history rule in District of Columbia

1991Second, it has been stressed that “we must ... weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation.” Finally, we have weighed the inequity imposed by retroactive application, for “[wjhere a decision of this Court could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis in our cases for avoiding the ‘injustice and hardship’ by a holding of nonretroactivity.” Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07 , 92 S.Ct. 34

1991Second, it has been stressed that “we must ... weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation.” Finally, we have weighed the inequity imposed by retroactive application, for “[wjhere a decision of this Court could produce substantial inequitable results if applied retroactively, there is ample basis in our cases for avoiding the ‘injustice and hardship’ by a holding of nonretroactivity.” Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07 , 92 S.Ct. 34

2003Co., 64 Wash.App. 838 , 827 P.2d 1024 (1992) (surveying the history of the clause).

2003Co., 64 Wash.App. 838 , 827 P.2d 1024 (1992) (surveying the history of the clause).

1991In District of Columbia v. White, supra, 442 A.2d 159 , the court was not presented with a question involving the effect of failing to request a special verdict, and this court has not announced a rule on special verdicts.

1991In District of Columbia v. White, supra, 442 A.2d 159 , the court was not presented with a question involving the effect of failing to request a special verdict, and this court has not announced a rule on special verdicts.

1988Notably, Griffith and its predecessors “did not address the area of civil retroactivity,” id. at 713 n. 8, which continues to be governed by the standard announced in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07 , 92 S.Ct. 349, 355 , 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971) (retroactivity determined after considering whether a new principle of law has been established, the prior history of the rule in question, and whether substantial inequitable results would be produced). 2 Applying Chevron, I would conclude that James is not retroactive. 3 Indeed, as I point out above, our reversal in James flowed from our c

1988Notably, Griffith and its predecessors "did not address the area of civil retroactivity," id. at 713 n. 8, which continues to be governed by the standard announced in Chevron Oil Co. v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07 , 92 S.Ct. 349, 355 , 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971) (retroactivity determined after considering whether a new principle of law has been established, the prior history of the rule in question, and whether substantial inequitable results would be produced). [2] Applying Chevron, I would conclude that James is not retroactive. [3] Indeed, as I point out above, our reversal in James flowed from o

1984E.g., Chevron Oil v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07 , 92 S.Ct. 349, 355-56 , 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971) (civil); Halliday v. United States, 394 U.S. 831, 832 , 89 S.Ct. 1498, 1498-99 , 23 L.Ed.2d 16 (1969) (per curiam) (criminal); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 , 87 S.Ct. 1967, 1970 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967) (criminal); Linkletter, supra, 381 U.S. at 629 , 85 S.Ct. at 1737 (criminal).

1984E.g., Chevron Oil v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07 , 92 S.Ct. 349, 355-56 , 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971) (civil); Halliday v. United States, 394 U.S. 831, 832 , 89 S.Ct. 1498, 1498-99 , 23 L.Ed.2d 16 (1969) (per curiam) (criminal); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 , 87 S.Ct. 1967, 1970 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967) (criminal); Linkletter, supra, 381 U.S. at 629 , 85 S.Ct. at 1737 (criminal).

1984E.g., Chevron Oil v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07 , 92 S.Ct. 349, 355-56 , 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971) (civil); Halliday v. United States, 394 U.S. 831, 832 , 89 S.Ct. 1498, 1498-99 , 23 L.Ed.2d 16 (1969) (per curiam) (criminal); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 , 87 S.Ct. 1967, 1970 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967) (criminal); Linkletter, supra, 381 U.S. at 629 , 85 S.Ct. at 1737 (criminal).

1984E.g., Chevron Oil v. Huson, 404 U.S. 97, 106-07 , 92 S.Ct. 349, 355-56 , 30 L.Ed.2d 296 (1971) (civil); Halliday v. United States, 394 U.S. 831, 832 , 89 S.Ct. 1498, 1498-99 , 23 L.Ed.2d 16 (1969) (per curiam) (criminal); Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 297 , 87 S.Ct. 1967, 1970 , 18 L.Ed.2d 1199 (1967) (criminal); Linkletter, supra, 381 U.S. at 629 , 85 S.Ct. at 1737 (criminal).

1984But if there is such a clear break, the courts may opt for prospectivity, see id., depending on the history of the rule in question, the purpose of the change, the extent of reliance on the old rule, and the effect retrospective or prospective application will have on the administration of justice.

1984But if there is such a clear break, the courts may opt for prospectivity, see id., depending on the history of the rule in question, the purpose of the change, the extent of reliance on the old rule, and the effect retrospective or prospective application will have on the administration of justice.

1946The doctrine developed to the extent that the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Ray v. City of New York, 108 F.2d 170 , stated that under the New York rule, with the possible exception of a “trap,” “one test of what is not too inconsequential to be the basis of actionable negligence seems to be whether or not the hole is more than five inches deep.” Whether the “rather arbitrary rule of depth” is 5 inches, as stated by the Second Circuit; or 4 inches, as indicated in Carson v. City of New York, 267 App.Div. 993 , 48 N.Y.S.2d 265 ; or merely “pretty deep,” to use the language of Keener v. Tilt

1946The doctrine developed to the extent that the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Ray v. City of New York, 108 F.2d 170 , stated that under the New York rule, with the possible exception of a “trap,” “one test of what is not too inconsequential to be the basis of actionable negligence seems to be whether or not the hole is more than five inches deep.” Whether the “rather arbitrary rule of depth” is 5 inches, as stated by the Second Circuit; or 4 inches, as indicated in Carson v. City of New York, 267 App.Div. 993 , 48 N.Y.S.2d 265 ; or merely “pretty deep,” to use the language of Keener v. Tilt

1946The doctrine developed to the extent that the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Ray v. City of New York, 108 F.2d 170 , stated that under the New York rule, with the possible exception of a “trap,” “one test of what is not too inconsequential to be the basis of actionable negligence seems to be whether or not the hole is more than five inches deep.” Whether the “rather arbitrary rule of depth” is 5 inches, as stated by the Second Circuit; or 4 inches, as indicated in Carson v. City of New York, 267 App.Div. 993 , 48 N.Y.S.2d 265 ; or merely “pretty deep,” to use the language of Keener v. Tilt

1946The doctrine developed to the extent that the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Ray v. City of New York, 108 F.2d 170 , stated that under the New York rule, with the possible exception of a “trap,” “one test of what is not too inconsequential to be the basis of actionable negligence seems to be whether or not the hole is more than five inches deep.” Whether the “rather arbitrary rule of depth” is 5 inches, as stated by the Second Circuit; or 4 inches, as indicated in Carson v. City of New York, 267 App.Div. 993 , 48 N.Y.S.2d 265 ; or merely “pretty deep,” to use the language of Keener v. Tilt

1946The doctrine developed to the extent that the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Ray v. City of New York, 108 F.2d 170 , stated that under the New York rule, with the possible exception of a “trap,” “one test of what is not too inconsequential to be the basis of actionable negligence seems to be whether or not the hole is more than five inches deep.” Whether the “rather arbitrary rule of depth” is 5 inches, as stated by the Second Circuit; or 4 inches, as indicated in Carson v. City of New York, 267 App.Div. 993 , 48 N.Y.S.2d 265 ; or merely “pretty deep,” to use the language of Keener v. Tilt