history rule in Connecticut

2016A defendant who fails to challenge the admissibility of the defendant's confession at trial is not entitled to raise the corroboration rule on appeal because (1) the evidentiary claim is not of constitutional magnitude and, thus, cannot meet Golding 's 9 second prong; see State v. Uretek, Inc. [ 207 Conn. 706 , 713, 543 A.2d 709 (1988) ] ; and (2) the rule does not implicate the sufficiency of the state's evidence." State v. Leniart , supra, at 168 , 140 A.3d 1026 .

1999Washington v. Garrett , 10 F.3d 1421 CT Page 8702 (CA 9, 1993); invidious comments or disparaging ethnic, racial, gender or other discriminatory remarks by decision makers, Lopez v. S.B.

1998In modifying our constancy of accusation doctrine in State v. Troupe, 237 Conn. 284 , 677 A.2d 917 (1996), to limit such evidence to the fact and the timing of the complaint; see footnote 9 of this opinion; we reviewed the history of the doctrine, “which traces its roots to the ‘fresh complaint’ rule.” Id., 294 .

1998In modifying our constancy of accusation doctrine in State v. Troupe, 237 Conn. 284 , 677 A.2d 917 (1996), to limit such evidence to the fact and the timing of the complaint; see footnote 9 of this opinion; we reviewed the history of the doctrine, “which traces its roots to the ‘fresh complaint’ rule.” Id., 294 .

1997Id., citing Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 , 92 S.Ct. 349 , 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971). 2 First, the decision to be applied nonretroactively must establish a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied, or by deciding an issue of first impression; second, the court must weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the history of the rule, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation; third, the court must weigh the inequity imposed by retroactive application to avoid "substa

1997Id., citing Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97 , 92 S.Ct. 349 , 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971). 2 First, the decision to be applied nonretroactively must establish a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied, or by deciding an issue of first impression; second, the court must weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the history of the rule, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation; third, the court must weigh the inequity imposed by retroactive application to avoid "substa

1993As noted above, this court first applied it, in Wolcott v. Coleman, supra, to preclude appellate consideration of the defendant’s claims of error following a general verdict for the plaintiff on a multicount complaint of the plaintiff.

1993Our courts have recognized and approved the principle of inchoate offenses when pleaded in conjunction with predicate crimes for something in excess of one hundred twenty-five (125) years and have declared that a person is guilty of an attempt to commit a crime if that person performs an act with the intent to commit the crime, and that act is adapted to the perpetration of the crime, regardless of whether the person's purpose fails "by reason of interruption . . . or for other extrinsic cause." State v. Wilson, 30 Conn. 500 , CT Page 2815 506.

1985Second, it has been stressed that‘we must . . . weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation.’ Linkletter v. Walker, [ 381 U.S. 618, 629 , 85 S. Ct. 1731 , 14 L.

1985Second, it has been stressed that‘we must . . . weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation.’ Linkletter v. Walker, [ 381 U.S. 618, 629 , 85 S. Ct. 1731 , 14 L.

1979As authority for this proposition, the plaintiffs cited the case of Stiles v. Town Council, 159 Conn. 212 , 268 A.2d 395 (1970), where this court had held (p. 221) that “a change of zone which is dependent for its proper functioning on action by other agencies and over which the zoning commission has no control cannot be sustained unless . . . the necessary action appears to be a probability.” After examining closely the history of the rule enunciated in Stiles and relied on by the plaintiff, this court in Lurie , speaking through House, J., concluded (p. 307) that the strict application of th

1979As authority for this proposition, the plaintiffs cited the case of Stiles v. Town Council, 159 Conn. 212 , 268 A.2d 395 (1970), where this court had held (p. 221) that “a change of zone which is dependent for its proper functioning on action by other agencies and over which the zoning commission has no control cannot be sustained unless . . . the necessary action appears to be a probability.” After examining closely the history of the rule enunciated in Stiles and relied on by the plaintiff, this court in Lurie , speaking through House, J., concluded (p. 307) that the strict application of th

1968The history of the rule-making power of the court is amply set forth by Chief Justice Maltbie in In re Appeal of Dattilo, 136 Conn. 488, 492 .