history rule in Louisiana

2005Citing Chevron Oil Company v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 , 92 S.Ct. 349 , 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971), the Lovell court listed three factors which should be considered in determining whether or not a decision should be given retroactive effect: (1) the decision to be applied nonretroactively must establish a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied, or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed; (2) the merits and demerits must be weighed in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question,

2005Citing Chevron Oil Company v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 , 92 S.Ct. 349 , 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971), the Lovell court listed three factors which should be considered in determining whether or not a decision should be given retroactive effect: (1) the decision to be applied nonretroactively must establish a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied, or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed; (2) the merits and demerits must be weighed in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question,

2005Succession of Clivens, 426 So.2d 585 (La.1982); Young, supra. In determining whether a decision should be given only prospective effect, this court in Young, supra, noted the following factors: (1) The decision established a new principle of law, either by overruling clear precedent on which litigants may have relied, or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed; (2) the merits must be weighed in each case by considering the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective application will further its operatio

2001Citing Lovell v. Lovell, 378 So.2d 418 (La.1979), the court explained the criteria which should be considered in determining whether a judicial decision should be made nonretroactive: (1) [T]he decision to be applied non-retroactively must establish a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied, or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed; (2) the merits and demerits must be weighed in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect and whether retrospe

1998BACKGROUND A long, well-settled line of jurisprudence charts the history of bar pilots in Louisiana. 2 As noted in Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Com’rs for Port of New Orleans, 330 U.S. 552 , 67 S.Ct. 910 , 91 L.Ed. 1093 (1947), “studies of the long history of pilotage reveal that it is a unique institution and must be judged as such.” Id. at 557 , 67 S.Ct. at 912-13 .

1998BACKGROUND A long, well-settled line of jurisprudence charts the history of bar pilots in Louisiana. 2 As noted in Kotch v. Board of River Port Pilot Com’rs for Port of New Orleans, 330 U.S. 552 , 67 S.Ct. 910 , 91 L.Ed. 1093 (1947), “studies of the long history of pilotage reveal that it is a unique institution and must be judged as such.” Id. at 557 , 67 S.Ct. at 912-13 .

1996(Supreme court gave limited retroactive effect to Succession of Brown, 388 So.2d 1151 (La.1980) which declared unconstitutional La.Civ.Code art. 919.); Lovell v. Lovell, 378 So.2d 418, 422 (La.1979) (supreme court did not give retroactive application to their decision which declared La.Civ.Code art. 160 unconstitutional.) The three factors to consider when determining whether a decision should be made nonretroactive are: (1) the decision to be applied nonretro-actively must establish a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied, or by dec

1995(Supreme court gave limited retroactive effect to Succession of Brown, 388 So.2d 1151 (La.1980) which declared unconstitutional La.Civ.Code art. 919.); Lovell v. Lovell, 378 So.2d 418, 422 (La.1979) (supreme court did not give retroactive *66 application to their decision which declared La.Civ.Code art. 160 unconstitutional.) The three factors to consider when determining whether a decision should be made nonretroactive are: (1) the decision to be applied nonretroactively must establish a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied, or by

1990Faucheaux v. Alton Ochsner Medical Foundation, 468 So.2d 720, 722 (La.App. 5th Cir.), rev'd on other grounds 470 So.2d 878 (La.1985).

1986The court should consider, however, three factors in making a determination of non-retroactivity: (1) the decision to be applied nonretroactively must establish a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied, or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed; (2) the merits and demerits must be weighed in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect and whether retrospective application will further or retard its operation; and (3) the inequity imposed by r

1968Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 , 87 S.Ct. 1967 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 , set forth criteria for resolving the question: " * * * (a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards. * * * ” Tt was pointed out in the dissent by Mr. Justice Harlan in Duncan v. Louisiana that beginning with Barron for use of Tiernan v. Mayor, etc., of City of Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243 , 8 L.Ed. 672 (1833): “ * * * every member of the Court fo

1968Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 , 87 S.Ct. 1967 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 , set forth criteria for resolving the question: " * * * (a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards. * * * ” Tt was pointed out in the dissent by Mr. Justice Harlan in Duncan v. Louisiana that beginning with Barron for use of Tiernan v. Mayor, etc., of City of Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243 , 8 L.Ed. 672 (1833): “ * * * every member of the Court fo

1968Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 , 87 S.Ct. 1967 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 , set forth criteria for resolving the question: " * * * (a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards. * * * ” Tt was pointed out in the dissent by Mr. Justice Harlan in Duncan v. Louisiana that beginning with Barron for use of Tiernan v. Mayor, etc., of City of Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243 , 8 L.Ed. 672 (1833): “ * * * every member of the Court fo

1968Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293 , 87 S.Ct. 1967 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 , set forth criteria for resolving the question: " * * * (a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards. * * * ” Tt was pointed out in the dissent by Mr. Justice Harlan in Duncan v. Louisiana that beginning with Barron for use of Tiernan v. Mayor, etc., of City of Baltimore, 7 Pet. 243 , 8 L.Ed. 672 (1833): “ * * * every member of the Court fo

2006In Felice v. Valleylab, Inc., 520 So.2d 920, 924 (La.App. 3 Cir.1987), writ denied, 522 So.2d 562 , 563 (La.1988), this court stated that in bifurcated cases where there are conflicting findings of fact, the manifest error standard does not apply and the "court of appeal must decide which decision is more reasonable after a careful examination of the record." We went on to state that findings of fault are factual findings and that when there is no conflict between the judge and jury (there can be different findings and still not be a conflict), these findings are reviewable under the clear err

1992Schewe, Obligations, 47 La.L.Rev. 377, 382 n. 39 (1986). [39] The three factors looked to in deciding whether a judicial decision should be given nonretroactive effect are as follows: "(1) the decision to be applied nonretroactively must establish a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied, or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed; (2) the merits and demerits must be weighed in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospec

1992Schewe, Obligations, 47 La.L.Rev. 377, 382 n. 39 (1986). [39] The three factors looked to in deciding whether a judicial decision should be given nonretroactive effect are as follows: "(1) the decision to be applied nonretroactively must establish a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied, or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed; (2) the merits and demerits must be weighed in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospec

1990See Lovell v. Lovell, 378 So.2d 418 (La.1979); Stafford v. Division of Admin., 407 So.2d 87 (La.App. 1st Cir.1981).

1982Chevron Oil Company v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 , 92 S.Ct. 349 , 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971)." However, Justice Rehnquist in Federated Department Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394 , 101 S.Ct. 2424 , 69 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981), stated that "the res judicata consequences of a final, unappealed judgment on the merits [are not] altered on a legal principle subsequently overruled in another case." Citing this as authority for its decision in Wilson v. Wilson, 667 F.2d 497 (5th Cir. 1982), the Fifth Circuit, when considering the res judicata effect of a prior judgment awarding a percentage of military retirement

1982Chevron Oil Company v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 , 92 S.Ct. 349 , 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971)." However, Justice Rehnquist in Federated Department Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394 , 101 S.Ct. 2424 , 69 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981), stated that "the res judicata consequences of a final, unappealed judgment on the merits [are not] altered on a legal principle subsequently overruled in another case." Citing this as authority for its decision in Wilson v. Wilson, 667 F.2d 497 (5th Cir. 1982), the Fifth Circuit, when considering the res judicata effect of a prior judgment awarding a percentage of military retirement

1982Chevron Oil Company v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 , 92 S.Ct. 349 , 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971)." However, Justice Rehnquist in Federated Department Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394 , 101 S.Ct. 2424 , 69 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981), stated that "the res judicata consequences of a final, unappealed judgment on the merits [are not] altered on a legal principle subsequently overruled in another case." Citing this as authority for its decision in Wilson v. Wilson, 667 F.2d 497 (5th Cir. 1982), the Fifth Circuit, when considering the res judicata effect of a prior judgment awarding a percentage of military retirement

1982Chevron Oil Company v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 , 92 S.Ct. 349 , 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971)." However, Justice Rehnquist in Federated Department Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394 , 101 S.Ct. 2424 , 69 L.Ed.2d 103 (1981), stated that "the res judicata consequences of a final, unappealed judgment on the merits [are not] altered on a legal principle subsequently overruled in another case." Citing this as authority for its decision in Wilson v. Wilson, 667 F.2d 497 (5th Cir. 1982), the Fifth Circuit, when considering the res judicata effect of a prior judgment awarding a percentage of military retirement

1981The Supreme Court of the United States in the Chevron Oil Company case took this second factor from Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 , 85 S.Ct. 1731 , 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965).

1981The Supreme Court of the United States in the Chevron Oil Company case took this second factor from Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618 , 85 S.Ct. 1731 , 14 L.Ed.2d 601 (1965).

1977And in Louisiana the history of the principle that it is error for the State's attorney to refer directly or indirectly to the failure of the accused to testify in his own defense is fully set forth in State v. Bentley, 219 La. 893 , 54 So.2d 137 (1951).

1977And in Louisiana the history of the principle that it is error for the State's attorney to refer directly or indirectly to the failure of the accused to testify in his own defense is fully set forth in State v. Bentley, 219 La. 893 , 54 So.2d 137 (1951).

1973The court reviewed the history of the privilege and, at page 646, summed it up as follows: "In the case of Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1 , 53 S.Ct. 465 , 77 L.Ed. 993 , the accused was adjudged guilty of criminal contempt of court in deliberately obstructing justice by giving answers knowingly misleading and false, in response to questions covering her qualifications as a juror.

1973The court reviewed the history of the privilege and, at page 646, summed it up as follows: "In the case of Clark v. United States, 289 U.S. 1 , 53 S.Ct. 465 , 77 L.Ed. 993 , the accused was adjudged guilty of criminal contempt of court in deliberately obstructing justice by giving answers knowingly misleading and false, in response to questions covering her qualifications as a juror.

1951In support of this view counsel call our attention to the fact that the commissioners who drafted this code stated, in their letter transmitting the draft to the then governor, it was their intention to eliminate “the law which forbids the district attorney and the judge to discuss and comment on the defendant’s failure to testify,” as well as the dicta in the case of State v. Davis, supra, that the expression in this letter, coupled with the history of the rule, furnishes “a logical argument for the contention that the rule does not exist in this state.” [ 214 La. 831 , 39 So.2d 81 .] The rul

1951In support of this view counsel call our attention to the fact that the commissioners who drafted this code stated, in their letter transmitting the draft to the then governor, it was their intention to eliminate "the law which forbids the district attorney and the judge to discuss and comment on the defendant's failure to testify," as well as the dicta in the case of State v. Davis, supra, that the expression in this letter, coupled with the history of the rule, furnishes "a logical argument for the contention that the rule does not exist in this state." [ 214 La. 831 , 39 So.2d 81 .] The rul

1934App. 628 , 140 So. 282 , this court traced the history of the rule that “the King can do no wrong” and the corollary thereof, “the sovereign may not be forced to submit to a suit.” We pointed out the injustice which might well result from the application of that rule under modern conditions, with the sovereign, both national and state, and subdivisions thereof, engaging in so many activities, but that the great weight of authority favored the application of that doctrine.