus protects Members [of congress] against prosecutions that directly impinge upon or threaten the legislative process." Gravel v. United States, 408 U.S. 606, 616 , 92 S.Ct. 2614, 2622 , 33 L.Ed.2d 583 (1972). "[I]t is apparent from the history of the clause that the privilege was not born primarily of a desire to avoid private suits ... but rather to prevent intimidation by the executive and accountability before a possibly hostile judiciary." United States v. Johnson, 383 U.S. 169, 180-81 , 86 S.Ct. 749, 755 , 15 L.Ed.2d 681 (1966). "[A]ny restriction on a legislator's freedom undermine | 1 | 1997–1997 |
Country Insurance v. Agricultural Development, Inc.
green
2 sentences1985The trial bench and bar are reminded of our recent decision in Country Insurance Co. v. Agricultural Development, Inc., 107 Idaho 961 , 695 P.2d 346 (1984), where the history of the rule was reviewed at length. 1985The trial bench and bar are reminded of our recent decision in Country Insurance Co. v. Agricultural Development, Inc., 107 Idaho 961 , 695 P.2d 346 (1984), where the history of the rule was reviewed at length. | 1 | 1985–1985 |
McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital
green
1 sentence1966A study of this history indicates the first American decision to follow the immunity doctrine was McDonald v. Massachusetts General Hospital, 120 Mass. 432 , 21 Am.Rep. 529 (1876). | 1 | 1966–1966 |
President & Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes
green
2 sentences1966The history of the doctrine of charitable immunity is especially well set forth in Presidents and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 76 U.S.App.D.C. 123 , 130 F.2d 810 (1942), and an exhaustive annotation in 25 A.L.R.2d 29 , 38. 1966The history of the doctrine of charitable immunity is especially well set forth in Presidents and Directors of Georgetown College v. Hughes, 76 U.S.App.D.C. 123 , 130 F.2d 810 (1942), and an exhaustive annotation in 25 A.L.R.2d 29 , 38. | 1 | 1966–1966 |
State v. Elsen
green
2 sentences1951In State v. Elsen, 68 Idaho 50 , 187 P.2d 976, 978 , Mr. Justice Hyatt traced the history of the rule as to corroboration required in a rape case, and made a concise statement of the rule as it has developed in this state, to-wit: "If the character or reputation of the prosecutrix for truth and chastity is *674 unimpeached, and her testimony is not contradictory nor inconsistent with the admitted facts of the case, and is not inherently improbable nor incredible, there can be either direct evidence corroborating her testimony, or evidence of surrounding circumstances clearly corroborating her 1951In State v. Elsen, 68 Idaho 50 , 187 P.2d 976, 978 , Mr. Justice Hyatt traced the history of the rule as to corroboration required in a rape case, and made a concise statement of the rule as it has developed in this state, to-wit: "If the character or reputation of the prosecutrix for truth and chastity is *674 unimpeached, and her testimony is not contradictory nor inconsistent with the admitted facts of the case, and is not inherently improbable nor incredible, there can be either direct evidence corroborating her testimony, or evidence of surrounding circumstances clearly corroborating her | 1 | 1951–1951 |
Opinions by the citing court's state. A doctrine retained in one state and abandoned in another shows up here as a year span that stalls.