history rule in Wisconsin

2023Second, it has been stressed that 'we must * * * weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation.' Finally, we have weighed the inequity imposed by retroactive application, for '(w)here a decision of this Court could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis in our cases for avoiding the 'injustice or hardship' by a holding of nonretroactivity.' 3 No. 2020AP140-FT.rgb 404 U.S. at 106–07 (citations omitt

2023Second, it has been stressed that 'we must * * * weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation.' Finally, we have weighed the inequity imposed by retroactive application, for '(w)here a decision of this Court could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis in our cases for avoiding the 'injustice or hardship' by a holding of nonretroactivity.' 3 No. 2020AP140-FT.rgb 404 U.S. at 106–07 (citations omitt

1990The court stated in Integration of Bar Case, 244 Wis. 8, 50 , 11 N.W.2d 604 , 12 N.W.2d 689 (1943), "it is quite obvious from a study of the history of the bar and the consideration of judicial decisions that the line of demarcation between the legislative field and the judicial field in mat ters relating to the bar is not a straight line or even a fixed one." I can find no unified theory in our cases explaining the court's and legislature's spheres of authority in matters relating to admission to the bar, practice of law or disbarment.

1990The court stated in Integration of Bar Case, 244 Wis. 8, 50 , 11 N.W.2d 604 , 12 N.W.2d 689 (1943), "it is quite obvious from a study of the history of the bar and the consideration of judicial decisions that the line of demarcation between the legislative field and the judicial field in matters *114 relating to the bar is not a straight line or even a fixed one." I can find no unified theory in our cases explaining the court's and legislature's spheres of authority in matters relating to admission to the bar, practice of law or disbarment.

2004Id. at 1363 .

2000As explained by Truhitte v. French Hospital, 180 Cal. Rptr. 152 (Cal. App. 1982), after first recounting the history of the doctrine, which in California apparently developed in the 1930s (see id., 180 Cal. Rptr. at 158-160 ): We question whether the "captain of the ship" doctrine has any remaining independent existence: the vicarious liability of a surgeon for the independent negligence of nurses and other assistants is determined in the cases under the general rules of agency.

2000As explained by Truhitte v. French Hospital, 180 Cal. Rptr. 152 (Cal. App. 1982), after first recounting the history of the doctrine, which in California apparently developed in the 1930s (see id., 180 Cal. Rptr. at 158-160 ): We question whether the "captain of the ship" doctrine has any remaining independent existence: the vicarious liability of a surgeon for the independent negligence of nurses and other assistants is determined in the cases under the general rules of agency.

1984Finally, we have weighed the inequity imposed by retroactive application, for ‘[w]here a decision of this Court could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis in our cases for avoiding the “injustice or hardship” by a holding of nonretroactivity.’ Cipriano v. City of Houma, [ 395 U.S. 701, at 706 ].” Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, at 106-07 .

1984Second, it has been stressed that ‘we must . . . weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation.’ Linkletter v. Walker, [ 381 U.S. 618, at 629 ].

1975Ed. 2d 212 , for an excellent review of these cases, and of the whole history of immunity statutes. 32 Kastigar v. United States, supra, footnote 31, at page 445. 33 Ullmann v. United States (1956), 350 U. S. 422, 438 , 76 Sup. Ct. 497, 100 L.

1975Ed. 2d 212 , for an excellent review of these cases, and of the whole history of immunity statutes. 32 Kastigar v. United States, supra, footnote 31, at page 445. 33 Ullmann v. United States (1956), 350 U. S. 422, 438 , 76 Sup. Ct. 497, 100 L.

1972The history of the doctrine of comparative negligence as given in my dissent in Vincent v. Pabst Brewing Co. (1970), 47 Wis. 2d 120 , 177 N. W. 2d 513 , demonstrates the remedial character of sec. 895.045.

1972The history of the doctrine of comparative negligence as given in my dissent in Vincent v. Pabst Brewing Co. (1970), 47 Wis. 2d 120 , 177 N. W. 2d 513 , demonstrates the remedial character of sec. 895.045.

1972Reynolds v. Dinger (1961), 14 Wis.2d 193 , the court was faced by an administrative rule, REB 5.04, which purported to authorize, to a limited degree, real estate brokers to give legal advise or services.

1957In Muench v. Public Service Comm. 261 Wis. 492, 499 , 53 N. W. (2d) 514 , 55 N. W. (2d) 40 , Mr. Justice Curme reviewed the history of the doctrine that the state holds the beds underlying navigable waters in trust for all of its citizens. (p. 501.) The trust is “for public purposes.” Illinois Steel Co. v. Bilot, 109 Wis. 418, 426 , 84 N. W. 855 , 85 N. W. 402 .

1957In Muench v. Public Service Comm. 261 Wis. 492, 499 , 53 N. W. (2d) 514 , 55 N. W. (2d) 40 , Mr. Justice Curme reviewed the history of the doctrine that the state holds the beds underlying navigable waters in trust for all of its citizens. (p. 501.) The trust is “for public purposes.” Illinois Steel Co. v. Bilot, 109 Wis. 418, 426 , 84 N. W. 855 , 85 N. W. 402 .

1957In Muench v. Public Service Comm. 261 Wis. 492, 499 , 53 N. W. (2d) 514 , 55 N. W. (2d) 40 , Mr. Justice Curme reviewed the history of the doctrine that the state holds the beds underlying navigable waters in trust for all of its citizens. (p. 501.) The trust is “for public purposes.” Illinois Steel Co. v. Bilot, 109 Wis. 418, 426 , 84 N. W. 855 , 85 N. W. 402 .

1957In Muench v. Public Service Comm. 261 Wis. 492, 499 , 53 N. W. (2d) 514 , 55 N. W. (2d) 40 , Mr. Justice Curme reviewed the history of the doctrine that the state holds the beds underlying navigable waters in trust for all of its citizens. (p. 501.) The trust is “for public purposes.” Illinois Steel Co. v. Bilot, 109 Wis. 418, 426 , 84 N. W. 855 , 85 N. W. 402 .

1926In regard to the policy of this provision, in State v. Lloyd, 152 Wis. 24 , 139 N. W. 514 , Mr. Justice Timlin said: “The constitutional rights of the citizen secured to him by the provision in question should be carefully guarded, but it is safe to say that it was never intended by the framers of the constitution that this clause should be so construed and applied as to malee it principally the buckler and shield of crime or so as to furnish an easy means of escape from deserved responsibility for criminal conduct.

1926In regard to the policy of this provision, in State v. Lloyd, 152 Wis. 24 , 139 N. W. 514 , Mr. Justice Timlin said: “The constitutional rights of the citizen secured to him by the provision in question should be carefully guarded, but it is safe to say that it was never intended by the framers of the constitution that this clause should be so construed and applied as to malee it principally the buckler and shield of crime or so as to furnish an easy means of escape from deserved responsibility for criminal conduct.