history rule in Texas

2015In Chevron, the Supreme Court articulated a three-part analysis for deciding whether to give a holding only prospective relief:  First, the decision to be applied nonretroactively must establish a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on which litigants may have relied, or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed.  Second, [the court] must . . . weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or re

2015First, the decision to be applied nonretroactively must establish a new principle of law, either by overruling clear past precedent on. ■ ‘ which litigants may have relied, or by deciding an issue of first impression whose resolution was not clearly foreshadowed. — Second, [the court] must ... weigh the merits and demerits in each case by looking to the prior history of the rule in question, its purpose and effect, and whether retrospective operation will further or retard its operation. — Finally, [the court must] weig[h] the inequity imposed by retroactive application, for where a decision o

2005Id., 541 U.S. at 36-50 , 124 S.Ct. at 1354-63 .

2004The Crawford Standard While appellant’s case was pending before this Court, the Supreme Court replaced the Roberts test with a new test, set out in Crawford v. Washington, — U.S. -, 124 S.Ct. 1354 , — L.Ed.2d - (2004). 3 Crawford relates the history of the principle of confrontation from ancient Roman times through eighteenth century Europe, and from the early colonial period in America through the adoption of the Sixth Amendment and early cases decided under it.

2015We adopted the Chevron test in Edgewood III and elected to apply our decision in that case declaring the State’s public school finance system unconstitutional prospectively only. 826 S.W.2d at 521 .

2015We adopted the Chevron test in Edgewood III and elected to apply our decision in that case declaring the State’s public school finance system unconstitutional prospectively only. 826 S.W.2d at 521 .

2009Id. at 16 .

2009Id. at 16 .

1989In Stovall v. Denno, supra, the Court subsequently distilled from the language of Linkletter a three-pronged test, inquiring into “(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards.” 388 U.S. at 297 , 87 S.Ct. at 1970 , 18 L.Ed.2d at 1203 .

1989In Stovall v. Denno, supra, the Court subsequently distilled from the language of Linkletter a three-pronged test, inquiring into “(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the reliance by law enforcement authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the administration of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards.” 388 U.S. at 297 , 87 S.Ct. at 1970 , 18 L.Ed.2d at 1203 .

1980The history of the doctrine of strict liability in tort indicates that it was designed, not to undermine the warranty provisions of the sales act of the Uniform Commercial Code but, rather, to govern the distinct problem of physical injuries. 45 Cal.Rptr. at 21 , 403 P.2d at 149 .

1980The history of the doctrine of strict liability in tort indicates that it was designed, not to undermine the warranty provisions of the sales act of the Uniform Commercial Code but, rather, to govern the distinct problem of physical injuries. 45 Cal.Rptr. at 21 , 403 P.2d at 149 .

2016Hill’s authority thus does not take into consideration the unique “evidentiary problems”8 in many 8 See Belcher, 474 S.W.3d at 845 . 8 prosecutions for sexual assault of children or the history and analysis presented in Belcher.

2015In any event, L.Ed.2d 1225 (1957); In re John Lakis, Inc., the history of the privilege itself contains 228 F.Supp. 918 (S.D.N.Y., 1964); In re its own condemnation of a procedure in Mutual Security Savings & Loan Ass'n, 214 camera." Id. at 629.

2015Id. at 608 .

2014Howard v. State, 941 S.W.2d 102, 117 (Tex.Crim.App.1996) (citation omitted), overruled on other grounds by Easley v. State, 424 S.W.3d 535 (Tex.Crim.App.2014). .

2012A part of that review included a *540 discussion of Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. DeLanney, 809 S.W.2d 493 (Tex.1991).

2011Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-80 , 58 S.Ct. 817 , 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938). [13] See Dixon, 509 U.S., at 703-712 , 113 S.Ct. 2849 . [14] Ashe, 397 U.S. at 445 , 90 S.Ct. 1189 . [15] United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85, 85 , 37 S.Ct. 68 , 61 L.Ed. 161 (1916). [16] Id., at 87 , 37 S.Ct. 68 (accepting the prosecution's assertion that the case was one where "the defendant never has been in jeopardy in the sense of being before a jury upon the facts of the offense charged"). [17] Id., at 87-88 , 37 S.Ct. 68 ("The safeguard provided by the Constitution against the gravest abuses has tended to g

2011Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-80 , 58 S.Ct. 817 , 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938). [13] See Dixon, 509 U.S., at 703-712 , 113 S.Ct. 2849 . [14] Ashe, 397 U.S. at 445 , 90 S.Ct. 1189 . [15] United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85, 85 , 37 S.Ct. 68 , 61 L.Ed. 161 (1916). [16] Id., at 87 , 37 S.Ct. 68 (accepting the prosecution's assertion that the case was one where "the defendant never has been in jeopardy in the sense of being before a jury upon the facts of the offense charged"). [17] Id., at 87-88 , 37 S.Ct. 68 ("The safeguard provided by the Constitution against the gravest abuses has tended to g

2011Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-80 , 58 S.Ct. 817 , 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938). [13] See Dixon, 509 U.S., at 703-712 , 113 S.Ct. 2849 . [14] Ashe, 397 U.S. at 445 , 90 S.Ct. 1189 . [15] United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85, 85 , 37 S.Ct. 68 , 61 L.Ed. 161 (1916). [16] Id., at 87 , 37 S.Ct. 68 (accepting the prosecution's assertion that the case was one where "the defendant never has been in jeopardy in the sense of being before a jury upon the facts of the offense charged"). [17] Id., at 87-88 , 37 S.Ct. 68 ("The safeguard provided by the Constitution against the gravest abuses has tended to g

2011Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 78-80 , 58 S.Ct. 817 , 82 L.Ed. 1188 (1938). [13] See Dixon, 509 U.S., at 703-712 , 113 S.Ct. 2849 . [14] Ashe, 397 U.S. at 445 , 90 S.Ct. 1189 . [15] United States v. Oppenheimer, 242 U.S. 85, 85 , 37 S.Ct. 68 , 61 L.Ed. 161 (1916). [16] Id., at 87 , 37 S.Ct. 68 (accepting the prosecution's assertion that the case was one where "the defendant never has been in jeopardy in the sense of being before a jury upon the facts of the offense charged"). [17] Id., at 87-88 , 37 S.Ct. 68 ("The safeguard provided by the Constitution against the gravest abuses has tended to g

2011Because appellant relies on Hardesty v. State as support for this statement, we understand appellant to assert the same argument made by the appellant in Hardesty , i.e., that there is “insufficient evidence to support the presumption of guilt arising from appellant’s recent and unexplained possession of stolen property.” 656 S.W.2d 73 , 75–76 (Tex. Crim.

1989The purpose of federal statutes which limit the right of states to tax federal obligations held by banks is “to prevent taxes which dimmish in the slightest degree the market value or the investment attractiveness of obligations issued by the United States in order to secure necessary credit.” Smith v. Davis, 323 U.S. 111, 117 , 65 S.Ct. 157, 160 , 89 L.Ed. 107 (1944).

1989The purpose of federal statutes which limit the right of states to tax federal obligations held by banks is “to prevent taxes which dimmish in the slightest degree the market value or the investment attractiveness of obligations issued by the United States in order to secure necessary credit.” Smith v. Davis, 323 U.S. 111, 117 , 65 S.Ct. 157, 160 , 89 L.Ed. 107 (1944).

1986See also Bell v. State, 582 S.W.2d 800 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); Hitt v. State, 548 S.W.2d 732 (Tex.Cr.App. 1977); Clinard v. State, 548 S.W.2d 716 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); and Dudley v. State, 548 S.W.2d 706 (Tex.Cr.App.1977).

1986See also Bell v. State, 582 S.W.2d 800 (Tex.Cr.App.1979); Hitt v. State, 548 S.W.2d 732 (Tex.Cr.App. 1977); Clinard v. State, 548 S.W.2d 716 (Tex.Cr.App.1977); and Dudley v. State, 548 S.W.2d 706 (Tex.Cr.App.1977).