history rule in Florida

1992In Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 , 85 S.Ct. 1731 , 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965), the Court adopted a policy directing courts to "weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation." Id. at 629 , 85 S.Ct. at 1738 .

1992In Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 , 85 S.Ct. 1731 , 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965), the Court adopted a policy directing courts to "weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation." Id. at 629 , 85 S.Ct. at 1738 .

2023The Rule’s Origin and History The rule appears to have its origin in the second district’s summary decision over three decades ago in Allen v. State, 508 So. 2d 360 (Fla. 2d DCA 1987).

2017Id. at 575 (quoting Fla. R.

2016However, the rule does not distinguish between active or passive record activity and generally requires “only a cursory review of the record because ‘there is either activity on the face of the record or there is not.’ ” Citibank, N.A., 149 So.3d at 1186 (quoting Wilson, 923 So.2d at 368 ). *1069 Inarguably, Zuppardo filed a'notice of filing and a motion for leave to amend within the sixty-day grace period.

2008The Fourth District relied primarily on this language to conclude that "[r]etroactive application could hardly have been stated more clearly." Old Port Cove, 954 So.2d at 745 . *1284 Having explained the history of the rule in Florida, we now address the issues presented.

2007Bank & Trust Co. v. Willys Corp., 8 F.2d 463 (2d Cir.1925), which traces its common law origins to a period well before the Revolutionary War.

2005Id. at 562-63 .

2004That year, the United States Supreme Court decided Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 , 83 S.Ct. 792 , 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963), which held that the Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel in criminal cases applied to state criminal prosecutions by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution because it was one of those fundamental rights essential to a fair trial and, therefore, to due process of law.

2004That year, the United States Supreme Court decided Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 , 83 S.Ct. 792 , 9 L.Ed.2d 799 (1963), which held that the Sixth Amendment right to the assistance of counsel in criminal cases applied to state criminal prosecutions by virtue of the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution because it was one of those fundamental rights essential to a fair trial and, therefore, to due process of law.

2003In 1992, in Florida Bar v. Cillo, 606 So.2d 1161 (Fla.1992), Cillo was accused of paying money to a former client as an inducement for the client to dismiss his Bar complaint against Cillo.

1992Significantly, the decision in Linkletter was limited to collateral review only, holding that the new rule established in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961), would not be applied retrospectively to state decisions that had become final before Mapp was decided.

1992Significantly, the decision in Linkletter was limited to collateral review only, holding that the new rule established in Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 , 81 S.Ct. 1684 , 6 L.Ed.2d 1081 (1961), would not be applied retrospectively to state decisions that had become final before Mapp was decided.

1992Chevron Oil Company v. Huson, 404 U.S. at 106-107 , 92 S.Ct. at 355-356 . .

1992Chevron Oil Company v. Huson, 404 U.S. at 106-107 , 92 S.Ct. at 355-356 . .

1989In Faulk v. State, 104 So.2d 519 (Fla.1958), in tracing the history of the rule, the court held that the right is a substantial procedural right which cannot be denied merely because the defendant happens to be represented by the same counsel who represents a co-defendant.

1989The court further held that denial of this vested procedural right constitutes reversible error. 104 So.2d at 523 .

1988July 15, 1987) [ 1987 WL 35832 ], slip op. at fn. 1: Given the myriad of possible backgrounds ... clinical, behavioral, or educational psychology; counseling or vocational experts; and degrees ranging from a bachelor's to a Ph.D.... expanding rule 35 would put courts in the difficult business of determining whether a particular individual has received sufficient training to conduct a highly intrusive examination into a party's private life.

1986Hermes, 765 F.2d 306 (2d Cir.1985) (Friendly, J.), [4] which persuasively sets out the history of the doctrine and the reasons for its establishment — ones which do not apply to the present situation: In City of Detroit v. Grinnell Corp., 495 F.2d 448 (2 Cir.1974), this court adopted the Lindy I approach; [5] the court made clear that it also was dealing only with cases where an attorney had conferred a benefit upon a class of plaintiffs with whom he had no direct relationship and was seeking fees in his own right.

1984In the recent decision of Brown v. Brown, 432 So.2d 704 (Fla.3d DCA 1983), the Third District Court of Appeal extensively reviewed the history of rule 1.540(b) and the case law relating to attacks on final judgments.

1982See Hoeme v. Commissioner , 63 T.C. 18 (1974) ; Shiosaki v. Commissioner , 61 T.C. 861 (1974). *134 Summary judgment is a device used to expedite litigation and is intended to avoid unnecessary and expensive trials of "phantom factual questions." Cox v. American Fidelity & Casualty Co ., 249 F.2d 616 , 618 (9th Cir. 1957) ; Shiosaki v. Commissioner, supra .

1982See Hoeme v. Commissioner, 63 T.C. 18 (1974); Shiosaki v. Commissioner, 61 T.C. 861 (1974).

1982See Hoeme v. Commissioner , 63 T.C. 18 (1974) ; Shiosaki v. Commissioner , 61 T.C. 861 (1974). *134 Summary judgment is a device used to expedite litigation and is intended to avoid unnecessary and expensive trials of "phantom factual questions." Cox v. American Fidelity & Casualty Co ., 249 F.2d 616 , 618 (9th Cir. 1957) ; Shiosaki v. Commissioner, supra .

1982Finally, we have weighed the inequity imposed by retroactive application, for "[w]here a decision of this Court could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis in our cases for avoiding the `injustice or hardship' by a holding of nonretroactivity." Cipriano v. City of Houma, supra, 395 U.S., [701] at 706, 89 S.Ct. [1897] at 1900 [ 23 L.Ed.2d 647 ].