history rule in North Carolina

1986Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. at 629 , 85 S.Ct. at 1738 , 14 L.Ed.2d at 608 .

1986Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. at 629 , 85 S.Ct. at 1738 , 14 L.Ed.2d at 608 .

2000In R.R. v. Platt Land, 133 N.C. 266 , 45 S.E. 589 (1903), after tracing the history of the rule, Justice Connor stated that " in the absence of any express language to the contrary, only special benefits can be deducted from the compensation or damages assessed against the corporation [Southport, Wilmington and Durham Railroad Company]." Id. at 274 , 45 S.E. at 592 .

2000In R.R. v. Platt Land, 133 N.C. 266 , 45 S.E. 589 (1903), after tracing the history of the rule, Justice Connor stated that " in the absence of any express language to the contrary, only special benefits can be deducted from the compensation or damages assessed against the corporation [Southport, Wilmington and Durham Railroad Company]." Id. at 274 , 45 S.E. at 592 .

2000In Elks , Chief Justice Clark, who authored the opinion in Miller , again cited the holding of the Supreme Court in Miller that the legislature could "authorize the deduction of general as well as special benefits from the damages assessed, but holding that if the statute does not so provide, only the special benefits will be deducted." Elks, 179 N.C. at 247 , 102 S.E. at 417 .

2000In Elks , Chief Justice Clark, who authored the opinion in Miller , again cited the holding of the Supreme Court in Miller that the legislature could "authorize the deduction of general as well as special benefits from the damages assessed, but holding that if the statute does not so provide, only the special benefits will be deducted." Elks, 179 N.C. at 247 , 102 S.E. at 417 .

1991Finally, we have weighed the inequity imposed by retroactive application, for "[w]here a decision of this Court could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis in our cases for avoiding the `injustice or *794 hardship' by a holding of nonretroactivity." Id. at 106-107 , 92 S.Ct. at 355 , 30 L.Ed.2d at 306 .

1991Finally, we have weighed the inequity imposed by retroactive application, for "[w]here a decision of this Court could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis in our cases for avoiding the `injustice or *794 hardship' by a holding of nonretroactivity." Id. at 106-107 , 92 S.Ct. at 355 , 30 L.Ed.2d at 306 .

1986The Court determined that five policy reasons were relied upon in support of the immunity: (1) disturbance of domestic tranquility, (2) danger of fraud and collusion, (3) depletion of the family exchequer, (4) the possibility of inheritance, by the parent, of the amount recovered in damages by the child, and (5) interference with parental care, discipline and control. 281 N.C. at 480 , 189 S.E. 2d at 232 .

1986The Court determined that five policy reasons were relied upon in support of the immunity: (1) disturbance of domestic tranquility, (2) danger of fraud and collusion, (3) depletion of the family exchequer, (4) the possibility of inheritance, by the parent, of the amount recovered in damages by the child, and (5) interference with parental care, discipline and control. 281 N.C. at 480 , 189 S.E. 2d at 232 .

1976In doing so he noted that (1) This “judge-made doctrine” was first adopted by this Court in 1889 *312 in Moffitt v. Asheville, 103 N.C. 237 , 9 S.E. 695 , earlier North Carolina cases having specifically rejected it. (2) For many years the doctrine has been under attack.

1976In doing so he noted that (1) This “judge-made doctrine” was first adopted by this Court in 1889 *312 in Moffitt v. Asheville, 103 N.C. 237 , 9 S.E. 695 , earlier North Carolina cases having specifically rejected it. (2) For many years the doctrine has been under attack.

1973Although, as the Gardner comment demonstrates, the silent witness doctrine was seemingly adopted by the majority of this Court in a few cases, Davis v. Railroad, 136 N.C. 115 , 48 S.E. 591 (1904); Pickett v. Railroad, 153 N.C. 148 , 69 S.E. 8 (1910); Bane v. Railroad, 171 N.C. 328 , 88 S.E. 477 (1916), that support was shortlived.

1973Although, as the Gardner comment demonstrates, the silent witness doctrine was seemingly adopted by the majority of this Court in a few cases, Davis v. Railroad, 136 N.C. 115 , 48 S.E. 591 (1904); Pickett v. Railroad, 153 N.C. 148 , 69 S.E. 8 (1910); Bane v. Railroad, 171 N.C. 328 , 88 S.E. 477 (1916), that support was shortlived.

1973Although, as the Gardner comment demonstrates, the silent witness doctrine was seemingly adopted by the majority of this Court in a few cases, Davis v. Railroad, 136 N.C. 115 , 48 S.E. 591 (1904); Pickett v. Railroad, 153 N.C. 148 , 69 S.E. 8 (1910); Bane v. Railroad, 171 N.C. 328 , 88 S.E. 477 (1916), that support was shortlived.

1973Although, as the Gardner comment demonstrates, the silent witness doctrine was seemingly adopted by the majority of this Court in a few cases, Davis v. Railroad, 136 N.C. 115 , 48 S.E. 591 (1904); Pickett v. Railroad, 153 N.C. 148 , 69 S.E. 8 (1910); Bane v. Railroad, 171 N.C. 328 , 88 S.E. 477 (1916), that support was shortlived.

1973Although, as the Gardner comment demonstrates, the silent witness doctrine was seemingly adopted by the majority of this Court in a few cases, Davis v. Railroad, 136 N.C. 115 , 48 S.E. 591 (1904); Pickett v. Railroad, 153 N.C. 148 , 69 S.E. 8 (1910); Bane v. Railroad, 171 N.C. 328 , 88 S.E. 477 (1916), that support was shortlived.

1973Although, as the Gardner comment demonstrates, the silent witness doctrine was seemingly adopted by the majority of this Court in a few cases, Davis v. Railroad, 136 N.C. 115 , 48 S.E. 591 (1904); Pickett v. Railroad, 153 N.C. 148 , 69 S.E. 8 (1910); Bane v. Railroad, 171 N.C. 328 , 88 S.E. 477 (1916), that support was shortlived.