history rule in Indiana

2018Further, each element had to be " 'established as a necessary, independent, ultimate fact, the burden of showing which is on the party asserting the prescriptive title, and the failure to find any one of such element [is] fatal ..., for such failure to find is construed as a finding against it.' " Id. (citations omitted, alteration in original). [21] In Wilfong v. Cessna Corp. , 838 N.E.2d 403 (Ind. 2005), however, our Supreme Court modified the traditional elements of prescriptive easements to correspond to the Court's reformulated elements of adverse possession as follows: In our recent deci

2010Further, "'each ... element [] ... [had tol be established as a necessary, independent, ultimate fact, the burden of showing which is on the party asserting the prescriptive title, and the failure to find any one such element [is] fatal ..., for such failure to find is construed as a finding against it"" Id. (citation omitted, alteration in original). *965 But in Wilfong v. Cessna Corp., 838 N.E.2d 403 (Ind.2005), our Supreme Court modified the traditional elements of prescriptive easements to correspond to the Court's recently reformulated elements of adverse possession: In our recent decisio

2018Further, each element had to be " 'established as a necessary, independent, ultimate fact, the burden of showing which is on the party asserting the prescriptive title, and the failure to find any one of such element [is] fatal ..., for such failure to find is construed as a finding against it.' " Id. (citations omitted, alteration in original). [21] In Wilfong v. Cessna Corp. , 838 N.E.2d 403 (Ind. 2005), however, our Supreme Court modified the traditional elements of prescriptive easements to correspond to the Court's reformulated elements of adverse possession as follows: In our recent deci

2005Furthermore, "[elach ... element[] ... must be established as a necessary, independent, ultimate fact, the burden of showing which is on the party asserting the prescriptive title, and the failure to find any one such element [is] fatal ..., for such failure to find is construed as a finding against it." Id. at 441-42 (quoting Monarch Real Estate Co. v. Frye, 77 Ind. App. 119, 124-25 , 133 N.E. 156, 158 (1921)). *406 In our recent decision, Fraley v. Minger, 829 N.E.2d 476 (Ind.2005), we reviewed the history of the doctrine of adverse possession in Indiana and reformulated the elements necessa

2018Further, each element had to be " 'established as a necessary, independent, ultimate fact, the burden of showing which is on the party asserting the prescriptive title, and the failure to find any one of such element [is] fatal ..., for such failure to find is construed as a finding against it.' " Id. (citations omitted, alteration in original). [21] In Wilfong v. Cessna Corp. , 838 N.E.2d 403 (Ind. 2005), however, our Supreme Court modified the traditional elements of prescriptive easements to correspond to the Court's reformulated elements of adverse possession as follows: In our recent deci

2010Further, "'each ... element [] ... [had tol be established as a necessary, independent, ultimate fact, the burden of showing which is on the party asserting the prescriptive title, and the failure to find any one such element [is] fatal ..., for such failure to find is construed as a finding against it"" Id. (citation omitted, alteration in original). *965 But in Wilfong v. Cessna Corp., 838 N.E.2d 403 (Ind.2005), our Supreme Court modified the traditional elements of prescriptive easements to correspond to the Court's recently reformulated elements of adverse possession: In our recent decisio

1998Nelson , 670 N.E.2d at 964 (citing Willard v. First Church of Christ, Scientist, Pacifica , 498 P.2d 987, 989 (Cal. 1972) (explaining the history of the rule and concluding that “it is clearly an inapposite feudal shackle today.”)).

1997Nelson, 670 N.E.2d at 964 (citing Willard v. First Church of Christ, Scientist, Pacifica, 7 Cal.3d 473 , 102 Cal.Rptr. 739 , 498 P.2d 987, 989 (1972) (explaining the history of the rule and concluding that “it is clearly an inapposite feudal shackle today.”)).

2020Id. at 1188 . [26] Regarding abrogation by action of the Indiana State Legislature, the Court outlined the history of waiver of sovereign immunity when the State is sued for a tort, dating back to Indiana’s earliest days of statehood.

2020Id. at 1189-90 .

2005Furthermore, "[elach ... element[] ... must be established as a necessary, independent, ultimate fact, the burden of showing which is on the party asserting the prescriptive title, and the failure to find any one such element [is] fatal ..., for such failure to find is construed as a finding against it." Id. at 441-42 (quoting Monarch Real Estate Co. v. Frye, 77 Ind. App. 119, 124-25 , 133 N.E. 156, 158 (1921)). *406 In our recent decision, Fraley v. Minger, 829 N.E.2d 476 (Ind.2005), we reviewed the history of the doctrine of adverse possession in Indiana and reformulated the elements necessa

1991The second factor favoring nonretroac-tivity requires an analysis of "the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation." Chevron, 404 U.S. at 107 , 92 S.Ct. at 355 , 30 L.Ed.2d at 306 .

1991The second factor favoring nonretroac-tivity requires an analysis of "the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation." Chevron, 404 U.S. at 107 , 92 S.Ct. at 355 , 30 L.Ed.2d at 306 .

1991After correctly citing the history of the rule barring the admission into evidence of confessions by third parties to the crime at issue, the majority states that the Supreme Court of the United States reversed its position in Chambers v. Mississippi (1973), 410 U.S. 284 , 93 S.Ct. 1038 , 35 L.Ed.2d 297 .

1991After correctly citing the history of the rule barring the admission into evidence of confessions by third parties to the crime at issue, the majority states that the Supreme Court of the United States reversed its position in Chambers v. Mississippi (1973), 410 U.S. 284 , 93 S.Ct. 1038 , 35 L.Ed.2d 297 .

1958Co. v. Barnes (1905) [164 Ind.], ante, 143.” Continuing our examination into the history of the rule, we find that in the case of Harrison v. Stanton et al. (1896), 146 Ind. 366, 370-371 , 45 N. E. 582 , cited as authority in Jarnecke, supra, the rule was similarly stated as follows: “. . .

1958Co. v. Barnes (1905) [164 Ind.], ante, 143.” Continuing our examination into the history of the rule, we find that in the case of Harrison v. Stanton et al. (1896), 146 Ind. 366, 370-371 , 45 N. E. 582 , cited as authority in Jarnecke, supra, the rule was similarly stated as follows: “. . .